Summary
In Com. v. Greer, 373 Pa. 400, 96 A.2d 376, defendant, a mechanic in a machine shop, drove his car 80 miles an hour on a public highway (where the speed limit was 50 miles an hour) at 7:30 o'clock P.M. daylight time, when the evening was clear and the road dry.
Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. StrobelOpinion
March 31, 1953.
April 22, 1953.
Motor vehicles — Licenses — Suspension — Excessive speed — Economic hardship — Discretion of court below — Appellate review — Vehicle Code.
1. Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, followed. [401]
2. On appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the court of common pleas setting aside a suspension by the Secretary of Revenue of an operator's license for operating a motor vehicle, in which it appeared that the operator traveled on a public highway at eighty miles per hour where the lawful maximum speed was fifty miles per hour, and that the court below had revoked the order of suspension solely on the ground of economic hardship, it was Held that, in the circumstances, the order of the court below constituted a manifest abuse of discretion and reversible error. [401-2]
Before STERN, C. J., STEARNE, JONES, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
Appeal, No. 35, March T., 1953, from order of Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Sept. T., 1952, No. 46, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Paul M. Greer. Order reversed.
Appeal by motor vehicle operator from decision of Secretary of Revenue suspending operating privileges. Before PURVIS, P.J.
Order entered sustaining appeal and directing reinstatement of license. Commonwealth appealed.
Randolph C. Ryder, Deputy Attorney General, with him Robert B. Greer, Jr., and Robert E. Woodside, Attorney General, for appellant.
No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.
This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the Court of Common Pleas setting aside a suspension by the Secretary of Revenue of an operator's license for operating a motor vehicle. The offense charged was speed on a public highway at eighty miles per hour where the maximum lawful speed was fifty miles per hour.
What we said in Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, 96 A.2d 370, relating to legal principles and the construction of The Vehicle Code has similar application to the facts in the present case.
Paul M. Greer, defendant, was charged by a state police officer with travelling on a public highway on May 3, 1952, at 7:30 p.m. on a dry, clear night at eighty miles per hour where the lawful maximum speed was fifty miles per hour. The charge is not denied. His only excuse was, "I was going to Ohio and was a little late and making up a little time." Defendant had been driving for fifteen years, was never before arrested for speeding, was thirty-two years of age, worked in shifts in a machine shop and used his car for transportation both for pleasure and business.
The learned court below revoked the Secretary of Revenue's order of suspension solely on the ground of economic hardship. In the order the court said, ". . . the operator's license . . . is necessary and that the loss thereof would work an undue hardship on [defendant]." Such an order in the circumstances of this case constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion.
The order is reversed at the cost of appellee.