Summary
considering the Appeals Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by the Board
Summary of this case from Giandonato v. Inn at MontchaninOpinion
C.A. No. 02A-10-008 RRC.
Submitted: April 1, 2003.
Decided: June 6, 2003.
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.
AFFIRMED.
Linda Majaya, pro se
Paul J. Dougherty III, Esquire, Attorney for Sojourners' Place
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney for the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
ORDER
This 6th day of June, 2003 it appears to the Court that:
1. Linda Majaya ("Claimant") applied for unemployment compensation benefits following termination of her employment with Sojourners' Place ("Employer"). Claimant's application was denied at all administrative levels on the ground that Claimant had been discharged from her employment for just cause in connection therewith, pursuant to title 19, section 3315(2) of the Delaware Code. Following the adverse decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board"), Claimant filed a pro se appeal in this Court. For the reasons below, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
Section 3315(2) provides in pertinent part that a claimant is disqualified from benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work and for each week thereafter. . . ."
2. In affirming the Appeals Referee's decision, the Board adopted the factual findings that the referee had made; accordingly, this Court will review also the Appeals Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, upon appeal from a denial of unemployment insurance benefits, this Court is limited to consideration of the record that was before the Board.
See Boughton v. Dept. of Labor, 300 A.2d 25, 26 (Del.Super.Ct. 1972) (holding that when the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board adopts the findings of an Appeals Referee, a reviewing court "relies [also] upon the [r]eferee's determination[s] . . .").
Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976); see also SUPER.CT.CIV.R. 72(g) (providing that unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, appeals to this Court shall be heard and determined solely on the record below).
The Court therefore begins by restating the factual findings made by the Appeals Referee, substantially in their entirety:
The [C]laimant was employed by Sojourners' Place from November 1, 1999 until February 14, 2002[,] when she was discharged. At the time of the [C]laimant's separation from employment she was the community voicemail coordinator/director . . . [at Sojourners' Place]. The [C]laimant's job had originally been full-time but was reduced to part-time in 2001.
On November 21, 2001, the [C]laimant was given a deadline of January 24, 2002 to accomplish two things: [o]ne, increase the number of [state] agencies using the voicemail service; and two, determine why some agencies were not using their voicemail boxes and take steps to increase usage.
In December 2001, the people in Seattle who provide the model for the voicemail program as well as training requested that the [C]laimant contact every agency to help request a [federal] grant from Washington. Because the [C]laimant believed that there was an overlap in some of what Seattle wanted her to do with what the [E]mployer wanted her to do, she decided to work on the Seattle project. She also had ideas for increasing the number of agencies [using the voicemail service].
When the [C]laimant was injured on January 21, 2002[,] the deadline [of January 24, 2002] was extended to February 14, 2002. She returned to work on February 5, 2002. By the February 14th deadline she had not accomplished what had been requested.
The [C]laimant did not tell the [E]mployer that she was bogged down with work. Nor did she request an extension.
When on February 14, 2002 the [C]laimant had not met the goals set at the November [2001] meeting, she was discharged.
R. at 0010.
At its hearing, the Board accepted additional testimony, both from Claimant and from Sister Jeanne Cashman, a representative for the Employer. While the Board technically did not make additional findings of fact (it instead implicitly adopted those findings made by the Appeals Referee), it did receive additional testimony, which it recorded in the following "Summary of Evidence":
Claimant was sworn and testified that she was hit by a car in January 2001, sustaining a head injury and herniated disc. The head injury affect[ed] [C]laimant's immediate memory. In addition, [C]laimant fell on ice on January 21, 2002 and hit her head. In March 2001, Sister Jeanne said that the [C]laimant's job was going part time, with the [C]laimant receiving half of her former hours and salary. . . . . In June 2001, [C]laimant's job went part time. . . . In November [2001], Sister Jeanne asked [C]laimant to contact certain agencies and [C]laimant did this. . . . Claimant's work was slowed by problems such as a computer virus and Sister Jeanne's non-responsiveness [to Claimant's concerns]. Claimant's deadline to get the projects done was January 24 and [C]laimant sustained her fall on January 21. Claimant had planned to complete the work on January 22. Claimant also felt she was hindered because she had to do a full-time job in part-time hours.
Sister Jeanne . . . was sworn . . . [and gave the following testimony]. Employer is part of a national network which provides voicemail [services] to homeless persons. Part of the job is getting [state] agencies to use the voicemails and getting new agencies on board. Claimant was hired to get the program set up and was told that she would be full-time until the project was adequately underway, at which time her job would become a part-time position. . . . In March 2001 [C]laimant was told that, as of June 1, 2001, her job would be part-time. Employer also offered [C]laimant other part-time work so that she could remain a full-time employee. . . . In November 2001, Sister Jeanne met with [C]laimant because [C]laimant was not getting her work done. . . . The existing agencies were having problems and [C]laimant had added no new agencies. This was a known requirement of [C]laimant's job. . . . At no time between November [2001] and the [original] January [2002] deadline did [C]laimant report she was having any problems. Claimant knew that her job was on the line.
R. at 0094-0095.
At the Board hearing, Claimant was not permitted to introduce into evidence a "packet" of information including her handwritten notes, although she was told she could "certainly refer to . . . [it]." The Board so ruled because it found Claimant's "packet" to constitute "hearsay."
R. at 0101.
R. at 0103.
Both the Appeals Referee and the Board ultimately concluded that Claimant was terminated for "just cause," and that she was therefore ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appeals Referee found that the Claimant's "failure to meet the goals set by . . . [Sister Jeanne Cashman] indicated a wanton disregard for the employment relationship and the interests of the employer." In affirming the Appeals Referee, the Board stated an additional ground for its decision in that "[C]laimant's actions in waiting until two days before the [original] deadline to complete half of the [voicemail] project which she had been given two months prior[ ] was a reckless or wanton act in disregard of the [E]mployer's interests." The Board found that its conclusion was warranted "given that . . . [Claimant] was explicitly warned that her job would be in jeopardy if these projects were not completed."
R. at 0018.
R. at 0095.
Id.
3. Claimant now urges this Court to reverse the Board so that she may be awarded unemployment insurance benefits. Claimant's "primary complaint against the [B]oard is that it stopped [her] from submitting a packet[,]" apparently comprised largely of Claimant's handwritten notes. Claimant argues that she "was stopped from using [her] notes and . . . stopped . . . [from] handing them in."
Letter from Linda Majaya to the Court of 1/20/03, at 1 (Dkt. #7).
Id.
Claimant also states that she "disagree[s] with the decision of the [B]oard." Claimant has submitted a 14-page letter of factual assertions to support her position, most of which do not appear to be within the existing record.
Id.
Claimant has also submitted a nine-page Reply Brief in letter form, wherein she states for the first time that "the decision of the Appeals Board is not supported by substantial evidence and is not free from legal error." Letter from Linda Majaya to the Court of 3/11/03, at 3 (Dkt. #12). This document contains attachments that also appear not to have been part of the record as it was developed below.
With regard to diverting her attention to "Seattle's request" relative to federal funding, Claimant argues that the Appeals Referee "seemed to feel that [she] shouldn't have responded" but that she "always responded to Seattle's requests." Claimant additionally contends that she "had not thought to ask for an extension because it looked like [she] was going to be able to get the job done."
Letter from Linda Majaya to the Court of 1/20/03, at 6.
Id.
Additionally, Claimant does not agree that there was "just cause" for her termination because she "was a strong advocate for community voice mail, the program [she] was hired to advocate[,]" and that she "completed many job duties . . . [while] recovering from [t]raumatic [b]rain [i]njury. . . ."
Id. at 9.
Lastly, Claimant contends that "Sister Jeanne told a lot of lies and interfered with the program," and that if the Board "could see . . . [her point of view] . . . perhaps [she] could have her benefits."
Letter from Linda Majaya to the Court of 3/11/03, at 7.
The Board has filed a response "briefing only the issue alleged by [C]laimant . . . that . . . [it] `did not allow' her to submit a `packet' of documents." The Board "takes no position on the underlying merits of [C]laimant's separation from employment."
Bd.'s Answering Br. at 2.
Id.
The Board contends that it provided Claimant a "full and fair" hearing, but that Claimant's "packet" was neither relevant nor competent, and that the information therein was "cumulative," given Claimant's oral presentation of evidence. The Board contends that at the time of Claimant's hearing, it could not consider hearsay evidence, and that "Claimant's written notes . . . were hearsay [not to be considered]." The Board nonetheless posits that it did not err in refusing to allow Claimant to introduce her notes into evidence, largely because "Claimant was repeatedly encouraged to review and refer to her written notes [while giving testimony]."
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Employer, in addition to agreeing with the Board's arguments regarding Claimant's "packet" of information, contends that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that Employer had shown "just cause" for terminating Claimant, so that she is now ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Employer asserts that this Court "must rely on the [Board]'s weighing of the evidence, its determinations of credibility of the Claimant, the Employer and any other witnesses, and its factual findings in reaching its . . . decision." Employer highlights the fact that "detailed testimony was given by both Employer and Claimant in an attempt to explain Claimant's employment history, as well as the reasons . . . for Claimant's termination." Employer therefore contends that Claimant's assertions are "without merit" and this Court should not disturb the Board's decision "simply because Claimant disagrees with it[ ]. . . ."
Employer's Answering Br. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
4. The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of factual findings of an administrative agency; the function of the reviewing court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. On appeal, the court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. The reviewing court merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. Upon appeal from a denial of unemployment insurance benefits, this Court is limited to consideration of the record that was before the Board; when the Board adopts the factual findings of an Appeals Referee, this Court will also review the Appeals Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. If substantial evidence exists and the Board made no error of law, its decision must be affirmed.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965).
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981).
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3323(a) (1995) (providing that, absent fraud, the factual findings of the Board shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of a reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law).
Hubbard, 352 A.2d at 763.
Boughton, 300 A.2d at 26.
Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 1988).
5. Title 19, section 3315(2) of the Delaware Code provides that an employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work and for each week thereafter. . . ." Just cause is defined in turn as "a willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer's interest, the employee's duties, or the employee's expected standard of conduct." While "willful" implies "actual, specific or evil intent[,]" the term "wanton" requires only "heedless, malicious or reckless [action] . . . [and] does not require actual intent to cause harm."
Avon Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Boughton, 300 A.2d at 26.
Here, much of the evidence Claimant urges the Court to consider was not produced at the initial hearing below, and therefore cannot now be considered in the Court's review of the Board's decision. With regard to Claimant's assertions of due process violations (insofar as she was unable to introduce into evidence those documents comprising her information "packet"), a review of the record indicates that Claimant was in fact told she could "certainly refer to . . . [it]" at the time of the Board hearing. Thus Claimant was not completely foreclosed from introducing evidence into the record, as she could accomplish the same by way of oral recitation. And as the Board correctly notes, it was permitted to limit cumulative or incompetent testimony, as was apparently done in this case.
Hubbard, 352 A.2d at 763.
R. at 0101.
See e.g., Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1981) (holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion or deny claimants due process by limiting the number of witnesses claimants could call following claimants' own testimony on the issue of the employer's "time off" policy).
On the evidence properly before it, this Court finds that the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. There was evidence that although Claimant was given a specific deadline within which to complete a specific task, Claimant instead advanced the interests of someone other then Employer, i.e., the "Seattle people," because, as Claimant now bluntly asserts, she "always responded to Seattle's requests." And, as the Board so stated, Claimant "was explicitly warned that her job would be in jeopardy if the [assigned] projects were not [timely] completed."
Letter from Linda Majaya to the Court of 1/20/03, at 6.
R. at 0095.
Claimant's contention that her traumatic brain injury mitigates any failure to timely complete assigned projects is unavailing on the record generated at the Board level and presently before this Court. In Starkey v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, the court further explained that "just cause" is "essentially the equivalent of the term `misconduct'" (which that court defined as "not mean[ing] mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, or failure of performance as a result of inability or incapacity . . ."). Rather, that court noted, and as exists here, "where evidence on the record exists from which a factfinder [i.e., the Board] could infer that an employee's substandard performance [wa]s the result of a willful act in violation of the employer's interests rather than conduct which . . . appears to be merely inadvertent or inefficient, a denial of [unemployment insurance] benefits is most appropriate." As stated (and implicitly admitted by Claimant herself), Claimant diverted her focus from Employer's interests to the demands of Seattle while working within a specified timeframe and knowing that her failure to timely complete a given assignment would result in her dismissal. A reasonable person, in evaluating this evidence, could accept that evidence as adequate to conclude that Claimant had committed an act of misconduct justifying her discharge.
340 A.2d 165 (Del.Super.Ct. 1975).
Starkey, 340 A.2d at 166.
Id. at 166-167.
Id. at 167.
6. The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Board otherwise committed no error of law. The decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.