Opinion
2023 CA 0052 2023 CA 0053
06-02-2023
LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE & INDEMNITY COMPANY D/B/A BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA v. KIMBERLY L ROBINSON, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF LOUISIANA LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE & INDEMNITY COMPANY D/B/A BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA v. KIMBERLY L. ROBINSON, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF LOUISIANA
William M. Backstrom, Jr. Jeffrey P. Birdsong New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/ b/ a Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana Miranda Y. Scroggins Antonio Ferachi Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Kimberly L. Robinson, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana
Appealed from the Board of Tax Appeals, State of Louisiana Docket Nos. 09927D c/w 09985C The Honorable Anthony J. "Tony" Graphia (Ret), Chairman, Francis "Jay" Lobrano, Chairman Cade R. Cole, Vice-Chairman Judge Lisa Woodruff-White (Ret.), Board Member
After presiding over the initial hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals in this matter, Judge Graphia's term expired, and he retired from the Board. Thus, he did not participate in rendering the final Order and Written Reasons entered by the Board on July 14, 2022.
According to the record, although Judge White was present for the second hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals, she did not take part in the final decision of the Board as she was not appointed to the Board when the initial hearing occurred.
William M. Backstrom, Jr. Jeffrey P. Birdsong New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/ b/ a Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana
Miranda Y. Scroggins Antonio Ferachi Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Kimberly L. Robinson, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana
BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.
These consolidated matters are before us on appeal by Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/b/a Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana ("BCBS"), challenging a judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") that granted in part and denied in part cross motions for summary judgment filed by BCBS and Kimberly Robinson, in her capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Revenue for the State of Louisiana ("the Department"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying facts forming the basis of this appeal are undisputed by the parties. Originally formed in 1934, BCBS is an insurance company duly authorized to do business in Louisiana. BCBS is engaged in the business of issuing accident and health insurance plans to individual, business, and government customers in the State. As an insurer doing business in Louisiana, BCBS is subject to a "Premium Tax," which is an annual tax levied against insurance companies doing business in Louisiana in an amount "based on the combined gross annual premiums" collected by the insurer, as well as corporate income tax on its Louisiana taxable income. See La. R.S. 22:842(A) and La. R.S. 47:287.2, et seq.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:832, Louisiana insurers are entitled to a credit, based on qualifying Louisiana investments, against the amount of Premium Tax owed. The amount of the "Investment Tax Credit" is dependent on the ratio of qualifying Louisiana investments of the insurer over the total admitted assets of the insurer. Moreover, La. R.S. 47:227 provides that every insurance company is entitled to offset its Louisiana corporate income tax by the amount of any taxes, based on premiums, paid by the insurance company during the preceding twelve months ("Premium Tax Offset").
In 2016, BCBS filed petitions against the Department contesting the assessments of additional income tax due for the taxable years 2012, 2013, and 2014 (the "Tax Period"). In BTA Docket No. 09927D, BCBS challenged the assessments for the 2013 and 2014 tax years. Thereafter, in BTA Docket No. 09985C, BCBS brought the same challenge to the assessment for the 2012 tax year. By joint motion of the parties, the matters were consolidated. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the Premium Tax Offset claimed by BCBS against its Louisiana corporate income tax includes the Investment Tax Credit taken against the Premium Tax paid.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, BCBS submitted the affidavit of Adam Short, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Treasurer of BCBS, along with attachments; the Consolidated Joint Stipulation of Facts ("Joint Stipulation"), along with attachments; and the Department's responses and objections to BCBS's requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. In the Joint Stipulation, the parties agreed that other contested matters, such as penalties and whether the Municipal Premium taxes paid by BCBS were properly included in the Premium Tax Offset, were no longer an issue. Rather, the parties stipulated that the only issue in dispute was the Investment Tax Credit.
In opposition to BCBS's motion for summary judgment, the Department submitted copies of BCBS's petitions; a copy of the Joint Stipulation; a copy of BCBS's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment; and the affidavit of Danielle Palmer, the Department's Revenue Tax Assistant Director. The Department also objected to various portions of Adam Short's affidavit and several of the exhibits attached thereto, arguing, in part, that the statements and documents were inadmissible because they were not relevant to the Tax Period and had no probative value.
The Department raised the same objections during the July 14, 2021 BTA hearing on BCBS's motion for summary judgment and again noted its objection during the May 4, 2022 BTA hearing on the Department's motion for summary judgment. Moreover, we note that at the May 4, 2022 hearing, counsel for BCBS stated, "[T]he evidence that we put in regarding [the] 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011 [tax years], was admitted by the Board in July. So, it's in the record." Counsel for the Department made no further objection or comment concerning this issue. Although the BTA did not specifically address these issues in its judgment, the following language is included: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that any claim or request for relief of any kind or nature asserted by either party that is not specifically granted in this Judgment is hereby denied." Accordingly, we will consider all of the evidence that is in the record before us.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Department submitted copies of BCBS's petitions; a copy of the Joint Stipulation; and the affidavit of Danielle Palmer. In its opposition to the Department's motion for summary judgment, BCBS incorporated a motion to strike portions of Ms. Palmer's affidavit, along with a number of the statements included in the Department's Uncontested Material Facts.
Following the two hearings on the cross motions for summary judgment, the BTA issued written reasons for judgment on July 14, 2022, granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment filed by BCBS and granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment filed by the Department. The BTA also denied the motion to strike filed by BCBS. A final judgment in accordance with these findings was rendered on September 7, 2022, in pertinent part, as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Blue Cross owes additional Louisiana corporation income tax (the "Income Tax") for the Income Tax periods that ended on December 31, 2012 (the "2012 Tax Period") and December 31, 2013 (the "2013 Tax Period") of $1,437,549.00 and $3,827,218.00, respectively, for a total additional amount of Income Tax due of $5,264,767.00, plus interest thereon as provided by law; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Blue Cross made an overpayment, as that term is defined in La. R.S. 47:1621, of Income Tax for the Income Tax period that ended on December 31, 2014 (the "2014 Tax Period") of $8,440.00; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that pursuant to La. R.S. 47:1621, the Department shall refund to Blue Cross the amount of $8,440.00, together with interest thereon at the rates and for the periods provided in La. R.S. 47:1624; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Blue Cross owes no penalties or attorney fees for any of the Income Tax periods at issue in this matter; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Blue Cross shall remit to the Department the amount of $5,264,767,00, together with interest thereon at the rates and for the periods provided in La. R.S. 47:1601[.]
It is from this judgment that BCBS has appealed. The issues for our review are (1) whether the Investment Tax Credit claimed pursuant to La. R.S. 22:832 constitutes a payment of the Premium Tax such that it should be included in computing the Premium Tax Offset as provided in La. R.S. 47:227; and (2) whether detrimental reliance applies to preclude the Department's change of position with regard to the calculation of the Premium Tax Offset.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction for judicial review of decisions of the BTA is vested solely with the appellate courts. BCBS's appeal to this court is authorized by La. R.S. 47:1435, La. R.S. 47:1436, and La. Code Civ. P. art. 2083. Bannister Properties, Inc. v. State, 2018-0030 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/18), 265 So.3d 778, 785, writ denied, 2019-0025 (La. 3/6/19), 266 So.3d 902. Judicial review of a decision of the BTA is rendered upon the record as made before the BTA and is limited to facts on the record and questions of law. The BTA's findings of fact should be accepted where there is substantial evidence in the record to support them and should not be set aside unless they are manifestly erroneous in view of the evidence on the entire record. Ciervo v. Robinson, 2020-1106 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 323 So.3d 893, 896. With regard to questions of law, the judgment of the BTA should be affirmed if the BTA has correctly applied the law and has adhered to the proper procedural standards. However, if the BTAs judgment is not in accordance with law, it may be reversed or modified, with or without remanding the case. Bannister Properties, Inc., 265 So.3d at 785.
Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bannister Properties, Inc., 265 So.3d at 787-788. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(3).
The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the adjudicating tribunal on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential claims of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that may be decided by summary judgment. When addressing legal issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the BTA, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law de novo. Bannister Properties, Inc., 265 So.3d at 788.
On appeal, BCBS raises the same issues it asserted before the BTA. Specifically, it complains that the BTA failed to apply the well-established methods of statutory interpretation "in evaluating a matter of first impression." BCBS argues that based on the plain meaning of the word "paid" in La. R.S. 47:227, BCBS is entitled to a Premium Tax Offset based on the gross amount of Premium Tax paid, whether such tax was paid in cash or by utilization of the Investment Tax Credit. Further, BCBS asserts that the legislature's intent in enacting the Investment Tax Credit is clearly stated in La. R.S. 22:832(D), "the legislature finds that a premium tax reduction for insurers investing in certain qualified Louisiana assets promotes the public interest." The Department maintains that under the applicable statutory provisions, the amount of Premium Tax payable pursuant to La. R.S. 22:842 is reduced by the amount of the Investment Tax Credit. Moreover, the Department asserts that because the Investment Tax Credit is not paid, it is not included in the Premium Tax Offset.
In all cases of statutory construction or interpretation, legislative intent is the fundamental question. Davis-Lynch Holding Company, Inc. v. Robinson, 2019- 1574 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 316 So.3d 1126, 1133. As our supreme court explained in M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16,26-27:
The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the Legislature. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. We have often noted the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law.
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. However, when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.
It is also well established that the Legislature is presumed to enact each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption the Legislature was aware of existing statutes, well established principles of statutory construction and with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view. It is equally well settled under our rules of statutory construction, where it is possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. [Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.]
We further note that taxing statutes are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority. If the statute can reasonably be interpreted more than one way, the interpretation less onerous to the taxpayer is to be adopted. Likewise, however, exemptions from taxation or tax credits that relieve a tax burden are strictly construed and must be clearly, unequivocally, and affirmatively established. Cora-Texas Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 2020-0972 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 323 So.3d 886, 890, writ denied, 2021-00684 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So.3d 103.
After hearing argument on both motions for summary judgment and considering the evidence before it, the BTA issued written reasons for judgment, in pertinent part, as follows:
We begin our analysis of this issue with the general principles of statutory construction. "Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation; rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute." What a legislature wrote in the text of a statute itself is "the best evidence of the legislative intent or will." "A statutory provision should be construed with the remaining portions of the statute, but more importantly, all statutes on the same subject matter should be read together and interpreted as a whole."
First and foremost, we find that the legislature's use of the terminology that an "insurance company shall be entitled to an offset against any tax incurred under this Chapter, in the amount of any taxes, based on premiums, paid by it during the preceding twelve months ...." [emphasis added] means what it says; i.e., that the credit requires a payment of tax based on premiums and cannot be stretched to include an investment of an insurance company's own funds in one of the investments enumerated in La. R.S. 22:832(C). A deposit of
one's own cash in a Louisiana bank or the purchase of Louisiana immovable property is simply not the payment of a Premium Tax.
Second, to adopt [BCBS's] interpretation of La. R.S. 47:227 and its interaction with La. R.S. 22:832 is contrary to the implicit legislative intent in the enactment of La. R.S. 47:227. The granting of a credit against the income tax for taxes paid based on insurance premiums is clearly designed to avoid an insurance company from being subject to a combined income and Premium Tax liability in excess of the insurance company's state income tax liability without consideration of the income tax credit. Stated another way (and to state the obvious), without the credit allowed by La. R.S. 47:227, an insurance company would pay more overall combined tax to the State of Louisiana than an entity NOT subject to the Premium Tax. La. R.S. 22:832 grants a credit against the Premium Tax for certain enumerated investments in Louisiana. To allow the same credit for qualified Louisiana investments against the income tax would in effect grant [BCBS] a "double" credit for the same investment - one against the Premium Tax and one against the income tax. Exemptions from taxation are strictly construed and must be clearly, unequivocally and affirmatively established. The case herein involves a tax credit rather than an exemption. However, irrespective of whether it is termed an exemption, deduction or credit, the taxpayer is relieved of a tax burden and, thus, we see no distinction. As such, the credit claimed by [BCBS] must be clearly, unequivocally, and affirmatively established. We find that no such clear establishment of the credit sought by [BCBS] in La. R.S. 47:227. [Emphasis in original; internal citations omitted.]
Applying the principles of statutory construction as discussed above, we are in agreement with the BTA that to adopt the argument posited by BCBS would result in a double credit for the same investment. Based on a clear reading of the statutes in question, we find the legislature did not intend for the Investment Tax Credit to be claimed against both the Premium Tax and the Louisiana corporate income tax.
At all times pertinent hereto, La. R.S. 22:832 provided, in part, as follows:
This statute has since been amended several times, but the substance remains unchanged. See La. R.S. 22:832 as amended by Acts 2016, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 10, § 1, eff. March 9, 2016; Acts 2016, 2nd Ex.Sess., No. 7, § 1, eff. June 24, 2016; and Acts 2017, No. 313, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.
A. The amount of the tax payable shall be reduced from the amount otherwise fixed in this Part if the payer files a sworn statement with the annual report required by this Part showing as of the end of each fiscal quarter reporting period that at least the following amounts of the total admitted assets of the payer, less assets in an amount equal to the reserves on its policies issued in foreign countries in which it is
authorized to do business and which countries require an investment therein as a condition of doing business, are invested and maintained in qualifying Louisiana investments as hereinafter defined in Subsection C of this Section. The amount of tax credit granted shall be the average of the percentage of qualifying Louisiana securities held at the end of each fiscal quarter for the fiscal year.
B. If one-sixth of the total admitted assets of the payer are in qualifying Louisiana investments, then the tax payable shall be thirty-three and one-third percent of the amount otherwise fixed in this Part; if at least one-fifth of the total admitted assets of the payer are in qualifying Louisiana investments, then the tax payable shall be twenty-five percent of the amount otherwise fixed in this Part; if at least one-fourth of the total admitted assets of the payer are in qualifying Louisiana investments, the tax payable shall be fifteen percent of the amount otherwise fixed in this Part; and if at least one-third of the total admitted assets of the payer are in qualifying Louisiana investments, then the tax payable shall be five percent of the amount otherwise fixed in this Part.
C. For the purposes of this Part, "a qualifying Louisiana investment" is hereby defined as:
(1) Certificates of deposit issued in Louisiana by any bank or savings and loan association or savings bank, any of which are operating in the state of Louisiana or a trust company operating in the state of Louisiana with a main office or one or more branches where the trust company holds such funds in trust and invests them in certificates of deposit issued by a bank, savings and loan association or savings bank operating in the state of Louisiana with a main office or one or more branches.
(2) Bonds of this state or bonds of municipal, school, road, or levee districts, or other political subdivisions of this state or bonds approved for issue by the Louisiana State Bond Commission;
(3) Mortgages on property located in this state;
(4) Real property located in this state;
(5) Policy loans to residents of Louisiana, or other loans to residents of this state, or to corporations domiciled in this state;
(6) Common or preferred stock in corporations domiciled in this state; and
(7) Cash on deposit in an account in Louisiana in any bank or savings and loan association, or savings bank, or trust company holding such funds in trust, operating in the state of Louisiana with a main office or one or more branches.
D. Recognizing that it is in the public interest to create an incentive for environmentally clean industry to locate in this state and
to broaden the economic base; to encourage investment in this state; and to enhance the economic and financial climate of the state, the legislature finds that a premium tax reduction for insurers investing in certain qualified Louisiana assets promotes the public interest. [Emphasis added.]Moreover, La. R.S. 47:227 provides, "Every insurance company shall be entitled to an offset against any tax incurred under this Chapter, in the amount of any taxes, based on premiums, paid by it during the preceding twelve months, by virtue of any law of this state." (Emphasis added.)
Reviewing these statutes, along with the Premium Tax statute, La. R.S. 22:842, it is clear that the amount of Premium Tax paid by an insurer is reduced by the amount of the Investment Tax Credit that is calculated as set forth in La. R.S. 22:832. Thus, it follows that the Premium Tax Offset allowed by La. R.S. 47:227, which is based on premiums paid by an insurance company during the preceding twelve months, does not include the Investment Tax Credit. Accordingly, we find no error in the BTA's judgment, granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment filed by BCBS and granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment filed by the Department.
Detrimental Reliance
The doctrine of detrimental reliance is designed to prevent injustice by barring a party from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions, representations, or silence. Luther v. IOM Company LLC, 2013-0353 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825. Pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 1967, M[a] party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying." In analyzing a detrimental reliance claim, this court has defined a "promise" as follows:
A promise is a declaration which binds the person who makes it, either in conscience or law, to do a specific thing, which then gives to the other person a right to expect or claim the performance of that
thing. Another definition of a promise is that it is an offer which is definite and certain and which the promisor intends to be binding. A promise must be clear and unambiguous in order to be enforceable. The mere expression of an intention is not a promise. [Emphasis in original.]Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2006-1167 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1228, 1239.
A party claiming detrimental reliance must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the reliance. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 2004-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59. The doctrine of detrimental reliance is not favored in Louisiana law, and all claims must be examined strictly and carefully. Harris v. Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges, 2021-0844 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So.3d 1121, 1126.
As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, "Louisiana jurisprudence applying estoppel to tax matters has been described as running a spectrum." Showboat Star Partnership v. Slaughter, 2000-1227 (La. 4/3/01), 789 So.2d 554, 561 n.12. At one extreme, when the tax statutes are clear and unambiguous, estoppel has not been applied; at the other, when the Department abruptly departs from established precedent, estoppel has been applied. Id. Moreover, it has been suggested that proving detrimental reliance against a governmental agency should be more burdensome, requiring: (1) unequivocal advice from an unusually authoritative source, (2) reasonable reliance on that advice by an individual, (3) extreme harm resulting from that reliance, and (4) gross injustice to the individual in the absence of judicial estoppel. Luther, 130 So.3d at 825; Showboat Star Partnership, 789 So.2d at 562; Eicher v. Louisiana State Police, Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Division, 97-0121 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98), 710 So.2d 799, 804, writ denied, 98-0780 (La. 5/8/98), 719 So.2d 51.
BCBS asserts that it relied on the Department's position in prior years allowing BCBS's reporting of a Premium Tax Offset equal to the actual amount of Premium Tax paid in cash and the Investment Tax Credit used to reduce its Premium Tax liability. In its reply brief on appeal, BCBS further argues that had it known of the Department's change in position regarding what is included in the Premium Tax Offset, it may have made other investments that yielded higher returns than those yielded by the qualifying Louisiana investments as set forth in La. R.S. 22:832. BCBS also points to Attorney General Opinion Number 00-381 as further support for its position that the Department was in agreement with the manner in which BCBS had been computing its Premium Tax Offset in the years prior to the Tax Period.
In this opinion, the attorney general was asked to consider whether an insurance company is entitled to a Premium Tax Offset resulting from a credit against its Premium Tax liability because of its investment in a Louisiana certified company. We are mindful, however, that Attorney General opinions are merely advisory and not binding authority. Conachen v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 2009-0100 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09), 30 So.3d 820, 824 n.4.
As we have previously concluded that the statutes in question are clear and unambiguous, we find detrimental reliance has no application in this matter. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by BCBS's argument that the Department's action in reversing its position regarding what is included in the Premium Tax Offset has caused BCBS to suffer a gross injustice. Although the contemporaneous administrative construction of statutes by an agency charged with administering them is generally entitled to great weight, an administrative construction cannot be given any weight where it is contrary to or inconsistent with the statute. MRT Exploration Co. v. McNamara, 94-0063 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 703 So.2d 40, 43. An interpretation used by the state administrative agency may be persuasive, but inconsistent interpretation of the overall scheme or use of the wrong rule cannot stand. See Jurisich v. Jenkins, 99-0076 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d 597, 602.
DECREE
For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the September 7, 2022 judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals and assess all costs associated with this appeal against Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/b/a Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana. AFFIRMED.