Opinion
FSTCV166027436S
09-11-2017
Rosemary Rigakos v. Sean Oneill
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Kenneth B. Povodator, J.
Factual/Procedural Background
The plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a motor vehicle accident. For purposes of this proceeding, the defendant admits responsibility for causing the accident. The plaintiff already has been compensated for her claimed personal injuries. What remains are limited/specific aspects of the property damage claim.
In particular, the plaintiff's vehicle has been repaired, and substitute transportation was provided to her by way of a car rental, during the repairs. However, the plaintiff asserts that she was not adequately compensated for her property damage claim in two respects. First, she claims that the vehicle provided to her during the course of repairs was sufficiently inferior to the car being repaired (the car she owned) that she was not fully compensated for the loss of use of her vehicle. Additionally, although the car was repaired--and there is something of a subordinate/incidental claim that it was not repaired properly--the claim is that a vehicle that has been involved in an accident requiring extensive repairs has a decreased value, even after the repairs are fully completed.
The court heard evidence on this matter on April 18, 2017. Both sides have submitted briefs in support of their respective positions.
Discussion
In a matter tried to the court, the court is charged with evaluating credibility and finding facts. The court also considers the legal limitations of the claims being asserted by the parties. There was only a modest amount of evidence that was submitted that the court could accept at face value.
I. Loss of Use
There does not appear to be any dispute that an owner of damaged property is entitled to compensation for loss of use of the property, during repairs. This case involves a somewhat subtler issue, in which the injured party is provided with a substitute " loaner" during repairs, with the focus on the difference in " use value" of the owner's property and the substitute provided during the course of repairs. The defendant does not appear to dispute that at least in principle, if there is a material distinction between the " use value" of owned property and substitute property, the owner is or might be entitled to compensation.
The court concludes that the plaintiff's claim for loss of use, over and above the substitute vehicle that was provided to her (rental vehicle), was substantially if not grossly overstated. The plaintiff claimed that she is entitled to the difference between the actual rental paid for the substitute vehicle, a Dodge Charger--approximately $33-34 per day--and the claimed rental cost of a Mercedes C300 which according to her research could be rented for $225 per day. (As may be inferred from the previous sentence, the plaintiff's vehicle that was involved in the accident was a Mercedes C300.)
This perhaps facially appealing and somewhat simple/direct approach has numerous major flaws, when examined. An immediate problem with that approach is that the car that was damaged (the owned vehicle) was three years old at the time of the accident, whereas the rental cost being quoted was for a then-current model year Mercedes. If the rental rate for the vehicle were to be used as a benchmark for use value, there would need to be either an adjustment based on age, or a direct quote for rental of a three-year-old vehicle, neither of which exercise was undertaken.
A somewhat more subtle but significant distinction is that the daily rate for a rental vehicle is not necessarily a direct marker or indicium of use value. The daily cost for a rental vehicle includes a profit for the company, and the daily cost also must cover maintenance, depreciation, business overhead, repairs, and idle time. The court does not believe that any of these considerations go into the concept of use value for an owned vehicle; they are direct or implied costs of ownership.
Either as a separate point or as an exclamation point to the previous paragraph, under plaintiff's theory, the use value of her vehicle is in excess of $82,000 per year ($225/day x 365 days = $82,125 per year), which is a multiple of the pre-accident fair market value of her vehicle. As estimated by her expert (discussed below), the value of the vehicle was claimed to be approximately $25,000, such that the use value ascribed to her car for a single year is more than 3 times the actual value of the vehicle. Put differently, the fair market value of the car was claimed to be the same as the claimed use value of the car over a period of less than 4 months (about 112 days). And again, the plaintiff's car, at the time, was approximately 3 years old, and she had been given an essentially-new vehicle for use during repairs. The court cannot lose sight of the simple fact that the primary use of a car is transportation--that use component was compensated in full, by virtue of the rental vehicle provided (or cost reimbursed).
From the opposite perspective, the plaintiff is using the actual rental paid for the substitute vehicle (approximately $34 per day) as a " credit" against her claim of $225 per day of use value. There was testimony that the rental rate for a vehicle during insurance covered often/generally is a more favorable rental rate than otherwise available. To the extent that this was or may have been a rate based on the existence of an insurance allowance, in effect, the plaintiff is claiming that she is entitled to the benefit of whatever favorable terms might have been negotiated. In other words, if a hypothetical " rack rate" or otherwise undiscounted rate for that substitute vehicle had been $50 per day, without any relationship to the actual deprivation of use of the vehicle, the plaintiff would be claiming that she is entitled to the additional approximately $16 per day in savings that are available during repairs.
The plaintiff correctly pointed out that the substitute vehicle lacked some of the amenities of her owned vehicle. A Dodge Charger--even if newer (or in this case, according to the paperwork, virtually new)--also lacks something of the cachet of a Mercedes. The court finds wholly unsupportable, however, the implied claim that better seats, better climate control, etc., are worth $190+ per day (even putting aside the fact that use of her own vehicle would implicate at least some if minimal level of wear and tear on her own vehicle, which was not incurred when the owned vehicle was not being used).
The court appreciates that when a rental vehicle is rented, the customer literally is paying for the use of the vehicle, which in that sense is a measure of the cost or value of use. At some point, however, it would appear that the cost of use and the " value" of use can become decoupled due to market forces such as decreased demand and increased acquisition costs (the likelihood that a Mercedes will cost more to acquire and will be in lesser demand for purposes of rental), possibly influenced by a sense that a person seeking to rent a Mercedes may be less price sensitive and therefore able to support a higher profit margin. The court need merely recognize these as possible considerations--there was no evidence whatsoever concerning any meaningful attempt to establish a true use value, other than by reference to car rental rates, and these and other such unaddressed considerations undercut the ability of the court to rely on such raw data (especially as to the Mercedes).
In opposing the plaintiff's claim, the defendant relies upon Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., Inc., 96 Conn. 337, 340-41, 114 A. 94 (1921), for the proposition that the cost of a rental is not a valid measure of loss of use. This court has rejected the contention that the claimed rental cost for a Mercedes should be the measure of loss of use, but that is not dispositive of the plaintiff's claim that the value of the loss of use of a Mercedes is greater than an equivalent period of time's loss of use of a less-luxurious vehicle. As discussed above, the court recognizes that a rental charge incorporates numerous factors other than pure value of use, but there is a certain scaling effect when dealing with more expensive vehicles, such that it is not a priori unreasonable to claim a greater value to loss of use for a vehicle that is more expensive to rent.
The defendant acknowledges that the plaintiff was entitled to a " reasonably equivalent vehicle" --the issue is whether the vehicle provided was, in fact, reasonably equivalent. The court is satisfied that the vehicle that was provided as a substitute, while not grossly disparate, was not reasonably equivalent. Indeed, the facts of this case suggest something of a reversal of cause and effect--the defendant did not provide the plaintiff with anything in the nature of a substitute vehicle (directly or through a representative). Rather, the plaintiff appears to have rented a substitute vehicle at a price that was roughly equivalent to the maximum (slightly above) allowance allowed by her own insurance company. In other words, the selection of vehicle was not primarily based on perceived equivalence, but largely was influenced if not controlled by the cost allowance provided.
Taking all of these considerations into account, recognizing that her basic transportation needs were more than amply covered, the court concludes that the uncompensated loss of use of her vehicle was far less than claimed, and the court finds that a fair measure of the value of that loss to be $10 per day. In the aggregate (33 days), the plaintiff is entitled to $330 for loss of use, above and beyond the provision of a substitute vehicle (more accurately, the cost of the substitute vehicle actually obtained).
II. Diminished Value
The premise of the diminished value claim--that the plaintiff is entitled to the difference in value of her vehicle before and after the accident--does not appear to be seriously contested, at least in a theoretical sense, but very much contested in terms of actual facts. The claim is that a vehicle that was involved in an accident, even if seemingly repaired to pre-accident condition, has a lesser value than a similar or virtually identical vehicle that wasn't involved in an accident. Certainly, a vehicle that was involved in an accident and had been repaired will not be worth more than a comparable vehicle that had not been involved in an accident. Given the at least theoretical concern that a repaired vehicle might not have been restored, 100%, to pre-accident condition, it certainly is reasonable to assume that a rational and informed buyer considering the purchase of one of two virtually identical vehicles will select the one that had not been involved in an accident, if the price were to be the same. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the repaired vehicle will have at least some level of diminished value in the fair market value sense.
The problem is in proving what that disparity in value is, for a particular damaged vehicle. It likely would be near impossible to find a virtually identical vehicle in terms of features, mileage, signs of wear and tear, etc. The best that could be done is to find comparables as close as possible, and make such adjustments as seem appropriate, analogous to the process undertaken by real estate appraisers in trying to determine market value based on comparable sales. Continuing with the analogy to real estate appraisals, the selection of appropriate comparables is the first task, and often the most contentious.
The court notes that the plaintiff's expert currently is engaged in assessing this type of diminution in value for litigation purposes as a regular business. The expert self-identifies as the primary if not sole expert in the field, and although now has other attorneys seeking his assistance, initially was providing these opinions solely to plaintiff's counsel.
The plaintiff was represented by one attorney for her personal injury claim and a different attorney for purposes of the property damage claims.
Implicitly, the effect of plaintiff's claim--if her expert were to be credited in full--is that the vehicle was, in retrospect, effectively a total loss. The claimed pre-accident value was just over $25,000 (according to the expert). The cost of repairs was $16,433 and the claimed value post-repair is $19,000, yielding a diminished value claim of over $6,000. Comparing the combination of cost of repair and intrinsic loss of value due to repair (approximately $22,500) with the pre-accident value of just over $25,000 indicates that the aggregate value of the damage to the car was almost 90% of its pre-accident value--without even addressing the cost of substitute transportation (loss of use) and the claimed additional loss of use, above and beyond the value of the vehicle.
The court further notes that the defendant has made a point of claimed inadequacies in the repairs as actually performed, arguing that the plaintiff should have taken the vehicle back to the repair shop for corrective work. Even if that were the case, the plaintiff's appraiser did not consider those claimed inadequacies in determining an estimated value for the vehicle, such that the claimed improper repairs did not impact any value or differential in value. The expert valued the vehicle as in very good condition, and stated that some scratches from a minor accident kept the vehicle from being rated as in excellent condition. The actual repair estimate, when the vehicle initially was being evaluated for repairs, characterized the vehicle condition as good. The expert also indicated that, subject to a 5% adjustment for private owner pricing, the value was derived from a guide book, which in turn presents the issue as to whether (in practice) a guide book figure reflects an average asking price or is a true measure of fair market value.
The defendant also presented testimony of an expert relating to value. He is an employee of the defendant's insurer, and determination of diminution of value is not his primary duty or seemingly even a significant portion of his duties. The testimony given by this expert was less polished, and emphasized a concern of the court relating to both experts.
The concern is the method used in selecting the data to be used for purposes of this case. Both experts picked specific cars as identified in identified databases, but there was no clear explanation as to why the specific examples selected were deemed representative or appropriate. There was testimony that the cars being considered were comparable, but little guidance was provided as to how the specific instances came to the attention of the experts--why one expert, for example, relied on particular cars from the Florida area. The experts attempted to justify in a post-hoc manner their selections, but it was not clear how/why the initial selection of cars to compare was made.
More precisely, the defendant's expert's testimony was that he did not select the comparable vehicles himself, but rather they were provided to him--so the issue becomes the methodology used by some unknown individual in selecting vehicles for consideration.
The court recognizes that statistical rigor is not required or likely to be obtained. However, in any analysis involving comparison of a specific situation to others, there is concern as to what if any parameters were used in selecting claimed-to-be-comparable situations/properties--especially what if any criteria were selected in advance. An ad hoc approach leaves open--and invites--criticism that the selection criteria were result-oriented, with sampling designed to reach a pre-determined result. Certainly that could explain why the two experts who testified claimed to have used information relating to similar vehicles with the information coming from similar sources, yet leading to widely-varying conclusions.
There also is a potential problem with comparing values derived from different sources, including published pricing guides, especially within a single calculation. In other words, values likely based on differing considerations and weighting of considerations were being compared as if directly comparable. This was a problem on both sides, if not obviously so. The defendant's expert, coming from the insurance side, stated that claims-adjusting criteria required use of a standard printed guide to value, and the plaintiff's expert also used such guides--how indicative is a value from such a guide to the realities of any particular marketplace, and is there any validity to a comparison of such figures with market asking prices?
Specifically, the plaintiff's expert relied on different sources of data for one set of comparisons. He identified actual dealer asking prices for repaired vehicles, but compared those prices to hypothetical prices for undamaged vehicles--seemingly, derived from one or more standard pricing guides--in order to obtain the differential claimed to be due to status as a repaired vehicle.
Automobile sales, and especially used vehicles, routinely if not nearly universally are perceived to be based on negotiated prices, with an asking price as a starting point. (Many (most?) guides contain an explicit disclaimer along such lines, and the plaintiff's expert's report contained language to that effect.) The plaintiff inferentially is asking the court to assume that the price established by a dealer, for an on-the-lot vehicle, is likely to be the same as established by a pricing guide or at least directly comparable--an assumption that the court has difficulty making. Dealers presumably if not necessarily recognize the existence of pricing guides, in setting prices (including the likelihood that customers will have consulted such guides). Pricing guides require discrete categorization of condition--excellent, good, etc., whereas the actual condition of a car might be on a continuum (e.g., not quite excellent but better than merely good). The fact that what is being compared are actual and hypothetical asking prices--not necessarily linked in any definitive manner to actual value--only compounds the problem, i.e., what is being compared to what?
The plaintiff's expert cites Kelly Blue Book (KBB) as one of the guides relied upon. In Francois v. Nikiforides, No. FSTCV166027643S, 2016 WL 8115544, at *4 (Conn.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2016), the court quoted from disclaimer language from KBB along these lines.
Further, to the extent that the fair market value presumes a willing buyer and willing seller, with full information and reasonable exposure to the market, there remain at least two tiers of relevance in the automotive market--dealer as buyer and dealer as seller. (There also is the private seller to private buyer tier, and there also is wholesale versus retail.) In determining fair market value, which type of transaction is to be used? Guides separately address the different types of transactions. Dealer profit margins are largely dictated by the disparity in pricing, with preparation/marketing services as an overlay. The value of the plaintiff's vehicle, and the diminution in value, are not intrinsically linked to dealer asking prices.
This data-unreliability is compounded by the nature of the data sought for the second comparison--quotes from dealers for repaired vs. non-accident vehicles. In obtaining price quotes from dealers, the actual car was not (could not have been) presented for evaluation (as it had been returned to the plaintiff for use), and to the extent that offers/quotes were obtained for the same hypothetical vehicle with and without substantial repaired accident-damage, it hardly would be surprising that an " offer" based on an unseen (hypothetical) vehicle with reportedly-repaired damage would be likely to tend low, given the sight-unseen quality of any such offer. Whatever guesswork may be required, fewer assumptions would be needed to provide a quote for a vehicle that had never been in an accident than for a vehicle that had been subject to damage--precise extent not known/knowable--and subject to repairs that could only be presumed to have been done properly. The court has great reservations about the usefulness/reliability of hypothetical price quotes for a hypothetical vehicle, with no real-world anchors. (Implicitly if not explicitly, any such price quote necessarily would be subject to actual examination of any vehicle presented for purchase.)
Harking back to the court's earlier reference to different markets, one dealer was identified as a wholesaler, one as a used car dealer, and one as a new car retailer for a non-Mercedes line of vehicles (a manufacturer usually associated with economy-priced vehicles).
For example, there was no indication/implication that there were written offers and no indication/implication that any dealer was in any way bound by such offers.
There are numerous secondary and tertiary considerations that can apply. For example, there was no indication as to whether the dealers providing hypothetical offers for a damage-repaired vehicle would intend to sell them at retail, or quoted a price for a quick-turnaround sale to another dealer or for auction. As noted in footnote 5, at least one dealer was a wholesaler, and there is no reason to believe that a price differential at the wholesale level, even if reliable, can be utilized for determining a fair market value differential.
The court recognizes the difficulties in obtaining reliable yet cost-effective data, but recognition of that difficulty does not justify much less compel unquestioned acceptance of the data and conclusions being offered. Each expert had his own particular " baggage" --the plaintiff's expert is creating (has created) a niche specialty in this area, and the defendant's expert is an employee of an insurance company who must pay claims such as the one before the court.
The plaintiff's expert's report was polished, containing a blend of seemingly standardized language and case-specific analysis. A close examination of the report reveals many of the problems suggested or identified above, which problems are not addressed and sometimes masked.
On the first page of the report, the expert states that " we use automotive industry accepted motor vehicle valuation techniques to determine the fair market value of a vehicle." On page 2 of the report, included in the " applicable, primary factors considered" are " the fair market value for a motor vehicle of like kind and quality"; " the price paid for the vehicle, less depreciation"; " the actual cost to purchase an available motor vehicle of like kind and quality"; and " current auction results and sale prices." Page 7 of the report contains certain definitions, including a definition of actual cash value (claimed to be the same as fair market value), as distinguished from " book value." On page 6 of the report, there is a recognition that with respect to a claimed asking price, " due to the normal bargaining process between the buyer and seller, these vehicles will likely sell for less than the asking price."
The recited sources for the actual determination of pre-accident value were guide books and cars available for sale in the area. No mention is made of use of the purchase price of the vehicle less depreciation, one of the factors identified as properly to be considered. Guides typically contain disclaimers such as the comment on page 6 of the report as quoted above, and " cars available for sale" suggests reliance on asking prices rather than actual sale prices. No attempt appears to have been made to employ a consistent adjustment of asking/offering price quotes to actual value.
To the contrary, the report distorts the comparison process: On page 6, in discussing actual offering prices for damaged vehicles, the report states that " these vehicles are offered for sale at dealerships at the asking price. Due to the normal bargaining process between the buyer and seller, these vehicles will likely sell for less than the asking price making the diminished value numbers conservative in nature." This ignores the fact that the theoretical prices for non-accident vehicles also would likely be reduced in the " normal bargaining process between the buyer and seller." Depending on markup, the differential could be higher or lower--but there is no identified basis for assuming that only the damaged vehicles would be subject to reduction in price via negotiations, an implication of the way that the quoted statement was phrased. By characterizing the prices associated with repaired vehicles as " conservative" for these purposes, without an express recognition of the same factor applying to non-accident vehicles, the expert skewed his results, at least in a qualitative fashion.
Ultimately, the plaintiff's expert is calculating a percentage derived from asking prices--with no firm anchor to actual selling prices or actual fair market value--and applying that percentage to a calculated value of the subject vehicle. Actual asking prices for repaired vehicles are being compared to hypothetical (guide-derived) prices for undamaged vehicles, and two sets of hypothetical prices are being compared (dealer contacts for offered purchase prices--damaged and undamaged). The vehicles at dealerships were 2012 and 2013 models, whereas the plaintiff's vehicle was a 2011 model year vehicle, based on the assumption that the differential would be the same for 3-year-old vehicles, regardless of when the calculation is made. For the purely hypothetical offer-to-purchase prices, he used a 2011 hypothetical vehicle, which potentially adds an additional uncertainty--whether the percentage differential remains constant as cars get older, a position that the expert seemed to have espoused.
The court finds the discussion in Muckle v. Pressley, No. CV156013126S, 2017 WL 1429932, at *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Mar. 30, 2017), on reconsideration, (Conn.Super.Ct. June 19, 2017), to be helpful, with the dollar figures coincidentally similar to those present here (+/-10%)--the value of the vehicle prior to the accident, the cost of repairs, and the claimed diminution in value, all within that approximate range. (The percentage of decrease in value, per the plaintiff's expert, was a bit higher--28% instead of 24%, a variance of approximately 14%.) In Muckle, the court accepted the defendant's expert's figure of approximately 10% diminution in value, post-repair, without an extensive explanation--other than stating that the plaintiff's expert's opinion was not credible. Here, the court finds the defendant's expert's opinion to lack credibility, but can only conclude that the plaintiff's expert's opinion is credible in a qualitative sense.
The court also is concerned about economic waste; see, e.g., Argentinis v. Fortuna, 134 Conn.App. 538, 554, 39 A.3d 1207, 1221 (2012). As recited in Muckle and tort-based property damage cases in general, the plaintiff is entitled to the difference in value of her property before and after the damage was inflicted. The plaintiff here is claiming that the defendant should spend or pay $16,433 for actual repairs, plus an additional $6000 for diminution in value post-repair, plus loss of use ($225 - $34 = $191) for 33 days (more than $6,300) (which does not include the $1,000 + actually paid for substitute transportation during repairs). On a net basis, the plaintiff is seeking more than $12,000 in cash, to go with her continued possession of a car she claims was worth approximately $19,000 after repairs, with a pre-accident value of about $25,000. The $6,000 premium ($19,000 + $12,000 - $25,000) over the pre-accident value (again, not considering the cost of the substitute transportation actually provided), seemingly suggests that there is something very much amiss.
Having identified Argentinis, the court notes that the defendant invoked Argentinis as part of his argument, but the court believes that the significance of the case is somewhat overstated as to applicability. In Argentinis, a plaintiff was not allowed to recover both the loss of value to the property due to removal of shrubbery (total destruction), and the cost of replacement. To be analogous, the plaintiff here would have to be asking to be compensated for the diminution in value of her vehicle prior to repairs plus the cost of repairs. The plaintiff was entitled to be made whole, and if repairs did not restore the value of the vehicle to its pre-accident condition, then there would be an increment left uncompensated. The defendant does not seem to disagree that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole--just what that concept means, in these circumstances.
Although the expert presented by the defendant seemed to take the position that based on his investigation, there was no disparity in value to a vehicle as a result of significant repairs, the court must reject that opinion as simply defying common sense. As noted earlier, given a choice between 2 otherwise identical vehicles, one having been in an accident requiring substantial repairs and the other not having been in any such accident, any rational buyer, fully informed, likely would pay less for the repaired vehicle. How much less such a buyer would pay is the focus of inquiry of the court.
The court has not ignored the defendant's arguments. The court rejects the reliance on General Statutes § 38a-353, for a number of reasons. Most directly, existing insurance-based statutes and related regulations are intended to regulate the practices of insurance companies in dealing with first party and third party claimants; they are not intended to regulate tort law. Related, the goal of the statutes and related regulations is to create objective standards for the industry, notwithstanding the necessarily-individualized nature of each claim--no two accidents will be identical. The risk of what the defendant characterizes as a double recovery due to a subsequent total loss in which the diminished value of the vehicle due to a prior repair may not be obvious, is but a particularized risk or limitation of the system. Unrepaired damage from a prior accident may not be noticeable in the event of a subsequent total loss, and evaluation of the pre-accident value of vehicle is unlikely to take into account the degree of diligence in maintenance (regular oil changes, etc.). The difficulty if not practical impossibility of identifying this diminution in value, for purposes of adjusting the pre-accident value of the vehicle in connection with a possible subsequent accident, cannot control evaluation of the extent of a loss at the time of an actual accident. Tort law is not governed by insurance law, and in some instances explicitly ignores or overrides insurance considerations, such as in connection with the common law collateral source rule and the statutory collateral source rule.
In sum, the opinions of the experts provided a range of values, but the court cannot accept either opinion at face value. The plaintiff's expert's opinion is far more detailed, but each of those details implicates a range of questions, most of which point to a lower diminution in value. The sheer magnitude of the claimed diminution in value, itself, with the secondary implication that the car was virtually a total loss, require the court to reject the 24% figure for diminution of value. The court concludes that a fair estimation/quantification of the diminution in value, under the circumstances of this case, is $2,500.
Conclusion
The court must decide this case upon its facts. The court must recognize, however, that accepting the plaintiff's methodology and figures as correct, the tort and insurance-based approach to property damage would seemingly have to be adjusted to a new reality, where an unknown but sizable claimed differential between pre-accident and post-repair values might require more vehicles to be deemed a total loss, on a prophylactic basis. Some diminution in value attributable to status as a repaired vehicle, after a moderately severe accident, is more likely than not to be a real world consideration, and the court cannot ignore that reality.
In round numbers, the plaintiff is claiming that her vehicle, after repairs, is worth only three quarters of what it was worth prior to the accident. While the plaintiff's expert identified possible long-term consequences of the vehicle having been repaired, as compared to a new vehicle, the court does not find it credible that it would have an impact of the magnitude as opined by the expert. Particularly given the magnitude of dollars (tens of thousands) in the value of the vehicle, an almost 25% discount for having been repaired seems excessive.
Again, the court recognizes the difficulty in getting objectively-reliable data, but that requires the court to evaluate the evidence offered with more than a mere grain of salt. The court recognizes that an expert may rely upon otherwise-inadmissible information/data, but the court as fact finder is entitled if not required to evaluate the credibility of the opinion based on the perceived reliability of the underlying data.
For all these reasons, then, the court enters judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2,830, consisting of $330 for loss of use of her vehicle during repairs, and $2,500 for diminution in value of the vehicle as a result of the repairs.