Opinion
C. A. PC-2022-04394
03-28-2023
DOMINIQUA NEWKIRK, Plaintiff, v. PEZZELLI NURSING HOME, INC. d/b/a GOLDEN CREST NURSING CENTRE and PAUL PEZZELLI Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Vicki J. Bejma, Esq. For Defendant: Michael D. Chittick, Esq., Brendan F. Ryan, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Vicki J. Bejma, Esq.
For Defendant: Michael D. Chittick, Esq., Brendan F. Ryan, Esq.
DECISION
McHUGH, J.
Before this Court for decision is Defendants Paul Pezzelli (Mr. Pezzelli) and Pezzelli Nursing Home, Inc. d/b/a Golden Crest Nursing Centre's (Golden Crest) Motion to Dismiss Paul Pezzelli as to All Counts and Both Defendants as to Count VIII (Mot. to Dismiss)),to which Plaintiff Dominiqua Newkirk (Plaintiff) objects. (Docket.) Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-14, 28-5-1, 28-48-1, 28-50-1, and 42-112-1.
Collectively, Defendants Golden Crest and Mr. Pezzelli will be referred to as Defendants throughout this Decision.
I
Facts and Travel
Plaintiff was employed by Golden Crest from 2013 to 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 56.) Mr. Pezzelli is the administrator of Golden Crest and President of Pezzelli Nursing Home, Inc. Id. ¶ 2.
Plaintiff-an African American female-alleges that during her employment with Golden Crest, "Pezzelli treated African-American employees differently than white employees." Id. ¶¶ 45. While the details of the alleged discrimination are irrelevant for purposes of deciding the present motion, it should be noted that Plaintiff describes at length actions taken by Mr. Pezzelli-who supervised Plaintiff-that led her to this conclusion. See generally id. ¶¶ 6-43.
On March 6, 2021, while employed at Golden Crest, Plaintiff "went to an urgent care for chest and back pains, and was advised to take three days out of work, then follow up with her primary care doctor." Id. ¶ 44. Thereafter, at the direction of her primary care physician, Plaintiff took medical leave for one month and "promptly submitted her leave documentation to Golden Crest" before taking said leave. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. During her medical leave, Plaintiff learned that Mr. Pezzelli was telling co-workers that Plaintiff would not be coming back to work. Id. ¶ 47. "Plaintiff attempted to contact Pezzelli, but never got an answer." Id. ¶ 48. In addition, "Defendants posted Plaintiff's position online on or about March 21, 2021." Id. ¶ 49.
"On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff's physician cleared her to return to work on June 5, 2021, and provided a note reflecting that." Id. ¶ 52. Aware of the need to receive permission to return to work, Plaintiff "immediately delivered her doctor's note clearing her return to work on June 5, 2021." Id. ¶ 54. "Plaintiff made several attempts to call management regarding her clearance to return to work[,]" but Plaintiff received a letter from Golden Crest on June 8, 2021, informing her that she was terminated "purportedly for having used all of her FMLA time as of June 8, 2021[.]" Id. ¶¶ 55-56. Plaintiff submits that she "was terminated at the behest of Pezzelli." Id. ¶ 57.
On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the present action, alleging various state employment law discrimination claims against Defendants. Docket; see generally Compl. ¶¶ 58-120.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Golden Crest violated the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA), the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act (RIPFMLA), the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), and the Whistleblowers' Protection Act. Id. ¶¶ 58-112. Plaintiff also avers that Mr. Pezzelli, in his individual capacity, is liable for violations under RIPFMLA and RICRA. Id. ¶¶ 58-75, 107-112. In addition, Plaintiff asserts Mr. Pezzelli is liable for "tortious interference with contract and economic advantage." Id. ¶¶ 113-120.
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss with an accompanying memorandum on August 29, 2022. (Docket.) Plaintiff filed her Objection and a memorandum of law in support thereof on September 27, 2022. Id. Thereafter, Defendants filed a reply brief on October 7, 2022. Id. Following oral argument regarding the Motion to Dismiss heard on December 6, 2022, this Court now renders its Decision.
II
Standard of Review
'"The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint."' EDC Investment, LLC v. UTGR, Inc., 275 A.3d 537, 542 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 176 A.3d 472, 476 (R.I. 2018)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial justice is "confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff's favor." Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 278 (R.I. 2011). "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 'does not deal with the likelihood of success on the merits, but rather with the viability of a plaintiff's bare-bones allegations and claims as they are set forth in the complaint.'" Ferreira v. Child and Family Services, 222 A.3d 69, 75 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 824 (R.I. 2005)). "'A motion to dismiss may be granted only when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of conceivable facts that could be proven in support of its claim.'" Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Tri-Town Construction Co. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC, 139 A.3d 467, 478 (R.I. 2016)).
III
Analysis A
Counts III, IV, and VI: RIFEPA Claims
Defendants argue that Counts III, IV, and VI (the RIFEPA claims) should be dismissed as against Mr. Pezzelli because (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not including Mr. Pezzelli as a respondent in the related proceedings before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, and (2) the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159 (R.I. 2017) clearly precludes a finding of individual liability against Mr. Pezzelli under the RIFEPA. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Defs.' Mem.) 4-5; see also id. at 5 (citing and relying on Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165). However, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, the Complaint clearly limits Counts III, IV, and VI-or the RIFEPA claims-to Golden Crest alone. See Compl. ¶¶ 76-91, 100-106; Mem. in Supp. of Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss (Pl.'s Mem.) 3-5. Ostensibly, those claims are solely directed at Golden Crest because the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Mancini explicitly precludes individual liability claims under RIFEPA. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165 ("It is our view that, if the General Assembly intended to authorize the imposition of individual liability, it would have done so by using language far clearer than that employed in § 28-5-7(6).")
Therefore, although Defendants argue for dismissal of Counts III, IV, and VI with respect to Mr. Pezzelli, the Court need not reach a decision on those requests because Plaintiff concedes that its RIFEPA claims do not seek to impose liability on Mr. Pezzelli under RIFEPA. See Pl.'s Mem. at 3-5; see also Compl. ¶¶ 76-91, 100-106.
B
Count V: Whistleblower Claim
Next, Defendants argue that any claim against Mr. Pezzelli for violation of Rhode Island's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (the RIWPA)-i.e., Count V-should be dismissed because the RIWPA does not allow for individual liability against supervisors for employment discrimination. (Defs.' Mem. 9-11.)
Here, the Complaint makes clear that Count V alleges violations of the RIWPA against Golden Crest and does not implicate Mr. Pezzelli in his individual capacity. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 99 ("Said actions of Defendant Golden Crest were wicked and wanton .... Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant Golden Crest[.]"). Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that the RIWPA limits liability to "employers" and does not allow for individual liability. See Pl.'s Mem. at 4-5; §§ 28-50-2 to 28-50-3.
Accordingly, there is no basis for dismissal of claims under Count V-as argued by Defendants-because Mr. Pezzelli is not an individual defendant with respect to Count V. See Compl. ¶¶ 92-99.
C
Counts II and VII: Individual Liability Under RICRA
Plaintiff's claims under Counts II and VII-alleging violation of RICRA-are asserted against both Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 67-75, 107-112.) With respect to these Counts, the sole issue for purposes of the instant Motion to Dismiss is whether, under RICRA, Mr. Pezzelli can be held individually liable for employment discrimination he allegedly committed in his capacity as Plaintiff's supervisor. See Defs.' Mem. at 5-8; Pl.'s Mem. at 7-11; see also generally Compl. ¶¶ 4-57 (containing Plaintiff's allegations of disparate treatment).
On that issue, Defendants contend that "[i]nterpreting the Rhode Island employment discrimination statutes, including RIFEPA and RICRA, consistently with Title VII, there is no individual liability under either RIFEPA or RICRA." (Defs.' Mem. 6.) Further, Defendants submit that pursuant to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Horn v. Southern Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007), RIFEPA and RICRA must be read in relation to each other to harmonize the two statutory schemes. See Defs.' Mem. at 5-8 (citing and quoting Horn, 927 A.2d at 295-96). Defendants submit that the harmonization of these statutory schemes means that the inability to pursue individual liability under RIFEPA should apply with equal force to RICRA. See id. Therefore, Defendants conclude that Plaintiff's claim against Mr. Pezzelli for violation of RICRA should be dismissed as a matter of law. Id. at 7-8.
In response, Plaintiff asserts that individual supervisors are subject to liability under RICRA because RICRA is broader than RIFEPA, and as such, the holding in Mancini should not be interpreted to prohibit RICRA claims against individual supervisors. See Pl.'s Mem. at 7-9. In support of that contention, Plaintiff details the contextual and legislative history underlying RICRA and explains that RICRA "does not limit itself to discrimination against employers, but anyone whose discriminatory animus interferes with a right to employment." Id. at 10-11.
1
Horn, Mancini, and Fantini
In Horn, our Supreme Court directly addressed the relationship between RICRA and RIFEPA, providing key guidance for determining whether the holding in Mancini should be applied to RICRA. Horn, 927 A.2d at 295. There, the Court was tasked with deciding whether it would be appropriate to "engraft[ ]" the one-year statute of limitations contained in RIFEPA onto RICRA. Id.
In Horn, the Court held that "[s]ince both the [RI]FEPA and the RICRA expressly deal with the subject of employment discrimination, in our view it is entirely appropriate to read the two statutes as being in pari materia-i.e. as necessitating that they 'be read in relation to each other.'" Id. at 294-95. Our Supreme Court also stated that where statutory provisions are in pari materia, Rhode Island courts are to '"construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope."' Id. at 295 (quoting State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 666 (R.I. 2004)). The Horn Court added that "[t]his is true even when 'the statutes in question contain no reference to each other and are passed at different times.'" Id. (quoting State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I. 1981)). Accordingly, the Horn Court held that because every effort must be made to harmonize the two statutes, the statute of limitations contained in RIFEPA should be grafted onto RICRA. Id.
In addition, the Horn Court also explained its concern about applying different statute of limitations periods to RIFEPA and RICRA:
"It is also worth noting that, if we were to accept plaintiff's contention that the three-year residual statute of limitations applies to claims brought under the RICRA, rather than harmonizing the two statutes, we would in effect be rendering meaningless the one-year statute of limitations contained in the FEPA by allowing plaintiffs an end run around the limitations provision of the latter
statute. Such a reading of the RICRA would be inconsistent with the principle that 'repeals by implication are not favored."' Id. at 296 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
In Mancini, our Supreme Court dealt solely with the issue of whether individual liability is available under RIFEPA. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 161, 165. The issue of individual liability under RICRA has not been addressed by Rhode Island courts since the Mancini decision was issued in 2017. See Andrew Berg &Michael A. Gamboli, Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. (MCLE), A Practical Guide to Employment Law in Rhode Island § 4.3.2(c) (1st ed. 2016 &Supp. 2022) ("Despite the Mancini decision, to date no court has affirmatively overruled prior precedent and directly held that there is no individual liability under RICRA.").
In 2009-eight years prior to Mancini-the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued its decision in Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2009). In Fantini, the First Circuit held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act precludes individual liability and determined that by defining an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person," Congress could not have intended to create individual liability for supervisors. Id. at 28-29. The Fantini court reasoned "it would be incongruous to hold that Title VII does not apply to the owner of a five-person company but applies with full force to a person who supervises an identical number of employees in a larger company." Id. at 30. As such, the First Circuit determined that "[i]f Congress did not intend to protect small entities from the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims, it would not have limited liability to employers with fifteen or more employees." Id. Accordingly, the Fantini court found that "[a]s held by our sister circuits[,] . . . 'the statutory scheme [of Title VII] itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees.'" Id. (quoting Miller v. Maxwell's International Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).
"To provide understanding to [RICRA and RIFEPA, Rhode Island Courts] look to the federal interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 1036 (R.I. 2004).
The Mancini Court used analogous reasoning as part of its reasoning that RIFEPA precludes individual liability and stated the following:
"Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that § 28-5-6(8)(i), as amended by P.L. 2013, ch. 413, § 1, defines '[e]mployer' to include 'any person in this state employing four (4) or more individuals[;]' in our view, it would not be logical to conclude, without far more textual evidence, that the General Assembly intended to exempt employers with less than four employees from potential liability but simultaneously intended to authorize the imposition of liability on individuals under the ambiguous language of § 28-5-7(6)." Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, RICRA does not contain any language regarding individual liability for supervisors in employment discrimination suits. Section 42-112-1. In Horn, where our Supreme Court was faced with the similar issue of RICRA being silent on an issue, the Court stated as follows:
"[W]e may take it as a given that, when the General Assembly enacted the RICRA in 1990, it did so with knowledge of the explicit one-year limitations period that is contained in . . . [RI]FEPA; and there is no reason to conclude that it thought that some other time period would be appropriate for employment discrimination actions under the RICRA." Horn, 927 A.2d at 296 (emphasis added).
Thus, as in Horn, it is to be presumed that the General Assembly recognized that RIFEPA would operate in the background in the context of employment discrimination claims brought under RICRA because RIFEPA provides a direct avenue for relief for such claims. See id.; see also id. at 293 (noting that RIFEPA and RICRA are complementary employment discrimination statutes).
While Plaintiff directs the Court to the principle that "[t]he Rhode Island Civil Rights Act [(RICRA)] provides broad protection against all forms of discrimination in all phases of employment," RICRA was enacted as a reaction to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), where the United States Supreme Court held "that [42 U.S.C.] § 1981 provided protection against racial discrimination in contract formation only." Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Department., 639 A.2d 1379, 1381 (R.I. 1994). Following Patterson, the General Assembly enacted RICRA to protect persons from harassment or discrimination "in all phases of employment[,]" rather than merely in contract formation. Id. In other words, the contextual history behind RICRA demonstrates it was adopted to ensure individuals subjected to employment discrimination could seek recourse at any phase during their employment, rather than to expand the scope of those who may be liable for discriminatory conduct in the workplace. Id.; see also Mancini, 155 A.3d at 164 ('"[T]his Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute."') (quoting State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I. 2005)).
In light of the foregoing analysis, the holdings enumerated in Horn and Mancini are instructive and provide important guidance. See Horn, 927 A.2d at 294-96; Mancini, 155 A.3d at 163-65. Clearly, the Court's holding in Horn mandates that Rhode Island courts treat RICRA and RIFEPA as in pari materia and make every attempt to harmonize the two statutory schemes. Horn, 927 A.2d at 294-95. Therefore, the Court holds that, like RIFEPA, RICRA does not provide for individual liability against supervisors in an employment discrimination suit as a matter of law. See Horn, 927 A.2d at 294-95; Mancini, 155 A.3d at 161, 163-65.
2 Persuasive Authority and Federal Trends
Moreover, while the issue of individual liability under RICRA can be decided by following Mancini and Horn, it should be noted that "[t]o provide understanding to [RICRA and RIFEPA, Rhode Island Courts] look to the federal interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 1036 (R.I. 2004); see also Lima v. City of East Providence, 17 F.4th 202, 207 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that RICRA cases "are analyzed using standards applicable to suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
In 2009, the Fantini court held that Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act does not allow for individual liability. Fantini, 557 F.3d at 30-31. Shortly thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island acknowledged that Fantini abrogated precedent holding otherwise with respect to Title VII, and that the same was likely true under RIFEPA. Johnston v. Urban League of Rhode Island, Inc., No. C.A. 09-167 S, 2009 WL 3834129, at *2-3 (D.R.I. Nov. 13, 2009).
This suspicion was confirmed by Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 163-65, 168 (R.I. 2017).
In 2010, however, the Rhode Island Federal District Court-faced with the issue of whether there is individual liability under RICRA in light of Fantini-declined to depart from precedent and explained that it was "unpersuaded that Fantini and Johnston have undermined [its precedent stating] that individual liability exists under RICRA." Mayale-Eke v. Merrill Lynch, 754 F.Supp.2d 372, 385 (D.R.I. 2010).
However, the District Court's decision in Mayale-Eke is only persuasive authority while our Supreme Court's decisions in Horn and Mancini are binding and therefore carry more weight. See Forte Brothers, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation, 541 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I. 1988) ("[O]nly the decisions of [the Rhode Island Supreme] [C]ourt are of binding effect upon all justices of trial courts of this state."). What is more, Mancini was decided after Mayale-Eke, further indicating that the holding in Mancini should control here. See also Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp., 24 F.Supp.2d 202, 211 (D.R.I. 1998), and Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 562, 573 (D.R.I. 1996) (pre-Mancini decisions where the Rhode Island Federal District Court found individual liability under RICRA).
In fact, in 2014 while Mancini was pending, the Rhode Island Federal District Court recognized the importance of the Mancini decision with respect to its own RICRA precedent. See Reilly v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., No. CA 13-785S, 2014 WL 4473772, at *12 (D.R.I. Apr. 16, 2014) ("While the certified question [in Mancini] asks only for a statutory interpretation of [RI]FEPA, the response is overwhelmingly likely to be relevant to claims against individuals under RICRA.").
Moreover, it is also telling that a majority of federal courts around the country have held individual supervisors cannot be personally liable under Title VII. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Title VII 'does not create liability in individual supervisors and co-workers who are not the plaintiffs' actual employers.'") (quoting Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2014)); Burton v. Pennsylvania State Police, 990 F.Supp.2d 478, 509 (M.D. Penn. 2014) (explaining that the "the Third Circuit's disposition on individual liability under Title VII is clear-Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under this statute"); Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 404 (6th Cir. 1997) ("A majority of our sister circuits that have addressed this issue have held that an employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an "employer," cannot be held individually liable under Title VII and similar statutory schemes."); Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 ("If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.... There is no reason to stretch the liability of individual employees beyond the respondeat superior principle intended by Congress."); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Individual capacity suits under Title VII are . . . inappropriate. The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act."); see also 1 Fair Employment Practices (HR Series), Liability for the Acts of Employers' Agents, Supervisors, and Employees § 1:28, Westlaw (database updated January 2023) (explaining trends on this issue).
There are a minority of jurisdictions which have held that individual liability may be available under Title VII under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Howard v. Temple Urgent Care Center, P.C., No. N-90-170 (WWE), 1990 WL 128633, at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 1990) (citing Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F.Supp. 1097, 1105 (D. Colo. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987)) ("A supervisor who participates in managerial decisions, but does not have any direct power to hire or fire employees, may nevertheless be an employer for purposes of Title VII.").
In addition, other jurisdictions have held that § 1981-which RICRA was modeled after- allows for individual liability. See, e.g., Henry v. NYC Health &Hospital Corp., 18 F.Supp.3d 396, 403 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Evans v. Port Authority of N.Y. &N.J., 192 F.Supp.2d 247, 280 nn. 208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)) (explaining that unlike Title VII claims, "Section 1981 claims . . . can carry individual liability, provided the plaintiff can show the personal involvement of the individual defendant"); Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F.Supp.2d 512, 541 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Sheppard v. Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin &Oshinsky, 59 F.Supp.2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 1999); Dalton v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 979 F.Supp. 1187, 1202 (S.D. Ohio 1997) and quoting Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The clear weight of authority finds Title VII and section 1981 distinguishable.... the statutory language of Title VII clearly imposes liability only upon 'employer[s],' as defined by the statute, while section 1981 does not contain such a limitation. Moreover, the Third Circuit has found that '[s]ection 1981 is a federal civil rights remedy . . . in the nature of a tort remedy' and therefore individuals who are personally involved in the discrimination against the plaintiff may be held liable.").
While Plaintiff contends that RICRA is broader than Title VII and § 1981 on the point of individual liability-a position adopted by the District of Rhode Island in Wyss-this Court has already explained why such an interpretation is misplaced. See supra Section III.C.1. In sum, as Defendants duly noted in their brief, "[a] determination that RICRA provides for individual liability in the employment context is simply incompatible with the Supreme Court's analysis and teachings in Mancini and Horn." (Defs.' Mem. 7.) (emphasis added).
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, individual supervisors are not subject to liability for discriminatory conduct in the workplace under RICRA. To hold otherwise would provide "plaintiffs an end run around" the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Mancini declaring that individual liability does not exist under RIFEPA. See Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165; Horn, 927 A.2d at 296. Consequently, the claims alleged against Mr. Pezzelli under Counts II and VII of the Complaint are dismissed because they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as a matter of law. Chase, 160 A.3d at 973.
While the question presented by this case is whether individual supervisors are subject to personal liability under RICRA, the Court's reasoning would be equally applicable to individual suits against co-workers or fellow employees that are not supervisors. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Title VII 'does not create liability in individual supervisors and co-workers who are not the plaintiffs' actual employers.'") (emphasis added). The same is true for the holdings below pertaining to the RIPFMLA and tortious interference. See infra Sections III.D-E.
D
Count I: Individual Liability Under RIPFMLA
Neither Mancini nor Horn addressed the separate, albeit related, issue of whether workplace supervisors can be individually liable under RIPFMLA for discriminatory behavior. See Mancini, 155 A.3d at 159-68; Horn, 927 A.2d at 292-97.
Nonetheless, Defendants argue that there is no individual liability under RIPFMLA because the reasoning in Mancini applies with equal force to RIPFMLA. (Defs.' Mem. 8-9.) Defendants contend that this Court's decision in Bringhurst v. Cardi's Department Store, Inc., No. KC-2010-1025, 2011 WL 9379273, at *4-5 (R.I. Super. Dec. 30, 2011) (K. Rodgers, J.), further supports that conclusion. See Defs.' Mem. at 8-9; Bringhurst, 2011 WL 9379273, at *4-5.
In response, Plaintiff argues that individual supervisors can be liable under RIPFMLA because an "employer" is defined in pertinent part as "any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer." Id. at 8-9 (quoting and analyzing § 28-48-1(3)(i)-(iv); see also id. at 8-10 (providing overall argument with respect to RIPFMLA).
RIPFMLA-prior to Mancini-provided a potential avenue for relief against supervisors in their individual capacity. See Reilly, 2014 WL 4473772, at *10-11 (federal District Court allowing individual liability claim under RIPFMLA). But see Bringhurst, 2011 WL 9379273 (Superior Court decision holding that there is no individual liability under RIPFMLA).
Under RIPFMLA, an aggrieved employee can sue his or her "employer" for violations of RIPFMLA. Section 28-48-6. Importantly, RIPFMLA defines the term "employer" as follows:
"(i) [A]ny person, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity . . . that employs fifty (50) or more employees;
"(ii) the state of Rhode Island, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and any state department or agency that employs any employees;
"(iii) any city or town or municipal agency that employs thirty (30) or more employees; and
"(iv) any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer." Section 28-48-1(3)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff contends that § 28-48-1(3)(iv) allows a supervisor to be sued individually for disparate treatment of their subordinates. (Pl.'s Mem. 5-7.) In particular, Plaintiff predicates her argument on (1) the fact that RIPFMLA and its federal analog (the FMLA) contain identical provisions and (2) case law from federal courts holding that the FMLA provides for individual liability with respect to supervisors. Id. (citing and relying on Graziadio v. Culinary Institute of America, 817 F.3d 415, 422-23 (2d Cir. 2016); Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 415 (3d Cir. 2012); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 685 (11th Cir. 1999)).
However, even prior to Mancini, this Court (K. Rodgers, J.) recognized that some federal courts held precisely the opposite and cautioned interpreting § 28-48-1(3)(iv) as imposing individual liability on supervisors. See Bringhurst, 2011 WL 9379273, at *3 (citing to Fantini, 557 F.3d at 30 and Johnston, 2009 WL 3834129, at *2-3). Bringhurst involved an employee at Cardi's Furniture who was allegedly assaulted by a co-worker in the workplace. Id. at *1. Following the alleged assault, the Bringhurst plaintiff began to suffer from anxiety and requested medical leave pursuant to the RIPFMLA. Id. Her request for leave was granted, but weeks later, the plaintiff was hospitalized and then received notice from her employer indicating that she "voluntarily resigned" from her position. Id. Thereafter, in her employment discrimination suit against Cardi's Furniture, the plaintiff included counts against her supervisors and the human resources employee who signed the discharge notice, alleging that the individual defendants were "in violation of directly or indirectly aiding and abetting a violation of" the RIPFMLA. Id. at *5. The Bringhurst plaintiff further alleged that her assailant's "inappropriate behavior directed toward females was common knowledge at Cardi's Furniture." Id. at *1.
On the issue of individual liability under RIPFMLA, the Bringhurst Court (K. Rodgers, J.) stated the following:
"Like the RIFEPA issue of individual liability, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to decide whether individual liability claims may be brought under RIPFMLA. However, . . . federal precedent provides reliable and solid grounds for determining that the definition of 'employer' in RIFEPA precludes individual liability, and the same rationale holds true for excluding individual liability under the RIPFMLA. Indeed, to find otherwise would allow a human resources employee who signs a letter of termination or discipline to be routinely subject to individual liability simply by signing his or her name. This would be an absurd result." Bringhurst, 2011 WL 9379273, at *5 (emphasis added except to "individual" which is italicized in original).
The holding in Bringhurst is bolstered by our Supreme Court's holding in Mancini, as RIFEPA-the statutory scheme at issue in Mancini-utilizes nearly identical language for the definition for "employer" as the one provided under RIPFMLA. Compare § 28-5-6(8)(i) ("'Employer' includes the state and all political subdivisions of the state and any person in this state employing four (4) or more individuals, and any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly."), with § 28-48-1(3).
While Mancini involved the question of whether there was individual liability under the "aiding and abetting" provision found in the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA) under § 28-5-7(6), the Mancini Court acknowledged the importance of considering the statutory scheme as a whole. See Mancini, 155 A.3d at 163 ("When confronted with an ambiguous statute, we must look to the entire statutory scheme to deduce the legislative intent; our interpretive gaze should not be restricted to a mere 'isolated provision[.]'") (quoting In re Harrison, 992 A.2d 990, 994 (R.I. 2010)). Accordingly, the Court directly referenced the definition of "employer" under § 28-5-6(8)(i) as support for the proposition that the General Assembly did not intend to hold individuals liable under RIFEPA. Id. at 165. Therefore, it is a logical step to take the holding from Mancini- especially considering the Court's detailed explanation of its opinion that supervisors should not be held personally liable for employment discrimination as a matter of public policy-and conclude that RIFEPA also does not provide for individual liability under § 28-5-6(8)(i). Id.
Furthermore, to conclude that the General Assembly would immunize all businesses of less than fifty employees from an RIPFMLA suit while simultaneously permitting claims against an individual in their capacity as a supervisor for the employer in question constitutes an absurd result that the Court will not embrace. See § 28-48-1(3); Peloquin v. Haven Health Center of Greenville, LLC, 61 A.3d 419, 425 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I. 2012)) (holding that "under no circumstances will this Court construe a statute to reach an absurd result"); Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165; Fantini, 557 F.3d at 30.
Instead, it is more logical to conclude that the General Assembly drafted the definition of "employer" under the RIPFMLA to: (1) allow supervisors to be sued in their official capacity, or (2) define the scope of employer liability to include activities undertaken by supervisors acting as agents of the employer. See Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1337 (Cal. 1998) (construing the California Fair Employment and Housing Act containing a nearly identical "agency" provision as RIPFMLA to preclude individual liability); Fantini, 557 F.3d at 30 (interpreting the inclusion of agency language in Title VII's definition of employer was "simply to establish a limit on an employer's liability for its employees' actions"); Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging the consensus view that "the language 'any agent of such a person' is designed to incorporate the principles of respondeat superior into Title VII rather than to expose either supervisors or co-workers to personal liability in employment discrimination cases"); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that an individual qualifies as an "employer" when he or she "exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment" and that "[i]n such a situation, the individual operates as the alter ego of the employer, and the employer is liable for the unlawful employment practices of the individual without regard to whether the employer knew of the individual's conduct") (emphasis added)); Park v. TD Ameritrade Trust Co., Inc., No. 10-cv-02599-BNB, 2010 WL 4608225, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2010) ("Supervisory employees may only be sued in their official capacities in a Title VII or ADA action as a means to sue the employer under an agency theory.").
Further, the Mancini Court deemed the Supreme Court of California's decision in Reno v. Baird to be persuasive and quoted passages at length in forming its conclusion that RIFEPA precludes individual liability. See Mancini, 155 A.3d at 166-67 (citing and quoting Reno, 957 P.2d at 1339-41, 1343, 1347). In Mancini, the Court quoted the following passage from Reno:
'"[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties....
'"[I]t is manifest that if every personnel manager risked losing his or her home, retirement savings, hope of children's college education, etc., whenever he or she made a personnel management decision, management of industrial enterprises and other economic organizations would be seriously affected.
'"[S]upervisory employee[s] [would be coerced into] not [making] the optimum lawful decision for the employer. Instead, the supervisory employee would be pressed to make whatever decision was least likely to lead to a claim of discrimination against the supervisory employee personally, or likely to lead only to that discrimination claim which could most easily be defended. The employee would thus be placed in the position of choosing between loyalty to the employer's lawful interests at severe risk to his or her own interests and family, versus abandoning the employer's lawful interest and protecting his or her own personal interests."' Mancini,
155 A.3d at 166-67 (quoting Reno, 957 P.2d at 1340-41) (emphasis added).
These observations are equally applicable for determining whether individual supervisors are liable for employment decisions under RIPFMLA-as well as RICRA-and Plaintiff has failed to explain why, in the wake of Mancini, this Court should hold that RIPFMLA provides for individual liability of supervisors while RIFEPA does not. Compare id., with Pl.'s Mem. at 5-7. What is more, adopting Plaintiff's position in this respect would provide an "end run around" for RIPFMLA claimants to go after supervisors in their personal capacity when they are legally prohibited from doing so under RIFEPA. See Horn, 927 A.2d at 296.
Moreover, similar to the circumstances in Mancini, a key policy consideration here is that employee discrimination claimants-like Plaintiff-can still seek recourse against his or her employer under the various statutory schemes at issue in the present action-i.e., RIPFMLA, RIFEPA, and RICRA. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165-66; §§ 28-5-1, 28-48-5, and 42-112-1. Also weighing in favor of the construction adopted by the Court today is the issue "that imposing individual liability would create a substantial question, in the case of a collective decision, as to which individual might be liable." Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165-66.
For her part, in response to the policy concerns raised by Defendants and Mancini, Plaintiff contended at oral argument that discrimination also has harmful effects in the sense that people who are discriminated against may lose their jobs, homes, and livelihoods. However, Plaintiff failed to explain why it is necessary for employment discrimination plaintiffs to be able to sue individual supervisors in their personal capacities when they already have an adequate form of recourse in the form of a suit against their employer. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165-66.
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that RIPFMLA does not provide for individual liability against supervisors alleged to have partaken in employment discrimination. Accordingly, the claims asserted against Mr. Pezzelli under Count I of the Complaint are hereby dismissed because they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under RIPFMLA. Chase, 160 A.3d at 973.
E
Count VIII: Tortious Interference with Contract and Economic Advantage
For purposes of the instant Motion to Dismiss, the issue with respect to the claim of tortious interference found in Count VIII is whether Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish such a claim against Mr. Pezzelli. See Defs.' Mem. at 11-13; Pl.'s Mem. at 11-14; EDC Investment, LLC, 275 A.3d at 542.
Plaintiff contends that her tortious interference claim found in Count VIII-asserted only with respect to Mr. Pezzelli-should not be dismissed because "an at-will employment relationship still receives protection from third-party interference." (Pl.'s Mem. 11.) Defendants disagree and argue that the existence of a contract is necessary for a tortious interference claim. (Defs.' Mem. 12-13.) In D'Andrea v. Calcagni, 723 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1999), the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated as follows:
"[W]e note that whether [Plaintiff] D'Andrea was an 'at will' employee at the time of her termination is of little moment to our analysis since this employment status would merely permit Crystal to terminate D'Andrea "at any time for any reason or for no reason at all." Roy v. Woonsocket Institution for Savings, 525 A.2d 915, 917 (R.I. 1987). D'Andrea's 'at will' status would not and could not permit a third party, such as Calcagni, to interfere with the existing employment relationship, which but for Calcagni's interference, may have gone on indefinitely." D'Andrea, 723 A.2d at 278 (emphasis added).
This principle is also reflected by the holding in Roy v. Woonsocket Institution for Savings, 525 A.2d 915 (R.I. 1987), where our Supreme Court explained that the tortious interference claim at issue in that case was in effect "a claim of tortious interference with prospective contractual relations," because '"[o]ne's interest in a contract terminable at will is primarily an interest in future relations between the parties, and he has no legal assurance of them."' Roy, 525 A.2d at 919, 919 n.4 (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 766 at 11 (1979)).
Additionally, the facts of Roy and numerous other Rhode Island cases make clear that a claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations is viable even where the party that allegedly interfered with the prospective contractual relations is a supervisor. Id. at 916-17; see also Avilla v. Newport Grand Jai Alai LLC, 935 A.2d 91, 98-99 (R.I. 2007) (considering the fact that the defendant was the plaintiff's supervisor as merely a factor in determining whether the interference was intentional and improper); Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 753 (R.I. 1995) (relying on the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Swager v. Couri, 395 N.E.2d 921, 927 (Ill. 1979) for the proposition that "a corporate officer may be held liable under a tort theory for unjustified interference with his or her corporation's own contract"); Jarry v. ECC Corporation, 581 F.Supp.3d 376, 384 (D.R.I. 2022) ("[W]hile an employee generally 'may not sue her employer for interfering with its own contract .... a supervisor may be personally liable if he [or she] tortiously interferes with a subordinate's employment relationship.'") (quoting Zimmerman v. Direct Federal Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2001)); Cugini v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education, No. WC-2008-0722, 2020 WL 2145885, at *17 (R.I. Super. Apr. 28, 2020) (citing Roy and Jolicoeur and holding tortious interference claim not barred by the fact that claim was brought against the plaintiff's superior). With that legal issue resolved, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim of tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. See EDC Investment, LLC, 275 A.3d at 542.
To successfully advance her claim for tortious interference, Plaintiff must allege '"(1) the existence of a business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an intentional act of interference, (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damages to the plaintiff."' Avilla, 935 A.2d at 98 (quoting L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 207 (R.I. 1997)). "Malice, in the sense of spite or ill will, is not required; rather legal malice-an intent to do harm without justification- will suffice. The burden is on the defendant to show justification." Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 669-70 (R.I. 1986).
Assuming the facts in the Complaint to be true, Plaintiff has set forth sufficient allegations to establish a claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations against Mr. Pezzelli. Narragansett Electric Co., 21 A.3d at 278; Chase, 160 A.3d at 973. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) she expected her employment with Golden Crest to continue, (2) Mr. Pezzelli knew Plaintiff would derive an economic advantage from her continued employment, (3) Mr. Pezzelli "willfully," "deliberately," and "improperly]" interfered with her employment, (4) Mr. Pezzelli's alleged tortious interference harmed Plaintiff, and (5) she sustained damages. See Compl. ¶¶ 113-20. Furthermore, because any doubts regarding the allegations set forth in the Complaint must be "resolv[ed] . . . in plaintiff's favor," there are sufficient facts alleged to warrant an inference of "legal malice" by Mr. Pezzelli with respect to his allegedly tortious conduct. See id. ¶¶ 117-18; Narragansett Electric Co., 21 A.3d at 278; Mesolella, 508 A.2d at 670.
Therefore, Defendants' request to dismiss Count VIII of the Complaint with respect to Mr. Pezzelli cannot be granted. See Compl. ¶¶ 113-20; Avilla, 935 A.2d at 98; Narragansett Electric Co., 21 A.3d at 278; Chase, 160 A.3d at 973.
Golden Crest is not named as a defendant under Count VIII. See Compl. ¶¶ 113-20.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders the following:
(1) Defendants' requests for dismissal of the claims asserted against Mr. Pezzelli under Counts I, II, and VII of the Complaint are GRANTED;
(2) Defendants' request for dismissal of the claim asserted against Mr. Pezzelli under Count VIII of the Complaint is DENIED; and
(3) Defendants' requests for dismissal of Counts III, IV, V, and VI with respect to Mr. Pezzelli are DENIED because those claims do not implicate Mr. Pezzelli in his individual capacity.
Counsel shall prepare the appropriate order for entry.