Opinion
2 CA-JV 2024-0033
10-30-2024
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to R.F. and V. C.
Christina F., Tucson In Propria Persona Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Amber Pershon, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County No. JD202200058 The Honorable John F. Kelliher Jr., Judge
Christina F., Tucson
In Propria Persona
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
By Amber Pershon, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Gard and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ECKERSTROM, Judge:
¶1 Christina F. appeals the juvenile court's March 2024 ruling terminating her parental rights to her son R.F., born in July 2013, and her daughter, V.C., born in June 2016, based on neglect, a history of chronic drug abuse, and length of time in court-ordered care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (3), (8)(c). We affirm.
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of V.C.'s father, James C. He filed a separate notice of appeal, but this court dismissed that appeal pursuant to Rule 607(e)(1)(A), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., based, in part, on counsel's belief that James had abandoned the appeal. In re Termination of Parental Rights as to V.C., No. 2 CA-JV 2024-0037 (Ariz. App. May 6, 2024) (order). To the extent Christina attempts to challenge the termination of James's parental rights as part of her appeal, she cannot do so. See Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193, ¶ 17 (2005) ("To establish standing, we require that petitioners show a particularized injury to themselves.").
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the juvenile court's ruling. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, ¶ 13 (App. 2011). In September 2022, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed the children from the care of Christina and V.C.'s father, James C., due to their substance abuse and unstable living conditions, after Christina had tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. V.C. also tested positive for marijuana. Shortly thereafter, Christina was arrested for trespassing because she had continued to live on the property from which the family was evicted. In November 2022, Christina pled no contest to the allegations in a dependency petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated R.F. and V.C. dependent as to her. The court set a permanent case plan of family reunification.
R.F.'s hair was too short to be tested.
¶3 In the months that followed, DCS offered Christina reunification services, including supervised parenting time, random drug testing, substance abuse treatment, counseling, case management, and transportation. However, Christina did not consistently participate in services and did not obtain appropriate housing. She tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in January through March 2023, August 2023, and November 2023.
¶4 Christina claimed she used marijuana for pain related to a back injury, and, in December 2023, she obtained a medical marijuana card for that purpose. Around the same time, Christina also obtained a new apartment, but she failed to schedule a time for the DCS case manager to assess the fitness of the home for the children. Because of Christina's lack of participation in services and lack of visitation with the children, the juvenile court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. Thereafter, Christina stopped communicating with DCS.
¶5 In January 2024, DCS filed a motion for termination of the parent-child relationship. It alleged that Christina had neglected the children, in part, by failing to "obtain safe and stable housing" and by failing to "provide proper and appropriate supervision for the children." DCS also alleged that she was "unable to discharge parental responsibilities" because of her history of chronic drug abuse and that the children had been in an out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months.
¶6 Although Christina arrived for the contested severance hearing in March 2024, she left before the hearing began. Upon DCS's request, the juvenile court found she had been properly served but failed to appear, was presumed to be voluntarily absent, and had therefore waived her legal rights. At the end of the hearing, the court found DCS had established all three grounds for termination and termination was in the children's best interests. The court therefore granted the motion for termination. This appeal followed.
Discussion
¶7 In a pro se brief filed pursuant to Rule 607(e)(1)(B), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., Christina maintains she was "very compliant" and "completed all the classes." She argues the DCS caseworkers were "unprofessional" and had "poor communication skills." And she asserts the juvenile court erred by relying solely on the testimony of the DCS caseworkers in granting the motion for termination.
¶8 Christina's opening brief fails to comply with Rule 13(a), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to appeals from juvenile court); Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, ¶ 24 (2017) (pro se litigants held to same standards as attorneys). She fails to develop a meaningful argument with appropriate references to the record and citations to proper legal authorities. By failing to comply, a party may be deemed to have waived his or her arguments on appeal. See J.W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 184, ¶ 11 (App. 2021). As DCS points out, we could reject Christina's claims on this basis alone. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013). However, because we prefer to address cases on their merits-particularly when the best interests of children are involved-we will do so here. See DeLong v. Merrill, 233 Ariz. 163, ¶ 9 (App. 2013); In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, ¶ 2 (App. 2002).
¶9 The juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); see Sandra R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, ¶ 12 (2020). We defer to the juvenile court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). We will affirm a severance order if reasonable evidence supports the factual findings and the juvenile court's legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous. See Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 30-31 (2023).
¶10 Christina seems to be challenging the reunification services offered to her by DCS. But Christina did not object to the services below. Accordingly, she is precluded from challenging them on appeal. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, ¶ 18 (App. 2014). Even assuming the argument were not waived, we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4. The record shows DCS offered Christina numerous services, and she failed to consistently participate in them.
¶11 To the extent Christina challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination, there was no error. Section 8-533(B)(3) provides, as a ground for termination, "[t]hat the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period." V.C. was born exposed to marijuana. The family was involved with DCS in 2020, based on similar concerns, and V.C. tested positive for marijuana at that time. Most recently, V.C. tested positive for marijuana around the time of her removal by DCS in September 2022. During the current dependency, Christina tested positive for THC multiple times, in addition to cocaine, alcohol, opiates, and amphetamines.
¶12 Christina admitted to regular marijuana and alcohol use since she was a teenager. Although she now has a medical marijuana card, Christina was unable to implement the family's safety plan, which was for her and James to use drugs at separate times to ensure that one parent would always be sober for the children. Instead, both parents repeatedly tested positive for drug use around the same time. Christina also failed to consistently participate in drug testing and substance abuse treatment throughout the current dependency. Thus, as the DCS case manager explained, Christina was unable to make the necessary behavioral changes to safely parent the children. The juvenile court did not err in severing Christina's parental rights based on § 8-533(B)(3).
Because sufficient evidence supports termination based on Christina's history of chronic drug abuse, we do not address the other statutory grounds found by the juvenile court. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 27 (2000).
¶13 Reasonable evidence also shows that termination was in the children's best interests. "In proving severance is in the children's best interests, DCS must show either that severance affirmatively benefits the children (such as showing they are adoptable or more stable in an existing placement), or eliminates a detriment to the children if the parent-child relationship is not severed." Dominique M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, ¶ 8 (App. 2016). The DCS specialist testified that termination would benefit the children because they are living with a family member who is providing permanency and stability and would like to adopt them. The specialist explained, "[W]here they are now, they're loved." The children attend school consistently, and all their medical, dental, and behavioral health needs are addressed. By contrast, continuing the parent-child relationship would put the children at a continued risk for exposure to substances. Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's factual findings and its legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous, we cannot say the court erred in granting the motion for termination. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 30-31.
Disposition
¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's ruling terminating Christina's parental rights to R.F. and V.C.