Opinion
No. 04-16-00011-CV
03-23-2016
IN RE Irene BALDRIDGE and Kathy Hill
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Original Mandamus Proceeding Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Jason Pulliam, Justice PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2014-CI-03985, styled Irene Baldridge and Kathy Hill v. Art Reyna, pending in the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Antonia Arteaga presiding.
On January 6, 2016, relators Irene Baldridge and Kathy Hill filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining of the trial court's order granting a motion to abate their underlying suit for malicious libel. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting the abatement and that relators lack an adequate remedy by appeal. Therefore, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.
BACKGROUND
In May 2013, Irene Baldridge and Kathy Hill were incumbent city council members running for re-election to the Leon Valley City Council. Just prior to the election, fellow incumbent city council member Art Reyna published and distributed a printed campaign advertisement to Leon Valley residents. The advertisement encouraged voters to support Baldridge and Hill's opponents and contained statements alleging wrongdoing by Baldridge, Hill and another candidate. In one portion of the advertisement, Reyna republished excerpts from a 2013 lawsuit pending against Baldridge and multiple other defendants. That lawsuit, referred to by the parties in this proceeding as the "Rancher case," originally included an allegation that Baldridge had violated provisions of the Local Government Code pertaining to conflicts of interest of elected municipal officials. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 171 (West 2008). The plaintiffs in Rancher alleged Baldridge had participated in a vote to deny approval of a zoning request for certain real property despite an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Rancher plaintiffs seek to recover damages for loss of market value of the real property, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Reyna is not a party to the Rancher case. Reyna also alleged in the campaign ad that Hill had misappropriated city funds while on the city council.
The 2013 lawsuit involving Baldridge as a defendant is filed as Cause No. 2013-CI-03399, styled Wm. Rancher Estates Joint Venture, Rafael Alfaro, Jose Alfaro, Carman Alfaro, Daniel Bee, Robert Caldwell, Anne Caldwell, Deference Service Business, Inc., Earl Doderer, Sylvia Doderer, James Dowdy, Betty Dowdy, Isaac Elizondo, Suzanne Elizondo, Roberto Galindo, Erma Galindo, Shirl Jackson, Anne Jackson, and Ricardo A. Padilla v. City of Leon Valley, Texas; Unknown Employee(s) of City of Leon Valley; Alie Baldridge, Individually and d/b/a International Realty Plus; Irene Baldridge, Individually and d/b/a International Realty Plus; Marcus Semmelman; Albert Alcocer; Monica Alcocer; Ray Hendricks; Sharon Hendricks; and Marion Larkin. The suit remains pending in the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas.
Baldridge and Hill lost their bids for reelection and sued Reyna for malicious libel in March 2014. In their petition, Baldridge and Hill allege that the statements suggesting wrongdoing in Reyna's campaign advertisement are "maliciously false" and constitute libel per se.
Reyna filed a motion to dismiss Baldridge and Hill's suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, which the trial court denied. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003 (West 2015). This court affirmed the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss in July 2015 in Reyna's interlocutory appeal. See Reyna v. Baldridge, No. 04-14-00740-CV, 2015 WL 4273265 at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 15, 2015, no pet.).
Reyna then filed a motion seeking to sever Baldridge's claim from Hill's, and to abate Baldridge's claim pending final resolution of the Rancher case. The requested abatement was based on Reyna's contention that Baldridge's claim against him involves issues that are to be determined in the Rancher case. Specifically, Reyna argues that the trial court in Rancher will determine the truth or falsity of the allegations made against Baldridge in that case, and the truth or falsity of the Rancher allegations republished in the campaign ad will also be an issue in Baldridge's libel claim.
At a hearing in October 2015 the trial court announced its intention to deny the motion to sever Baldridge's claims, but grant abatement of the entire suit. Because Reyna's motion had made the request for abatement conditional upon the trial court's decision to grant severance, the trial court permitted Reyna to submit an amended motion making the requests independent of each other. Reyna filed an amended motion to abate on November 3, 2015. The trial court conducted a second hearing on November 13, and signed a written order suspending the entire libel suit until final disposition of the claims against Baldridge in the Rancher case, or until November 1, 2016, "unless circumstances change which would indicate the issues will not be resolved in Rancher, when the court might reconsider."
Baldridge and Hill filed this original mandamus proceeding asserting the trial court's order constitutes an abuse of discretion for which they have no adequate remedy by appeal.
ANALYSIS
A writ of mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion for which the relator lacks "a clear and adequate remedy at law, such as a normal appeal." Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984)). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or, stated differently, when it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles." In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998). "[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion" which may be corrected by mandamus. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
"Abatement is generally an incidental ruling not susceptible to mandamus relief." Gebhardt v. Gallardo, 891 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, orig. proceeding); see also Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566-67 (Tex. 1985) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus to correct incidental rulings when there is an adequate remedy by appeal). However, when the order of abatement vitiates another party's ability to prosecute and present a viable claim, ordinary appeal may not provide an adequate remedy for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Gebhardt, 891 S.W.2d at 332.
This court has previously held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it arbitrarily abates a civil case for an indefinite period of time. See In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 306 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding); Gebhardt, 891 S.W.2d at 332. An arbitrarily granted indefinite abatement has also been found to be violative of the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution which guarantees a party's right to a forum for redress of injury. See Trapnell v. Hunter, 785 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting mandamus relief to correct arbitrary abatement in deference to another forum which also offered no present right to relief); see also Colonial Pipeline, 968 S.W.2d at 941 (mandamus available to correct orders that severely compromise party's ability to present a viable claim or effectively deny the ability to develop the merits of one's case).
However, whether a trial court's abatement order "exceeded its discretion does not turn solely on whether the abatement is 'indefinite.'" In re Gore, 251 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding). Even where an abatement is not indefinite, if it completely curtails the prosecution of an entire case and denies another party the right to proceed with full discovery in a reasonable time, the aggrieved party has no adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus may issue to correct the trial court's abuse of discretion. Id. at 699-700.
Baldridge and Hill contend the challenged order constitutes an abuse of discretion because the trial court acted without reference to guiding rules and principles. See Colonial Pipeline, 968 S.W.2d at 941. Specifically, relators argue the two pending suits do not involve the same parties and controversies, and abatement is not warranted by any other principle of law.
It is well settled in Texas that "when suit would be proper in more than one county, the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts." Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988). The principle of dominant jurisdiction allows a party to seek abatement of a second-filed suit when the two cases involve the same parties and the same controversies. See Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 302. The purpose of dominant jurisdiction is to avoid interference with or conflicts of jurisdiction between two courts over the same parties and subject matter. See, e.g., Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974).
The parties approached the motion to abate in this case with reference to the principles of dominant jurisdiction, and it appears the trial court may have relied on those principles, at least in part, as the basis for granting abatement. Assuming without deciding that the principles of dominant jurisdiction are applicable to the facts of this case, we will discuss the elements of dominant jurisdiction analysis on which the parties express disagreement — whether the two cases involve the same parties and the same controversies.
In order to succeed on a motion to abate on the basis of dominant jurisdiction in another court, the movant must allege and be able to prove (1) suit in another court was filed first; (2) the first suit is in a county of proper venue; (3) is still pending; and (4) involves the same parties and same dispute. Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 303. The parties do not dispute that the Rancher case was filed first and is still pending in Bexar County, a county of proper venue. --------
It is undisputed that Baldridge is the only party common to both the libel case and Rancher. Although it is not a requirement that all the parties be included in the first action before the second is filed for dominant jurisdiction to apply, the first suit must at least be capable of amendment to include all necessary and proper parties and issues. See Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247. Reyna admits that neither he nor Hill are parties to Rancher. Reyna presents no basis upon which the Rancher case could be amended to include himself and Hill as parties. Assuming the trial court relied on the elements of dominant jurisdiction as guiding principles for granting abatement in this case, the record conclusively establishes that Reyna cannot show that the two suits involve the same parties as required to obtain abatement based on dominant jurisdiction in another court. See Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 303.
With respect to the same controversies component, the essential elements of Baldridge's common law libel per se claim are, "that the defendant '(1) published a statement; (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff; (3) while acting with . . . actual malice, if the plaintiff was a public official or public figure, . . . regarding the truth of the statement.'" Reyna, 2015 WL 4273265, at *3 (quoting WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998)). Actual malice concerns the defendant's attitude toward the truth of the published statement and requires proof that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth. Id. at *4. In order to establish the actual malice element of her libel claim, Baldridge need only demonstrate that Reyna published the statements in the campaign ad knowing they were false or that he displayed reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements at the time they were made. See Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 157-58 (Tex. 2014). That is not, as Reyna contends, an issue pending in Rancher. Baldridge's claims in the libel case are not the same as, nor are they dependent upon, any determination which may, or may not, ultimately be made in the Rancher case as to the truth of the specific allegation republished in the campaign ad.
Reyna also concedes, as he must, that there are no common issues between Hill's libel claims and Rancher. The statements Reyna published alleging Hill's wrongdoing are completely unrelated to the issues pending in Rancher and Reyna provides no basis on which the Rancher case could be amended to include Hill's claims.
The principles of dominant jurisdiction do not provide support for the trial court's decision to abate Baldridge and Hill's libel claims. The only other basis Reyna presents as possibly providing support for the abatement order is the trial court's inherent authority to manage its docket. See, e.g., Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (temporary stay incidental to trial court's inherent authority to manage court's own docket in the interest of comity, convenience or prevention of inconsistent rulings). This argument is also premised on Reyna's contention that an issue to be determined in Rancher is common to Baldridge's claim against him. As discussed above, there is no identity of issues between the two suits. Delaying discovery and trial of the libel claims under these circumstances is not a proper exercise of the trial court's inherent authority to manage its docket because the two cases do not present any common or dependent issues. Reyna concedes in his mandamus response that there is no existing "direct authority" supporting the trial court's exercise of discretion to abate in the circumstances presented in this case — a prior suit pending in the same county with a single common party and one potentially overlapping, but not identical, issue. Reyna asks this court to "extend existing law to allow abatement under the peculiar situation presented." We decline to do so.
Because the trial court appears to have acted without reference to guiding rules and principles in granting the order of abatement, we conclude that the challenged order constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See Colonial Pipeline, 968 S.W.2d 941.
The challenged order curtails the prosecution of the libel case and prevents both Baldridge and Hill from proceeding with full discovery as to their claims against Reyna in a reasonable time. Reyna argues in his mandamus response that Baldridge could possibly obtain discovery in the Rancher case that may be useful in the libel case; however, we do not agree that this provides an adequate substitute for full discovery as to her pending claims. Reyna is not a party to Rancher and there is no inherent interrelation between the issues in Rancher and Baldridge's claims against Reyna. Even if some information obtained through discovery may be useful in both suits, we conclude this does not adequately protect Baldridge's right to proceed with full discovery in the context of her libel suit. In addition, it is undisputed that there is no allegation or issue of fact with respect to Hill's claims that overlaps in any way with the claims pending in Rancher. The abatement completely deprives Hill of any ability to proceed with discovery regarding her claims. As this court has previously held, where an abatement order is entered without reference to guiding rules and principles, vitiates a party's ability to proceed with full discovery in a reasonable time, and completely curtails the prosecution of an entire case, the aggrieved party has no adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus may issue to correct the trial court's abuse of discretion. Gore, 251 S.W.3d at 699-700.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in granting the order of abatement in this instance and relators have no adequate remedy by appeal. Id. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its November 13, 2015 Order on Art Reyna's First Amended Motion to Abate. We are confident the trial court will comply. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to do as directed within fifteen days from the date of this court's order.
Jason Pulliam, Justice