Opinion
No. 0903023381 MJB.
Submitted: June 30, 2010.
Decided: August 30, 2010.
Upon Appeal from Court of Common Pleas. AFFIRMED.
Miguel Acosta Martinez, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Appellant.
Sarita Wright, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
In this pro se appeal, Miguel Acosta Martinez ("Appellant") appeals a criminal conviction from the Court of Common Pleas. Below is this Court's decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was charged by Information with five separate counts: (1) Receiving Stolen Property under $1,000.00; (2) Removing or Affixing License or Registration with the Intent to Misrepresent Identity; (3) Operating an Unregistered Vehicle; (4) Fictitious or Cancelled Registration Card, Number Plate, or Tag; and (5) Driving While Suspended or Revoked. The State entered a Nolle Prosequi on the Receiving Stolen Property charge prior to trial. On November 23, 2009, a jury found Appellant guilty on the remaining four charges.
In accordance with the briefing schedule set forth, on May 11, 2010, Appellant filed his Opening Brief. The State submitted its Answering Brief on June 8, 2010. Appellant did not file a Reply Brief.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Appellant's Contentions
On appeal, Appellant seeks the reversal of his convictions. Appellant requests that "the indictment be dismissed, because there were too many errors," including: (1) the arresting officer did not pull Appellant over; (2) the Receiving Stolen Property charge was dismissed; (3) the officer did not have the necessary information about Appellant's vehicle during the trial; (4) Appellant's summons to appear, issued by the Court of Common Pleas, stated "NO ACTIVE CHARGES;" and (5) at the time of the trial, the arresting officer had previously arrested the Appellant, and those charges were also pending.
Appellant's Br. at 1. Furthermore, there was a brief discussion at trial regarding whether Officer Lucas arrested Appellant prior to the traffic stop.
At the trial, Appellant cross examined Officer Lucas about a ticket that was issued in December 2008. Officer Lucas confirmed that he had, indeed, ticketed and arrested Appellant in December 2008. The Court determined that any questions regarding the earlier issued ticket were inappropriate as they had no bearing on the instant March 29, 2009 traffic arrest.
Appellee's Contentions
Appellee argues that the Appellant's appeal is without merit and requests that this Court affirm the Appellant's conviction. In support of this argument, Appellee contends that (1) Appellant's claim that the arresting officer did not pull him over is not properly before this Court because Appellant did not raise the issue at trial; (2) the State's Nolle Prosequi of the Receiving Stolen Property charge is not relevant to the remaining charges in the Information that have been established beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the arresting officer's testimony regarding his record check of the Appellant's vehicle was sufficient to support the trial court's findings; (4) the "NO ACTIVE CHARGES" language on the summons issued to Appellant is not relevant to the remaining charges in the Information that have been established beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) the fact that the arresting officer had a case pending with the Appellant did not constitute plain error.
State's Ans. Br. at 4.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statutory authority for Superior Court appellate review of Court of Common Pleas decisions in criminal actions is provided by 11 Del. C. § 5301(c). Such appeals to the Superior Court shall be reviewed on the record and shall not be tried de novo. Upon reviewing appeals from Court of Common Pleas decisions, this Court sits as an intermediate appellate court. Hence, this Court's role on appeal is to correct errors of law and to review the factual findings of the court below to determine if they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.In reviewing the appeal of a conviction, this Court does not apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. The "test" on appeal "is not whether the defendant is guilty . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial court. Under this standard of review, this Court must defer to findings if "any rational trier of fact could have found the evidence sufficient to establish the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, if substantial evidence exists for a finding of fact, this Court must accept that ruling, as it must not make its own factual conclusions, weigh evidence, or make credibility determinations. This Court may only make contradictory findings of fact in reaching its own determination when the record below indicates that the trial judge's findings are clearly wrong and the Court is convinced that a mistake has been made which, in justice, must be corrected.
State v. Cagle, 332 A.2d 140, 142 (Del. 1974).
Cagle, 332 A.2d at 142 (citing Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A2.d 671 (Del. 1971)).
Casey v. State, 2000 WL 33179684 (citing Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1988)).
Fiori v. State, 2004 WL 1284205 (Del. Super.) (citing Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d 64 (Del. 1965)).
Fiori, 2004 WL 1284205 at 1.
As a general matter, an appellate court will decline to review any issue not raised and fairly presented to the trial court for decision. However, where substantial rights are jeopardized and fairness of trial imperiled, an appellate court will apply the plain error standard of review. The doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the fact of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental and which either clearly deprives the accused of substantial rights, or which clearly show manifest injustice. Such a determination must be so clear that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the Defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.
Stevenson v. State, 1999 WL 464524 (Del. Super. 1999).
Id.
Id.
ANALYSIS
Appellant first argues that the Information should be dismissed because the police officer did not pull Appellant's vehicle over. In the instant matter, the officer testified that he was "conducting proactive patrol of the area" on the afternoon of the traffic stop. The officer then testified that he "observed a red BMW M5 traveling westbound on Lea Boulevard, traveling towards Market Street" and that after conducting a computer inquiry on the registration that was displayed on the vehicle, "the inquiry came back that the registration plate belonged to a 2003 Pontiac Grand Am as well as had been flagged as being reported stolen." At trial, Appellant had the opportunity to cross examine the officer. On cross-examination, the officer stated that he turned on his emergency lights to conduct a traffic stop but did not have the opportunity to pull Appellant over because Appellant exited his vehicle at a Shell gas station while the officer was "stuck at the red light." The officer testified that, after exiting the market at the gas station, Appellant walked over to him, at which time he took Appellant into custody.Based on the testimony, this Court finds that substantial evidence exists for a jury to convict Appellant of the charge and that it was reasonable for the jury to accept the testimony that the officer observed Appellant driving the vehicle, that the officer conducted a computer inquiry on the registration, and that, as a result, the officer contacted the Appellant. This Court does not find any material defect which deprived Appellant of substantial rights or which show manifest injustice. Accordingly, this Court cannot find that any plain error occurred with the admission of the testimony regarding the circumstance of the encounter between Appellant and the officer.
The Appellant also argues that the Information should be dismissed because the State entered a Nolle Prosequi as to the charge of Receiving Stolen Property. This Court finds that the dismissal of that particular charge is not relevant to Appellant's trial in the Court of Common Pleas and the resulting conviction on the remaining charges. Pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 2504, the State Department of Justice and Attorney General have the duty and responsibility to decide who shall be prosecuted and for what offense. The mere fact that the State Department of Justice and Attorney General exercised their discretion in entering the Nolle Prosequi is not grounds for reversal and is not relevant to this Court's decision regarding Appellant's conviction. Accordingly, Appellant's argument on this issue does not prevail.
Appellant's Br. at 1.
Trial Tr. 20. (the record reflects that the State entered a dismissal of this charge because the owner of the tag did not appear at the courthouse on the day of the trial).
Appellant next argues that the officer's testimony regarding the check of the vehicle's registration was not sufficient to support the findings made by the jury that the vehicle did not have the proper registration. The record reflects that the officer conducted a computer inquiry, which established that the registration plate of the vehicle that Appellant was driving was stolen, and further that the Appellant admitted that "the tags were bad."
Appellant's Br. at 1.
Trial Tr. 6.
Trial Tr. 8.
The Delaware Supreme Court has previously found that an officer's testimony as to what was discovered during a routine record check of the registration of a vehicle is properly admitted pursuant to Delaware Rules of Evidence 803(8). The same reasoning would apply under Delaware Rules of Evidence 803(10) if no record was found. Accordingly, this Court finds there was clearly sufficient evidence to support the findings made by the jury.
Hickson v. State, 2003 WL 1857529 (Del. 2003).
Appellant also argues that the Information must be dismissed because the language "NO ACTIVE CHARGES" was listed on Appellant's summons. Upon reviewing the submissions, this Court finds that Appellant failed to raise this issue at trial. As a general matter, an appellate court will decline to review any issue not raised and fairly presented to the trial court for decision. Since Appellant did not raise the issue at trial, this issue is not properly before this Court. Furthermore, even if this Court concluded that the issue is properly before the Court, this Court finds that no legal issue is raised by this argument. The summons, a court-issued document, was never introduced into evidence at trial and error cannot be claimed based on such a document. The Court finds that the general information generated in a summons is not critical to, or an element of, any of the charged offenses. Accordingly, this Court finds that this argument was not raised and fairly presented to the trial court for decision, and does not create a factual issue or legal issue that justifies dismissal of the Information or reversal of the conviction.
Appellant's Br. at 1.
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773 (Del. 1980).
Id.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. 7 (the Information or Indictment is a written statement advising of the offense charged).
Lastly, Appellant argues that the Information must be dismissed because, at the time of trial, the officer had another case pending with Appellant. While Appellant raised this issue at trial, Appellant did not provide any reasoning showing that a rational trier of fact could not have found the evidence, proffered at trial, sufficient to establish the elements of these charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant's Br. at 1.
During the cross examination of the officer, Appellant attempted to use a ticket issued to appellant by the same officer in 2008. The Court asked what relevance the ticket had in relation to the March 29, 2009 traffic stop and subsequent arrest. Appellant replied, "Because he has known me. He didn't pull me over for no thing." During Appellant's closing argument, he argued that he had been an employee for the City of Wilmington for six and a half years, and he "has never been humiliated by any minority officers ever only Caucasian officers. Although not specifically stated, the Court believes what Appellant was trying to argue is that the officer was biased in making the traffic stop and subsequent arrest.
Trial Tr. 14.
Id.
Trial Tr. 15.
Trial Tr. 23.
Officer Lucas is Caucasian.
In the instant matter, the arresting officer had personal knowledge of the events on the date of the charged offenses, and was available to testify regarding them. The fact that the officer had arrested Appellant in the past and that the charges in that case were still pending goes to the persuasiveness and credibility of the officer's testimony. To the extent that Appellant challenged the sufficiency and credibility of the officer's testimony concerning his observations on the date of the charged offenses, the jury found the officer's testimony credible.
In an appeal, this Court does not make its own determination regarding credibility. Those determinations are for the trier of fact, and the jury rejected Appellant's arguments that the officer was biased. This challenge to the conviction also fails.