Opinion
C/A 3:23-5322-MGL-SVH
07-19-2024
Ronald G. Rodgers, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey B. Hansen, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Ronald G. Rodgers (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his constitutional rights were violated when Jeffrey B. Hansen (“Defendant”) performed a gunshot residue test (“GSR test”) on him on August 29, 2023, following his arrest for murder. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims and/or a stay in this case pending resolution of Plaintiff's criminal proceedings in state court.
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 35]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the applicable procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendant's motion. [ECF No. 37]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF No. 39], it is ripe for disposition. Also pending before the court is Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. [ECF No. 29].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion in part and deny Plaintiff's motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 29, 2023, at 7:19 p.m. the City of Sumter Police Department received a call regarding an incident involving at least one gun shot at 930 Arnaud Street, Sumter, South Carolina, 29150. [ECF No. 35-4]. As recorded by her body camera, Officer Tiffany Arroyo (“Arroyo”) arrived first on the scene. [ECF No. 35-5]. Upon her arrival, Arroyo located Garry Lee Thompson, who had suffered a gunshot wound to his chest. See id. His girlfriend, Nichole Lunsford (“Lunsford”), was on top of him attempting to perform CPR. See Id. Another witness and resident at 930 Arnaud Street, Patrick McAlister, also was present. See id. Arroyo asked, “Did you guys see what happened?” and Lunsford responding, “Yeah, Ronny Rodgers shot him in the chest! Ronny Rodgers, he lives across the street!” Id. EMS transported the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. [See ECF No. 35-1 at 3].
Witnesses told the police that Plaintiff had given a ride to the victim and Lunsford, that when they returned home Plaintiff demanded $10 for gas, and that the victim told Plaintiff that he did not have any money but would pay him later. [ECF No. 35-6 at 19:28:38]. Plaintiff informed the victim that if he did not give him the $10 in two minutes, something bad would happen to him. Id. After that, Plaintiff shot the victim once in the chest from point blank range. Id. Lunsford witnessed the incident and shooting. Id.
A neighbor's security camera recorded some of the audio from the incident. [ECF No. 35-7].
The police also received information from Plaintiff's brother, who Plaintiff resided with, as well as neighbors from directly across the street. [ECF No. 35-8]. Plaintiff's brother told officers that Plaintiff fled the scene in the brother's 2010 Nissan Titan. See id.
Officer Kellahan (“Kellahan”) identified a vehicle matching the type and model reportedly used by Plaintiff to flee. [ECF No. 35-9]. As recorded by Kellahan's body camera, Plaintiff pulled into the Poplar Square Apartment Complex in Sumter, South Carolina, and parked the identified vehicle. [ECF No. 35-9, see also ECF No. 35-15 ¶ 1]. Kellahan and Defendant exited their respective police vehicles, drew their weapons, and approached the suspect vehicle while simultaneously ordering the driver to exit. [ECF No. 35-9]. He complied. See id. Defendant approached Plaintiff from the driver's right side, re-holstered his weapon, and began to arrest Plaintiff. See id. Defendant emptied Plaintiff's pockets and proceeded to place him in handcuffs. See Id. There were three to five uniformed officers present while Plaintiff was handcuffed. [ECF No. 35-9]. Plaintiff was arrested at 7:32 p.m., and Defendant had no further contact with Plaintiff until he went into the interview room shortly before the GSR test was conducted. [ECF No. 35-15 ¶¶ 1, 3, 5].
After Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs, Officer Shane Ploe (“Ploe”) escorted him to his car for transport, as recorded by Ploe's body camera. [ECF No. 35-10]. When Ploe guided Plaintiff into the right side of the backseat of Ploe's vehicle, Plaintiff stated, “Can you loosen them ‘cuffs up just a little bit?” See id. Ploe responded, “It is just the way your wrists are turned.” See id. Plaintiff stated, “I know, the cuffs or something now.” See id. Ploe then asked Plaintiff to step out of the patrol vehicle so the handcuffs could be reexamined. See id. Plaintiff exited the patrol vehicle, and Ploe loosened and adjusted the handcuffs, thereafter, double locking them. See id. Plaintiff does not appear in any pain and told Poe that he appreciated the assistance. See id. Plaintiff was then transported to the detention center with Plaintiff confirming he was “good” when Ploe asked en route. See id. Plaintiff arrived at the City of Sumter Police Department at approximately 7:42 p.m. See id.
Ploe is not a defendant in this action.
During the transport, Plaintiff states “I shot him.” [ECF No. 35-10 at 19:41:45].
Ploe escorted Plaintiff to interview room 230. Id. at 19:43:42. Plaintiff indicated to Ploe that he would like his handcuffs removed, but Ploe responded “I can't make them any looser than they already are.” See id. Plaintiff then stated, “Can you put them in front of me?” See id. As Ploe exited the room, he informed Plaintiff that the detectives will decide about the handcuffs. See id.
The interview room was also equipped with a camera. [See ECF No. 3512]. That video shows the same encounter as above, from a different perspective. See id. The video also shows that sometime after Ploe exited the room, Plaintiff proceeded to take roughly two minutes to maneuver his handcuffs from behind his back to the front of his body, slowly, but apparently without difficulty, while sitting in a chair, taking his shoes off, and moving one leg at a time into position:
(Image Omitted) See id.
Once his hands were free, Plaintiff placed his feet back into his shoes and checked his wrists, left over right and then right over left, moving them freely in the handcuffs. [ECF No. 35-12 at 19:55:49, see also ECF No. 35-13 (screen shot showing space between the handcuffs and Plaintiff's wrist)].
It appears that Plaintiff during the process of moving his handcuffs from the back to the front of his body, he scraped his left arm and perhaps his leg. [See ECF No. 35-14]. Moments after his maneuvering, Plaintiff knocked on the door to the interrogation room and stated, “I'm bleedin', I'm bleedin' like hell.” [EF No. 35-12 at 19:57:20]. Ploe reentered the room, asking where Plaintiff was hurt, and Plaintiff stated his arm and his legs. See id. Ploe asked how he hurt himself, and Plaintiff stated “[y]our handcuffs, I asked you to loose ‘em up and you wouldn't.” See id.
Ploe exited and returned shortly with bandages. See id. at 20:00:20. Poe then asked Plaintiff if there was anything hurt other than his wrist, and Plaintiff stated: “I had my hands behind my back, do you remember that? I got them in front of me, because that's what I had to do.” See id. During this time, Plaintiff also stated “I need a lawyer.” See id. As Ploe is about to exit, after wrapping Plaintiff's left wrist, he asked Plaintiff if there is anything else he needs, and Plaintiff stated “I just got the blood on there (legs) because I had to put my legs .... I had to put my arms around there ‘cause you wouldn't put my hands in front of me, like I asked you.” See id. Plaintiff then repeated his request for a lawyer. See id.
Defendant attests that he entered the interview room to speak with Plaintiff at 8:18 p.m. [ECF No. 35-13 ¶ 3]. As recorded in the room, Defendant entered the room and stated “Hey Mr. Rodgers. How are you doing? Can I get you to put your feet down?” [ECF No. 35-12 at 20:18:33]. Their initial exchange appears amicable, and Defendant seated himself across from Plaintiff, asking general questions, including his name and date of birth. Id. at 20:19:01. Plaintiff then stated he wants a lawyer but continues to talk to Defendant; in response to Plaintiff stating he wants a lawyer, Defendant stopped questioning him, exited the room, stating “I will be right back.” Id. at 20:19:35.
Defendant then reentered the room with the GSR test, stating “We have something to do real quick and then we will leave you alone.” Id. at 20:21:58. Plaintiff then shook his head from left to right, indicating refusal to cooperate, stating “Whatever you goin' to do ain't going' to work.” Id. at 20:22:20. Notwithstanding, Defendant opened and prepared to use the GSR test and informed Plaintiff, “Alright Mr. Rodgers, this is what is called a GSR kit, a Gun Shot Residue Kit,” id. at 20:22:58, while standing up and approaching Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Defendant then exchanged words as to whether Plaintiff has a choice regarding the test, with Defendant calmly informing Plaintiff he has no choice, explaining how to do the test, and informing Plaintiff he can contest the issue later, but at this time, the test would be conducted. See id. While this discussion occurs, Plaintiff turned his body away from Defendant, and Defendant gently maneuvered Plaintiff's hands so the test could occur. See id. At one point, Plaintiff states, “you are forcing me,” and Defendant responds, “yes, I am.” See id. Throughout, Plaintiff repeatedly stated he refused to cooperate and that he wanted his lawyer but physically allowed the test to proceed. See id. Defendant was polite and calm throughout the encounter. See id.
Also, during this exchange, Ploe, who has entered the room, obscures the room's camera; however, Ploe's body-camera recording provides a clear image of Defendant performing the GSR test on Plaintiff. [ECF No. 35-16].
As attested by Defendant:
I applied no more force than was necessary to Ronald G. Rodgers, to ensure we preserved any evidence he may have regarding his potential involvement with firing a weapon on August 29, 2023.
Ronald G. Rodgers attempted to avoid the Gun Shot Residue Kit by leaning away from me and putting his hands beside his body near the wall. He tried to prevent me from collecting gunshot residue evidence of his potential involvement in the murder of Barry Lee Thompson on August 29, 2023. Gunshot residue evidence can easily be lost, cleaned or otherwise damaged and it is necessary to preserve it as soon as practical.
I placed my hands on Ronald G. Rodgers for the sole purpose of collecting evidence with a Gun Shot Residue Kit for approximately six (6) seconds. I placed his hands on the table in Interview Room #230 to ensure the safety of myself and Ronald G. Rodgers and to efficiently collect evidence with a Gun Shot Residue Kit for approximately six (6) seconds.
I needed to have Ronald G. Rodgers place his hands on the table to ensure the safety of him, as well as myself while effectively performing the Gun Shot Residue Kit to gather evidence.
Ronald G. Rodgers was the only person who raised his voice while I attempted to perform the Gun Shot Residue Kit on August 29, 2023.
Once Ronald G. Rodgers placed his hands on the table, it took less than one and a half minutes to complete the Gun Shot Residue Kit. Rodgers did not complain of any injury in my presence. Rodgers never complained that the handcuffs were too tight in my presence.
I exited Interview Room #230 at approximately 8:27 pm.[ECF No. 35-15 ¶¶ 6-11].
Thereafter, Plaintiff was prepared to be transported to the Sumter Lee County Detention Center, and the room's recording shows Plaintiff moving around the room with no difficulties. [ECF No. 35-12 at 20:34:00]. Prior to departure, Officer Hatchley (“Hatchley”) informed Plaintiff his handcuffs need to be moved from the front of his body to behind his back. See id. In doing this, Hatchley asked Plaintiff, “Does your skin tear easy?” and Plaintiff responded, “Yes, very.” See id. Hatchley allowed Plaintiff to have his handcuffs in front, and Plaintiff exited the interview room at approximately 8:35 p.m. Id. at 20:35:00.
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [ECF No. 1]. The Public Index shows that Plaintiff was arrested on August 29, 2023, and charged with murder and possession of a weapon during commission of a violent crime, as true billed on February 8, 2024. See Public Index for the Sumter County Clerk of Court Office (https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Sumter/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx, last visited on July 1, 2024). The charges remain pending. Id.
This court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's criminal cases. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”). Defendant has also submitted screen shots of the Public Index. [See ECF Nos. 35-2, 35-3].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Standard on Judgment on the Pleadings
After pleadings are closed, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is assessed under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 117 (4th Cir. 2013). To withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
C. Analysis
1. Excessive Force Claim
The court analyzes claims of excessive force by law enforcement in the course of an arrest under the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). Determining whether the force used to carry out a particular arrest is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires “balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). The outcome of this balancing test necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 8-9 (holding question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure”). The court considers factors including the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Further, the analysis “must embody allowances for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 117 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding the extent of injuries to the plaintiff “is another consideration in determining whether force was excessive”).
Although Plaintiff may argue otherwise, the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to his excessive force claim. See, e.g., Aleman v. City of Charlotte, 80 F.4th 264, 285 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Pursuant to the Supreme Court's precedent in Graham v. Connor, any claim that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness' standard.”) (citation omitted)).
Additionally, under the qualified immunity defense, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity ensures that “[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and, when there are no relevant disputed material facts, a court should rule on the qualified immunity issue at the summary judgment stage. Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage.”).
To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case. Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to excessive force by Defendant when he was forced to undergo the GSR test. However, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence in support of his allegations, and he has failed to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment and supporting evidence as to any excessive force claim beyond pointing out that Defendant used the word “firmly” in their briefing of their motion for summary judgment when “describing the force he used to conduct the GSR kit,” appearing to argue this indicates Defendant acted forcefully. [See ECF No. 39 (citing ECF No. 35-1 at 11)].
The undisputed evidence submitted by Defendant directly contradicts Plaintiff's position that excessive force was used, including the camera evidence that recorded the relevant period. In reviewing the evidence related to a motion for summary judgment, the court considers undisputed facts, as well as the disputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Nonetheless, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Thus, when the record contains video footage that is not open to more than one interpretation and contradicts the non-movant's assertions, the court “view[s] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 381.
Defendant's evidence shows that at no point was excessive force used, nor does it indicate at any point that Plaintiff was harmed by Defendant's actions. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
2. Remaining Claims
Plaintiff additionally argues the GSR test was illegal because there was no warrant and because he repeatedly invoked his right to an attorney, invocations that were ignored. [See ECF No. 1, see also ECF No. 39 at 2 (“Defendant could have prevented all of this if he would have got a warrant or the Plaintiff's attorney as requested”)]. Defendant responds as follows:
Plaintiff also notes in his complaint that he was never read his Miranda rights, but offers no further argument concerning this issue. [ECF No. 1]. To the extent Plaintiff could establish such a claim, the state court would rule on any related exclusion of evidence. Additionally, it appears the proper remedy for any such violation is the exclusion of the evidence improperly obtained, not an action for money damages, as asserted here. See Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 150 (2022) (“In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution, and therefore such a violation does not constitute ‘the deprivation of [a] right . . . secured by the Constitution.'”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)); see also, e.g., Little v. Cutchin, C/A No. 4:23-1697-RMG-PJG, 2023 WL 5758625, at *3 (D.S.C. July 20, 2023) (“Additionally, Plaintiff's claim that he was not properly Mirandized in violation of the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination is not a cognizable claim under § 1983”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 4:23-1697-RMG, 2023 WL 5217923 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2023). For these reasons, the undersigned recommends dismissal of any claim Plaintiff is asserting regarding an alleged violation of his Miranda rights, to the extent he is asserting such a claim.
Plaintiff contends that the gun residue test was illegal since there was no warrant. A ruling on that allegation would improperly interfere with the pending state court criminal proceedings. The results of the gun residue test would be an important part of the prosecution evidence in state court. That issue should be litigated by the state court in the criminal case.[ECF No. 35-1 at 14].
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's excessive force claim is not subject to a stay, but should be dismissed. [ECF No. 35-1 at 15]. As stated above, the undersigned agrees and recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's excessive force claim. Additionally, because the undersigned also agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's claim concerning the GSR test should be stayed pending resolution of Plaintiff's criminal charges, the undersigned does not address Defendant's alternative argument that he is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See id. at 15-18.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for damages where a judgment in favor of the prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Id. at 486-87. In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified that Heck does not apply in the preconviction setting. Id. at 393. The Court continued to state that a stay of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is appropriate in such instances:
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended .... If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.Id. at 393-94; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding Younger provides a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances”).
Plaintiff is asking the federal court to make determinations identical to the determinations that must also be made in the state court, i.e., whether evidence procured by Defendant was done so in violation of Plaintiff's rights and, therefore, must be suppressed. Therefore, based on the guidance of the Wallace court, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's claim concerning the GSR test be stayed pending resolution of Plaintiff's criminal charges.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion, dismissing Plaintiff's claims except for his claim concerning the GSR test. [ECF No. 35]. For the same reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. [ECF No. 29]. The undersigned further recommends the district judge stay the remainder of this case pending resolution of state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff and that the court order Plaintiff to apprise the court of the status of the criminal proceedings every six months and to notify the court when the criminal charges are resolved such that the stay can be lifted.
Plaintiff's only argument in this motion is that the electronic evidence confirms Defendant used excessive force. [See ECF No. 29].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).