Opinion
No. 03-05-00500-CV
Filed: August 5, 2009.
Appealed from the District Court of Travis County, 345th Judicial District No. Gn203231, Honorable Margaret A. Cooper, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice JONES, Justices PEMBERTON and WALDROP.
Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice JONES.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Marcos Leal and Laura Leal, husband and wife, sued McDonald's Corporation and McDonald's Restaurants of Texas, Inc. (collectively "McDonald's") for injuries Laura received when she slipped on a wet floor at the McDonald's restaurant where she was employed. The district court granted McDonald's no-evidence motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Leals argue that they produced enough evidence in support of their premises liability claim to raise a genuine issue of material fact. We affirm the district court's judgment.
Marcos Leal alleges derivative claims as Laura Leal's spouse.
Factual and Procedural Background
According to the summary judgment evidence, Laura worked as a trainer at a McDonald's restaurant. On September 15, 2000, she reported to work at 5 a.m. to help prepare the restaurant for its 6 a.m. opening. Four other employees reported to work with her, including Xochitl Groves, the floor supervisor, and Jose Perez, the maintenance person. At 5:45 a.m., as Laura was walking from the kitchen area of the restaurant to the front counter area carrying an empty coffee pot, she slipped and fell. While getting up, she noticed that the floor where she had slipped was wet. She had not previously noticed that the floor was wet, and nothing in the area warned or indicated that the floor might be wet. Laura sustained wrist injuries from her fall that necessitated surgery.
On September 6, 2002, the Leals filed suit claiming that the wet floor Laura slipped on was a premises defect for which McDonald's is liable. McDonald's filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment arguing that the Leals had not and could not produce evidence (1) that McDonald's breached any duty to Laura, or (2) that McDonald's actions proximately caused Laura's injuries. On June 29, 2005, the district court granted McDonald's motion for summary judgment and entered a take nothing judgment in favor of McDonald's. The Leals appeal.
McDonald's did not carry worker's compensation insurance at the time Laura fell. Consequently, McDonald's employees could sue McDonald's for job-related injuries. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033 (West 2006).
Analysis
We review the summary judgment de novo. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). Under the Rule 166a(i) — or no-evidence — standard, after adequate time for discovery a defendant may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim on which the plaintiff would have the burden of proof at trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pre-trial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. at 751. The granting of a no-evidence motion will be sustained when the evidence offered by the non-movant to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence as a whole rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id. Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751.
An owner or occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care to keep the premises under his control in a safe condition. Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1985). Employers owe their employees the same duty of care that premises owners owe invitees. See Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61, 65 (Tex.App.-Houston 2005, no pet.). Thus, to prevail on their premises liability claim, the Leals have the burden of proving the following elements: (1) McDonald's had actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor on which she allegedly slipped; (2) the wet floor posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) McDonald's failed to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate that risk; and (4) McDonald's failure to exercise reasonable care proximately caused Laura's injuries. See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992) (citing Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983)). Before McDonald's can be held to have breached its duty to maintain a safe workplace, then, there must be evidence that McDonald's had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition. See Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
In its motion for summary judgment, McDonald's asserts that there is no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor alleged by the Leals to have caused the slip and fall. As to that issue, the Leals were required to produce more than a scintilla of evidence that a McDonald's employee knew about, or had a reasonable opportunity to discover, the wet floor. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814-16 (Tex. 2002) ("reasonable opportunity" involves some length of time); CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 102-03 (Tex. 2000) (constructive knowledge in slip and fall case exists when dangerous condition would have been discovered by reasonable inspection). The Leals produced deposition testimony by Laura and her co-worker Xochitl Groves, to the effect that they believed the wet floor existed due to the mopping activities of the maintenance person Jose Perez. Groves based her belief that Perez was responsible on the fact that the daily maintenance guide in McDonald's "31-day book" listed mopping the front counter area as the maintenance person's responsibility to be completed between 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., that Perez's morning mopping was normally in the order of the grill area, the front area, and then the lobby area, and that Groves would typically sign off on Perez's mopping responsibilities at 6:00 a.m. Laura based her belief that Perez was responsible on the fact that he "always cleans" the area where she fell, and also that mopping in that area was required by the daily maintenance guide.
Following the Leals' filing of a response to McDonald's motion for summary judgment, McDonald's filed a reply with excerpts from depositions attached in support of its motion for summary judgment. In our review, we do not consider the evidence attached to McDonald's reply. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic, 22 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied) ("[I]n reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we will not consider summary judgment evidence propounded by the movant. . . .").
Laura's only basis for her conclusion that Perez would have mopped the area by 5:45 a.m. was the time frame set out in the daily maintenance guide: "Before opening he has to do his job." However, the daily maintenance guide's stating that the "suggested time line" for mopping the lobby, counter, grill, and drive-thru areas is 5:30 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. is, by itself, no evidence that Perez in fact had mopped the area in which Laura slipped and fell on September 15, 2000. To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the Leals must produce some evidence that the directive in the daily maintenance guide was actually followed — either as a routine or on that particular day. The Leals produce no evidence regarding the time by which Perez normally mopped the area in question. Laura admitted that she would prepare the coffee in the morning once or twice a week during the two years she worked at the store, but could not remember if that area was ever wet. She also admitted to not knowing when Perez typically mopped the front area. Groves did testify that Perez would typically announce the completion of his mopping responsibilities to her at 6:00 a.m. However, she professed no knowledge regarding exactly when he typically completed any specific area of the store. Moreover, neither Laura nor Groves testified to seeing Perez mopping the area on the day of the accident, talking to Perez about whether he had mopped the area, or otherwise having actual knowledge of Perez's mopping activities on that day. Groves was in an office in the back of the restaurant at the time that Laura fell and did not come to the counter area until several minutes later.
Laura's deposition testimony that she discovered the floor was wet after she fell raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the floor was wet. However, there is no evidence that McDonald's had actual or constructive knowledge that the floor was wet. The Leals failed to produce a scintilla of evidence that Perez had mopped the area in question prior to Laura's slip and fall, or regarding a "documented daily routine" that would create a reasonable inference that such was the case. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (circumstantial evidence must transcend mere suspicion to raise genuine issue of material fact). It is well established that while the trier of fact may draw inferences from circumstantial evidence, it may draw only reasonable and logical inferences. Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997). A fact-finder may not infer an ultimate fact from meager circumstantial evidence that could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another. Id. Here, it would be mere speculation that simply because McDonald's employees were present in the restaurant, they caused and were aware of the wet floor. As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Lozano v. Lozano, "in cases with only slight circumstantial evidence, something else must be found in the record to corroborate the probability of the fact's existence or non-existence." 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001). "When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence." Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983). Such is the case here.
There is simply no evidence in this record regarding how the floor got wet, who or what made the floor wet, or that McDonald's was aware or should have been aware the floor was wet prior to Laura's fall. See Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 265-66 (even if established that defendant created condition, plaintiff must still establish that defendant had knowledge of condition); Smith v. Mohawk Mills, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (grant of no-evidence motion for summary judgment proper where plaintiff presents no evidence of defendant's knowledge of dangerous condition, even though defendant had created condition).
The fact that only McDonald's employees were in the restaurant at the time or were the only people in a position to have mopped the floor is not evidence, by itself, for a fact-finder to infer that a McDonald's employee caused the floor to be wet. Without more, the mere presence of McDonald's employees in the store says nothing about how the floor got wet — i.e. their mere presence is no more evidence that they caused the floor to be wet (e.g. by mopping) than it is evidence that the floor was wet due to a plumbing leak or leaking machine. There must be some evidence tending to show that a McDonald's employee either caused the problem or was aware of it. The mere fact that only McDonald's employees were in the restaurant at a time when the floor was wet does not raise a fact issue on McDonald's actual or constructive knowledge in connection with a premises liability cause of action.
Conclusion
We affirm the district court's summary judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent.
When, as here, we review the grant of a summary judgment, we are obligated to examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005); see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). "The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence . . . would enable reasonable and fair-minded people" to differ in their conclusions. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; see also Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). Appellate judges must be vigilant to avoid falling into the trap of concluding that since they are reasonable and fair-minded people, their particular view of the circumstantial evidence presented establishes the outer limits of what inferences can reasonably be drawn therefrom.
At the end of the day, the standards of review are mental constructs that discipline the mass of evidence placed before a reviewing court. When a judge no longer needs strictly to separate out evidence and inferences in favor of the verdict, but may immediately look through the prism of what is "reasonable," it comes much closer to weighing conflicting evidence and inferences, and inquiring into credibility.
W. Wendell Hall and Mark Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil and Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 539, 557 (Spring 2008).
Thus, the "more than a scintilla" bar is necessarily a low one: "When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. . . . Evidence that is so slight as to make any inference a guess is in legal effect no evidence." Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).
Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish any material fact, but it must transcend mere suspicion. The material fact must be reasonably inferred from the known circumstances. By its very nature, circumstantial evidence often involves linking what may be apparently insignificant and unrelated events to establish a pattern. Thus, each piece of circumstantial evidence must be viewed not in isolation, but in light of all the known circumstances.
Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, as long as the circumstantial evidence, viewed as a whole, rises above naked suspicion or guesswork, it is more than a scintilla.
With this analytical framework, what is the pattern of circumstantial evidence in the present case? The restaurant did not open until 6:00 a.m. One of the morning crew, Jose Perez, was responsible for mopping the floor of the restaurant between 5:30 and 6:00 each day. His supervisor testified, "He had to follow a pretty set schedule." In fact, a book describes all the tasks the maintenance man has to do every morning before the store opens, and he is required to do them "in that exact order every day." Not only was Perez responsible for mopping the floor every day, the record contains deposition testimony that he did mop on the morning Leal slipped:
Q. (By attorney for McDonald's) Do you know who cleaned the lobby that morning?
A. (By Laura Leal) Always the maintenance person cleans it.
Q. And who was the maintenance person that day?
A. Always Jose, there is nobody else.
Q. Each day that you're there when Jose is the maintenance man, is one of his jobs that he mops the lobby?
A. Yes. First to clean everything and then mop at the end before opening.
Leal fell at 5:45 a.m., during the relatively small window of time that Perez was required to mop. Because the accident occurred before the restaurant had opened, there were no customers in the store, only the morning crew of McDonald's employees. Leal slipped even though she was wearing slip-resistant shoes. As she was getting up, she noticed that the floor was wet. There was nothing else on the floor except the water, and there were no known defects in or problems with the floor.
The majority concludes that the foregoing evidence is not sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that the wet floor was the result of Perez's mopping or some other employee activity. Respectfully, I believe that is too narrow a reading of the concept of "reasonable inference." In my opinion, the circumstantial evidence presented here, viewed as a whole, produces a pattern by which a conclusion that the wet floor probably did result from mopping would not be a guess and would not be naked suspicion. Based on the standards by which we are required to evaluate the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from such evidence, that is more than a scintilla.
The majority also asserts that the mere fact that the only people in the store at the time Leal fell were McDonald's employees "is no more evidence that they caused the floor to be wet ( e.g., by mopping) than it is evidence that the floor was wet due to a plumbing leak or leaking machine." Slip opinion at 6. This appears to be an argument for application of the so-called "equal inference rule." See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 813-14. But there are at least two reasons why the equal inference rule is not dispositive here. First, the equal inference rule does not change the "more than a scintilla" legal analysis, as explained by former Chief Justice Phillips in Lozano:
Properly applied, the equal inference rule is but a species of the no evidence rule, emphasizing that when the circumstantial evidence is so slight that any plausible inference is purely a guess, it is in legal effect no evidence. But circumstantial evidence is not legally insufficient merely because more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from it. If circumstantial evidence will support more than one reasonable inference, it is for the jury to decide which is more reasonable, subject only to review by the trial court and the court of appeals to assure that such evidence is factually sufficient.
52 S.W.3d at 148 (emphasis added). As set forth above, the circumstantial evidence presented in this case is more than sufficient to make the inference that the water on which Leal slipped came from mopping (or some other employee activity) a reasonable one. Second, the equal inference rule applies only where two reasonable inferences are of precisely equal probability. In the face of the evidence set forth above, it strains credulity to argue that it is equally likely that the water Leal slipped on came from a leaking machine or a plumbing leak, when the record contains no indication whatsoever that the restaurant in question had ever had a leaking machine or a plumbing leak.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand the cause for trial.