Opinion
PD-0597-24
11-20-2024
JOSHUA LEE LAWRENCE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
DISSENT TO REFUSAL TO GRANT APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS HOOD COUNTY
Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.
This case presents an issue that this Court has declined to address on two prior occasions. Appellant was convicted of child trafficking when he was both the alleged trafficker and the alleged beneficiary of the trafficking, and he challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Relying on an opinion from a different court of appeals, the court of appeals in this case affirmed the conviction. I write again to explain why the Legislature would not have contemplated the court of appeals's broad interpretation of the trafficking statute. I would grant review and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Ritz v. State, 481 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. App.-Austin 2015), pet. dism'd, improv. granted, 533 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Griffin v. State, 662 S.W.3d 470, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (Keller, P.J., dissenting); Ritz, 533 S.W.3d at 315 (Keller, P.J., dissenting).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial
Appellant was twenty-three years old when he met S.H., a fourteen-year-old, on Snapchat. Appellant and S.H. planned together to stay at a hotel in Granbury, where S.H. lived, and drink together. On the agreed-upon day, Appellant picked up S.H. at a park in his truck. They traveled together to a liquor store, where Appellant purchased alcohol. When they arrived at the hotel, Appellant and S.H. began drinking. Appellant and S.H. then had sex.
Appellant's indictment alleged that he:
did then and there knowingly traffic by transporting, enticing, or recruiting [S.H.], a person younger than 18 years of age, and by any means caused [S.H.] to engage in or become a victim of conduct prohibited by Texas Penal Code Sec. 22.011 and Texas Penal Code Sec. 21.11 by sexually assaulting [S.H.] by penetrating the female sexual organ of [S.H.] with the defendant's penis and by placing the defendant's hands on the breasts of [S.H].
Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 58 years in prison.
B. Appeal
On appeal, Appellant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Appellant argued that the structure of the trafficking statute divided actors into two categories: traffickers and beneficiaries. Appellant posited that real ambiguity existed in the statute when the "trafficker" and the "beneficiary" were the same person. Appellant also claimed that applying the language of the statute so broadly that it encompasses cases such as his own leads to an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. Looking to extratextual factors, Appellant argued that one could not be guilty of trafficking in cases like Appellant's. For Appellant to be guilty, he would have needed to deliver S.H. to another beneficiary or someone else would have had to traffic S.H. to Appellant.
The court of appeals acknowledged that "[Appellant's] conduct would not constitute what is colloquially understood to be human trafficking." Nevertheless, the court relied on the Austin Court of Appeals's decision in Ritz and concluded that "the plain meaning of the Trafficking Statute" encompassed Appellant's conduct.
Lawrence v. State, No. 02-23-00238-CR, 2024 WL 3282193, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 3, 2024).
Id. at *5.
II. ANALYSIS
As I concluded previously in Ritz, the provisions in (a)(7) and (a)(8), when taken together, contemplate two different perpetrators in any trafficking offense-a person who traffics the child (subsection (a)(7)) and a different person who commits the sexual offense against the child (subsection (a)(8)). In the context of Appellant's case, Appellant could not be guilty of child trafficking when he was both the alleged trafficker and beneficiary of the very same trafficking.
533 S.W.3d at 312-13 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (citing Tex. Penal Code § 20A.02(a)(7)(B), (C) ("A person commits an offense if the person knowingly . . . traffics a child or disabled individual and by any means causes the trafficked child or disabled individual to engage in, or become the victim of, conduct prohibited by . . . Section 21.11 (Indecency with a Child) ... [and] Section 22.011 (Sexual Assault).") and Tex. Penal Code § 20A.02(a)(8) ("A person commits an offense if the person knowingly . . . engages in sexual conduct with a child trafficked in the manner described in Subdivision (7).")).
Later, in Griffin, I noted that "[g]iven the court of appeals's broad construction of the statute, we should expect more cases like this." Appellant's case appears to be another example of a plain child sexual assault dressed up as child trafficking merely because the defendant drove the child to a hotel before committing the actual offense. This kind of prosecution will continue because our Court has effectively given prosecutors a green light by not addressing the issue. Not only that, the risk of conviction for trafficking could easily lead defendants to enter plea bargains for plain sexual assault in order to avoid facing first-degree felony punishment instead of second-degree felony punishment. This Court should address the issue now. To do otherwise puts all of these convictions at risk. The proper construction of the child trafficking statute is an important issue for this State, and this Court should not continue to evade it.
662 S.W.3d at 470 (Keller, P.J., dissenting).
In this case, the solution is simple. When we find the evidence insufficient to establish an element of the charged offense, but there is an available lesser-included offense that the jury necessarily found for which the evidence is sufficient, we reform the judgment to reflect the lesser-included offense and remand for a new punishment hearing. Sexual assault of a child is a lesser-included offense of the child trafficking offense charged in Appellant's indictment. The jury would have necessarily found that Appellant committed this offense, and the evidence is clearly sufficient to support his commission of that offense. Therefore, I would reform Appellant's conviction to reflect a conviction for the offense of sexual assault of a child and remand the case for a new punishment hearing.
Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 300-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
III. CONCLUSION
I would grant review to address the proper construction of the child trafficking statute.
Because the Court declines to do so today, I respectfully dissent.