Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1825-L.
June 10, 2003.
ORDER
Before the court is Defendant Ellis County's Motion to Dismiss, filed September 20, 2002. Having considered Defendant's motion, Plaintiff's response, Defendant's reply, Plaintiff's Complaint, and the applicable law, the court grants Defendant Ellis County's Motion to Dismiss as herein provided.
I. Motion to Dismiss — 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). Stated another way, "[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise, "` [d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the plaintiff's] claims.'" Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)). The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Lowrey, 17 F.3d at 247. A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
II. Analysis
Defendant Ellis County ("Defendant" or "Ellis County") contends that Plaintiff Bobby Charles Jones's ("Plaintiff") claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "prosecutorial decisions" of the Ellis County District Attorney should be dismissed, because the District Attorney is a state official, not a local official, for purposes of liability arising out of his prosecutorial decisions. For support, Defendant cites Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 828 (1997), in which the Fifth Circuit held that when acting in a prosecutorial capacity, a district attorney is an agent of the state, not an agent of the county in which the criminal case happens to be prosecuted. See id. at 678. Defendant also relies on Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75 (5th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that the actions of a Texas district attorney, which are within the scope of his prosecutorial function during a criminal proceeding, do not constitute official policy for which a county can be held liable. See id. at 77. Plaintiff, on the other hand, cites Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985), for the proposition that a Texas district attorney is a local official that is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 194-95. In its reply, Defendant asserts that it is not relying on Eleventh Amendment immunity; rather, it maintains that when deciding whether to prosecute a particular case, the Ellis County District Attorney acts on behalf of the State of Texas and not on behalf of Ellis County. It therefore argues that the District Attorney is not a county policymaker for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot be held liable as such. The court agrees.
Citing Esteves, the Fifth Circuit in Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 817 (2001), made clear that "a county may only be held liable for acts of a district attorney when he `functions as a final policymaker for the county.'" Id. at 192. The court further concluded that a district attorney is not a policymaking official for the county when he acts in his prosecutorial capacity, because he is enforcing state rather than county law. Id. Here, Plaintiff's claim against Ellis County, as set forth in his complaint, is in part based on the Ellis County Attorney's or prosecutor's decision to prosecute Plaintiff for criminal assault rather than dismiss the charges against him. Because the district attorney was not a policymaking official for Ellis County while acting in his prosecutorial capacity, Ellis County cannot be held liable for his acts. Accordingly, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is therefore appropriate.
III. Miscellaneous
Defendant's motion is based on a claim arising out of the Ellis County District Attorney's prosecutorial decisions; however, as the court reads Plaintiff's Complaint, this is not the only basis for Plaintiffs claim regarding county policy. Plaintiff also alleges that "[b]y policy and custom, the Ellis County Attorney routinely accepts cases without a probable cause determination and the case filed against the Plaintiff was no exception." Plaintiff's Complaint 13. According to Plaintiff, this procedural failure constitutes a violation of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which held that a judicial determination of probable cause must be conducted before there can be an extended restraint on a person's liberty following arrest. Defendant did not address the alleged constitutional inadequacy regarding probable cause determinations. This issue thus remains for further resolution or trial.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons herein stated, Defendant Ellis County's Motion to Dismiss is granted as herein provided. The policy issue regarding Gerstein remains for resolution or trial.