Opinion
C/A 4:23-1697-RMG-PJG
07-20-2023
David Antonio Little, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Officer Justin Thomas Cutchin; Officer K. Phillips; Keith Thomas; G. Polson; Bradley Redfearn; Jeremy R. Mabry; Terry Leviner, Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff David Antonio Little, Jr., a self-represented state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. By order dated May 15, 2023, the court severed many of the claims and defendants listed in the original complaint. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint that properly includes the claims the court left remaining in this case. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. (ECF No. 17.)
The Clerk of Court is directed to re-docketed Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 15) as an Amended Complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, claiming that the defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights during Plaintiff's February 14, 2021 arrest. Plaintiff alleges he was accused of trying to fight people at a store, but the defendants did not charge him with disorderly conduct. Instead, Plaintiff alleges, he was charged with simple possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, which the defendants found in Plaintiff's vehicle. However, Plaintiff claims the search of Plaintiff's vehicle was illegal because he was twenty feet away from the vehicle and not occupying it, and the defendants failed to obtain a search warrant or obtain Plaintiff's consent to search.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Cutchin and Mabry falsified incident reports with the assistance of Defendants Phillips and Thomas. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Cutchin accused Plaintiff of having a knife, but Plaintiff dropped the knife when Cutchin pulled out his service pistol. Plaintiff also claims Cutchin failed to provide him Miranda warnings. Plaintiff further alleges he was denied a phone call once he was arrested and he was not allowed to sign an inventory receipt of his property. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Leviner stole his property. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Thomas used coercive tactics and fabricated lies to falsely arrest, detain, and convict Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims the defendants falsely arrested him, illegally searched and seized him, fabricated documents, violated his right to due process, and participated in conspiracy to neglect or prevent a violation of his rights. Plaintiff seeks damages.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff indicates that he raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Section 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Meanwhile, § 1985 allows a plaintiff to recover for damages arising out of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law. A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). Section 1986, in turn, allows a plaintiff to seek damages against a party who neglects to prevent a conspiracy to violate a person's rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985).
However, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated. Id. at 487; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”). Plaintiff has provided no factual allegations to show that he successfully challenged his conviction. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for damages associated with an allegedly unlawful arrest or imprisonment are barred at this time by the holding in Heck.
Regardless, the court concludes that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and search his vehicle. See generally Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show he was arrested without probable cause); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions); United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[A] search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.' ”) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)). Here, Plaintiff provides conclusory statements that his arrest and the search of his car were unlawful, but he fails to provide specific facts that would plausibly show that the officers lacked probable cause. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment upon which relief can be granted.
Maybe more importantly, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts that explain in particular which officers were actually involved in his arrest. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to each defendant. This is baked into Rule 8's requirement that the complaint ‘show' the plaintiffis entitled to relief.”) (internal citations
Additionally, Plaintiff's claim that he was not properly Mirandized in violation of the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination is not a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S.Ct. 2095, 2101 (2022) (stating that a violation of Miranda is not tantamount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and accordingly, no such cause of action is cognizable under § 1983). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted.
Finally, Plaintiff fails to plead any specific facts that plausibly show that the defendants conspired or neglected to prevent a conspiracy. See A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 346 (“We have specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.”) (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 361 (4th Cir. 2022) (stating that to demonstrate a conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a “single plan, the essential nature and scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1985 or § 1986 claim upon which relief can be granted. See Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a cause of action under § 1986 is dependent upon the existence of a claim under § 1985).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).