Opinion
02 CV 83 (JG)
February 23, 2004
ALADIN MEDUNJANIN, New York, for Petitioner Pro se
RICHARD A. BROWN, Jennifer Hagan, New York, for Respondent
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Aladin Medunjanin ("A. Medunjanin"), an inmate at the Sing Sing Correctional Facility, seeks habeas corpus relief from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial in state court. I held oral argument by telephone conference on February 20, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1996 and continuing over the course of approximately seventeen months, A. Medunjanin sexually molested his then-nine-year-old son Armin Medunjanin ("Armin" or the "victim") at their home. A. Medunjanin threatened to kill Armin if he told anyone of this. In 1998, several months after A, Medunjanin had moved out of the family home, Armin's younger sister saw Armin behaving in an inappropriate sexual manner with her twin brother (Armin's younger brother). Armin's sister informed their mother, Zumretta Medunjanin ("Z. Medunjanin"), who in turn spoke to Armin about his behavior. Armin told Z. Medunjanin that he had learned that behavior from A. Medunjanin. Z. Medunjanin called the police, and A. Medunjanin was arrested. After he was informed of his rights, Medunjanin wrote a statement denying his guilt and accusing Z. Medunjanin of acting in a sexual manner with Armin. A. Medunjanin was charged with four counts of sodomy in the first degree, two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, one count of engaging in a course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, two counts of incest, and one count of endangering the welfare of a child.Prior to trial, the government sought leave to offer evidence that A. Medunjanin engaged in a continuous course of conduct that included verbal threats and physical abuse of Armin, A. Medunjanin's two other children, and Z. Medunjanin. The government argued that this evidence completed the narrative of events and was important to explain Armin's delayed outcry. The government also argued that, as the threats and abuse occurred during the same period of time as the sexual assaults, they were part of the narrative of the case. Over A. Medunjanin's objection that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, the court ruled that it would allow Armin to testify about the threats made against him and the incidents he observed of A. Medunjanin physically abusing his mother and the other children. (Nov. 16, 1998 Hr'g Tr. at 15, 18.) The court found that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect (Id. at 18.)
A. Medunjanin was convicted by a jury on all counts, and, on December 16, 1998, was sentenced to indeterminate terms of from twelve-and-one-half to twenty-five years for the sodomy and course-of-conduct convictions, two-and-one-third to seven years for the sexual abuse convictions, and one year for the endangerment conviction. All sentences were to run concurrently.
On December 16, 1998, A. Medunjanin appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, Second Department, claiming that (1) the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by admitting testimony that he abused his wife and by failing to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding that testimony, and (2) his sentence was excessive. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed A. Medunjanin's judgment of conviction:
Evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct toward the victim's mother was properly introduced into evidence. The challenged evidence was admissible because it was probative of the victim's state of mind and on the issue of delayed outcry. The probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to the defendant.
The defendant's contention that the court improperly failed to instruct the jury regarding the limited purpose of testimony of his prior misconduct is unpreserved for appellate review. The defendant never requested such a limiting instruction. In any event, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming proof of guilt.
The defendant's sentence was neither harsh nor excessive.People v. Medunjanin, 716 N.Y.S.2d 314, 314 (2d Dep't 2000). Application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied on December 29, 2000. People v. Medunjanin, 95 N.Y.2d 966 (2000) (Levine, J.).
In the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Medunjanin raises the same two claims he raised on direct appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") has narrowed the scope of federal habeas review of state convictions where the state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the AEDPA standard, which applies to habeas petitions filed after AEDPA's enactment in 1996, the reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "clearly established Federal law" to mean "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law if a state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case."Id. "In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a `governing legal principle' to `a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct 2527, 2535 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 So. Ct 1166, 1175 (2003)).
Under the latter standard, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S.Ct. 1, 4 (2003) (per curiam) ("Where . . . the state court's application of governing federal law is challenged, it must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable."); Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2535 (same). InterpretingWilliams, the Second Circuit has added that although "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)).
This standard of review applies whenever the state court has adjudicated the federal claim on the merits, regardless of whether it has alluded to federal law in its decision. As the Second Circuit stated inSellan v. Kuhlman:
For the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court "adjudicate[s]" a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim "on the merits," and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim — even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001).
In addition, a state court's determination of a factual issue is presumed to be correct, and is unreasonable only where the petitioner meets the burden of "rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
However, "even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. . . . A federal court can disagree with a state court's credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence."Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003)).
B. Medunjanin's Claims
1. The Testimony That Medunjanin Assaulted His Wife
a. The Admission of the Testimony
A. Medunjanin contends that Armin's testimony that he had witnessed A. Medunjanin assault Z. Medunjanin denied him his right to a fair trial.
Erroneous evidentiary rulings by a state trial court generally do not rise to the level of constitutional violations upon which a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus. See Jenkins v. Bara, 663 F. Supp. 891, 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1977)). Erroneously admitted evidence must be "crucial, critical, [and] highly significant." Collins v. Scully, 755 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1985). In this regard, petitioner bears a "heavy burden." Roberts v. Scully, 875 F. Supp. 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd. 71 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). However, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where "the evidence in question `was sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction or to remove reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it.'" Johnson v. Ross, 955 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Collins, 755 F.2d at 19). This test applies post-AEDPA. See Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
At a hearing prior to trial, the court, after argument and over defense objection, ruled that Armin could "testify regarding threats that were made against him [or that] he is aware of on the issue of the delay in outcry." (Nov. 16, 1998 Hr'g Tr. at 15.) The court later specified that it was relying on "a great deal of authority regarding battered child syndrome and issues of outcry regarding introduction of testimony to explain the delay in outcry." (Id. at 18.) The court also held that "the testimony is necessary and its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect." (Id.)
At trial, Armin testified that A. Medunjanin hurt him by smacking him and pulling his hair. His testimony continued as follows:
Q Did you ever see him do anything like that to your younger sister?
A No.
Q Did you ever see him do anything like that to your younger brother?
A No.
Q Did you ever see him do anything like that to your mom?
A I walked in once.
Q When you walked in once, what room did you walk into?
A My mom's room.
Q What did you see?
A The same thing.
Q What did you see your father doing to your mother when you walked in on that date?
A The same thing he was doing to me.
Q Can you tell us what that was? Can you tell us what you saw him do?
A He touched her. . . . .
Q Armin, you said that you walked into your mother and father's room and you saw him doing things to her that he had done to you. Can you tell us what you remember seeing? Withdrawn.
Did you ever see him do anything to her hair?
A Yes.
Q What did you see him do to her hair?
A Pull it.
Q Did you ever see him do anything to her nose?
A Yes.
Q What did you see your father do to your mother's nose?
A He like twisted it.
Q Was he saying anything to her at the time this was going on?
A No.
Q Do you remember him doing anything like that to your brother or sister that you saw?
A No.
(Tr. at 224-26.)
As set forth above, the Appellate Division held that this evidence was properly admitted "because it was probative of the victim's state of mind and on the issue of delayed outcry. The probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to the defendant." Medunjanin, 716 N.Y.S.2d at 314. I agree. First, Armin's testimony was at most only slightly prejudicial to A. Medunjanin. He testified that he had not witnessed A. Medunjanin hurt his younger siblings. As for Z. Medunjanin, Armin testified only that he once saw A. Medunjanin pull her hair and twist her nose. While this testimony obviously did not help A. Medunjanin's case, it certainly did not remove any reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it. Furthermore, as the Appellate Division recognized in affirming A. Medunjanin's conviction, Armin's testimony was probative evidence explaining his delayed reporting of A. Medunjanin's sexual acts. As the Appellate Division's holding was not unreasonable, this claim does not justify issuance of the writ.
b. The Trial Court's Failure to Give a Limiting Instruction
i. Procedural Default
Federal habeas review of a state prisoner's claim is prohibited if a state court judgment denying the claim is based on an "adequate and independent state ground." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261 (1992);Levine v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 44 F.3d 121, 126 (2d. Cir. 1995). A procedural default in state court is an adequate and independent ground barring federal habeas review, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744, 750 (1991) (noting the state's interest in "channeling the resolution of claims to the most appropriate forum, in finality, and in having the opportunity to correct [its] own errors'"): see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376, 381 (2002) (noting the existence of a "small category" of "exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question").
A defaulted claim will be considered by the court upon a showing of cause and prejudice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989). A petitioner may establish cause by showing "`that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, . . . or that some interference by officials . . . made compliance impracticable.'" Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (ellipses in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)). To satisfy the prejudice requirement, the alleged error must have worked to the petitioner's "actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Torres v. Senkowski, 316 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). If the petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim, i.e., "that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he has been convicted." Dunham v. Travis, 313 F.3d 724, 730 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)).
A. Medunjanin concedes that he never requested a limiting instruction regarding the challenged testimony at trial. (Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 18, Medunjanin, 716 N.Y.S.2d 314 (No. 1998-11670) ("It is conceded that defense counsel never requested a limiting instruction or excepted to its absence. Nevertheless, in view of the nature of the charges appellant faced, and the pervasiveness of the prejudicial testimony, this Court should reverse appellant's conviction in the interest of justice, and order a new trial.")). A. Medunjanin offers no explanation for this failure. Furthermore, even if he had been prevented in some manner from requesting the instruction, it would still be necessary to demonstrate that he suffered an "actual and substantial disadvantage" to his case or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted. A. Medunjanin offers no basis for drawing either conclusion. In any event, even if I could review his challenge to the instruction, the Appellate Division's holding that the trial court's error was harmless was not unreasonable, as discussed below.
ii. Harmless Error
In order to obtain habeas relief based on an error in the state court's instructions to the jury, A. Medunjanin must show that the error violated a right guaranteed by federal constitutional law. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973); Casillas v. Scully, 769 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1985). The relevant issue is not whether the instruction was "undesirable" or "erroneous," but rather "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. "In weighing the prejudice from an allegedly improper charge, a reviewing court must view the instruction in its total context" Brooks v. Ricks, No. 00-CV-3746, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13646, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47).
The Appellate Division held that the trial court's error in failing to provide a limiting instruction "was harmless in light of the overwhelming proof of guilt." Medunjanin, 716 N.Y.S.2d at 314. I agree. At trial, Armin testified that A. Medunjanin orally and anally sodomized him on myriad occasions and threatened to kill Armin if he told anyone. (Tr. at 210-223, 226-27.) There was evidence that, during the period of time after the incidents of sexual abuse, Armin's physical condition changed and he became withdrawn, (See id. at 209, 217, 236 (Armin testifying that the incidents with A. Medunjanin began in the summer before the fourth grade, a grade he had to repeat; he had done well in the third grade), 282-83 (Z. Medunjanin testifying that Armin became "withdrawn" and began stuttering, and that Armin had physical problems because A. Medunjanin was beating him).) A nurse testified at trial that Armin's medical records indicated that his anus was "funnel-shaped," a "soft sign" of anal sodomy in a child. (Id. at 272-73.) A child-abuse expert testified that a delayed outcry and accidental disclosure are common in child-abuse cases. (Id. at 341-47.) Other testimony showed that Armin disclosed the sexual abuse after his mother confronted him regarding his sexually inappropriate manner with his younger brother. (Id. at 229-33, 286-87.) In light of the overwhelming evidence of A. Medunjanin's guilt presented at trial, I find that the trial court's failure to provide a limiting instruction did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), and indeed was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, this claim does not justify issuance of the writ.
2. Excessive Sentence
A. Medunjanin's sentence of twelve-and-one-half to twenty-five years in prison fell within the maximum sentence authorized by New York law for his crimes, and therefore does not qualify for consideration as excessive under the Eighth Amendment. See White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992) ("No federal constitutional issue is presented where . . . the sentence is within the range prescribed by state law."). I also note that A. Medunjanin's sentence is not grossly disproportionate and is therefore not unconstitutional. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied. Because A. Medunjanin has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, no certificate of appealability shall issue.
So Ordered.
Prior to the passage of AEDPA in 1996, federal habeas courts applied the harmless error standard established in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993), under which a petitioner was required to show that the constitutional error "had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"; in other words, "actual prejudice." Id., at 637. It is an open question in this circuit, however, whether Brecht survives AEDPA, or whether now a federal habeas court should determine instead whether the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of the Chapman v. California harmless error standard, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). See Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178, 185 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2001); Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 101 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2001). Because I conclude that A. Medunjanin has failed to establish harm under either standard, I need not decide this question.