Opinion
December 16, 1993
Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
At the time claimant was hired in February 1990 as a security guard, he was also working as a substitute teacher. During the balance of the 1990 school year, he worked evenings 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 A.M. and weekends at the security guard position in order to accommodate his teaching schedule. In the summer he switched to the night shift, 12:00 A.M. to 8:00 A.M. According to claimant, prior to commencement of the 1990-1991 school year, he entered into an agreement with his employer to return to the former evening schedule and, when the employer failed to honor that agreement, he was forced to quit. The employer controverted claimant's testimony, indicating that claimant expressly declined an offer to return to his former evening schedule, preferring instead to work an 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift, and when that work shift did not become available he quit. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board credited the employer's testimony, holding that claimant quit to make himself available for substitute teaching assignments, which did not rise to the level of good cause for leaving his job. Claimant appeals.
As a general rule, an employee's preference for particular work hours does not constitute good cause for leaving employment (see, e.g., Matter of Novak [Hudacs], 190 A.D.2d 979; Matter of McEvoy [New York Tel. Co. Roberts], 89 A.D.2d 1049). While claimant asserts that the presence of an agreement with his employer regarding hours constitutes sufficiently compelling circumstances to remove this case from the general rule, the Board rejected the existence of an agreement and found instead that claimant left in favor of another job. Inasmuch as the Board's determination constitutes a credibility determination within its sole province to resolve (see, e.g., Matter of Baker [Hartnett], 147 A.D.2d 790, appeal dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 714) and is otherwise supported by substantial evidence, we find lacking the existence of any basis for us to disturb these findings. We note as a final matter that leaving employment in favor of another job, or because a claimant is unable to concurrently work on two jobs, has been held not to constitute good cause for leaving employment (see, e.g., Matter of Koushakjian [Hudacs], 190 A.D.2d 938; Matter of Bates [Catherwood], 33 A.D.2d 860).
Claimant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for review.
Mercure, Crew III and White, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.