Summary
In Muckle, the court accepted the defendant's expert's figure of approximately 10% diminution in value, post-repair, without an extensive explanation--other than stating that the plaintiff's expert's opinion was not credible.
Summary of this case from Rigakos v. OneillOpinion
CV156013126S
03-30-2017
David Muckle v. Ronald Pressley et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Edward S. Domnarski, J.
In this case, the plaintiff, David Muckle, claims that his 2013 Subaru XV Crosstrek automobile (vehicle) suffered diminished value after it was fully repaired following a significant collision caused by the negligence of the defendant, the city of New Haven (the city). The city admits that its negligence caused the collision, and it has paid the cost to repair the plaintiff's vehicle. The city disputes the plaintiff's entitlement to damages for alleged diminished value of the vehicle. The case was tried on February 22, 2017.
All references to the defendant in the present case refers to the defendant city of New Haven, acting on its own behalf and on the behalf of the defendant Ronald Pressley. Pressley is an employee of the city and was acting in the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. General Statutes § 7-101a(a) states in relevant part that each municipality " shall protect and save harmless any municipal officer . . . from financial loss and expense, including legal fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of alleged negligence . . . on the part of such officer or such employee while acting in the discharge of his duties." Therefore, Pressley need not be addressed separately.
The plaintiff's vehicle was parked in the city on July 20, 2014, when it was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Ronald Pressley, an employee of the city. The collision was significant and resulted in frame damage to the vehicle. The vehicle was fully repaired, including the frame damage, for a cost of $15, 096.60. According to the experts who testified at trial, the vehicle had a value between $20, 037 and $23, 500 prior to the accident. The experts also testified that the value of the vehicle after repairs was between $14, 500 and $21, 150. The opinions of the respective experts are further discussed below.
The court concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the diminished value of his vehicle, after its repair. The rule for damages to an automobile was stated in Stults v. Palmer, 141 Conn. 709, 109 A.2d 592 (1944), which is somewhat factually similar. " The true rule is that the measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the car before the collision and its fair market value afterwards . . . However, if the automobile damage may be repaired and the repairs will restore the car to substantially its former condition, the cost of repair will ordinarily furnish proper proof of the loss . . . In the instant case the trial court could well have concluded, because the frame of the car had been sprung, that repairs would not have substantially restored the automobile to its former condition and that the owner was entitled to the difference between the fair market value of the car before the collision and its value after the collision . . ." (Citation omitted.) Id., 712. In Stults, there was expert testimony presented indicating that, because of the frame damage, the vehicle was not fit to be on the road. Id. In the present case, the plaintiff's vehicle sustained frame damage; however, after repairs, the vehicle was roadworthy. In fact, the plaintiff still owns and drives the vehicle. Although the plaintiff's vehicle could be driven after it was repaired, it still had diminished value because of the accident, and consequently, the vehicle was not restored to its former condition of " full" fair market value.
The court finds the foregoing measure of damages is applicable even though the plaintiff has not sold the vehicle, or attempted to sell it. The city refers the court to Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 149 Conn.App. 177, 193, 90 A.3d 219 (2014) (under Connecticut law damages may not be predicated on contingency). The city's reliance on Meadowbrook is misplaced because the plaintiff's damages were not speculative nor were they based on a contingency. In Meadowbrook, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the decedent's application for Medicaid benefits would have been approved if the application had been completed. This failure made the plaintiff's claim for damages contingent because the trial court lacked evidence to adduce that the decedent would have been able to qualify for the benefits at all. Id., 193. In the present case, the city's own expert testified that the plaintiff's vehicle had diminished value after it had been repaired. During Hogan's testimony, he did not testify that his ability to determine the diminished value of the vehicle depended on its sale. Therefore, there is no contingency implicit in the plaintiff's claim for damages.
Robert E. Collins, Jr., a Connecticut licensed motor vehicle property damage appraiser testified on behalf of the plaintiff and his report was admitted. (Pl.'s Ex. 6.) It was Collins' opinion that the fair market value of the plaintiff's vehicle prior to the accident was $20, 037, and the value was $14, 500 after the accident, resulting in diminished value to the vehicle of $5, 537. (Pl.'s Ex. 6.) This diminished value represents a 28 percent reduction in the value of the vehicle.
Glenn Hogan, a licensed motor vehicle damage appraiser, testified on behalf of the city as to his opinion of the diminished value of the plaintiff's vehicle. Hogan's report was similarly admitted. (Def.'s Ex. H.) Hogan found that the subject vehicle had a retail value of $23, 500 prior to the accident and a fair market value of $21, 150 after the accident resulting in a diminished value of $2, 350, or a 10 percent reduction in the vehicle's valuation because of the accident. (Def.'s Ex. H.)
" It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony . . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony . . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 772-73, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012); see also In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781-82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).
The court has carefully considered the testimony and reports of the experts and chooses to accept Hogan's opinion as to diminished value: $2, 350. The court does not find Collin's opinion that the plaintiff's vehicle has a diminished value equal to 28 percent of its value before the accident to be credible. The plaintiff is awarded damages in the amount $2, 350 for the diminished value of his vehicle.
The plaintiff testified that he incurred damages for the repair of his vehicle and for a rental car in the total amount of $1, 067.77 that were not reimbursed. The city did not present any evidence to dispute these charges. The plaintiff is awarded damages for the amount of $1, 067.77.
The plaintiff also seeks damages for the inconvenience of having to contend with submission of the claim to his insurance company, obtaining a rental car, and dealing with the auto body shop regarding the repair of his vehicle. The plaintiff testified he spent twelve hours attending to these matters. " It is incumbent on the party asserting either direct or consequential damages to provide sufficient evidence to prove such damages . . . Further, [w]hen damages are claimed they are an essential element of the plaintiff's proof and must be proved with reasonable certainty . . . Damages are recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money with reasonable certainty." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. SKF USA, Inc., 146 Conn.App. 288, 313, 78 A.3d 195 (2013), rev'd on other grounds, 318 Conn. 737, 123 A.3d 417 (2015); see also Sullivan v. Thorndike, 104 Conn.App. 297, 304, 934 A.2d 827 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 907, 942 A.2d 415 (2008).
The plaintiff has not provided a sufficient basis for estimating his inconvenience damages with reasonable certainty. Unlike the plaintiff's claim for damages for his costs that were not reimbursed, which were supported by evidence of incurred expense, the claim for inconvenience damages is not supported by any evidence to establish a monetary loss suffered by the plaintiff for his inconvenience. For example, there was no evidence that the plaintiff incurred lost wages because he spent time on issues related to the damage to his vehicle. In the absence of such evidence, an award of damages for inconvenience would be speculative.
The plaintiff has requested interest from the date of the loss, July 20, 2014. The plaintiff's claims are grounded in the negligence of the defendants. In negligence actions, interest is allowed only after judgment. General Statutes § 37-3b.
Judgment may enter for the plaintiff in the amount of $3, 417.77.