Opinion
01-21-00496-CV
12-29-2022
JENNIFER ANN LARKINS-RUBY, Appellant v. AUSTIN COUNTY, SEALY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND AUSTIN COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES DISTRICT #1, Appellees
On Appeal from the 155th District Court Austin County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2020V-0165
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
April L. Farris Justice
Appellant Jennifer Ann Larkins-Ruby, proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court's judgment in this ad valorem tax delinquency suit in favor of appellees Austin County, Sealy Independent School District, and Austin County Emergency Services District #1 (collectively, the "taxing units"). We construe Larkins-Ruby's appeal to argue that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case; (2) the taxing units lacked authority to assess ad valorem taxes against her real property; and (3) the taxing units failed to establish a prima facie case. We affirm.
Background
On December 16, 2020, the taxing units sued Larkins-Ruby to recover delinquent ad valorem taxes, penalties, and interest on real property located in Austin County for tax years 2018 and 2019. The taxing units also sought to recover "all additional taxes which become delinquent on such property prior to judgment, as well as any additional penalties and interest which accrue prior to or after judgment, to the date of sale." At trial, the taxing units also requested delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest for tax year 2020.
The taxing units also sued other defendants who are not parties to this appeal. The legal description of the property is:
TRACT #1: A TRACT OF LAND BEING 1.00 ACRE, MORE OR LESS, IN ALLEN CREEK FARM, SECTION 4, IN THE JOHN P. BORDEN HEADRIGHT SURVEY, ABSTRACT 125, AUSTIN COUNTY, TEXAS, BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS TWO 0.50 ACRE TRACTS DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A" TO VOLUME 441, PAGE 843 OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF AUSTIN COUNTY, TEXAS.
The trial court held a bench trial on August 17, 2021. The taxing units entered into evidence a certified tax statement showing that, as of August 31, 2021, Larkins- Ruby owed delinquent taxes in the amounts of $2,855.79 to Austin County; $6,694.45 to Sealy Independent School District; and $155.69 to Austin County Emergency Services District #1. Larkins-Ruby defended against her tax liability by arguing that the taxing units had not established standing to sue; they lacked authority to tax her property because she submitted a certificate withdrawing her property from the tax rolls; her "land is not commercial"; her property was "redeemed . . . back to private status" through a trust; and the taxing units have never rebutted these arguments. She did not introduce any evidence, but the trial court took judicial notice of her previous filings in the case.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the taxing units, ordering that they are entitled to recover delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 2018 through 2020 as well as costs. The judgment also ordered foreclosure and a sale of the subject property to satisfy the judgment. This appeal followed.
Jurisdiction
On appeal, Larkins-Ruby first contends generally that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
Section 33.41(a) of the Property Tax Code states,
At any time after its tax on property becomes delinquent, a taxing unit may file suit to foreclose the lien securing payment of the tax, to enforce personal liability for the tax, or both. The suit must be in a court of competent jurisdiction for the county in which the tax was imposed.TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(A); see id. § 1.04(12) (defining "taxing unit" to include counties, school districts, "a special district or authority," or "any other political unit of this state" authorized to impose ad valorem taxes on property). The Texas Constitution provides that a district court's jurisdiction "consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body." Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Town &Country Suites, L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 461 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
The taxing units filed the underlying ad valorem tax suit in the 155th District Court in Austin County, Texas. See TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(A). THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN AUSTIN COUNTY. See id. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction over the taxing units' delinquency lawsuit against Larkins-Ruby.
Larkins-Ruby also argues that the taxing units did not prove they had standing. Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a lawsuit. Garcia v. City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 206 (Tex. 2019); Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and is never presumed. Tex. Ass n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 44344 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) an "injury in fact" that (2) is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable decision. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154-55 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
Larkins-Ruby repeatedly states in her appellate brief that the taxing units did not prove they had "standing/privity," but she does not provide any analysis or authority supporting her privity argument. "Failure to cite to appropriate legal authority or to provide substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver of a complaint on appeal." Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 538 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellate brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citation to authorities”). Therefore, Larkins-Ruby has waived any complaints concerning privity.
In addition to constitutional standing, standing may be predicated upon statutory authority. Nephrology Leaders &Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs. LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 915-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). When the Legislature has conferred standing by statute, "the proper analysis is to determine whether the claimant falls within the category of claimants upon whom the Legislature conferred standing." Nephrology Leaders, 573 S.W.3d at 916; see Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851; In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Statutory standing, however, does not supplant constitutional standing, and a plaintiff must have constitutional standing even if standing has been conferred by statute. Nephrology Leaders, 573 S.W.3d at 917; see also Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 582 n.83 (Tex. 2013) ("[C]ourts' constitutional jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by statute.").
As stated above, section 33.41(a) of the Property Tax Code authorizes a "taxing unit," at any time after its tax on property becomes delinquent, to sue a property owner "to foreclose the lien securing payment of the tax, to enforce personal liability for the tax, or both." TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(a). The taxing units alleged in their petition that they were each political subdivisions of the state "legally constituted and authorized to impose and/or collect ad valorem taxes[.]" See id. § 1.04(12) (defining "taxing units"). They further alleged that the ad valorem taxes on the subject property had become delinquent for tax years 2018 and 2019, and they added delinquent taxes for tax year 2020 at trial. The taxing units therefore alleged that they fall within the category of claimants upon whom the Legislature conferred standing in section 33.41(a). See id. § 33.41(a); Nephrology Leaders, 573 S.W.3d at 916. We conclude that the taxing units had statutory standing to maintain the tax delinquency lawsuit against Larkins-Ruby.
The taxing units also alleged facts in their petition establishing constitutional standing. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (stating that plaintiff must plead facts affirmatively demonstrating trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction). Their petition alleged that Larkins-Ruby owned the property on the first day of January for each tax year in which the taxing units sought to recover delinquent taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE § 32.07(a) (stating that “property taxes are the personal obligation of the person who owns or acquires the property on January 1 of the year for which the tax is imposed”). The taxing units alleged that property taxes were “delinquent and owing, along with penalties and interest authorized by law,” for each of the tax years alleged.
These allegations establish that the taxing units were injured by Larkins-Ruby's failure to pay legally imposed ad valorem taxes on the subject property. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154-55 (stating elements of constitutional standing). These allegations also establish that the taxing units' injury likely would be redressable by an award of damages or, alternatively, foreclosure of tax liens on the property and an order to sell the property in a tax foreclosure sale. See id. Larkins-Ruby does not offer any argument or analysis or point to any evidence showing that the taxing units did not have standing to maintain their lawsuit beyond arguing they did not offer proof of their standing. We therefore conclude that the taxing units had standing to maintain suit against Larkins-Ruby. We overrule Larkins-Ruby's jurisdictional issues.
Authority of Taxing Units to Levy Taxes
Larkins-Ruby also challenges the taxing units' authority to tax the subject property. She argues that Texas granted a land patent to John P. Borden, an apparent predecessor-in-title, which divested the government of jurisdiction over the subject property, including the right to levy taxes against it. She further argues that she does not conduct business on her property, and therefore it is not subject to taxation. These arguments lack merit.
The Texas Constitution provides, "All real property and tangible personal property in this State, unless exempt as required or permitted by this Constitution, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by law." TEX. CONST. art VIII, § 1(b); see Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton &Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 42 (Tex. 2018) (stating that property tax liability derives from ownership of property, and person who owns property is generally liable for property taxes assessed on that property); Jim Wells Cnty. v. El Paso Prod. Oil &Gas Co., 189 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) ("Obligations to pay . . . ad valorem taxes are derived entirely from constitutional and statutory provisions."). The Texas Constitution further provides that the "several counties of the State are authorized to levy ad valorem taxes upon all property within their respective boundaries for county purposes ...." TEX. CONST. ART. VIII, § 1-A (EMPHASIS ADDED); see Dallas Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. L.D. Brinkman &Co. (Tex.), 701 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Avery v. Guadalupe Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 04-16-00572-CV, 2017 WL 1337640, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr. 12, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting property owner's challenges to taxing units' lawful authority to impose and collect ad valorem taxes).
These constitutional provisions are codified in the Property Tax Code. Section 11.01(a) provides that "[a]ll real . . . property that this state has jurisdiction to tax is taxable unless exempt by law." Tex. Tax Code § 11.01(a). Section 11.01(b) provides that "[t]his state has jurisdiction to tax real property if located in this state." Id. § 11.01(b); see L.D. Brinkman, 701 S.W.2d at 22 (stating that "section 11.01, which defines the state's taxing jurisdiction over real and tangible personal property, also defines the limits of the legitimate power of the State of Texas and its political subdivisions to tax such property"). The Property Tax Code authorizes the county tax assessor-collector to assess and collect taxes on property located in the county for the county and other taxing units if authorized by law. Tex. Tax Code § 6.23(a). "[S]ubject only to federal limitations and exemptions set forth in the Texas Constitution, the State of Texas, through its political subdivisions, has the power to tax any real and tangible personal private property in the state." L.D. Brinkman, 701 S.W.2d at 22. Therefore, the taxing units had authority under the Texas Constitution and the Property Tax Code to tax the subject property.
A land patent simply conveys an interest in real property owned by the government to a private citizen. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 572 U.S. 93, 99 (2014) ("A land patent is an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made public, or 'patent.'"); Land Patent, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An instrument by which the government conveys a grant of public land to a private person.”). A state does not relinquish its sovereign right of taxation over real property by conveying its interest in the property. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2464 (2020) ("These patents transferred legal title and are the basis for much of the private land ownership in a number of States today. But no one thinks any of this diminished the United States's claim to sovereignty over any land."); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 874-75 (1996) (stating, in context of public contracts, that "[a]ll public grants are strictly construed," "[n]othing can be taken against the State by presumption or inference," and "neither the right of taxation, nor any other power of sovereignty, will be held . . . to have been surrendered, unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken") (citations omitted); Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 538 S.W.3d 89, 105 (Tex. 2017) (stating that Texas Constitution "prohibits the surrender of the sovereign tax power. A state's sovereign power to tax encompasses not merely whether to tax, but also what to tax") (citing Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 4).
Larkins-Ruby cites to Severance v. Patterson, in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that the Republic of Texas, in issuing a land patent to private individuals, could have reserved the right of the public to use the beachfront property, but the plain language of the grant showed that it did not do so. See 370 S.W.3d 705, 717 (Tex. 2012). Larkins-Ruby relies on Severance to argue that "Texas did not typically reserve rights on land relinquished" from the state by a land patent. However, this argument confuses Texas's right to maintain an interest in land conveyed to a private individual-such as a public right to access beachfront property-with Texas's sovereign right of taxation. As discussed above, the state enjoys the sovereign right to tax property located within the state regardless of whether it maintains a legal interest in the property. Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1-a (authorizing counties to levy ad valorem taxes upon all property located within their respective boundaries for county purposes) (emphasis added); see also McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2464; Graphic Packaging, 538 S.W.3d at 105. Severance does not support Larkins-Ruby's argument.
Larkins-Ruby cites mostly non-binding authority to support her argument that the State's grant of a land patent to her apparent predecessor-in-title divests the taxing units of authority to levy taxes against her property. See, e.g., Keag Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 757 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. T.C. 2001); Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11 (Cal. 1861); Brown v. N. Hills Reg'l R.R. Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732, 740 (S.D. 2007) (holding that United States relinquished interest in land when it conveyed land by patent, and limiting holding to facts of case).
Larkins-Ruby also argues that the subject property is not taxable because she did not generate income from the property. However, neither the Texas Constitution nor the Property Tax Code limits ad valorem taxation to income-generating property. See TEX. CONST. art VIII, § 1(b); TEX. TAX CODE § 11.01(a), (b).
Finally, we note that this Court has previously rejected identical arguments made by Larkins-Ruby. See Larkins-Ruby v. Sealy Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 01-18-00746-CV, 2020 WL 717548, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court had jurisdiction to hear taxing units' delinquency suit and "taxing units have the authority under the state constitution to levy taxes on the subject property"). We therefore conclude that the taxing units had authority under Texas law to levy ad valorem taxes on the subject property. We overrule Larkins-Ruby's challenges to the taxing units' ad valorem taxation authority.
Prima Facie Case
In two sentences at the end of her appellate brief, Larkins-Ruby states that the taxing units have not "made any signed, sworn claim against [Larkins-Ruby] for which relief can be granted. A mere complaint is not sufficient to steal someone's home." We construe this argument as a challenge to whether the taxing units established a prima facie case concerning the elements of their cause of action.
These two sentences do not properly present this issue. Although courts liberally construe pro se briefs, pro se litigants must comply with applicable laws and rules of civil procedure. See Nguyen v. Kuljis, 414 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) ("We certainly agree that pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure.") (quoting Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam)); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) ("Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel."). On appeal, a pro se appellant must properly present her case. Strange v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2004, pet. denied). This requires an appellate brief to, among other things, "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i); see Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) ("Failure to cite to appropriate legal authority or to provide substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver of a complaint on appeal."). Because Larkins-Ruby has not provided any substantive analysis of this argument or citation to the record or authorities supporting this argument, it has not been properly presented for our review.
Even if Larkins-Ruby had properly presented the issue for our review, however, we would conclude that that taxing units established a prima facie case.
Tax Code section 33.41 authorizes a taxing unit, at "any time after its tax on property becomes delinquent," to file suit to enforce the taxpayer's personal liability for the tax. Tex. Tax Code § 33.41(a). Section 33.47, in turn, provides:
In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit's current tax roll and delinquent tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the property and the amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest accrued constitute prima facie evidence that each person charged with a duty relating to the imposition of the tax has complied with all requirements of law and that the amount of tax alleged to be delinquent against the property and the amount of penalties and interest due on that tax as listed are the correct amounts.Id. § 33.47(a).
"Once a taxing authority in a delinquency suit introduces the tax records described in section 33.47(a) into evidence, it establishes a prima facie case as to every material fact necessary to establish its cause of action." City of Bellaire v. Sewell, 426 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (quoting Nat'l Med. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.)); Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ogg, 122 S.W.3d 257, 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The taxing units' establishment of a prima facie case raises a rebuttable presumption that the taxes in question are due, delinquent, and unpaid. Sewell, 426 S.W.3d at 120; Nat'l Med. Fin. Servs., 150 S.W.3d at 906. Once the taxing units establish a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer to rebut the presumption by introducing competent evidence that she has paid the full amount of taxes, penalties, and interest or by establishing some other applicable defense. Sewell, 426 S.W.3d at 120.
At trial, the taxing units introduced into evidence certified copies of a tax statement showing the subject property and the amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest accrued for tax years 2018 through 2020. See TEX. TAX CODE § 33.47(a). The taxing units also introduced a copy of the warranty deed conveying the property to Larkins-Ruby and the current tax roll for her property. See id. The taxing units therefore established a prima facie case that Larkins-Ruby was delinquent in paying taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 2018 through 2020. See id. § 33.41(a); Sewell, 426 S.W.3d at 120.
Larkins-Ruby did not introduce any evidence at trial. Although the trial court took judicial notice of her previous filings in the case, a trial court can only take judicial notice of the existence of certain documents in its records, but it cannot take judicial notice of the truth of factual statements ad allegations in the documents. See Perez v. Williams, 474 S.W.3d 408, 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) On appeal, Larkins-Ruby does not point to any record evidence showing that she paid the delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest. See Sewell, 426 S.W.3d at 120; Perez, 474 S.W.3d at 419. Nor does Larkins-Ruby argue or present any evidence of an applicable defense other than the jurisdictional issues that we rejected above. See Sewell, 426 S.W.3d at 120; TEX. TAX CODE § 11.01(a) (stating that all real property located in Texas is taxable unless exempt by law). Accordingly, Larkins-Ruby has not established a defense to the taxing units' claims.
Larkins-Ruby declined to introduce any evidence at trial, stating that her documents were original copies which she had already provided to the trial court.
We conclude that the taxing units were statutorily entitled to recover the delinquent ad valorem taxes owed by Larkins-Ruby for tax years 2018 through 2020. We hold that the trial court properly rendered judgment in favor of the taxing units in their delinquency tax suit. We overrule Larkins-Ruby's final issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.