Opinion
HHDCV176073844S
09-04-2018
Wayne R. MEDA v. Tina DUFFY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
PECK, JTR
The plaintiff, Wayne R. Meda, initiated this lawsuit against the defendant, Tina Duffy, and others arising out of a collision to his vehicle, a 2014 328d Xdrive BMW ("the BMW"), seeking monetary damages for the dimunition of value to the vehicle as a result of the physical damage sustained. Duffy was the operator of a vehicle when, on January 13, 2016, she caused that vehicle to strike the rear of the BMW while it was parked and unoccupied at a Citgo gas station in Thomaston, Connecticut. There is no dispute that the defendant was negligent in the operation of her vehicle; her negligence caused the collision; and her insurance carrier paid for repairs to the vehicle. The only issue before the court is whether the plaintiff’s vehicle suffered a dimunition in value due to the accident, and, if so, how much.
The claims against the remaining original defendants, Keith A. Brown, Ryder Truck Rental, LT, LLT, and Black Horse Carriers, Inc., have been withdrawn. See entry # 105.
The cost of the repairs, performed by Mel’s Auto Work in Waterbury CT, was $6,790.90.
The defendant argued initially that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case was not ripe for adjudication until the plaintiff actually suffered a loss upon sale of the BMW. The defendant, however, did not brief this argument and therefore it is deemed abandoned. See Walker v. Commissioner of Correction, 176 Conn.App. 843, 856, 171 A.3d 525 (2017). In any event, the court rejects the defendant’s assertion and finds that the weight of authority in Connecticut is that any loss in the value of the vehicle was actually incurred at the time of the accident, not at a later date. See Littlejohn v. Elionsky, 130 Conn. 541, 542, 36 A.2d 52 (1944). See also Stults v. Palmer, 141 Conn. 709, 109 A.2d 592 (1954); Cassella v. Lenches, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-08-5020898-S (December 9, 2010, Hadden, Jr., J.); Chenevert v. Turek, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-12-6017590-S (November 25, 2013, Wiese, J.); Bartnick v. Stehr, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-13-6019999 (September 2, 2014, Abrams, J.).
A trial to the court was held on January 17, 2018, with final argument on May 8, 2018. The witnesses at trial were the plaintiff and his designated expert witness, Robert Collins of Wreck Check Assessments of Boston, who also produced a Vehicle Inspection and Valuation Report ("the report"). See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2. Based on the defendant’s post-trial brief and at final argument, the defendant argued that because the repairs made to the vehicle substantially restored the BMW to its former condition, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages beyond those already paid by the defendant for the cost of repair. Alternatively, the defendant argues that Collins’s report and his testimony took an ad hoc approach, were result oriented and, therefore, were unreliable and speculative. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that the proper consideration for the court concerning the issue of damages in the form of diminished value is whether the repairs to the vehicle substantially restored the BMW to its former condition and value as before the accident.
The proper statement of the measure of damages in this case is "the difference in value between the property before and after the loss, with interest from the date of loss." Littlejohn v. Elionsky, supra, 130 Conn. 543. In the present case, while there was evidence at trial that the damage to the BMW resulting from the accident was repaired in a quality and workmanlike manner, the court finds that the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that even though the vehicle was restored "to a sound and good state," nonetheless, the value of the vehicle was diminished as a result of the accident. As stated in Littlejohn, "[t]his falls short of a claim that the repairs had put the car in substantially the same condition as before the collision." Id.
As set forth above, at trial, the plaintiff offered the testimony and report of Collins, a master automobile appraiser licensed in Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Collins testified that he has in excess of thirty years experience managing collision repair facilities and appraising antique and other vehicles after accidents. In addition to having performed tens of thousands of appraisals in total, since 2000 he has performed thousands of diminished value appraisals. He has appraised cars to determine value, cost of repairs, and quality of repairs. He stated that in his expert opinion, in addition to the physical damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle, it also suffered a diminished value compared to similar vehicles that have not been involved in such an accident. As a foundation for his opinion, he determined the value of the car pre-accident, its value post-accident, and evaluated the change in condition based on comparable vehicles. He used vehicle book values, such as NADA, Kelly Blue Book, Edmonds, and other market value data from local dealers, private party sales, and other resources to determine his fair market data. He personally inspected the plaintiff’s vehicle, and reviewed the repair estimate and/or final invoice of the repairs. He assumed the repair work was completed in a quality and workmanlike manner. Nonetheless, he found that the vehicle had not been substantially restored to its pre-loss condition. His methodology has been peer reviewed by the International Automotive Appraisers Association and, as further detailed herein, approved by a majority of the Superior Court judges who have read his report or heard him testify. Based on his testimony, background, and experience, this court finds Collins’ opinions on these matters to be credible and persuasive.
In support of her position, the defendant relies almost entirely on Rigakos v. Oneill, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-16-6027436 (September 11, 2017, Povodator, J.), one of the more in-depth cases discussing Collins’s credibility as an expert. In that case, the court found that "the defendant’s expert’s opinion lack[ed] credibility, [and it] can only conclude that the plaintiff’s expert opinion is credible in a qualitative sense." The court’s major issue with both experts in that case was the method used in selecting data, i.e., the cars selected as comparable to the vehicle in question. The court ultimately rejected Collins’ claim that the diminution in value amounted to $6,000, 24% of the pre-accident value of the car, and instead awarded $2,500, 10% of the pre-accident value.
The defendant also cites Muckle v. Pressley and Golebiewski v. Carroll for the proposition that Collins has been found not to be credible in the past. In Muckle, Collins argued for a reduction in value of $5,537, or 28% of the pre-accident value of the car, and the defendant’s expert argued for a reduction in value of $2,350, or 10%. Muckle v. Pressley, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-15-6013126-S (March 30, 2017, Domnarski, J.) (64 Conn.L.Rptr. 188). The court discussed credibility generally, reasoning that "[i]t is well established that in a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ... The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony it reasonably believes to be credible ... It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony ... The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other." Id. Without explaining its reasoning, the court concluded that it "has carefully considered the testimony and reports of the experts and chooses to accept" the defendant’s expert’s 10% figure. Id.
In Golebiewski, Collins’s report advocated for a reduction in value figure of $9,535, or 34% of the pre-accident value. Golebiewski v. Carroll, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-12-6016326-S (September 24, 2013, V. Roche, J.) . The court, without going into a detailed analysis, did "not exclusively rely on either parties’ position, but finds from the credible facts that were introduced at trial ... that some measure of damages beyond cost of repair may be inferred ... [but] the court finds the plaintiff’s position to be too speculative to adopt its position in its entirety." Id. Therefore, the court awarded a diminished value of $3,500, or about 12% of the pre-accident value. Id.
The plaintiff cited several cases wherein Collins’s valuations were adopted, in whole or substantial part, by the court. See Ippolito v. McKelvey, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-15-6052262-S (January 18, 2017, Thim, J.T.R.) (court granted plaintiff’s full request for $11,951 [21%] diminished value based on Collins’s report but does not explain basis for crediting Collins’s opinion other than stating he "has over forty years of experience in the automotive industry, specializing in collision repair and valuations"); Levy v. Neumann, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-6064884 (October 2, 2017, Epstein, J.) (this two-paragraph decision concludes, without analysis, that "plaintiff’s expert [Collins] has testified convincingly, [and] this court awards plaintiff the amount of $6,612"); Feng v. Chen, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-15-6054429-S (October 18, 2017, Richards, J.) (court granted plaintiff’s full request for $3,321 [15%] based on Collins’s report with no analysis other than an observation of the credibility of witnesses at trial); Bartnik v. Stehr, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-13-6019999-S (September 2, 2014, Abrams, J.) (court found Collins credible as expert "[i]n spite of a number !of valid issues raised by defense counsel regarding Collins, including his longstanding professional relationship with plaintiff’s counsel," reasoning he aided court as trier of fact in reaching "independent determination" of diminished value of $7,825.00); Sheldon v. Soucy, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-12-6016107-S (April 7, 2014, Young, J.) (court found Collins credible but awarded $6,048 [26.1%], slightly less than plaintiff’s claim of $6,950 [29.9%], as more appropriate based on comparable cars, stating that restoring vehicle with severe structural damage to pre-accident condition does not restore pre-accident market value, a fact "particularly true" now that buyers routinely request vehicle history when purchasing used vehicles); Chenevert v. Turek, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-12-6017590-S (November 25, 2013, Wiese, J.) (court accepted Collins’s diminished value analysis of $4,283 and rejected defendant expert’s value of $1,000 without analysis); Corridino v. Kovacs, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6031646-S (October 9, 2013, Rittenband, J.T.R.) (without analysis, court found Collins credible and accepted his opinion of diminished value of $7,525 [53%] ).
In the present case, the court finds there was no real evidence to counter the testimony of Collins, who the court found to be uniquely knowledgeable and reasonable in his approach while the defendant presented only argument based on speculation. For these reasons, the court accepts Collins’ valuation in full.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that, as a result of the defendant’s negligence, in addition to the cost of repairing his vehicle, the plaintiff also suffered a diminished value in the amount of $4,896 (18% of the pre-accident value), plus costs.
The court notes that the plaintiff did not press his claim for loss of use or inconvenience.