Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0468-L
June 19, 2003
FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 8 and 12, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement, filed May 9, 2003, and Plaintiff's Response to Court's May 14, 2003 ORDER, filed May 23, 2003. The preceding pleadings were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the District Court's Standing Order of Reference, filed April 23, 2003, which referred this matter for pretrial management and to submit to the District Court proposed findings and recommendations on dispositive motions.
The Court held a hearing on the above pleadings on Friday, June 13, 2003. Based on the pleadings, the oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 8 and 12, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lonnie Charles Chalmers ("Chalmers") filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Andrew Marks ("Marks"), who is the Executive Director of the Texas State Board of Social Workers Examiners ("Board") in Austin, Texas. Chalmers is studying to become a licensed social worker, and the Board is a state agency set up to regulate the profession of social work in Texas. The Board is administratively attached to the Texas Department of Health, has rule-making authority, is governed by a nine member board appointed by the Governor, and regulated by the Professional Social Work Act, TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 505.001, et seq. (Vernon 1999). Chalmers' Complaint ("Compl.") states that Marks violated his constitutional rights by not approving his application to take the social worker licensing exam and refusing to forward the matter a state administrative law judge. (Compl. at 1 — 2.) Chalmers requests monetary damages, declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and a trial. Id. at 3.
II. ANALYSIS
Marks filed a motion to dismiss ("Mot.") under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Chalmers' claims for monetary relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that the entire Complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. Alternatively, Marks moves for dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 or for an order under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) requiring Chalmers to provide a more definite statement of his claims. (Mot. at 1-4.) Chalmers filed a response ("Resp.) arguing that he should be allowed to take the social worker licensing exam and that the Board is violating his procedural due process and its own procedures by not providing him with a hearing before a state administrative law judge. (Resp. at 1-2.)
The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST, amend. XI.
A. Legal Standards for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court is further guided by the general rule that allegations in a pro se complaint are construed more permissively. See Bannister v. Dal-Tile Intern., Inc., 2003 WL 21145739, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2003). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings, which include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Jones v. Pillow, 2003 WL 21356818, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2003) (Lindsay, J.). The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id. A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Id. B. Eleventh Amendment
Chalmers' Complaint requests monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for the same alleged procedural due process violation. Because the Eleventh Amendment has a different effect on requests for monetary relief than requests for injunctive or declaratory relief, the Court addresses monetary relief separately.
1. Monetary Relief
Chalmers requests monetary relief for Marks' alleged violations of his procedural due process rights. (Compl. at 3.) Marks argues that Chalmers' request for monetary relief is barred because the alleged violations were official state actions, and money damages for such actions are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Mot. at 1-2.)
"The Supreme Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment under principles of sovereign immunity to establish that a state is generally immune from any action brought against it in federal court by one of its citizens." Whitehead v. Johnson County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center, 1997 WL 74714, *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 1997) (footnote omitted) (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). This immunity extends to agencies of the state, and suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the official's agency and are barred as suits against the state itself. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100 ("It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment."); see also Gaines v. Texas Tech University, 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 n. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1997). "Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a suit against a state." Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Stokes v. Scott, 2000 WL 343185, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000) (Lindsay, J.) (dismissing claim under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
Chalmers alleges that he should recover money damages for Marks' "refusal to either set up an administrative law hearing or move forward with [Chalmers'] social work license application." (Compl. at 1.) Chalmers' claims arise out of Marks' official actions as Executive Director of the Board, and thus, are claims against Marks in his official capacity. Id. at 1-2. Claims against Marks in his official capacity are considered as claims against the Board and, because the Board is an agency of Texas, these claims are properly against Texas. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100; see also Gaines, 965 F. Supp. at 889 n. 4. Further, it is likely that if Chalmers were to succeed, because the Board is a state agency, any money damages would be paid out of Texas's coffers. Consequently, Chalmers' request for monetary relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100. Eleventh Amendment immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, and the barred claims "can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice." Warnock, 88 F.3d at 343; United States v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 286 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While the Supreme Court has left this question open, our court has repeatedly referred to the Eleventh Amendment's restriction in terms of subject matter jurisdiction."). Although Marks moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may sua sponte determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction over Chalmers' claim for monetary relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3), cited in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-466 (5th Cir. 1999) (and raising issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte in context of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Chalmers' request for monetary relief, the request should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Warnock, 88 F.3d at 343; see also Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d at 286 n. 9; Stokes, 2000 WL 343185, at *1.
2. Injunctive Relief Declaratory Relief
Chalmers also requests permanent injunctive and declaratory relief. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for prospective injunctive relief based on alleged unconstitutional actions of state officials. See Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). "To meet the Ex Parte Young exception, a plaintiff's suit alleging a violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Id. "In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
Chalmers requests an "injunction (permanent) ordering defendant to correct actions," and "declaratory judegement [sic] on this issue." (Compl. at 3.) It is not clear from a straightforward inquiry into the Complaint, or from the arguments at the hearing, that Chalmers has properly pleaded claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645. At the hearing, the parties* disagreed as to whether the Board was providing Chalmers with procedural due process. Chalmers claimed that the Board did not hold a committee hearing until he filed this suit, but that he chose not to attend the hearing because the written notice thereof did not specify what the hearing would cover. Counsel for Marks stated that the Board's review of Chalmers' application was ongoing and that Chalmers had an opportunity for a committee hearing, but that the process had not yet progressed to the point where he could have a hearing before a state administrative law judge. Accepting Chalmers' Complaint as true, it is uncertain whether it alleges "an ongoing violation of federal law" or "seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." In Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Fifth Circuit could not "say with certainty that there is no possibility that any set of facts which might be proved in support of the allegations would entitle the Rylands to some relief." Ryland, 708 F.2d at 974. Here, the Court cannot say with certainty that there is no possibility that any set of facts might be proved in support of the allegations that would entitle Chalmers to injunctive or declaratory relief. Thus, Marks' motion to dismiss Chalmers' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief should be denied. See id.
C. Motion for More Definite Statement
Alternatively, Marks moves for dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 or for an order under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) requiring Chalmers to provide a more definite statement of his claims. (Mot. at 3-4.) "Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist." Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999). "If a complaint is ambiguous or does not contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the proper remedy is a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)." Id. (citing 5 WRIGHT MILLER, FED. PRACTICE PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1356 at 590-591). Chalmers' Complaint is ambiguous and contains insufficient information regarding his claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. As an alternative to dismissal, Marks moves for an order under Rule 12(e) requiring Chalmers to file a more definite statement of his claims. In light of Marks' motion, the Court recommends that Chalmers, who is proceeding pro se, be permitted an opportunity to provide a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) and replead only his claims of injunctive and declaratory relief, because his request for monetary relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Addams-More v. Moore, 1997 WL472501, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 1997) (dismissing some claims as barred by Eleventh Amendment and allowing pro se plaintiff an opportunity to replead other claims).
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss-Under Rule 8 and 12, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement should be GRANTED and that Chalmers' request for monetary relief be dismissed without prejudice and that Chalmers be allowed additional time, as fixed by the District Court, to amend his Complaint to specifically replead his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.SO RECOMMENDED.