Opinion
No. 11-06-00260-CR
Opinion filed May 22, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 238th District Court Midland County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CR31096.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The jury convicted Martin Mendoza of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child. The jury assessed his punishment at sixty years confinement for each aggravated sexual assault conviction and twenty years confinement for the indecency with a child conviction. The trial court set the two sixty-year sentences to run concurrently and the twenty-year sentence to run consecutively. We affirm. I. Background Facts L.B. was an eight-year-old girl who lives with her grandparents and two brothers. The police were called to L.B.'s residence to assist with a call for medical service. When Officer Jesus Robledo arrived, L.B.'s thirteen-year-old brother D.P. ran out of the house. Officer Robledo stopped him, and D.P. yelled, "Take me to jail, take me to jail." Officer Robledo investigated and learned that D.P. and his sister had undressed and that he was going to have sex with her but was unable to do so. Detective Joe Rogers participated in the investigation. He concluded that D.P. did not know what sex was and that he had not penetrated his sister. However, during a conversation with L.B., she told him that her father, Mendoza, had sexually assaulted her. Detective Rogers contacted CPS, and the child was taken to the Child Advocacy Center. L.B. told a forensic interviewer that her father had forced her to rub his private part and that he had stuck his private part in her private part and in her behind. Detective Rogers took L.B. to the hospital for a SANE examination. The SANE nurse found a notch in L.B.'s hymen that was consistent with a penetration more than seventy-two hours prior to the exam. II. Issues on Appeal Mendoza challenges his conviction with six issues. He argues that his conviction for indecency with a child is supported by legally insufficient evidence and that there is insufficient evidence to treat it as a separate crime from the aggravated sexual assault allegations. He also argues that the trial court incorrectly defined "intentionally" and "knowingly" in the court's charge. III. Analysis A. Legal Sufficiency. To convict Mendoza of indecency with a child, the State was required to prove that, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, he exposed his genitals to a child younger than seventeen. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (Vernon 2003). Mendoza concedes that there was evidence that he made L.B. touch his penis and move her hand up and down. He argues, however, that there was no evidence that this was done to arouse or gratify anyone's sexual desire. To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). The factfinder may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The jury can infer the requisite intent to arouse or gratify from conduct, remarks, and the surrounding circumstances. See McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). No oral expression of intent or visible evidence of sexual arousal is necessary. See Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd). Courts have found sufficient evidence of intent based upon the defendant's conduct alone in a number of circumstances. L.B. testified that her father would sometimes grab her when she went to the bathroom by his bedroom and that he would take her to bed. He would take her clothes off and touch her private part. On at least one occasion, he grabbed her hand, made her put it on his private part, and then made her move her hand up and down. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendoza's intent was to arouse or gratify his own sexual desire. Indeed, there is no other logical explanation for his conduct. Issue one is overruled. B. Double Jeopardy. Mendoza's second issue raises a double jeopardy claim. Mendoza argues that there is insufficient evidence to justify treating the indecency allegation as a separate offense because it and the aggravated assault allegations arise from the same incident. Mendoza acknowledges that this complaint was not raised in the trial court and, therefore, that he must show that the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record and that enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serve no legitimate state interest. Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Because Mendoza stood trial for all three offenses in the same trial, the record is fully developed. The trial court knew or should have known of a potential jeopardy issue. Saenz v. State, 131 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003), aff'd, 166 S.W.3d 270 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Accordingly, Mendoza has satisfied the first prong of the Gonzalez test. With respect to the second prong, we believe enforcement of the usual procedural default rules would serve no legitimate state purpose. The appropriate remedy for any double jeopardy violation is to vacate one of the convictions. Id. As a matter of state law, we are required to retain the conviction with the most serious punishment and vacate any remaining convictions that are the same for double jeopardy purposes. Id. A successful double jeopardy challenge in this case would not require a retrial or even a remand to the trial court. There are, therefore, no legitimate state interests that would be negatively impacted if Mendoza is allowed to raise his double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Among the protections afforded by this provision is the protection from multiple punishments for the same offense. Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Mendoza contends that this protection is implicated because indecency with a child is a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault and the evidence establishes that the conduct giving rise to the indecency allegation is the same conduct that constitutes one of the aggravated assault allegations. L.B., however, consistently described three separate incidents. Juan Urias, a forensic interviewer for the Midland Rape Crisis and Children's Advocacy Center, interviewed L.B. The interview was videotaped, and the video was played for the jury. During the interview, L.B. described three separate incidents of abuse. L.B. told Urias that her father placed his private part in her vagina and in her anus and that he made her place her hand on his private part. At trial, she testified that her father would grab her when she went to the restroom near his bedroom and take her to bed with him. She described how he put his private part inside hers and inside her behind. She also told the jury that her father grabbed her hand, made her put it on his private part, and then made her rub it up and down. She demonstrated for the jury what her father made her do with her hand. This is sufficient evidence to establish that the indecency conduct represents a separate offense and that Mendoza's double jeopardy rights have not been violated. Issue two is overruled. C. Charge Error. Mendoza complains that the trial court erred by defining the culpable mental states of intentionally and knowingly as both a result of conduct and a nature of conduct element. We will analyze the trial court's charge on the indecency and aggravated sexual assault allegations separately. 1. Indecency With a Child. Three conduct elements may be involved in an offense: (1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the result of the conduct; or (3) circumstances surrounding the conduct. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon 2003). The jury charge defined "intentionally" and "knowingly" as follows:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.Indecency with a child is a nature of conduct offense. Caballero v. State, 927 S.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd). The charge, therefore, should not have included the result of conduct language in its definitions. This is not error if the application paragraph correctly states the elements of the offense. Washington v. State, 930 S.W.2d 695, 699-700 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no pet.). The charge instructed the jury:
According to these instructions and definitions, you will find the Defendant guilty of the offense of INDECENCY WITH A CHILD as alleged in Count III of the indictment if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, MARTIN MENDOZA, on or about the 16th day of November, 2002 through the 16th day of November, 2004, in the County of Midland and State of Texas, as alleged in the indictment did then and there with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the said MARTIN MENDOZA, engage in sexual contact with [L.B.], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the spouse of the said MARTIN MENDOZA, by then and there causing and aiding the said [L.B.], an innocent and non-responsible person, to touch a part of the genitals of the said MARTIN MENDOZA.Mendoza contends that this instruction did not cure the error because it fails to specify the required culpable mental state. Mendoza acknowledges that he must show egregious harm because he did not object to the charge at trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). He contends that egregious harm is shown because he received a twenty-year sentence for indecency by contact merely by engaging in contact with L.B. The risk of an improper instruction is that it allows the jury to wrongfully convict the defendant or to punish him for noncriminal conduct. That risk was not present in this case. The jury either believed L.B.'s accusation that her father made her touch and rub his penis or it did not. There were no other fact questions — such as accident or mistake — that made a distinction between result or conduct behavior relevant. Cf. McMillan v. State, 926 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1996, pet. ref'd) (assuming jury charge in indecency with a child case was incorrect, the error was not harmful because the only contested issue was whether the defendant had rubbed the minor's private parts). Because the conduct of which L.B. accused Mendoza constitutes indecency with a child, he has failed to show egregious harm, and we overrule issues three and four. 2. Aggravated Sexual Assault. Mendoza also argues that the trial court's inclusion of both culpable mental states in the definitions impacted the jury's consideration of the aggravated sexual assault allegations. Mendoza commendably acknowledges that, in Baker v. State, 94 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.), this court held that aggravated sexual assault of a child involves both result of conduct and nature of conduct elements. Mendoza asks us to reconsider that holding and to hold that aggravated sexual assault of a minor is a result of conduct offense. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not characterized sexual assault of a minor as a conduct or result of conduct offense. For the reasons stated in Baker, we continue to believe that it involves elements of both and, therefore, that the trial court did not err by utilizing the full statutory definitions of intentionally and knowingly. Id. at 690-91. Furthermore, even were we convinced that the trial court's charge was erroneous, no harm is shown. Mendoza testified during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and denied any wrongdoing. No alternative or mitigating explanations were offered. Consequently, the trial court's definitions of intentionally and knowingly did not alter the jury's assessment of this issue. Issues five and six are overruled. IV. Holding The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner.
See, e.g., Cunningham v. State, 726 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (accused forced minor to take off her clothes, took down his own pants, placed his finger on her vagina, and forced her to lick his penis); Jacquez v. State, 579 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (stranger grabbed minor male victims, dragged them behind school building, and forced them to "touch and scrub" his penis); Ferguson v. State, 579 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (accused forced stepdaughter to take his penis in her mouth and move her head up and down); Hohn v. State, 538 S.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) (adult male companion of mother made her child take off clothes, get in his bed, and perform an act of oral sodomy on him).