Opinion
March 6, 1961.
March 22, 1961.
Motor Vehicles — Licenses — Suspension — Power of common pleas to modify order of Secretary of Revenue — Penalty deemed by court below to be too severe — Action of other state as affecting power of Secretary of Revenue — Actions of two states as "double punishment" — The Vehicle Code.
1. On an appeal from the action of the Secretary of Revenue in suspending a motor vehicle operator's license, the court of common pleas has no authority to modify the Secretary's order solely because it considers the period of suspension to be a too severe penalty.
2. Economic hardship, standing alone, is insufficient to excuse the violation of law by the operator.
3. The Secretary of Revenue cannot be denied the right to suspend an operator's license in Pennsylvania merely because another state previously has denied him the privilege of operating in that state.
4. The actions of Pennsylvania in suspending a motor vehicle operator's license and of another state in withdrawing his privilege to operate in that state, for periods of time which do not coincide, based upon a violation in the other state, do not constitute "double punishment."
5. In this case, in which it appeared that the operator was convicted in New Jersey of speeding at seventy-two miles per hour in a fifty miles per hour speed zone and that that state withdrew his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in New Jersey for a period of thirty days; that the Secretary of Revenue, after hearing, suspended the operator's license for a period of thirty days (which period was subsequent to the expiration of the New Jersey period of suspension); and that the court below, finding that it was necessary for the operator to operate his automobile daily in New Jersey in furtherance of his business and concluding that his license should not be suspended in Pennsylvania because he had been punished sufficiently by the suspension of his driving privileges for thirty days in New Jersey, reversed the order of the secretary; it was Held that the order of the court below should be reversed and the order of the secretary reinstated.
Before ERVIN, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, and FLOOD, JJ. (RHODES, P.J., absent).
Appeal, No. 29, Feb. T., 1961, from order of Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, April T., 1960, No. 667, in case of Charles M. Dougherty, Secretary of Revenue, v. Paul Magida. Order reversed.
Appeal by motor vehicle operator from decision of Secretary of Revenue suspending license.
Order entered reversing decision of Secretary of Revenue, opinion by NEALON, J. Commonwealth appealed.
Elmer T. Bolla, Deputy Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Jerome E. Parker, with him Farrell, Butler, Kearney and Parker, for appellee.
Argued March 6, 1961.
This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County reversing an order of the Secretary of Revenue suspending Paul Magida's operator's license for thirty days.
Magida was convicted in New Jersey of speeding at 72 miles per hour in a 50 mile per hour speed zone, and paid a fine of $27. Because of this conviction, the State of New Jersey denied him the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on the highways of that state for a period of thirty days from January 8, 1960.
After receiving notice of the conviction and conducting a hearing, the Secretary of Revenue of this Commonwealth suspended Magida's operator's license for a period of thirty days beginning May 23, 1960. See § 618(e) of The Vehicle Code of 1959, P.L. 58, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 618(e). The actions by both the New Jersey and the Pennsylvania officials were based upon the speeding violation in New Jersey. Action against Magida by Pennsylvania authorities to suspend his operator's license was not started until after the thirty day period during which New Jersey forbade him to operate in that state.
Magida appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County from the order of the Secretary of Revenue and secured an order of supersedeas from that Court. After a hearing, the court below found that it was necessary for Magida to operate his automobile daily in New Jersey in furtherance of his business, and having been denied the privilege of operating in that state for thirty days, his "license should not be suspended in Pennsylvania inasmuch as he has been punished sufficiently by the suspension of his driving privileges for thirty days in New Jersey, during which period he was unable to make his daily trips to that State."
The court below did not have advantage of our opinion in Anen Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 194 Pa. Super. 379, 169 A.2d 600 (1961), in which we held that, on an appeal from the Secretary of Revenue, the courts of common pleas have no authority to modify the secretary's order, even though the court may be of the opinion that the "penalty" is too severe. Courts cannot function as ex officio pardon boards to mitigate the penalties which the legislature empowered the Secretary of Revenue to impose. Commonwealth v. Moogerman, 385 Pa. 256, 259, 122 A.2d 804 (1956).
There is no question of the conviction of Magida in New Jersey for speeding. Under such circumstances, the court has no authority to reverse the Secretary of Revenue solely because it considers the period of suspension to be a too severe penalty. Economic hardship, standing alone, is insufficient to excuse the violation. Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, 96 A.2d 370 (1953); Commonwealth v. Greer, 373 Pa. 400, 96 A.2d 376 (1953); Commonwealth v. McCullough, 373 Pa. 402, 96 A.2d 377 (1953); Commonwealth v. Matil, 373 Pa. 404, 96 A.2d 380 (1953); Commonwealth v. Cornetti, 373 Pa. 407, 96 A.2d 378 (1953); Commonwealth v. Roher, 373 Pa. 409, 96 A.2d 382 (1953); Commonwealth v. Starcher, 373 Pa. 411, 96 A.2d 383 (1953); Commonwealth v. Gaiser, 373 Pa. 413, 96 A.2d 379 (1953).
The court below points out that there is now an agreement on procedure between New Jersey and Pennsylvania administrative agencies which, under the circumstances of this case, would result in the licensee being denied the privilege of operating in New Jersey only during the period of the Pennsylvania suspension. This action on the part of the officials of the two states is praiseworthy. But the Secretary of Revenue cannot be denied the right to suspend Magida's operator's license in Pennsylvania merely because New Jersey previously denied him the privilege of operating in that state. Neither does the action of the two states constitute "double punishment." See Levy Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 194 Pa. Super. 390, 169 A.2d 596 (1961).
Order of the court below is reversed, and the order of the Secretary of Revenue suspending appellee's license for thirty days is reinstated.