Opinion
2014-06-18
Richard LaPIEDRA, appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.
Krentsel & Guzman, LLP (Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Scott T. Horn], of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Janet L. Zaleon of counsel), for respondents.
Krentsel & Guzman, LLP (Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Scott T. Horn], of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Janet L. Zaleon of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated February 26, 2014, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants City of New York and New York City Fire Department which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On September 8, 2010, the plaintiff, a New York City firefighter, responded to the scene of a fire at a building in Staten Island which housed a marijuana grow room. The plaintiff testified that this room contained numerous planters containing marijuana plants and that the planters “were all connected with wires, plugged in at some point.” In the process of searching the premises, the plaintiff stepped onto a marijuana planter and fell forward, striking a window jamb. Approximately 15 minutes later, the plaintiff's feet became tangled in the wiring and he fell a second time. As a result of these falls, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injures which required surgery.
The plaintiff commenced this lawsuit against the City of New York and the New York City Fire Department (hereinafter together the municipal defendants), among others, alleging, inter alia, a right to recover under General Municipal Law § 205–e based on the municipal defendants' violation of Labor Law § 27–a(3)(a)(1). The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the municipal defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
General Municipal Law § 205–a(1) states, in part, that a firefighter may maintain an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments.” Labor Law § 27–a(3)(a)(1) provides that every employer shall furnish employment and a place of employment that are “free from recognized hazards” that cause or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. This statute may serve as a proper predicate for a cause of action alleging a violation of General Municipal Law § 205–e ( see Gammons v. City of New York, 109 A.D.3d 189, 972 N.Y.S.2d 559;Campbell v. City of New York, 31 A.D.3d 594, 819 N.Y.S.2d 294;Balsamo v. City of New York, 287 A.D.2d 22, 733 N.Y.S.2d 431).
Here, even assuming that the grow room presented hazards constituting a violation of Labor Law § 27–a(3)(a)(1), the municipal defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff's injuries did not result from their “neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence” in failing to comply with the statute (General Municipal Law § 205–a[1]; see Alexander v. City of New York, 82 A.D.3d 1022, 920 N.Y.S.2d 148;see also Williams v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 352, 779 N.Y.S.2d 449, 811 N.E.2d 1103;Blake v. City of New York, 109 A.D.3d 503, 971 N.Y.S.2d 4;cf. Gammons v. City of New York, 109 A.D.3d at 201–202, 972 N.Y.S.2d 559). In opposition to this showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Williams v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d at 364, 779 N.Y.S.2d 449, 811 N.E.2d 1103;Norman v. City of New York, 60 A.D.3d 830, 875 N.Y.S.2d 232;see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the municipal defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.