Opinion
No. 05-19-00326-CR
05-20-2020
RAYNALDO MARTINEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MA1724740-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Pedersen, III, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Evans
After a jury trial, Raynaldo Martinez appeals from his misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. The trial court assessed appellant's punishment at six days' confinement in jail. In two issues, appellant generally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings that he acted intentionally and that his conduct was voluntary. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
In May 2017, appellant visited his daughters' school for an awards ceremony on the last day of the school year. Appellant brought his two young sons with him. One of the sons had a toy gun in his possession when he entered the school which was against school policy. Appellant placed the gun in his left back pocket and proceeded outside to the school playground with his two sons. Dean of Students Todd Evans testified that he had gotten a text from a staff member that there was a parent on campus with a gun in their back pocket. Teacher Holly Crone testified that she was in the cafeteria having lunch with her students when several students reported there was a man with a gun outside. Crone went to a window and saw a man playing with what appeared to be his children and the man had a gun in his hand, "[a]nd he was kind of waving it around . . . kind of directing the children . . . ." According to Crone, the gun had some kind of color on the tip and she believed it was a toy gun. Nevertheless, she called 911 "to get professionals to check it out." Dean Evans put the school on lockdown.
On her way to the cafeteria, Crone was stopped by another teacher who indicated that students were saying there was a man with a gun, but neither teacher had seen anything.
Officer Matlick, a 34-year veteran with the Garland police force, testified he was on patrol in a marked patrol car and in uniform when he received a call that there was a man at a school with a gun. Follow-up notes on the call said man was with a couple of kids at the playground with a gun in his pocket. When he arrived at the scene, two other police officers, Detective Duncan and Officer Hallows, proceeded behind the school where the playground was while Matlick headed in the opposite direction. Matlick spotted the man with the gun, whom he identified at trial as appellant, in the front of the school walking with two children toward the front doors and near some big plate glass windows. Matlick could see the butt of a black gun sticking out of appellant's back pocket. After radioing that he had located the suspect, Matlick exited his vehicle, drew his pistol and engaged appellant with verbal commands. Matlick yelled to appellant to stop and put his hands on the wall, but appellant just kept walking. According to Matlick, appellant looked at him "like, I don't care who you are." Eventually, appellant put one hand on the wall, the hand on the same side as the gun.
The officer had received notes from the original caller that one of the man's arms was paralyzed.
Although Matlick commanded appellant to face the wall, appellant kept turning around and looking at the officer as he got closer. Then, appellant reached back, grabbed the gun, threw it down to the ground, and turned around. Matlick estimated he was about twenty to thirty yards away from appellant. Matlick then holstered his gun, drew his taser, and started moving toward appellant. One of the children did not move while the other walked toward the front door. Appellant walked off in the opposite direction from the walking child. Although Matlick was telling him to stop, appellant continued to walk. As appellant approached the corner of the building, the other two officers turned the corner and caught him. Appellant started to "tussle" with the officers. After the officers got appellant on the wall, he still refused to comply and kept pushing off with his legs and his body and arm, trying to get away, while the officers tried to pat him down and secure his hands. Once the two officers had a hold of appellant, Matlick returned to the front to retrieve the gun. Upon inspecting the gun, Matlick determined it was a toy.
Crone saw Matlick interact with appellant from the window. She stated the officer "was in a stance that nonverbally would let you know that he required your attention" but appellant's hands were "not in the social norm of what do you need, kind of thing" and was instead moving his hands as if he was having a conversation.
Detective Duncan also testified, largely corroborating Officer Matlick's version of events. Duncan saw Matlick giving the man identified as appellant commands to face the wall and place his hand on the wall, but appellant kept turning toward Matlick. As appellant walked towards Duncan and Hallows, they approached him and put him against the wall to handcuff him and search him for weapons. Appellant wouldn't follow commands and pushed off the wall and was turning. At that point, when the officers couldn't control him against the wall, they maneuvered him onto the ground and the two officers were on top of him. Appellant continued to try to get away from underneath them, moving his legs around and twisting. After wrestling with him for about thirty seconds to a minute, the officers were able to handcuff appellant. Even after he was handcuffed, appellant continued to "squirm around." Duncan placed his knee on appellant's shoulder blade to keep his shoulder pinned to the ground but when appellant complained he could not breathe, Duncan stood the man up and took him to his squad car. As a result of the struggle, Duncan received some minor scratches to his forearms, but they did not require any treatment. EMS was called after appellant complained of having an asthma attack. After examining appellant, EMS determined he was not having an asthma attack and did not require treatment.
Other witnesses at the trial included appellant's wife and the school's attendance clerk who both testified they saw appellant with the toy gun at school. Neither of these witnesses, however, saw appellant's interactions with the officers as he was being detained. In addition to testimony, the court admitted into evidence several maps of the school, the 911 calls, several pictures of the gun, and photographs of appellant after he was arrested.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found appellant guilty as charged in the information. The trial court then assessed punishment at six days' confinement. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In two issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he asserts the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted intentionally and that his conduct was voluntary. We do not agree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We assume the fact-finder resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the trier of fact's determinations of witness credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence. See Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
The information by which appellant was charged stated that appellant did "intentionally prevent and obstruct" persons he knew to be peace officers "from effecting the arrest or search or transportation of the defendant, by using force against [the officers]." A person commits an offense under section 38.03 of the penal code "if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another by using force against the peace officer or another." TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.03(a). "Using force against the peace officer or another" has been construed by the Court of Criminal Appeals to mean "violence or physical aggression, or an immediate threat thereof, in the direction of and/or into contact with, or in opposition or hostility to, a peace officer or another." Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 171. One who actively "pull[s] against" the force of an officer who is attempting to arrest him is resisting arrest. See Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a). Intent may be inferred from the acts, words and conduct of appellant. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In addition to proving appellant's requisite mental state, the evidence must also prove that appellant voluntarily engaged in an act, an omission, or possession. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.01(a). Voluntariness refers only to the actor's physical body movements and does not necessarily go to the ultimate act. See Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 905-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Here, there was evidence that appellant used force to resist being detained by pushing off the wall, turning his body and then, once on the ground, using his legs and body to avoid being handcuffed. Appellant's actions immediately preceding his apprehension including actively disregarding Officer Matlick's commands when first confronted and walking away from Matlick is evidence that appellant's conduct was intentional. We further conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that appellant's physical body movements were not the result of physical reflex or convulsion and were not the product of unconsciousness, hypnosis or other "nonvolitional impetus." See Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Accordingly, we resolve appellant's first and second issues against him.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.
/David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
190326F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MA1724740-A.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices Bridges and Pedersen, III participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered May 20, 2020