Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00CV-282-H
August 1, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an appeal of an administrative ruling from the Department of Agriculture, which denied Plaintiff his request for equitable relief and payment under the Department's Production Flexibility Contract payment program. The precise issue before the Court is whether the Director for the National Appeals Division of the United States Department of Agriculture (the "Director") acted within his discretion in denying Plaintiff relief. The Director did so because Plaintiff failed to timely execute a succession-in-interest Production Flexibility Contract and because Plaintiff knew or had reason to know that even if he requested the Department to designate his shares, he had not signed a succession interest contract by September 30, 1997, as required by law.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706, provides for a deferential standard of review to determine whether an agency acted in a manner that was "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This Court's role is to determine, based on the review of the administrative record, "whether the administrative decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and whether there was clear error of judgment." Simms v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 45 F.3d 999, 1003 (6th Cir. 1995). The Administrator's interpretation of the record is entitled to deference and this Court is not entitled to substitute its own judgment for that of an agency.
Plaintiff contends that he requested Department employees to process his successor-in-interest designation. The Court assumes this to be undisputed. He says that he followed up several times and was led to believe that he was in compliance. The hearing officer and the National Appeals Division agreed. Each reviewed Plaintiff's original request and granted it. They concluded that Plaintiff attempted to designate his shares prior to the 1997 deadline and requested the local office to do so. They found that the county office had erred in not processing Plaintiff's paperwork. The hearing officer concluded, therefore, that Plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief.
The Director reversed this decision. He did so after concluding that Plaintiff was required to execute a succession-in-interest Production Flexibility Contract prior to September 30, 1997, in order to receive payments for 1997. Even if Plaintiff had requested the Department to process his paperwork, Plaintiff knew or should have known that he had not actually signed the succession-in-interest by the required date as provided by law. Therefore, he was not entitled to payments.
No one can deny that the county office agriculture employees should have followed up on Plaintiff's request and prepared the succession-in-interest contract for Plaintiff's signature. Unfortunately, they did not do so. In his administrative appeal, Plaintiff asked for "equitable" relief to correct for Plaintiff's misreliance and for Defendant's misfeasance. One can certainly see that such equitable relief might be appropriate under these circumstances, depending on the precise evidence.
While the foregoing rationale seems reasonable, countervailing arguments also exist. Preparing, filing and signing the succession-in-interest contract and the designation of PFC shares is ultimately Plaintiff's responsibility. No one can sign the documents on his behalf. To comply with regulations which ultimately benefit him is Plaintiff's responsibility. One can reasonably assume Plaintiff's awareness that the succession-in-interest contract could not be accomplished without his signature. The Director based his decision on these principles. In essence, he concluded that county office employees cannot be bound as a matter of law to undertake a responsibility which is Plaintiff's by statute. The Court does not agree that the Director had no choice but to follow the regulations and deny Plaintiff's relief. However, the Court cannot say that a decision, based on this rationale, was arbitrary, capricious or clearly erroneous. The Court finds that his decision was reasonable and in accordance with the existing statute.
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment is SUSTAINED and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This is a final and appealable order.