Opinion
Civil Action No. 01A-04-002
Date Submitted: July 18, 2001
Date Decided: October 18, 2001
Sean A. Dolan, Esquire, Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Coleman Goggin
Gina L. Mifflin
Dear Ms. Mifflin and Mr. Dolan:
Pro se claimant Gina L. Mifflin ("Claimant") appealed a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") dated April 21, 2001. The Board denied Claimant's request for unemployment benefits. The Board found that Claimant voluntarily resigned from her employment with The Polo Factory Store ("Employer").
Claimant's reasons were personal as she wanted to care for her mother. The Board's decision is affirmed.
FACTS
Claimant was a Group Manager at the store from September 1995 until December 15, 2000. This was a full time position with a $23,000 annual salary.
Claimant quit this employment because her mother was ill with dementia, an illness requiring 24-hour care. Claimant was the only person capable of providing her mother with complete care. Before December 15, 2000, Claimant's mother was hospitalized and doctors and relatives routinely called Claimant at work. Claimant informed the general manager of the store that she faced an emergency. The employer knew Claimant left her job given her mother's illness. The record contained the following letter dated December 5, 2000:
Although Claimant argues she did not "quit," the Board found she did and, as discussed below, the evidence supports that finding.
As per conversation on [November 28, 2000] I am writing this letter as to why I need time off. As I explained my mother is in the hospital in [Pennsylvania] she is very ill. She will be discharged in a couple of weeks. My mother will need 24 hour care. And I am the only one in the family that can take care of her at this point. This is not by choice it is an emergency.
Claimant stated she was not offered leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("Family Medical Leave"). The general manager told her to write a letter regarding her situation. However, Claimant did not submit this letter or ask for leave because the general manager told her they would discuss her situation together. The general manager never contacted Claimant. At a subsequent hearing, the general manager testified that Family Medical Leave was included in the employee handbook but was not offered.
On December 15, 2000, a claim for unemployment insurance benefits was filed.
On January 25, 2001, the Claims Deputy found that Claimant voluntarily resigned from her employment without good cause. Claimant appealed the Claims Deputy's decision to the Appeals Referee, and a hearing was held on February 20, 2001.
On February 22, 2001, the Appeals Referee found that Claimant's mother was ill with dementia and, when she was released from the hospital, Claimant moved her mother into her home. Claimant intended to provide the 24-hour care needed by her mother, and Claimant had to leave work.
The Appeals Referee concluded that the motivating reason for Claimant's leaving her employment was personal to the Claimant and barred the receipt of unemployment benefits. Providing for her sick mother was not a reason for leaving that was inherent in the work or connected with the job itself, such as, a substantial reduction in hours, wages, or a deviation in the working conditions. Instead, her mother's home care was a reason personal to Claimant and, consequently, Claimant lacked "good cause" to leave her job to permit unemployment benefits. The decision of the Claims Deputy was affirmed.
Thereafter, Claimant appealed the decision of the Appeals Referee to the Board on February 25, 2001. The Board's written decision dated April 12, 2001, affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee denying Claimant unemployment benefits. The Board considered evidence presented to the Appeals Referee as well as before it. Its Summary of Evidence related:
Claimant was sworn and testified that she was needed to take care of her mother who was ill, and this interfered with the hours she needed to work for her job. Before being discharged, claimant tried to do some work for employer from home. Claimant stated she was not offered Family Medical Leave (FMLA) although her manager told her to write a letter regarding her situation. She did not submit this letter because the manager did not contact her to discuss it.
Kristin Mitchell was sworn and testified that Employer stands upon the Referee's record. Mitchell stated that FMLA was not discussed with claimant.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Board determined:
The Appeals Referee found that [C]laimant voluntarily terminated her employment for personal reasons, to take care of her mother. A three-member quorum of the [B]oard considered the Referee's decision and record as well as the testimony presented at the Board hearing of March 28, 2001. Following deliberations, two members of the Board, a majority of the quorum, voted to affirm the Referee, finding that [C]laimant had quit her employment for personal reasons. One Board member, Mr. Engle, dissented, finding that [C]laimant's rights were violated in that she should have been counseled on and offered Family Medical Leave by the employer.
This timely appeal was filed on April 16, 2001.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decisions. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-7 (1965); General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Indus. v. Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297, app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 19 Del. C. § 3323(a).
Claimant discusses matters that are outside the record below. As an appeal is limited to our record, I cannot consider them. Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Supr. 352 A.2d 761, 763 (1976).
DISCUSSION
Claimant has raised an issue regarding the granting of a continuance of the initial hearing. Since she did not raise that issue below, the Court cannot consider it on appeal. Delstar Indus., Inc. v. Delaware Dep't of Labor, Div. of Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-04-001, Quillen, J. (Jan. 8, 1997).
In her brief, Claimant stated, ". . . .[N]o one could have taken the time to discuss with me a plan or a policy to accommodate me. Such as short term disability, FMLA or time off. Nothing was offered or discussed." In the hearings below, Claimant testified that she voluntarily left her employment because she was faced with an emergency situation and thought that was the best thing to do. As indicated, the employer knew Claimant's mother was ill. Claimant needed to take care of her. Although Family Medical Leave was not discussed, Claimant did not submit a letter as requested on this subject.
It is unnecessary to remand the case for further factual determinations on whether Claimant qualified for Family Medical Leave. Claimant is seeking unemployment compensation. The Family Medical Leave Act provides an eligible employee from a qualifying work site with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for various reasons, including the care of an immediate family member. It further entitles the employee to the restoration of her original job or an equivalent upon return from Family Medical Leave. See 29 U.S.C.S. 2612. Here, Claimant neither sought unpaid leave nor restoration to her original job. Moreover, if Claimant had obtained Family Medical Leave she would not receive unemployment compensation because she would be employed.
The Court notes that while the Claimant's mother's condition would likely qualify as a "serious health condition" entitling her to leave under FMLA, the Claimant has not indicated that she would be able to return to work after the 12 week period expired. Failure to return to work upon the expiration of the 12 week period would have exposed the Claimant to termination by her employer. See Baker v. SPL Polyols, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. 97A-03-021, Carpenter, J. (Jan. 7, 1998) (noting that "[n]either this Court, nor the laws of this State, can require more of an employer than to hold a job for an employee for 12 weeks").
Claimant conceded that she made a personal decision to leave her employment to care for her ill mother. This Court's review is limited. Is there evidence before the Board to support its decision that Claimant is disqualified from unemployment benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause? Is the Board's decision legally correct?
19 Del. C. § 3315(1) states in pertinent part that "an individual shall be disqualified for benefits for the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." When a claimant voluntarily quits employment, the burden falls upon that claimant to establish good cause for leaving and, thus, her eligibility for unemployment compensation. White v. Security Link, Del. Super., 658 A.2d 619 (1994). Good cause to leave employment "must be such cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed" and must be for reasons connected with the employment. Id. at 622. The burden of proving "good cause" for voluntarily leaving employment and, therefore, a right to unemployment compensation falls on the claimant. Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (1971).
While this is a difficult decision in light of the trying family circumstances involved, sympathy cannot influence it. As another Superior Court Judge similarly noted, "The situation is unfortunate. There are times when people must quit work if they are to attend to pressing personal matters. But the Court must determine eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits based on statutory standards. Good cause to voluntarily terminate under the statute must be attributable to the job." Ayala v. Delaware Racing Ass'n, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-07-009, Quillen, J. (Feb. 26, 1996). In this vein, public policy underlying Unemployment Compensation Law is to eliminate economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co. v. Dale, Del. Supr., 271 A.2d 35, 36 (1970).
Claimant presented no evidence that she left work for good cause connected with employment based grounds. To the contrary, she voluntarily left the workplace for a personal reason, to care for her sick mother. Substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that Claimant voluntarily quit, Claimant failed to carry her burden to show good cause, and correct legal standards were applied in denying unemployment compensation.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing, the Board's decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.