Summary
In M.E.L., a mother sought to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the father to the parties' biological child, M.E.L. See M.E.L., supra at 120.
Summary of this case from In re K.E.G.Opinion
No. 109 MAP 2022
07-19-2023
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.E.L., a Minor Appeal of: D.D.L., Father
Dean Edward Reynosa, Esq., Heather Z. Reynosa, Esq., MPL Law Firm, LLP, York, PA, for Appellant. Kelly L. McNaney, Esq., Lemoyne, PA, for Appellee Legal Counsel for Minor Child. Alexis Kathryn-Lehman Swope, Esq., for Appellee Mother.
Dean Edward Reynosa, Esq., Heather Z. Reynosa, Esq., MPL Law Firm, LLP, York, PA, for Appellant.
Kelly L. McNaney, Esq., Lemoyne, PA, for Appellee Legal Counsel for Minor Child.
Alexis Kathryn-Lehman Swope, Esq., for Appellee Mother.
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE TODD
Under the Adoption Act, the biological parents of an adoptee must relinquish their parental rights over their child before an adoption of the child may take place. An exception to this relinquishment requirement exists in the context of stepparent adoptions, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903, or if the parent has demonstrated "cause shown" to excuse the requirement, id. § 2901. In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether a proposed adoption by a mother's long-term partner, in conjunction with the termination of the biological father's parental rights, may constitute "cause" to excuse the relinquishment requirement with respect to the mother under Section 2901. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the Superior Court remanding this matter to the orphans' court for further consideration of this issue.
By way of background, C.J. ("Mother") and D.D.L. ("Father") were married and had a child together, M.E.L. ("Child"), who was born in February 2016. They later divorced in July 2018. Meanwhile, Mother became romantically involved with T.V. ("Partner") in March 2018, and Mother and Child began living with Partner later that month. Initially, Mother and Father shared custody of Child every other weekend, but this arrangement deteriorated after Father's parents ("Paternal Grandparents"), with whom Father had been residing, banished him from their residence. Eventually, in September 2019, Father signed an agreement providing Mother with sole physical and legal custody of Child. Thereafter, Father ceased communication with Child, and Mother later terminated Father's child support obligation because she "didn't see a point in someone paying for someone they don't see." N.T., 2/22/22, at 9.
In October 2021, Mother and Partner filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), averring that Father had evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to Child by refusing to perform parental duties for a period exceeding six months, and that termination of his parental rights was in Child's best interests. Along with this petition, Mother and Partner filed a report of intention to adopt pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531, indicating that Partner intended to adopt Child upon the termination of Father's parental rights.
The orphans' court held a hearing on the petition in February 2022, at which Mother, Partner, and Child's guardian ad litem , Kelly L. McNaney, Esq., provided testimony; Father failed to appear despite being served with notice of the proceeding. During the hearing, Mother testified that Child had not seen Father since September 2019, N.T., 2/22/22, at 6, and that Child views Partner as her father, id. at 9, noting that she and Child, along with Partner, Child's half-brother, and Partner's other son from a prior relationship, live together as a family, id. at 15-16. Notably, when asked whether she and Partner intended to marry, Mother responded that, "I'd hope so, but that's ... not in our immediate plans right now." Id. at 14. Partner, for his part, testified regarding his positive relationship with Child, noting that he helps care for Child, and provides her financial and emotional support. Partner also confirmed that Child calls him "Dad." Id. at 19. Finally, Attorney McNaney testified and recommended that the orphans' court terminate Father's parental rights and grant the adoption. Specifically, Attorney McNaney described that Child refers to Partner as "Daddy," and that, when asked whether she knew anyone by Father's first name, Child responded only that there was a boy at her school with that name. Id. at 22. While Attorney McNaney noted that Child had a positive relationship with Paternal Grandparents, counsel explained that Child nevertheless wanted to share the last name of her half-sibling and Partner's other son. Id.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans' court granted the termination petition pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). The orphans' court also expressly indicated on the record its intent to grant the petition for adoption after expiration of the 30-day appeal period from the decree terminating Father's parental rights, opining that it had "no trouble reaching the conclusion that it is in the best interest of [Child] to grant the petition for adoption." Id. at 28. Father appealed to the Superior Court.
The orphans' court did not enter an adoption decree at this time; however, as explained further infra , when a parent petitions to involuntarily terminate the rights of the other parent, the petitioning parent must demonstrate that an adoption of the child is anticipated.
Before delving further into the procedural history of this case, a brief background regarding the interplay between the provisions in the Adoption Act governing termination of parental rights and those addressing the requirements for adoption is helpful. Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act sets forth 11 statutory grounds for terminating a parent's rights to his or her child, including, as relevant herein, "[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). If the orphans' court finds the existence of any one of those grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court then considers whether termination would best serve "the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child" under Section 2511(b). Id. § 2511(b). If the orphans' court concludes that termination of the parent's rights is consistent with the best interests of the child, the court may grant the termination petition.
Section 2512(a) of the Adoption Act lists the parties who may petition for involuntary termination, including, inter alia , an agency or a parent. Id. § 2512(a). Critically, unlike in the context of an agency petition, a petition of a parent seeking to terminate the rights of the child's other parent must contain "an averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until such time as the child is adopted. " Id. § 2512(b) (emphasis added). In other words, "the petitioning parent must demonstrate that an adoption of the child is anticipated in order for the termination petition to be cognizable." In re Adoption of M.R.D. , 636 Pa. 509, 145 A.3d 1117, 1120 (2016) (citations omitted). We have explained that "[t]he purpose of the involuntary termination provisions of the Adoption Act is not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide a means for changing the surname of the child," but instead "to dispense with the need for parental consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed to meet the continuing needs of the child." In re B.E. , 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153, 156 (1977).
Significantly, because a termination petition filed under these circumstances "must occur in the context of an anticipated adoption, and because adoption is a statutory right, ... the parent seeking termination must strictly comply with all pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act in order for the adoption to be valid." M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1120 (citation omitted). Of particular relevance herein, Section 2711 of the Act requires the parent seeking termination to consent to the adoption, which entails relinquishing his or her own parental rights. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a)(3) (requiring consent to adoption by the parent of an adoptee who is under 18 years of age); id. § 2711(d)(1) (setting forth contents of consent, including the statement that "I understand that by signing this consent I indicate my intent to permanently give up all rights to this child."). Thus, these provisions make clear that "a legal parent must relinquish his parental rights in order to consent to the adoption of his child by a non-spouse." In re Adoption of R.B.F. , 569 Pa. 269, 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (2002). In sum, these petitions have the effect of terminating one parent's rights over the child, while requiring the petitioning parent's rights over that child to be relinquished.
As noted, the Adoption Act provides an exception to this relinquishment requirement in the context of stepparent adoptions. Indeed, under Section 2903 of the Act, "[w]henever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the adoption proceeding." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903.
Notably, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5326, when a stepparent adopts a child under Section 2903, grandparents and great-grandparents retain their right to seek physical or legal custody of the child, as well as retain any custody rights already awarded to them. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5326. Such rights are "automatically terminated," however, when the child is adopted "by an individual other than a stepparent, grandparent or great-grandparent." Id.
Additionally, and central to the matter before us, as Mother and Partner are not married, the Act also provides an exception to the relinquishment requirement under Section 2901 for "cause shown," specifically providing that:
Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents' rights have been terminated, the investigation required by section 2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed, the report of the intermediary has been filed pursuant to section 2533 (relating to report of intermediary) and all other legal requirements have been met....
Id. § 2901. While the phrase "cause shown" is not defined in the Act, this Court found in R.B.F. , supra , that cause may be shown by clear and convincing evidence where parents sought to have their same-sex domestic partners adopt their children, but demonstrated that the domestic partners were unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption because they were not permitted to marry at the time. By contrast, in M.R.D. , we found that cause was not shown to permit a mother to retain her parental rights when she sought to have her father adopt her child. M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1129-30.
R.B.F. involved two consolidated appeals by domestic partners.
Here, as noted, the orphans' court granted Mother's petition, and Father appealed. Specifically, Father asserted on appeal that the proposed adoption was not valid, and, thus, his parental rights should not have been terminated, because Mother had not relinquished her parental rights and had not otherwise established that the prospective adopting party was her spouse, or that there was "cause shown" to permit the adoption to proceed.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the orphans' court emphasized that it found that Mother met her burden "with clear and convincing evidence as to both the termination, and as to the welfare of [Child]" under Section 2511(a) and Section 2511(b), given that Father has been completely absent from Child's life for a period of over two years. Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/22, at 5. Moreover, the court rejected Father's claim that the proposed adoption by Partner was not valid, as, in its view, Father's argument concerned Partner's standing to adopt, which, the court reasoned, was not an issue that should be raised in an appeal from the termination of his parental rights. In this regard, the court stressed its policy of "not finalizing adoptions until the point that a parent whose rights are terminated has exhausted all routes of appeal, precisely to avoid an attack on an adoption by a parent who by separate order has had their rights terminated." Id. at 4. Thus, because there was not yet an adoption from which to appeal, the court concluded that Father's claim was without merit and that the proposed adoption did "not have any bearing on the analysis and outcome of Father's termination." Id. at 5.
In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion authored by Judge Deborah Kunselman, the Superior Court vacated the order terminating Father's parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. In re Adoption of M.E.L. , 479 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 4113115 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 9, 2022). As an initial matter, the court considered whether Father waived a challenge to the proposed adoption by raising it for the first time on appeal. Characterizing Father's claim as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grant of relief to Mother under the Adoption Act, the court concluded that Father had preserved his claim, as challenges to the evidentiary sufficiency of a case may be raised for the first time on appeal, and, here, Father timely appealed and raised the issue in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Id. at 10-11.
While the court noted that Father's claim potentially could be viewed as a standing claim, which would have been waived due to Father's failure to raise it during the termination proceedings, the court nevertheless declined to characterize the claim in that manner, reasoning that "the precise issue here is not whether Mother and [Partner] had standing to file a termination and adoption petition, but whether they proved the necessary requirements to obtain relief under the law." M.E.L. , 479 MDA 2022, at 10 n.8. The lower court's analysis in this regard is not before us.
Next, noting that Mother clearly did not meet the spousal exception to the requirement that she relinquish her parental rights prior to adoption, the court proceeded to consider whether Mother established the "cause shown" exception thereto under Section 2901 by clear and convincing evidence. In so doing, the court observed that, although Mother attempted to establish "cause" in her Superior Court brief by alleging that the proposed adoption by Partner would protect the integrity and stability of their new family unit, she did not advance any argument pertaining to "cause shown" before the orphans' court, nor did the orphans' court consider whether Mother had met the "cause shown" exception before it granted the termination petition. Id. at 12. The Superior Court explained that, as a result of the orphans' court's omission in this regard, the termination order could not stand because the orphans' court can terminate Father's parental rights only if the averred adoption in Mother's termination petition was valid, and, here, it is not clear whether the averred adoption was, in fact, valid. Id. at 13.
The court further stressed that, even if the record contained some legal basis in support of Mother's position, the court nevertheless could not proceed, as the Superior Court's appellate role "is not to scour the record for facts and then substitute our judgment for that of the orphans' court," but, rather, "to review the record to see whether the evidence supports the orphans' court['s] decision." Id. Here, observing that the orphans' court made no such decision, the Superior Court concluded that the orphans' court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was in error. Thus, the Superior Court found that it was necessary to remand this matter to the orphans' court to determine whether Mother satisfied the "cause shown" exception to permit the proposed adoption without requiring Mother to relinquish her parental rights. Id. at 16. Finally, to the extent that Father asserted that the Superior Court should find that cause may never be shown in cases involving adoption by an unmarried partner, the court declined to do so, reasoning that such a broad-sweeping policy decision should instead be left for our Court. Id.
Following the Superior Court's decision, Father filed a petition for allowance of appeal. We granted review to consider the following question:
Whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in remanding this matter to the trial court to evaluate whether Mother could establish the "cause" exception of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 where the child is proposed to be adopted by a non-spouse?
In re Adoption of M.E.L. , ––– Pa. ––––, 288 A.3d 75 (2022) (order). As the question of whether a parent may demonstrate cause to permit an adoption by the parent's long-term partner, but not her spouse, is a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary. In re Adoption of S.E.G. , 587 Pa. 568, 901 A.2d 1017, 1018 n.1 (2006).
Before us, Father asserts that the Superior Court erred in remanding this matter to the orphans' court to evaluate whether Mother could establish that cause exists for the adoption to proceed under Section 2901. Specifically, contending that "a petition to terminate a natural parent's rights involuntarily when filed by one parent against the other is only cognizable when it is accompanied by a prospective stepparent's intention to adopt the child," Appellant's Brief at 10 (quoting In re Adoption of L.J.B. , 610 Pa. 213, 18 A.3d 1098, 1107 (2011) (OAJC)), Father argues that Mother did not meet this standard, as Partner is not married to Mother. Moreover, Father observes that Mother has not relinquished her parental rights, as is required under Section 2711(d)(1), because she did not file the necessary consent to adopt under Section 2711(a)(3). Father stresses that "the parent seeking termination must strictly comply with all pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act in order for the adoption to be valid." M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1120.
While Father concedes that the relinquishment requirement may be excused if a court finds "cause shown" under Section 2901, he stresses that Mother did not raise the "cause shown" exception during the termination proceedings, and the orphans' court did not evaluate whether cause was shown to permit the adoption to proceed without Mother relinquishing her parental rights. Nevertheless, Father contends that cause cannot be shown to excuse Mother's failure to comply with the requirements of the Adoption Act because nothing in the record indicates that there is a legal impediment to Mother and Partner marrying. Indeed, noting that one of the primary goals of the Adoption Act is to ensure permanency for a child, Father maintains that permitting Partner to adopt Child would not advance this goal, as Mother and Partner are not married, "Mother has chosen not to marry [Partner] for reasons unknown," and the "permanency of the Child's family environment is only so long as the relationship between Mother and [Partner] exists." Appellant's Brief at 16. Father emphasizes that, by contrast, termination of his parental rights is permanent and would also extinguish Paternal Grandparents' rights, see supra note 2, despite their recognized involvement in Child's life.
In Father's view, if the legislature wished to permit adoptions by non-spouses without requiring a petitioning parent to relinquish his or her own parental rights, it could have done so, as it did in stepparent adoption cases; yet the legislature chose not to, signifying an intent to retain the relinquishment requirement for such adoptions. Appellant's Brief at 19. Thus, Father claims that allowing his parental rights to be terminated when Mother has not satisfied the statutory requirements for adoption would reduce these requirements to "purely recommendations." Id. at 16. Father also warns that, "[s]hould this Court permit adoptions to unwed parent's partners when the unwed parent is involved in custody litigation, it would essentially permit the type of gamesmanship that this Court suggested be avoided in M.R.D. " Id. at 23.
In support of his position that Mother cannot establish "cause" for the adoption to proceed without relinquishing her parental rights, Father points to our decision in M.R.D. , wherein we denied termination of the father's parental rights, finding that cause was not shown to permit the mother to retain her parental rights where she sought to have a non-spouse — her father, the child's grandfather — adopt her child. Father further notes that this case is unlike R.B.F. , wherein we found that a court may, in its discretion, find cause was shown to excuse the relinquishment requirement for same-sex partners who wished to adopt at a time when same-sex marriages were not permitted in the Commonwealth. Father observes that, unlike in R.B.F. , there is no legal impediment to Mother marrying Partner, and, indeed, if the two married, the adoption could proceed.
In light of the foregoing, Father maintains that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in remanding this matter to the orphans' court to consider whether Mother can establish the "cause" exception when it is clear under the facts of this case that she cannot. Thus, Father suggests that the portion of the Superior Court's order remanding to the orphans' court should be vacated and the portion of the order vacating the termination decree should be affirmed.
In response, Mother and Child's legal counsel (collectively, "Mother") have filed a joint brief in which they assert that Mother can, in fact, establish the cause exception under the facts of this case. As a preliminary matter, Mother notes that a party may show cause to proceed with an adoption without relinquishing her parental rights if "the purpose of Section 2711(d)'s relinquishment of parental rights requirement will be otherwise fulfilled or is unnecessary under the particular circumstances of [his or her] case." Appellees' Brief at 10 (quoting M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1128 ). Here, stressing that the purpose behind terminating or relinquishing an existing parent's rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a "new parent-child relationship" between the child and the adoptive parent and to protect "the integrity and stability of the new family unit," Mother maintains that the termination of Father's parental rights and the impending adoption by Partner satisfy both of those aims. Id. Indeed, Mother emphasizes that this case does not present the unusual "hybrid-type relationship" at issue in M.R.D. , where the maternal grandfather was the proposed adoptive parent with the mother. Id. at 15. Moreover, Mother argues that the concerns about gamesmanship in adoption proceedings that were present in M.R.D. are not implicated by the proposed adoption here, as Partner is a long-time committed companion to Mother and co-parent to Child, not a random third-party. To the contrary, Mother contends that Father's challenge to the termination of his parental rights — and, concomitantly his challenge to the proposed adoption by Partner — is the very type of custody gamesmanship this Court sought to avoid in M.R.D. , suggesting that Paternal Grandparents are actually behind this challenge and are using it "as a tool for [them] to gain footing in the custody matter they initiated after Mother and [Partner] petitioned for termination and adoption." Appellees' Brief at 16. Thus, Mother argues that she and Partner "have met their burden of showing cause why the proposed adoption by [Partner] would serve the underlying purposes of relinquishment and that relinquishment is otherwise unnecessary under the circumstances of this case." Id. at 13.
While Father argues that the Superior Court erred in remanding this matter to the orphans' court for a determination of whether Mother established "cause shown" to proceed with the adoption, Mother disagrees, noting that our Court has previously remanded for such a determination on at least one occasion, see R.B.F. Mother maintains that remanding this matter for a determination of cause "was and remains[ ] in the best interest of the child." Id. at 16. She, thus, asks our Court to affirm the Superior Court's decision to remand to the trial court to allow her to establish "cause."
Turning to our analysis of the issue before us, we first emphasize that neither party disputes that Mother has established the statutory grounds for termination of Father's parental rights under Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, as the lower courts in this matter aptly observed, the evidence of record clearly demonstrates that, although Paternal Grandparents maintain a relationship with Child, Father himself has not had contact with Child in over two years, well beyond the six-month period set forth in Section 2511(a). Moreover, testimony from the termination hearing regarding the fact that Child has no knowledge that Father exists, and that she, instead, views Partner as her Father, certainly supports the conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. Thus, there is no dispute that termination of Father's parental rights would be appropriate under Section 2511 if the proposed adoption by Partner satisfies the requirements set forth in the Adoption Act.
Nevertheless, because Mother did not, and does not, intend to relinquish her parental rights in consenting to the proposed adoption by Partner, as required by Section 2711(d)(1) of the Act, she must satisfy one of the Act's statutory exceptions to relinquishment in order for the proposed adoption to be effectuated. Given that Mother and Partner are not married and, thus, do not satisfy the spousal exception to relinquishment under Section 2903, we focus our inquiry on whether Mother has demonstrated cause under Section 2901 to allow the adoption to proceed.
The parties' dispute in this matter, distilled to its essence, concerns the meaning of "cause" for purposes of Section 2901. In Father's view, "cause" is established if Mother and Partner have good reason for failing to satisfy the requirements of the Adoption Act. By contrast, Mother suggests that, regardless of the reason, "cause" is established if the proposed adoption would serve the underlying purposes of relinquishment and render relinquishment unnecessary under the circumstances of a particular case. We find that the "cause" analysis under Section 2901 necessarily requires an examination of both of these factors.
Although the Act does not define "cause," the decisions in which this Court has examined Section 2901's "cause shown" language are instructive. In R.B.F. , which involved proposed adoptions outside the context of a termination petition, we found that "there is no reasonable construction of the Section 2901 ‘cause shown’ language other than to conclude that it permits a petitioner to demonstrate why, in a particular case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements." R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1201-02. We explained that, "[u]pon a showing of cause, the trial court is [then] afforded discretion to determine whether the adoption petition should, nevertheless, be granted" without terminating the petitioning parent's rights under Section 2711(d). Id. at 1202 (emphasis original). This cause analysis entails determining whether the legal parent and the prospective adoptive parent can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence "whether the purpose of Section 2711(d)'s relinquishment of parental rights requirement will be otherwise fulfilled or is unnecessary under the particular circumstances" of their case. Id. at 1203. Applying that standard, our Court found that the appellants in that case — two sets of domestic partners who could not legally marry at the time, and, thus, could not rely upon the stepparent exception to the relinquishment requirement under Section 2903 — were entitled to have the opportunity to demonstrate in an evidentiary hearing that the purpose of the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) was fulfilled or unnecessary under their particular circumstances.
We again visited Section 2901's "cause shown" language in M.R.D. , wherein a mother petitioned to involuntarily terminate the father's parental rights over their child while seeking to retain her own parental rights, but offering her father, the child's grandfather, as the adoptive resource. Reaffirming that Section 2901 gives "the trial court the discretion to grant an adoption petition in circumstances where, as in [ R.B.F. ], the party seeking adoption is unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption, but has demonstrated cause for his or her noncompliance with those requirements," M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1121 (emphasis added), we found that the mother was unable to demonstrate cause under the circumstances of her case. Indeed, while it was clear that the mother and her father could not legally marry, and, thus, could not meet the statutory requirements for adoption, we held that they could not establish that the purpose of the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) would be otherwise fulfilled or unnecessary because the mother and the child's grandfather were not part of an "intact family unit." Id. at 1128. Thus, we held that they did not satisfy the "cause" exception under Section 2901.
As the above cases illustrate, to satisfy the cause exception to relinquishment under Section 2901 two things must be established. A party must first show why he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements for adoption. This is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which provides that, "[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless ... all other legal requirements have been met ." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 (emphasis added). In both R.B.F. and M.R.D. , the parties seeking to adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, could not satisfy the Act's marriage requirement. Upon this showing, the party may then appeal to the court's discretion by demonstrating with clear and convincing evidence why the purpose of Section 2711(d) would nevertheless be fulfilled or unnecessary in their case, despite the parties' inability to fulfill the statutory requirements.
Here, in claiming that she has established cause under Section 2901 because the proposed adoption by Partner will facilitate a new parent-child relationship between Partner and Child, Mother puts the proverbial cart before the horse: before she may demonstrate that the proposed adoption satisfies the purpose underlying Section 2711(d), she must, as an initial matter, explain why she is unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption. Indeed, while our Court's analysis in R.B.F. and M.R.D. centered more directly on the second portion of the inquiry — i.e. , whether the parties could establish that the proposed adoptions in those cases rendered the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) unnecessary — that was because there was no question that the domestic partners in R.B.F. , and the mother and grandfather in M.R.D. , were legally prohibited from marrying and, thus, could not satisfy the statutory requirements for adoption. By contrast, although Mother concedes that she and Partner do not satisfy the statutory requirements for adoption in this case because they do not intend to marry at this time, she does not allege any legal impediment preventing her and Partner from doing so, and, as noted, the orphans' court made no inquiry on this subject.
Interpreting Section 2901 so as to require Mother to demonstrate first why she is unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption — in this case, the spousal requirement — is consistent with our principles of statutory construction, which require us to construe every statute "if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Indeed, we may not "ignore the language of a statute, nor may we deem any language to be superfluous." Bd. of Revision of Taxes, City of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia , 607 Pa. 104, 4 A.3d 610, 622 (2010) ; see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2). Permitting a parent, such as Mother, to simply waive the relinquishment requirement in circumstances where she offers her long-term partner as an adoptive resource, but does not first demonstrate why they cannot marry, would allow the "cause shown" exception to swallow the rule, as that parent could proceed with the adoption even if there were no legal impediment to marrying the prospective adoptive parent, rendering the spousal requirements effectively optional, and the stepparent exception to relinquishment under Section 2903 largely unnecessary.
Critically, however, the General Assembly did not intend for the spousal requirement for adoption to be merely aspirational. To the contrary, the relinquishment requirement was designed to promote the General Assembly's clear goal of promoting adoptions by a spouse, in the context of an intact marriage. As then-Justice, later Chief Justice, Baer aptly articulated in M.R.D. , this goal is "rooted in the belief that children benefit from permanency," the best indicator of which "is to have children parented by two parents in a permanent relationship — a marriage." M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1131-32 (Baer, J., concurring).
Moreover, as a practical matter, excusing the relinquishment requirement and allowing the adoption to proceed without first requiring Mother to demonstrate why she and Partner are unable to marry could lead to abuse by spiteful parents seeking to terminate the rights of unwanted parents, a scenario we cautioned against in M.R.D. See id. at 1129 (warning about the potential for misuse in adoption proceedings "by spiteful parents as a means to involuntarily terminate the rights of unwanted parents, potentially allowing grandparents, cousins, pastors, coaches, and a litany of other individuals who have a close relationship with a child to stand in as prospective adoptive parents so that termination may be achieved."). In addition, broadly excusing the relinquishment requirement for non-stepparent adoptions would distort the operation of Section 5326, which, as noted, terminates the custody rights of grandparents (and great-grandparents) over their grandchildren where the proposed adoption is by an individual other than a stepparent.
See supra note 2.
We recognize that the relinquishment requirement for adoption and termination of another parent's rights over a child may be seen by some as anachronistic in this day and age, particularly given the changing notion of what it means to be "family." No longer is society's concept of family limited to a mother, father, and their children, as was commonplace at the time the Adoption Act was originally enacted. Today, it is not unusual to see multigenerational families, single-parent families, or, as here, families where the parents are live-in partners, rather than spouses. Moreover, our Court is sensitive to the plight of single parents who receive no assistance or benefit from an absent parent, but are precluded from seeking termination of the rights of that parent because they do not have a spouse. Nevertheless, regardless of the wisdom of the spousal and relinquishment requirements, the General Assembly has not revisited these provisions, and they remain the law.
Accordingly, we find that, in order to seek termination of Father's parental rights and the proposed adoption by Partner under Section 2901, Mother must demonstrate cause as to why she cannot satisfy the statutory requirement, i.e. , why she and Partner cannot marry, and then establish why the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) is satisfied under the facts of her case. As the orphans' court precipitously terminated Father's parental rights without first evaluating whether Mother established cause under Section 2901, and given that Mother has not provided evidence pertaining to this "cause" analysis, we affirm the Superior Court's order remanding to the orphans' court for consideration of whether Mother may establish cause, as we have defined it in this opinion, to excuse the relinquishment requirement under the facts of this case.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Mundy and Brobson join the opinion.
Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE WECHT, concurring and dissenting
The Adoption Act opens with two broad premises: "[a]ny individual may be adopted," and "[a]ny individual may become an adopting parent." In the provisions that follow, however, the Adoption Act imposes "exacting substantive and procedural requirements" that limit "a petitioner's eligibility to finalize an adoption." The requirements "serve the critical broadscale function of scrutinizing the safety, wellbeing, and viability of the resulting court-sanctioned, permanent parental relationship."
23 Pa.C.S. § 2311.
Id. § 2312.
Int. of K.N.L. , ––– Pa. ––––, 284 A.3d 121, 139-40 (2022).
Id. at 139.
The General Assembly could have left it at that: meet the requirements to adopt or the adoption cannot proceed. But it did not. Instead, in Section 2901, the General Assembly provided trial courts with discretion to grant adoptions that do not conform to the statute's exacting requirements. For instance, one of the Adoption Act's legal requirements is Section 2711(d)'s relinquishment requirement. Ordinarily, a parent consenting to adoption of her child by another individual must agree to relinquish her own parental rights to the child. The Act contains one stated exception to this relinquishment requirement. Under Section 2903, if the prospective adoptive parent is the parent's spouse, the parent-child relationship between the parent and child remains intact after the spouse's adoption of the child. But, what if the parties seeking an adoption are an unmarried couple comprised of the child's legal parent and that parent's long-term partner? Section 2901 provides trial courts with marching orders in such situations. If the legal requirements of the Act are satisfied, the court may enter an adoption decree. If the legal requirements of the Act are not met, the trial court shall not enter the decree, "[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise."
Id. § 2903 ("Whenever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the adoption proceeding.").
Id. § 2901 (emphasis added).
In its attempt to effectuate what it discerns to be a legislative preference for formally married couples, the Majority interprets Section 2903 as a "spousal requirement" rather than as an exception to the relinquishment requirement. It then creates a two-part framework that all but forecloses an adoption by a parent's partner if the couple chooses not to marry. In attempting to honor what it perceives as the implicit intent behind Section 2903, the Majority disregards the explicit words of Section 2901.
Maj. Op. at 128.
Id. at 127–28.
Section 2901 does not invite courts to cast aside the Act's requirements with reckless abandon. Yet, as written, Section 2901 manifests the General Assembly's express blessing to allow a trial court, interacting with the parties on the front lines, to use its measured discretion to override the Adoption Act's legal requirements in a particular case upon a showing of cause. This Court already has held that it is "indeed, possible for parties to waive the relinquishment requirement under Section 2901 upon a showing of cause. ..." Thus, while I concur in the Majority's decision to affirm the Superior Court's order vacating the decree that terminated D.D.L. ("Father")'s parental rights and remanding for further proceedings, I dissent from the Majority's analysis.
In re Adoption of M.R.D. , 636 Pa. 509, 145 A.3d 1117, 1127 (2016) (citing In re Adoption of R.B.F. , 569 Pa. 269, 803 A.2d 1195, 1203 (2002) ).
The Majority describes the Superior Court's opinion as unanimous. Maj. Op. at 123. It was unanimous as to the disposition, but without elaboration Judge Dan Pellegrini concurred only in the result.
The subject of the instant case, M.E.L. ("Child"), was on the verge of turning six years old at the time of the hearing before the trial court. Child and C.J. ("Mother") have lived with Mother's partner, T.V. ("Partner"), since Child was two years old. Mother and Partner are raising Child alongside Partner's older child from a previous relationship and a younger child who was born to Mother and Partner. Mother and Partner have not married, but the adults and children consider themselves to be, and operate on a daily basis as, a unified and loving family.
While Partner parents Child daily, Partner is not Child's only paternal figure. Child's legal and biological father is Father. Child and Father used to have a relationship after Mother and Father separated and divorced. When Child was age three and a half, Father discontinued that relationship, signed an agreement giving Mother full custody of Child, and disappeared from Child's life. Father's parents ("Paternal Grandparents") have regular contact with Child through an informal arrangement with Mother, but Father does not. Nor does Father support Child financially (or in any other manner).
Averring that Partner is a father to Child for all practical and emotional purposes, Mother and Partner filed two correlating petitions with the objective of creating a legal tether between Child and Partner: a termination of parental rights ("TPR") petition and an adoption petition. In the TPR petition, Mother and Partner sought to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights to Child. In the adoption petition, Mother and Partner petitioned the court to permit Partner's adoption of Child while allowing Mother to retain her parental rights.
Alongside the TPR petition, Mother and Partner also filed a report indicating Partner's intention to adopt Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531. Of the three filings, only the TPR petition appears in the certified record before us.
Although they are separate petitions with distinct statutory requirements, the TPR petition and the adoption petition necessarily are intertwined. The Adoption Act provides a mechanism for one parent to petition to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of the child's other parent who, "by choice or neglect ... has failed to meet the continuing needs of the child." It is axiomatic that a TPR has "significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child." Unlike a custody order, which is subject to modification when it meets the best interest of the child, an order severing parental rights is final. It is, in effect, the "nuclear option."
In re B.E. , 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153, 156 (1977) ; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
In re Adoption of L.A.K. , ––– Pa. ––––, 265 A.3d 580, 591 (2021).
In re Adoption of C.M. , ––– Pa. ––––, 255 A.3d 343, 376 (2021) (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
A TPR petition filed by one parent against the other is an extreme measure that cannot, and should not, ever be used "to punish an ineffective or negligent parent." Instead, a parent-filed TPR petition is a means to a singular end: the establishment of a "new parent-child relationship" between a prospective adoptive parent and a child. A TPR decree eliminates the need for the non-petitioning parent's consent to adoption and protects "the integrity and stability of the new family unit," which is comprised of the child, the petitioning parent, and the prospective adoptive parent.
B.E ., 377 A.2d at 156. See also C.M. , 255 A.3d at 376 (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (condemning the weaponization of TPRs "as implements in order to lever advantage in custody, to stiff-arm a neglectful father or mother, or to punish an inattentive parent who belatedly seeks to reconnect with a child").
B.E. , 377 A.2d at 156.
Among the many ways that TPR eviscerates the ties between a parent and child is by "extinguish[ing]" the parent's "power" or "right" to object to, or even to "receive notice of," adoption proceedings. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2521(a).
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1128.
The Adoption Act requires a parent who seeks an involuntary TPR against the other parent to attest that he or she will assume custody until such time as the child is adopted. For her TPR claim to be "cognizable," the petitioning parent must demonstrate, that "an adoption of the child is anticipated." Because the sole legislatively recognized purpose of a parent's TPR petition against the other parent is to clear the path for creation of a new family unit with legal ties between a prospective adoptive parent and child, the parent-petitioner must demonstrate, as part of a cognizable TPR proceeding, that the desired adoption will be able to proceed in accordance with the statutory requirements of the Adoption Act.
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1120.
The Adoption Act contains one exception to this purpose. A petitioner whose child was conceived as the result of rape or incest is not "required to aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt exists." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b)(3).
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1120.
One statutory requirement that comes into play in private adoptions is Section 2711, entitled "Consents necessary to adoption." Subsection 2711(a)(3) states that, except as otherwise provided in the Adoption Act, consent to an adoption is required of the "parents or surviving parent of an adoptee who has not reached the age of 18 years." This consent must be attached as an exhibit to the adoption petition. In the consent, the parent must aver that he or she intends "to permanently give up all rights to this child." This requirement obviously poses a problem for a legal parent who wishes to create a new family unit with a partner. The goal in such a scenario is to connect the partner and child legally, not to destroy the existing connection between the legal parent and child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2711.
Id. § 2711(a)(3) ; see also id. § 2713 (providing the trial court with discretion to dispense with consents other than that of the adoptee in limited circumstances not present here).
Id. § 2701(7) (requiring that "all consents required by section 2711 ... are attached as exhibits" or that the petition set forth "the basis upon which such consents are not required"); see also id. § 2702(1) (mandating that the petitioner attach to the adoption petition the consents required by section 2711 ).
Id. § 2711(d)(1).
To that end, the General Assembly created a path for a parent's spouse to adopt the parent's child while the parent maintains his or her parental rights. Section 2903, entitled "Retention of parental status," provides that "[w]henever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the adoption proceeding." Because Section 2903 applies only to an adoption by a "spouse," the intended adoptive parent must be married to the child's parent.
Id. § 2903.
R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1199-1200.
Referring to Section 2903 as the "spousal requirement"—a characterization that, as I will explain, is a misnomer—the Majority asserts that "the General Assembly did not intend" for such requirement "to be merely aspirational." Issues of nomenclature aside, I have no reason to quarrel with this assertion. By providing for automatic retention of the legal parent's rights, the plain language of Section 2903 reveals the General Assembly's intent to facilitate the creation of and legal recognition of families through remarriage and adoption with as few statutory hurdles as possible.
Maj. Op. at 128.
That the General Assembly intended to facilitate stepparent adoptions is not dispositive, as the General Assembly also afforded trial courts the discretion to permit an adoption to proceed even if the adoption is not pursued by formally married couples. Section 2901, which is entitled "Time of entry of decree of adoption," provides as follows:
Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents' rights have been terminated, the investigation required by section 2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed, the report of the intermediary has been filed pursuant to section 2533 (relating to report of intermediary) and all other legal requirements have been met. If all legal requirements have been met, the court may enter a decree of adoption at any time.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 (emphasis added).
Let's break down this provision one component at a time. Section 2901 allows a trial court to enter a decree of adoption at any time, provided that "all legal requirements are met." Section 2901 also addresses the inverse: it prohibits a trial court from entering a decree of adoption if the proposed adoption does not meet "all legal requirements." The General Assembly expressly listed three of the legal requirements—termination of the rights of the child's parent or parents; a completed Section 2535 investigation; and a filed Section 2533 report of intermediary—and concluded with a catchall—"all other legal requirements." The only circumstance in which the court may enter a decree of adoption that does not meet the referenced requirements is when "the court for cause shown determines otherwise."
The Majority interprets Section 2901 to be "consistent" with a two-step process that it imposes today. First, the Majority says, a party must "show why he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements for adoption." Notably, the statute itself does not contain this obligation. The General Assembly did not mandate any prior demonstration of incapacity to satisfy the statutory requirements as a condition precedent to invocation of the "for cause" provision. The statutory requirement in this instance, the Majority maintains, is the "spousal requirement." By "cannot," the Majority means that the party is "unable," emphasizing that the same-sex partners in R.B.F. and the mother and grandfather in M.R.D. were "legally prohibited from marrying." "By contrast," the Majority says, Mother and Partner are simply unwilling to marry; no "legal impediment" stands in the way of their matrimony.
Maj. Op. at 127–28. The Majority relies upon this portion of Section 2901 : "[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless ... all other legal requirements have been met ." Id. (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 ) (emphasis in Maj. Op.).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 127–28.
Under the Majority's rubric, it is not until the second step, after a party shows that he or she cannot meet the legal requirement, that such party "may then appeal to the court's discretion by demonstrating with clear and convincing evidence why the purpose of Section 2711(d) [i.e. , relinquishment] would nevertheless be fulfilled or unnecessary in their case, despite the parties' inability to fulfill the statutory requirements."
Id. (emphasis in Maj. Op.).
I am unconvinced that Section 2901—either the portion quoted by the Majority or the section in its entirety—justifies the Majority's two-step process. First, the prescribed procedure intermingles the legal requirements at issue. There is no "spousal requirement." The Adoption Act does not require parties to be married (or even coupled) in order to adopt. "Any individual may become an adopting parent." The specific legal requirement that Mother failed to fulfill is submission of a consent to adoption that relinquishes her parental rights. Section 2903 operates as an automatic exception to Section 2711's parental consent and relinquishment requirement. It is one of the ways that the Adoption Act confers a "benefit" to certain prospective adoptive parents based upon their relationships to the children. That married stepparents get the benefit of a simplified path to adoption in Section 2903 does not inherently prohibit others from invoking Section 2901 to demonstrate cause to excuse relinquishment under Section 2711.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2312 ; see also R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1202.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a)(3), (d)(1).
See R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1199 ("An exception to this relinquishment provision appears at Section 2903 ....); M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1120-21 ("An exception to this relinquishment requirement exists ... in second-parent adoption cases where the adopting party is the spouse of the parent seeking termination—that is, in the context of a stepparent adoption."). Section 2903 does not prohibit adoption by unmarried individuals. It is, however, the only express exception to Section 2711's relinquishment requirement.
See In re Adoption of Hess , 530 Pa. 218, 608 A.2d 10, 13 (1992). Another such "benefit" is eliminating Section 2531's requirement to file a Report of Intention to Adopt. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531(c) ; see also Hess , 608 A.2d at 13 (construing the legislative choice to relieve parents, grandparents, stepparents, whole or half-siblings, or aunts or uncles by blood, marriage, or adoption of filing a Report of Intention to Adopt as the General Assembly's conference of a benefit upon the named individuals based upon their relationship to the child). Eliminating the requirement to file a Report of Intention to Adopt also renders a stepparent exempt from the investigation requirement. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2535(a).
Second, as noted above, by insisting that petitioners prove that it is legally impossible for them to meet a statutory requirement for adoption, the Majority is foisting a burden onto petitioners that the statutory language does not expressly contain. The court's authority to determine whether there was "cause shown" relates to its evaluation of the reason offered by the party as to why the requirement was not met, not just to the ultimate decision of whether to grant the petition. Regardless, nowhere does the statute state that such evaluation occurs only after other exceptions are demonstrated to be unavailable or impossible to meet. The Majority's strict use of "cannot" in its two-step formulation restricts the trial court from considering whether the petitioner had cause to deviate from the legal requirements.
When interpreting a statute, our job is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's intent. Our search for the General Assembly's intent "begins and ends with the plain language of the statute if that statute is unambiguous." Perhaps the Majority is correct that the General Assembly did not intend to let the "cause shown" exception in Section 2901 override the requirement that a parent must relinquish her rights except if her spouse is the prospective adoptive parent. But the words that the General Assembly chose do not align with such supposed intent, and we are not permitted to disregard the letter of the Adoption Act under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh , 653 Pa. 596, 211 A.3d 810, 822 (2019).
"It is not for the judiciary to improve upon the legislative branch's efforts in contravention of the law's plain language." The General Assembly is and was perfectly capable of designing a statutory scheme that limited the cause shown exception to specified circumstances. It did not do so. Instead, the General Assembly clearly and unambiguously used broad, open-ended language in Section 2901 to vest the trial court with discretion to deviate from statutory requirements for cause shown. The legal requirements excusable by Section 2901 extend beyond the parental consent and relinquishment at issue in this case. The General Assembly plainly intended each requirement to serve a purpose that is more than "aspirational." Yet, any of the statutory requirements may be excused "for cause shown."
Commonwealth v. Peck , 663 Pa. 484, 242 A.3d 1274, 1288 (2020) (Wecht, J., concurring).
See Int. of K.N.L. , 284 A.3d at 139 (summarizing the statutory requirements regarding, inter alia , consents, reports, home studies, background checks, investigations, pleading specifications, exhibits, and hearing procedure).
See Maj. Op. at 128.
The General Assembly's vesting of this discretion with trial courts to judge "cause shown" is congruent with the Adoption Act's focus upon the best interest of the prospective adoptee. In honoring the General Assembly's preference for marriage, the Majority ignores the General Assembly's expression of flexibility in Section 2901 and significantly circumscribes the trial court's ability to decide what is best for the proposed adoptee. Restricting Section 2901 only to petitioners who have a legal impediment to marriage seems to put the child's best interest in the backseat, elevating instead the decision to marry (or not) as the paramount interest. In any event, while the General Assembly presumably is free to rewrite the statute to entrench such a restriction, we are not.
See R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1202 n.11 (determining that the trial court's assessment of whether there is cause to dispense with a legal requirement overlaps with "an examination of the best interests of the child"); see also Hess , 608 A.2d at 13 ("At all stages of the proceedings, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration."); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2902(a) ("If satisfied that the statements made in the petition are true, that the needs and welfare of the person proposed to be adopted will be promoted by the adoption and that all requirements of this part have been met, the court shall enter a decree so finding.") (emphasis added).
Prior to the General Assembly's addition of Section 2901, adoption petitioners who did not present legally conforming adoption petitions had no recourse. In E.M.A. , an unmarried person filed a petition to adopt a child. The child's father consented to the adoption but wished to retain his parental rights. This Court declined to allow the adoption to proceed because the petitioner and the father were not married, describing the stepparent path in the predecessor to Section 2903 as an "exclusive intra-family provision legislatively reserved only for spouses of consenting parents." Permitting the petitioner to use Section 2903 to adopt without the father's relinquishment of rights would create a judicial exception "where the Legislature did not see fit to create" one.
In re Adoption of E.M.A. , 487 Pa. 152, 409 A.2d 10 (1979). The opinion in E.M.A. did not explore the nature of the relationship between the petitioner and the father, other than to note that the petitioner was not married to the father. See id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Significantly, the version of the Adoption Act in effect when we decided E.M.A. did not contain a provision akin to the "for cause" mechanism in Section 2901. By the time we decided R.B.F. , our next case involving unmarried prospective adoptive parents, the statutory landscape was vastly different.
R.B.F. involved petitions to adopt filed by the same-sex partners of legal parents at a time when same-sex couples were prohibited from marrying each other in Pennsylvania. Because the petitioners legally could not marry, the spousal exception to relinquishment in Section 2903 did not apply. Nevertheless, this Court held that Section 2903 was not the only mechanism in the Adoption Act that a petitioner could rely upon in order to excuse the parental relinquishment requirement. Several years after E.M.A. , the General Assembly added Section 2901 to the Adoption Act. This Court interpreted Section 2901 as "afford[ing] the trial court discretion to decree the adoption without termination of the legal parent's rights pursuant to Section 2711(d)" when "the requisite cause is demonstrated."
See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102, 1704 (defining marriage in Pennsylvania as a civil contract between one man and one woman); but see Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states).
R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1201-02.
Id. at 1202.
This Court rejected the notion that the trial court's exercise of discretion would "open the door to unlimited adoptions by legally unrelated adults." Discretion was neither unreasonable nor unfettered, we reasoned, because it would be "confined by a finding of cause and a determination of the best interests of the child in each individual case" and subject to review for abuses. This Court also denied that it was "creating a judicial exception" to the Act's requirements; rather, the Court observed, it was "applying the plain meaning of the terms employed by the Legislature" in Section 2901.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Unlike today's Majority, which inaccurately pinpoints the statutory requirement as marriage, the R.B.F. Court recognized that the statutory requirement at issue was the relinquishment requirement in Section 2711(d). R.B.F. held that Section 2901 gave the petitioners leeway to demonstrate cause as to why the petitioners were seeking an adoption without relinquishment of the legal parent's rights. Nowhere in R.B.F. did this Court indicate in any way that the petitioners' inability to marry was an implicit antecedent and prerequisite to invocation of the cause shown provision in Section 2901. To the contrary, in M.R.D. , this Court explicitly recognized that the R.B.F. Court's "broad" interpretation of 2901 and its interplay with Section 2711 was not contingent upon the same-sex partners' legal inability to marry at the time. We unambiguously declared that the partners' inability to marry "was not relevant to our decision other than in noting that the spousal exception obviously did not apply to them."
See id. ("When the requisite cause is demonstrated, Section 2901 affords the trial court discretion to decree the adoption without termination of the legal parent's rights pursuant to Section 2711(d)."); id. at 1203 (remanding for determination of "cause as to whether the purpose of Section 2711(d)'s relinquishment of parental rights requirement will be otherwise fulfilled or is unnecessary under the particular circumstances of each case."); id. at 1203 n.14 ("As we find that the Adoption Act provides Appellants an opportunity to establish cause why the legal parent need not relinquish parental rights ...").
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1127 n.2 ("[A]lthough Justice Baer suggests that this Court's holding in R.B.F. was limited to adoption petitions filed by same-sex partners at a time when they could not marry, our decision in that case contains no such limitations.") (cleaned up).
Id.
It is hard to square R.B.F. 's reasoning with the Majority's holding today, particularly the first step of its Section 2901 framework. In its effort to disallow the exception from swallowing the rule, the Majority declares that only unmarried couples with a legal impediment to marriage can attempt to convince the trial court that they should be able to adopt. In this Commonwealth, that category includes minors, most incompetent persons, people under the influence of drugs and alcohol when applying for a license, relatives within specified degrees of consanguinity, people without a marriage license, and people already married except in the case of presumed death. Instead of allowing committed couples who do not marry by choice with this statutory opportunity to prove that there is cause to excuse the relinquishment requirement, the Majority interprets Sections 2901 and 2903 as affording the opportunity only to couples with a legal impediment to marriage. By subordinating Section 2901 to Section 2903, the Majority's interpretation distorts the intent of both of these statutory provisions.
See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 1301(a), 1304, 1702 ; see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 4301 (criminalization of bigamy); 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302 (criminalization of incest).
The Majority's interpretation of Sections 2901 and 2903 also is incongruent with the rationale of M.R.D. as to the types of proceedings that carry a high risk of gamesmanship. In M.R.D. , this Court condemned the use of the TPR and adoption statutes as weapons to defeat custody actions. There, a mother filed a TPR petition after the children's absent father resurfaced. The mother sought to manufacture an adoption by the children's maternal grandfather so that the mother and grandfather could co-parent. This Court declined to allow the adoption to proceed, warning that such an unconventional adoption, inter alia , may "open the door for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful parents as a means to involuntarily terminate the rights of unwanted parents."
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1129.
Here, Mother and Partner, who stand in a "horizontal relationship, are equals as between each other, and are equals with respect to the child," seek to create a legally recognized parent-child relationship between Partner and Child. Despite the apparent legitimacy of Mother's and Partner's relationship, the Majority still insists that "allowing the adoption to proceed without first requiring Mother to demonstrate why she and Partner are unable to marry" would open the door to "spiteful parents seeking to terminate the rights of unwanted parents." The Majority also expresses concern that permitting nonspouses to adopt would distort grandparents' custodial rights.
Id. at 1128.
Maj. Op. at 128–29.
Id. (discussing 23 Pa.C.S. § 5326, which extinguishes grandparent custody rights after adoption except for adoption of the child by a stepparent, grandparent, or great-grandparent).
I wholeheartedly agree with the Majority that we must protect against gamesmanship in TPR proceedings involving private family adoptions. But unlike the tactic ventured by the mother-grandfather adopting duo in M.R.D. , there are no inherent unique complications that militate against allowing unmarried partners to invoke the cause shown provision in order to pursue adoption without the legal parent's relinquishment. It is of course possible that unmarried partners could misuse adoption proceedings together and participate in gamesmanship. So could people in a sham marriage. So could married couples who do not discover an interest in formalizing a stepparent/child relationship until the child's absent parent resurfaces. The risk of gamesmanship here is not so high that this Court can or should presume as a matter of law that the arrangement sought could never be legitimate. Instead, when deciding whether petitioners make a showing of cause sufficient to excuse the relinquishment requirement, trial courts should scrutinize each individual case for gamesmanship. Similarly, trial courts should examine the correlative impact upon grandparents' rights on a case-by-case basis.
See infra n. 72 and accompanying text.
In Section 2901, the General Assembly left "cause shown" undefined. In the absence of a statutory definition, this Court has directed petitioners to demonstrate that a legal requirement "will be otherwise fulfilled or is unnecessary under the particular circumstances of each case." Instead of categorically denying unmarried couples the ability to protect the child's relationship with the parent's partner by adoption, I would do as the General Assembly intended: I would permit trial courts to scrutinize each non-conforming adoption case for a sufficient showing of cause. Petitioners must make this showing by clear and convincing evidence. Adoption is a statutory right, and "the parent seeking termination must strictly comply with all pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act in order for the adoption to be valid." Thus, the trial court's decision to approve a non-conforming adoption should not be undertaken lightly or indiscriminately. Section 2901 is a rare exception, not the rule or a gaping loophole. It is no guarantee of approval of a non-conforming adoption.
R.B.F. , 803 A.2d at 1203.
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1127.
Id. at 1120.
Of course, trial courts must have some parameters to guide their discretion. In my view, trial courts should consider the following non-exhaustive list when scrutinizing a case for cause. First, the court should examine the circumstances of the case carefully for gamesmanship. As the Majority notes, this Court has refused to allow a parent to misuse TPR and adoption proceedings to eliminate an undesired parent from a child's life. Trial courts should be diligent in ensuring that a parent is not "pull[ing] the TPR arrow out of the quiver" to stave off a custody dispute. Custody disputes belong in custody court. I have warned repeatedly concerning the perils of gamesmanship in TPR proceedings. Given the finality and severity of a TPR decree, it is imperative that trial courts scrutinize each case carefully to ascertain whether the parent and partner are seeking adoption in order to formalize and protect the relationship between partner and child, or whether they are seeking adoption to eliminate the other parent from the child's life.
Id. at 1134 (Wecht, J., concurring).
See M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1133-35 (Wecht, J., concurring); C.M. , 255 A.3d at 372-383 (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
This case differs from M.R.D. in several particulars. Here, Mother and Partner are in a long-term relationship, live as partners, and parent each other's children and their own joint biological child. There was no impending custody action by Father; he had agreed to yield his own custodial rights years before. Nor were the TPR petition and adoption petition filed in response to a custody petition filed by Paternal Grandparents. It was the other way around. Paternal Grandparents filed their custody petition only after Mother and Partner filed the TPR and adoption petitions.
Another factor to consider is the relationship between the child being adopted and the family of the parent whose rights would be terminated in order to clear the path for the adoption. In some cases, grandparents will not have a meaningful relationship with a child. In others, adoption by an unmarried partner may jeopardize a child's connection to grandparents. Trial courts should weigh the impact upon grandparents' legal ability to seek custody in each case.
In this case, the orphans' court took a myopic view of the proceedings, dismissing Father's concerns about the impact upon Paternal Grandparents' ability to seek custody as being outside the scope of the proceeding. Tr. Ct. Op., 3/31/2022, at 5 (unnumbered). From my perspective, discerning the importance of Child's relationship with Paternal Grandparents could be a proper part of the needs and welfare inquiry under Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act involving the TPR petition. But it also plays into the cause shown provision, because, if Partner adopts Child, Paternal Grandparents will lose their right to pursue custodial rights under Section 5326.
Finally, in light of the permanence of severing a parent's parental rights and the intended permanence of adoption, unmarried petitioners should be prepared to demonstrate their understanding of the gravity of what they are asking the court to do, and to present evidence of their commitment to each other and to the child. The petitioners should present information sufficient for the trial court to discern: the nature of the relationship between the petitioners; the stability and longevity of the relationship; the petitioners' living and parenting arrangements; and the degree to which the petitioners' lives are intertwined. The trial court should consider whether the petitioners are operating for practical and emotional purposes as an intact family, and whether adoption of the child by the legal parent's partner is the missing piece that would formalize and protect the child's relationship with the parent's partner, provide security for the child, and complete the family.
Finally, although I dissent today because I disagree with the Majority's two-step framework and its subordination of Section 2901 to Section 2903, I agree with the Majority's assessment that the orphans' court "precipitously terminated Father's rights." It is the petitioners' burden, as part of a cognizable TPR petition, to prove that adoption of the child is "anticipated" and that the petitioners can "strictly comply with all pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act." This is true even if the opposing party does not appear for the hearing.
Maj. Op. at 129.
M.R.D. , 145 A.3d at 1120 ; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b).
Father exercised his right to appeal from the termination decree. He correctly asserted that the orphans' court entered the termination decree without examining whether Mother and Partner proved that Partner's proposed adoption of Child could proceed in accordance with the statutory requirements because they were not married. The orphans' court, which already had announced its intention to grant the adoption decree, whipsawed Father by accusing him of waging an improper "attack" upon the adoption. The court insisted that it made a point of not finalizing the adoption in order to avoid such attacks, and it refused to address Father's argument that the orphans' court erroneously terminated Father's rights in service of an invalid adoption. The orphans' court should have been more attentive to the statutory requirements in the first instance and should not have summarily rebuffed Father's valid arguments on appeal.
N.T., 2/22/2022, at 28.
Tr. Ct. Op., 3/31/2022, at 4 (unnumbered).
Id.
Because the orphans' court erred by terminating Father's parental rights without Mother's and Partner's demonstration that Partner's proposed adoption of Child would satisfy the requirements of the Adoption Act, including a showing of cause of why Partner should be able to adopt Child without Mother's relinquishment of her parental rights, I agree that we must affirm the Superior Court's order vacating the termination decree and remanding for further proceedings regarding cause. I respectfully dissent from the Majority's interpretation of Section 2901. My disagreement with the Majority centers upon the Majority's disregard of the plain language of that provision. The General Assembly intended both Section 2901and 2903 to have meaning. In the Majority's effort to protect the implied intent of Section 2903, the Majority has ignored the General Assembly's express intent stated in Section 2901. I would honor the General Assembly's intent by instructing the orphans' court to conduct further proceedings with the requisite rigor in order to determine whether Mother and Partner have demonstrated cause to disregard the requirement that Mother relinquish her parental rights.