Opinion
04-22-00228-CV
06-15-2022
IN RE QUM QASR SERIES LLC - BIGARREN
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2021-CV-03806, styled Qum Qasar Series LLC - Bigarren v. Lesme Font, and All Other Occupants Residing at 5631 Forest Canyon, pending in the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable David J. Rodriguez presiding.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
Petition for writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
The underlying proceeding involves relator Qum Qasr Series LLC - Bigarren's appeal to the county court at law following the dismissal of its forcible detainer action by the justice of the peace court. Prior to the commencement of a trial de novo, the county court abated relator's forcible detainer appeal pending the full and final resolution of a separate title dispute filed by real party in interest Lesme Font in the district court. In this original proceeding, relator seeks a writ of mandamus directing the county court to vacate its order granting Font's plea to the jurisdiction, which abated the forcible detainer appeal until the title action in district court is resolved. We conditionally grant the petition.
Background
Font purchased the property through a special warranty deed in 2010. With this purchase, Font assumed the rights and responsibilities derived from the Canyon Crossing Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (the "Declaration") including, among other things, the Canyon Crossing Property Owners Association's (the "Association") right to bring a foreclosure action against owners who are obligated to pay the assessment but do not. If an owner failed to pay an assessment and a foreclosure was obtained by the Association, the occupants of the property would become tenants at sufferance. Font failed to pay an assessment, so the Association exercised its lien right-eventually foreclosing on the property. Font continues to occupy the property.
Relator purchased the property through a sheriff's sale in August 2020 and filed a forcible detainer action in the justice of the peace court to evict Font. Following the dismissal of relator's forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction, relator filed an appeal to the county court for a trial de novo. Five days later, while the eviction appeal was pending, Font filed an action in district court challenging the validity of relator's title.
Relator filed two forcible detainer actions in Precinct 1. The first was in Place 2 and the second was in Place 1; both were dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Relator filed an appeal only on the second dismissal arising out of Place 1.
Based on the newly filed title dispute in district court, Font filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the county court arguing the issue of possession and title are so intertwined in this case as to deprive the county court of jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action pending the resolution of the title action in district court. The county court agreed with Font and abated the forcible detainer appeal "pending the outcome" of the title action.
In response, relator filed this original proceeding arguing title and possession are not so intertwined as to prohibit the forceable detainer appeal and the title action from progressing through the judicial system simultaneously.
Standard of Review
To be entitled to mandamus relief, relator must show the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). "[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to guiding rules or principles." Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011). A "mandamus will not issue when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy." In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Services, 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2006).
Applicable Law
A forcible detainer action is "intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain possession without resort to an action on the title." Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Scott v. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818-19 (Tex. 1936)). An action for forcible detainer determines the right to immediate possession, and only the right to immediate possession, as "the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated." Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e); see Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) ("To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession."); see also Segura v. Segura, No. 04-21-00548-CV, 2022 WL 1158626, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr. 20, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (noting a forcible detainer action is not a final determination of whether an eviction is wrongful).
Jurisdiction over forcible detainer actions is expressly held by "the justice court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to county courts for a trial de novo." In re Guzman, No. 04-20-00589-CV, 2021 WL 2211458, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 2, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). While "a justice court has subject matter jurisdiction over forcible detainers, the justice court lacks jurisdiction to resolve title disputes." Pinnacle Premier Properties, Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
A forcible detainer action is not exhaustive, "but cumulative, of any other remedy that a party may have in the courts of this state." Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709 (citing Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d at 818-19). Thus, "the displaced party is entitled to bring a separate suit in the district court to determine the question of title." Id. However, if the issue of possession and title are so intertwined with one another, the adjudication of title must precede the adjudication of immediate possession. See Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 558-59 (citing examples where possession and title have been found so intertwined as to preclude the adjudication of immediate possession).
Discussion
Relator asserts the trial court abused its discretion by abating the forceable detainer action because the issues of title and possession are not so intertwined as to prevent an immediate determination of possession of the property. Font responds by arguing that because the circumstances preceding the sheriff's sale are currently being litigated in the district court, the county court was within its discretion to indefinitely abate the forcible detainer appeal pending the resolution of the title action.
We hold the issue of title and possession are not so interwoven in this case as to preclude relator from prosecuting its de novo trial in the county court. See Breton, 447 S.W.3d at 565. The foreclosure deed is prima facie evidence of valid title in the hands of relator. See Mills v. Pitts, 48 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1932); see Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 408 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (opining a valid deed exists where there is a valid judgment, levy, execution, sale, and deed); see Deposit Ins. Bridge Bank, N.A., Dallas v. McQueen, 804 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (noting the presumption in foreclosure is that all prerequisites to the sale have been performed). As the sole focus in a forcible detainer suit is the issue of immediate possession, the presumed validity of relator's title entitles relator to prosecute the de novo county court action notwithstanding the pending district court title action. Likewise, Font may pursue her title action in the district court.
Moreover, relator attached to the record the Declaration, notice of assessment lien, abstract of judgment, notices to vacate, and the deed purchased at the sheriff's sale. The Declaration states that Font would become a tenant at sufferance if she did not vacate the property after a foreclosure. For that reason, a landlord and tenant at sufferance relationship was created between the parties when Font continued to occupy the property following the foreclosure. Accordingly, the county court can determine the issue of immediate possession independent from the title issue. See In re Am. Homes for Rent Properties Eight, LLC, 498 S.W.3d 153, 156 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2016, orig. proceeding). In essence, the notion that both actions are concurrently proceeding does not in itself deprive the county court of jurisdiction. See In re Guzman, 2021 WL 2211458, at *3 (holding concurrent title action in district court challenging deed did not divest county court of jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action by property owner listed on deed); see In re Catapult Realty Capital, L.L.C., No. 05-19-00109-CV, 2020 WL 831611, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 20, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). ("[T]he county court was not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute."). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by abating the forcible detainer action pending the resolution of the title action.
We must next determine whether relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Whether indefinite or not, where an abatement order "completely curtails the prosecution of an entire case and denies another party the right to proceed . . . in a reasonable time, the aggrieved party has no adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus may issue to correct the trial court's abuse of discretion." In re Baldridge, No. 04-16-00011-CV, 2016 WL 1128236, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 23, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Because relator was "entitled to participate in th[e] suit to determine the question of title, while also participating in the forcible detainer action," it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Guzman, 2021 WL 2211458, at *3.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we conclude the county court abused its discretion by abating the forcible detainer action, and relator does not have an adequate remedy at law. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992). Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the county court, no later than fifteen days from the date of this opinion, to vacate its April 18, 2022, Order on Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction.