Opinion
2114 EDA 2021 J-S17029-22
11-17-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C. APPEAL OF: J.C.
Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-45-JV-0000171-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION
LAZARUS, J.
J.C. appeals from the dispositional order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, after J.C. made an admission to the crime of corruption of minors (COM) and was placed on one year of probation. Because a "child," as defined by the Juvenile Act, is incapable of committing a crime that applies only to adult perpetrators, we are constrained to vacate and reverse.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301, et seq.
On August 17, 2019, Officer John P. Bohman, of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department, executed an affidavit of probable cause seeking an arrest warrant for then-fifteen-year-old J.C. (born 4/04). The affidavit alleged that J.C. had committed the delinquent acts of aggravated indecent assault without consent, indecent assault without consent of other, and open lewdness. The allegations stemmed from accusations made by A.A., a 14-year-old fellow high school classmate of J.C.'s. A.A. alleged that on May 8, 2019, J.C. touched her breasts and digitally penetrated her vagina without her consent while the two were riding on an after-school bus. Alleged video surveillance from the bus, on the date in question, was erased by the school district during a software update.
For confidentiality reasons, we do not provide the exact birthdate of a minor. See Superior Court Internal Operating Procedure 424(A) (confidentiality issues regarding identification of minors in circulating Court decisions).
Id. at § 3126(A)(1).
Id. at § 5901.
The Dean of Students at J.C. and A.A.'s high school testified he viewed the video footage from the bus on the day of the alleged incident. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/12/20, at 23.
A.A. reported the incident to the principal of her high school, who then contacted the school's dean of students (Dean) and directed the Dean to meet with A.A. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/12/20, at 12-13. The Dean met with A.A., who detailed the events that occurred on the school bus, telling him that J.C. had "touched her in inappropriate and unwanted ways." Id. at 13, 23. The Dean then met with J.C., in the presence of the school's assistant principal, to determine whether J.C.'s conduct violated school policy. Id. at 13-16. In addition to giving an oral recitation of what occurred between him and A.A. on the bus, J.C. also gave a written statement wherein he admitted to the alleged acts, but claimed that A.C. gave her consent. Id. at 15-16. Prior to giving his statements, J.C.'s parents were not notified and J.C. was not administered his Miranda rights. Following his investigation, the Dean concluded that a possible crime had been committed and contacted the school's resource officer to report the alleged incident. Id. at 20-21.
The meeting took place in the assistant principal's office. Id. at 17. However, at the conclusion of the meeting, J.C. completed a Major Behavioral Referral (Form), at the behest of the Dean, in the Dean's office. The Form, signed by a school district official and the student, details the infraction and is entered into the school's disciplinary system. Carbon copies are mailed to the student's family. Id. at 31-34.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
On January 2, 2020, the Monroe County District Attorney's Office filed a petition alleging J.C.'s delinquency for the above-stated offenses. On February 18, 2020, J.C. filed a motion to suppress his oral and written statements, claiming he had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without first being advised of his Miranda rights or given an opportunity to speak with his parents. Following a hearing, the trial judge denied the suppression motion finding: (1) the school officials alone initiated the investigation of J.C.; (2) the purpose of questioning J.C. was primarily to determine whether a violation of school policy had occurred; and (3) the police neither participated in, coerced, dominated, or directed the school officials' actions. See Order Denying Suppression Motion, 9/22/20, at 2. On July 1, 2021, J.C. filed a motion for dismissal, claiming that the Commonwealth's failure to provide the video surveillance was a Brady violation warranting dismissal of his case, with prejudice.
Several continuances were granted, thus delaying J.C.'s adjudication. In particular, J.C. requested continuances due to the resurgence of COVID-19 in New York City, where he and his parents reside, his counsel's inability to schedule interviews due to "interstate travel protocols and . . . counsel's personal concerns about being at higher risk from COVID-19 due to being a sufferer of asthma," and J.C.'s mother's contraction of COVID-19. Motion for Continuance, 10/29/20, at ¶¶ 3-4. See also id., 11/30/20, at ¶ 4 (defense requesting continuance due to J.C. contracting COVID-19); id., 4/28/21, at ¶ 3 (continuance requested due to counsel contracting COVID-19). See also Commonwealth's Motion to Continue, 2/22/21 at ¶ 4 (Commonwealth noting it was unable to contact A.A. or her family, who were necessary witnesses at adjudicatory hearing).
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
On July 7, 2021, J.C. executed a four-page written "admission colloquy form," admitting to COM, a first-degree misdemeanor. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 407. After an adjudicatory hearing, during which the court conducted an oral colloquy, the court accepted J.C.'s admission, finding that it was voluntarily made. See N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 7/7/21, at 18-28. In exchange for J.C.'s admission, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosse all other charges. The juvenile court ordered a Social Study Report be prepared pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 513(A). See Pa.R.J.C.P. 120 (defining social study as "pre- dispositional report, which summarizes important information concerning the juvenile to aid the court in determining the disposition"). On August 19, 2021, following a dispositional hearing, J.C. was adjudicated delinquent and ordered to serve one year of probation and complete the following: (1) perform 50 hours of community service; (2) provide a DNA sample and fingerprints; and (3) undergo a Sexual Offender Evaluation. The court further denied J.C.'s motion to dismiss.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure:
(a) Before the court can accept an admission, the court shall determine that the admission is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
(b) As a part of this determination, the court shall ensure:
(i) an attorney has reviewed and completed the admission colloquy with the juvenile pursuant to paragraph C; and
(ii) there is a factual basis for the admission.Pa.R.J.C.P. 407(1)(a-b) (emphasis added). Here, the court stated the following as the factual basis for J.C.'s admission: "
J.C.'s probation was transferred to Kings County, New York, where his parents reside.
In his post-dispositional motion, J.C. states that he withdrew his motion to dismiss. See Post-Dispositional Motion, 8/30/21, at ¶ 9.
On August 30, 2021, J.C. filed a post-dispositional motion objecting to the Sexual Offender Evaluation he was ordered to complete, the DNA sample he was required to produce, and alleging a Brady violation due to the failure to preserve the school bus surveillance video. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 620. The motion was denied on September 17, 2021, following a hearing.
J.C. filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. J.C. presents the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Whether the [j]uvenile [c]ourt abused its discretion in denying [J.C.'s] motion to suppress statement, where [J.C.] was a minor questioned by a school official who[,] while acting as an agent of the police, failed to administer Miranda warnings and contact [J.C.'s] parents prior to conducting a coercive custodial interrogation, in violation of [J.C.'s] constitutional rights against self[-]incrimination and to have counsel present during questioning, respectively[,] under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article [I], Section 9[,] of the Pennsylvania State Constitution[.
(2) Whether the [j]uvenile [c]ourt abused its discretion in denying [J.C.'s] post[-]dispositional motion to vacate his guilty plea to [COM], which was a manifest injustice, where the Commonwealth failed to preserve video of the alleged incident, thereby prejudicing [J.C.'s] right to due process[.]
(3) Whether the [j]uvenile [c]ourt abused its discretion in ordering that [J.C.] undergo a sexual evaluation, where the juvenile was not adjudicated delinquent for [a] sexually[-] related felony or misdemeanor offense[.]
(4) Whether the [j]uvenile [c]ourt abused its discretion in ordering that a DNA sample be drawn from [J.C.] by law enforcement, where [J.C.] was not convicted of a felony offense, or the misdemeanor offenses of luring a child into a motor vehicle, 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2910, or indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 3125[.]
We note that because the filing of post-dispositional motions in juvenile matters is optional, J.C. has not waived his claim regarding the failure to suppress his pre-adjudication statement under Miranda, where he filed a pre-adjudicatory suppression motion and also included it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 620, Comment ("When properly raised before or during a hearing, a claim will be deemed preserved for appeal and the party need not file a post-dispositional motion solely for the purpose of preservation."); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998) (any issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived). However, in light of our disposition, discussed infra, we need not address this claim.
Juvenile's Brief, at 5 (bold and italics added).
Before we review J.C.'s claims, we sua sponte raise the issue of the legality of his disposition based on whether the offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent is a delinquent act within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See Commonwealth v. Edrington, 780 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. 2001) (challenge to legality of sentence is non-waivable that court can raise and address sua sponte); see also In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 809 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2015) (questions of jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte) (citation omitted).
Our legislature has created a separate legal system for the adjudication of juvenile offenders. In re Huff, 582 A.2d 1093, 1098 (Pa. Super. 1990); see also 42 Pa.C.S § 6301(b)(2) (purpose of Juvenile Act is "to provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation[,] which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of the community") (emphasis added).
The Juvenile Act (Act) grants jurisdiction to the juvenile court over proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent. Id. at § 6303. See Commonwealth v. J.H.B., 760 A.2d 27, 30 (Pa. Super. 2000) ("The Juvenile Act . . . 'encompasses the entire statutory scope of authority and discretion of the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction over children as defined by the act.'"). In order to adjudicate a child delinquent, the juvenile court must (1) determine that the juvenile has committed a delinquent act and (2) determine that the juvenile requires treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. See In the Interest of M.W., 39 A.3d 958 (Pa. 2012). A determination that a child has committed a delinquent act does not, on its own, warrant an adjudication of delinquency. See id.
Notably, the Juvenile Court loses jurisdiction over an individual when they attain the age of majority. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 230 A.2d 1050, 1060 (Pa. 2020), citing In re Jones, 246 A.2d 356, 363 n.5 (Pa. 1968).
The Act defines a "Child" as "[a]n individual who":
(1) is under the age of 18 years;
(2) is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years; or
(3) is under the age of 21 years and was adjudicated dependent before reaching the age of 18 years, who has requested the court to retain jurisdiction and who remains under the jurisdiction of the court as a dependent child because the court has determined that the child is:
(i) completing secondary education or an equivalent credential;
(ii) enrolled in an institution which provides postsecondary or vocational education;
(iii) participating in a program actively designed to promote or remove barriers to employment;
(iv) employed for at least 80 hours per month; or
(v) incapable of doing any of the activities described in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) due to a medical or behavioral health condition, which is supported by regularly updated information in the permanency plan of the child.Id. at § 6302 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Act defines a "Delinquent Act" as:
(1) [A]n act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth, or of another state if the act occurred in that state, or under Federal law, or an act which constitutes indirect criminal contempt under Ch. 62A (relating to protection of victims of sexual violence or intimidation) with respect to sexual violence or 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to protection from abuse) or the failure of a child to comply with a lawful sentence imposed for a summary offense, in which event notice of the fact shall be certified to the court.
(2) The term shall not include:
(i) The crime of murder.
(ii) Any of the following prohibited conduct where the child was 15 years of age or older at the time of the alleged
conduct and a deadly weapon as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (relating to definitions) was used during the commission of the offense which, if committed by an adult, would be classified as:
(A) Rape as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 (relating to rape).
(B) Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).
(C) Aggravated assault as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) or (2) (relating to aggravated assault).
(D) Robbery as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery).
(E) Robbery of motor vehicle as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3702 (relating to robbery of motor vehicle).
(F) Aggravated indecent assault as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault).
(G) Kidnapping as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901 (relating to kidnapping).
(H) Voluntary manslaughter.
(I) An attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder or any of these crimes as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 901 (relating to criminal attempt), 902 (relating to criminal solicitation) and 903 (relating to criminal conspiracy).
(iii) Any of the following prohibited conduct where the child was 15 years of age or older at the time of the alleged conduct and has been previously adjudicated delinquent of any of the following prohibited conduct which, if committed by an adult, would be classified as:
(A) Rape as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.
(B) Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123.
(C) Robbery as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), (ii) or (iii).
(D) Robbery of motor vehicle as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3702.
(E) Aggravated indecent assault as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125.
(F) Kidnapping as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901.
(G) Voluntary manslaughter.
(H) An attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder or any of these crimes as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 901, 902 and 903.
(iv) Summary offenses.
(v) A crime committed by a child who has been found guilty in a criminal proceeding for [something] other than a summary offense.42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (emphasis added). See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. 2007) (enumerated section 6302 crimes deemed so heinous that they are not considered delinquent acts under statute and are appropriately filed with criminal court where exclusive jurisdiction vests and is presumptively proper).
Instantly, J.C. entered an admission to COM, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i), "an act designated a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). In order to sustain a misdemeanor conviction for COM, the Commonwealth must prove:
(a) Offense defined.
(1) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or
encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
Statutes like section 6301 are designed to cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of our children, "plac[ing] the guardianship of their morality upon adults." Commonwealth v. Decker, 689 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. Super. 1997) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Collin, 335 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. Super. 1975) (same). Section 6301, by its plain language, seeks to prevent prohibited actions between minors and individuals 18 years or older, otherwise defined as an adult. See id. at 386 ("any depraved adult who participates in the corruption of children must do so at his own risk") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Meszaros, 168 A.2d 781, 782 (Pa. Super. 1961) (stating COM's predecessor statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4532, "forbids any act by an adult which tends to or actually does corrupt the morals of a child") (emphasis added); Commonwealth v Blauvelt, 140 A.2d 463, 467 (Pa. Super. 1958) ("[t]he terms of the proscription are clear[-]no adult may with impunity engage in conduct with a minor which has the effect of corrupting the morals of the child") (emphasis added). Therefore, by definition, a "Child" under the Act is incapable of committing the crime of COM where the statute requires that the perpetrator be at least 18 years old.
In Meszaros, supra, our Court noted that the reputation of the minor, like consent, is irrelevant with regard to a COM charge, where the statute "has . . . removed children from the area of responsibility for their own fault." Id.
Here, the Monroe County Juvenile Court Docket and "Juvenile Information" lists J.C.'s date of birth as April 2004. Thus, the record supports the fact that J.C. was 15 years old at the time he committed the alleged offense and, by definition, a "child" under the Act. Because J.C. was still a minor at the time of the alleged incident, the first prong of the M.W. test- commission of a delinquent act (an essential element of the crime)-could never have been met. See Commonwealth v. Iafrate, 594 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1991) (holding that, for purposes of the Act, birthday occurs on anniversary of date of birth).
In In the Interest of R.A., 761 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. 2000), our Court noted the difference between juveniles charged with committing delinquent acts and adults charged with committing crimes, stating:
It is true that juvenile courts concern themselves with acts which would be considered criminal if they were committed by adults. Our Legislature, however, has seen fit through the Juvenile Act to authorize separate non-criminal proceedings to adjudicate these matters, precisely because the perpetrators are not adults. As noted above, these proceedings are materially different from criminal proceedings in many respects. Moreover, if the Legislature sees fit to extend Section 4954 to juvenile proceedings, it is certainly free to do so. At present, however, we are constrained by the plain language of the statute itself to limit [s]ection 4954 to criminal matters.Id. at 1225 (emphasis added). As it is clear that juvenile proceedings are reserved for individuals who are "not adults," id., it logically follows that crimes that can only be committed by adults do not fall within the class of offenses subject to a juvenile adjudication under the Act. Simply put, where a crime under the law of this Commonwealth requires the perpetrator be an adult, such offenses cannot be deemed delinquent acts within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 120 (defining "adult" as "any person, other than a juvenile, eighteen years or older"), but see id. (defining "minor" as "any person, other than a juvenile, under the age of eighteen").
At first blush, this issue may appear to involve the sufficiency of the evidence to prove COM-specifically, the following element: "whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards." 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i). However, because of the fact that a juvenile can never be "of the age of 18 years and upwards," it is a legal impossibility. Thus, this is a legality of disposition issue, not merely one of evidentiary sufficiency. See In re D.S., 903 A.2d 582, 586 (where juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, all juvenile proceedings that took place so far were legally invalid); see also Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 563-64 (Pa. 2022) (legality of sentence claim is characterized as one where "the result would be that the trial court lacked the authority to impose the sentence at issue[; c]onversely, if the challenge is not to the existence of certain authority but to the exercise of that authority," then challenge goes to discretionary aspects of sentence, not legality).
In the instant case, the juvenile court undeniably had jurisdiction over J.C. where the affidavit of probable cause and adjudicatory petition alleged that, as a juvenile, he committed aggravated indecent assault without consent, indecent assault without consent of other, and open lewdness-all delinquent acts under the Act. However, once the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosse all of those offenses in exchange for J.C.'s execution of an "admission colloquy form," admitting to COM, the juvenile court was no longer vested with subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that offense under the Act. Thus, my learned colleague is incorrect in her statement that "none of the components of J.C.'s disposition exceeds the juvenile court's authority," Concurring Opinion, ___, at 10 n.5, where the essence of the juvenile court's authority stems from its ability to adjudicate a child delinquent when it finds that the "acts ascribed to the child were committed by him." See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a). Where J.C. was incapable of committing the acts ascribed to him- namely, being of the age of 18 years and upwards-the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority. See also id. at § 6341(b) (court can only find child delinquent where "court finds on proof beyond reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason of which he is alleged to be delinquent").
Moreover, this is not an instance where jurisdiction properly vests in the criminal court, which would be the case for those "heinous" crimes excluded from the list of delinquent acts in section 6302. Ramos, supra; In re D.S., supra; Commonwealth v. Potts, 673 A.3d 956, 958 (Pa. Super. 1996)("[W]hile the prosecution of juvenile offenders is generally within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court," juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction in certain cases, such as when juvenile charged with murder); see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322. The instant case presents a unique and rare situation because a juvenile can never be adjudicated delinquent for a crime under the Crimes Code, notwithstanding one excluded by 6302, which, by its very definition, can only apply to adult perpetrators. Cf. Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 219 (Pa. 2000) ("As amended in 1995, the Juvenile Act vests original jurisdiction in the criminal courts for specified violent felonies, e.g., rape, aggravated assault and robbery committed by minors aged fifteen or older who either used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense or were previously adjudicated delinquent for such crimes.") (emphasis added); see id. at 220 (amendments provide mechanism for minor to prove to court that juvenile does not belong in criminal court).
Notably, even in those rare cases where jurisdiction vests with the criminal court, if the juvenile proves that he or she "is amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation," the case may be transferred to the juvenile court. Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 568 A.3d 1313, 1315 (Pa. Super. 1990). Here, again, we are presented with the anomaly that neither the juvenile court nor the criminal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate or prosecute a juvenile of COM.
This case involves more than the trial court's inability to "accept[ J.]C.'s admission to [COM]." See Concurring Opinion, ___, at 11. Specifically, it involves the inherent authority of the court to adjudicate J.C. delinquent of COM. As such, McIntyre is not dispositive. Unlike McIntyre, this is not a situation where a conviction was based on an unconstitutional statute. See id. at 6109 (finding unconstitutional statute void ab initio). Herein, the juvenile court implicitly lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate any juvenile of COM because the offense simply cannot be classified as a delinquent act under the juvenile court's jurisdiction. See In Interest of J.F., 714 A.2d 467, 470 (Pa. Super. 1998) ("Any right to treatment as a juvenile is derived from statutory law and is defined by the legislature.").
Thus, because it is a legal impossibility for a "child" to commit the crime of COM, we conclude that the court illegally adjudicated J.C. delinquent of COM and entered a disposition on that adjudication. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 260 A.3d 208, 211 (Pa. Super. 2021) ("If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.") (citation omitted); see generally Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554 (Pa. 2022) (recognizing four broad types of legality of sentence challenges, including those where court lacks jurisdiction).
Accordingly, we vacate and reverse. See Commonwealth v. Pinko, 811 A.2d 576, (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 2000) (issue of whether trial court possessed authority to impose particular sentence implicates legality of sentence).
We make no pronouncement as to whether J.C. can be subject to further action in the Juvenile Court or if this was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.
Dispositional order vacated. Adjudication of delinquency reversed. Appellant discharged. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Having determined J.C.'s disposition is illegal, we need not reach his appellate issues regarding his suppression motion, post-dispositional motion, or the court's order requiring J.C. to undergo a sexual evaluation and submit a DNA sample.
Stabile, J., joins this Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
CONCURRING OPINION
BOWES, J.
I agree with my learned colleagues' decision to vacate the dispositional order and reverse the adjudication of delinquency. I write separately to emphasize that this case does not concern the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction, which I believe the majority infers by discussing situations where the Juvenile Act expressly vested original jurisdiction in criminal courts. As the majority highlights, there are specific instances where the legislature placed original jurisdiction in the criminal court. However, this is not one of those cases. Rather, this appeal implicates the narrow question concerning a court's authority to render a given decision in exercising its subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the issue is whether the juvenile court had the authority to accept J.C.'s admission to corruption of minors when the offense applies specifically to actors "the age of eighteen years and upwards." See 18 Pa.C.S. 6301(a)(1)(i). More importantly, presuming that the juvenile court did, in fact, lack the authority to accept J.C.'s admission, may we grant relief sua sponte?
An admission is the juvenile court corollary to a guilty plea and therefore cannot be accepted unless the court confirms "that the admission is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made." Pa.R.J.C.P. 407(A)(1)(a); see also Rule 407 comment("The admission colloquy is similar to a guilty plea colloquy in criminal court; however, the juvenile court judge has special responsibilities under the Juvenile Act in providing a balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for delinquent acts committed, and the development of competencies to enable juveniles to become responsible and productive members of the community.").
As the majority aptly observes, the Commonwealth's delinquency petition alleged that J.C. committed aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and open lewdness, but the Commonwealth subsequently agreed to nolle prosse those charges in return for the juvenile's admission to corruption of minors, which was designated amended count one in the delinquency petition. See N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 7/7/21, at 31.
Neither J.C., the Commonwealth, nor the juvenile court recognized that, based upon the elements of corruption of minors, a juvenile can never be adjudicated delinquent for that offense. The Majority characterized this situation as a "legal impossibility," and differentiated it from the issue of evidentiary insufficiency. See Majority Opinion at 14, n.18. In my view, legal impossibility and insufficient evidence are coterminous concepts insofar as both principles concern the Commonwealth's impossible burden of proving the elements of corruption of minors. Neither implicates subject matter jurisdiction.
For the reasons explained, infra, I believe we can address the dispositive issue sua sponte because J.C.'s admission to the commission of corruption of minors is void ab initio insofar as the juvenile court was not empowered to accept an admission to an offense that is impossible for a child to commit. See e.g., Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 232 A.3d 609, 616 (Pa. 2020) (issue implicates legality "given that a trial court is not empowered . . . to sentence an individual for a non-existent criminal offense."). Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
First, I observe that the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings is unassailable. The traditional concept of subject matter jurisdiction, "[a]lso termed jurisdiction of the subject matter" concerns the court's authority to consider cases of a given nature and grant the type of relief requested. See Black's Law Dictionary 857, 1413 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis omitted). The Courts of Common Pleas have unlimited original jurisdiction except where a statute or rule has vested exclusive original jurisdiction in another Pennsylvania court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a); see also Const. art. V, § 5 ("There shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial district (a) having such divisions and . . . (b) having unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law."). It is beyond cavil that "[t]his general grant of authority extends to juvenile delinquency matters, among many others." Pennsylvania Juvenile Delinquency Benchbook (2018), at 3.4.
The Juvenile Act applies exclusively to, inter alia, "[p]roceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent." The act defines a delinquent child as "[a] child ten years of age or older whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation." 42 Pa.C.S. at § 6302. In this situation, a delinquent act "means an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth," other than murder. Id. (emphasis added). As the majority observes, since the enactment of the 1995 amendments to the Juvenile Act, the definition has not included enumerated violent offenses committed by a fifteen-year-old child (1) with a deadly weapon or (2) who has been previously adjudicated delinquent of an enumerated offense. Id.
As the High Court explained in Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 219 (Pa. 2000)),
Prior to the amendments, those serious felonies initially came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, subject to certification and transfer to adult court. The 1995 amendments reflect a legislative judgment that the most serious violent felonies should be treated in the same manner as murder charges, i.e., as adult crimes in adult court, at least in the first instance.Thus, the 1995 amendments explicitly excluded the enumerated offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts specifically because of the violence innate in the crimes.
Thus, in these specified situations, "the Juvenile Act vests original jurisdiction in the criminal courts . . . ." Commonwealth. v. D.S., 903 A.2d 582, 584 (Pa.Super. 2006)(quoting Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 219 (2000)). This principle is also ensconced in the Juvenile Act's provisions regarding the transfer of matters to criminal courts for prosecution.
(e) Murder and other excluded acts.-Where the petition alleges conduct which if proven would constitute murder, or any of the offenses excluded by paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of "delinquent act" in section 6302 (relating to
definitions), the court shall require the offense to be prosecuted under the criminal law and procedures[.]42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(e) (emphasis in original).
Our High Court explained that "the Legislature has deemed [these] crimes so heinous" that it removed the offenses from the definition of delinquent act and conferred presumptive jurisdiction to the criminal court. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2007). Accordingly, where an offense is excluded from the definition of a delinquent act, the charges may be transferred or filed directly in criminal court. See Cotto, supra at 219-20.
Instantly, the Commonwealth's delinquency petition alleged that fifteen year-old J.C. committed several delinquent acts, i.e. a "crime[s ]under the law of this Commonwealth" that are not specifically excluded from the statutory definition of delinquent act due to their heinous nature. Hence, it is beyond argument that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to confront the Commonwealth's delinquency petition, rule on the merits of the matters at hand, and, if the allegations are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, adjudicate J.C. delinquent and craft an appropriate disposition best suited for the child's treatment and consistent with the public interest. Clearly, there is no jurisdictional issue in this case.
By invoking the legal framework addressed in Cotto, supra, Ramos, supra, and D.S., supra, the majority intimates that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Our High Court in Cotto upheld the constitutionality of the Juvenile Act's provisions permitting the criminal prosecution of a juvenile who was fifteen years old when he committed two armed robberies. In upholding the criminal court's express jurisdiction in this situation, the Supreme Court reasoned,
The fact that the legislature chose in the past to presumptively extend the benefits of the juvenile system to older juveniles charged with armed robbery and other serious violent offenses does not act as a constitutional restraint upon it to make a different judgment in response to changing societal conditions. It is no less the legislature's prerogative now to limit those benefits than it was to extend them in the first place.Id. at 224. Hence, the High Court recognize that the legislature carved explicit exceptions that removed specific violent offense from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.
Similarly, in Ramos, supra at 1258, this Court observed that a criminal court had exclusive and presumptively proper jurisdiction over a seventeen-year-old's prosecution for armed robbery because the offense was expressly "excluded from the Juvenile Act's definition of a delinquent [act.]" We reasoned, "despite the fact that Appellant was seventeen at the time he committed his offenses, because he committed the predicate offense of robbery while possessing a deadly weapon, his crimes were not considered delinquent acts." Id. Thus, "[the a]ppellant's charges were directly filed with the criminal court where original exclusive jurisdiction vests and is presumptively proper." Id.
Finally, in D.S., we applied the express legislative exception to the definition of delinquent act to reverse a trial court's refusal to transfer a fifteen-year-old to criminal court for the prosecution of aggravated assault and robbery with a deadly weapon. Again, we reiterated, "[a]s amended in 1995, the Juvenile Act vests original jurisdiction in the criminal courts for specified violent felonies...committed by minors aged fifteen or older who use a deadly weapon in the commission." D.S., supra at 584 (quoting Cotto, supra at 217). Hence, we concluded, "Because the offenses do not qualify as "delinquent acts," [the] offenses must be prosecuted under the criminal law and procedures." Id. at 586.
While the majority acknowledges that corruption of minors is not one of the enumerated violent offenses that the legislature decided should be prosecuted in a criminal court, it relies upon legal authority that discusses that precise situation and implies that because it is impossible for a juvenile to commit corruption of minors, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. See e.g., Majority Opinion at 13-14 ("[I]t logically follows that crimes that can only be committed by adults do not fall within the class of offenses subject to a juvenile adjudications under the [Juvenile] Act."); Majority Opinion at 14, n.18 (relying upon In re D.S., supra, for the proposition "where juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, all juvenile proceedings that took place so far were legally invalid"); Majority Opinion at 16 ("The instant case presents a unique and rare situation because a juvenile can never be adjudicated delinquent for a crime under the Crimes Code, notwithstanding one excluded by 6302, which, by its very definition, can only apply to adult perpetrators."). This rationale blurs the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction with its legal authority to accept J.C.'s admission to an offense that was impossible for the juvenile to commit.
The majority's reliance upon In re R.A., is equally unavailing. That case concerns whether a juvenile court had statutory authority to issue a protective order pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4954, when that provision of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code related to "Any court with jurisdiction over any criminal matter[.]" Recognizing the obvious differences between juvenile courts and criminal courts, we concluded, "the Legislature expressly limited the power to issue protective orders under § 4954 to courts with jurisdiction over criminal matters [and] because the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over a criminal matter at the time that it issued the protective order, it lacked statutory authority to issue the order." Id. at 1224. I do not share my colleagues' view that this relatively straight-forward principle bears upon the juvenile court's statutory authority over the juvenile petition in the case at bar.
Thus, while it was patent legal error for the court to accept J.C.'s admission to an offense that was impossible for a juvenile to commit, the fact that J.C. admitted to the offense did not divest the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction. Regardless of the elements of the offense, corruption of minors is "an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth" and because the offense was not specifically excised from the definition of a delinquent act, jurisdiction does not rest in the criminal court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6303 (defining delinquent act). Thus, to the extent that the import of the majority's rationale sounds in subject matter jurisdiction, we cannot simply renounce the juvenile court's jurisdiction over the juvenile delinquency proceeding because the offense that J.C. eventually admitted to committing included an element that is impossible to prove in a juvenile court.
As the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings is irrefutable, I next address whether we can raise the juvenile court error under the rubric of an "illegal sentence" when juvenile court's do not impose sentences or punishments. Juvenile delinquency involves a two-step process: (1) whether the juvenile committed a delinquent act and is need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation; and (2) the appropriate disposition to serve those needs. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(b) (Finding of delinquency); 42 Pa.C.S § 6352(a) (Disposition of delinquent child) ("If the child is found to be a delinquent child the court may make any of the following orders of disposition determined to be consistent with the protection of the public interest and best suited to the child's treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare[.]"). Thus, while it is well ensconced that this Court will address an illegal sentence sua sponte, it is less obvious whether this principle applies to juvenile dispositions, which are designed to balance the protection of public's interest with the treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation of the juvenile. Hence, this dynamic presents an ill-fitting analogy comparing the delinquency adjudication to an illegal sentence.
An apt sentencing analogy would involve the legality of the disposition, i.e., whether the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority in imposing probation, community service, the submission of DNA samples and fingerprints, and the directive to undergo a sexual offender evaluation. Instantly, none of the components of J.C.'s disposition exceeds the juvenile court's authority.
Nevertheless, in light of our Supreme Court's decision in McIntyre, supra, I agree with the majority's ultimate conclusion that we may address the underlying issue sua sponte, albeit for reasons that do not interweave principles of subject matter jurisdiction. I summarize the High Court's holding in McIntyre, as follows. McIntyre was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender under Megan's Law III, which was subsequently deemed unconstitutional in its entirety because the legislature utilized an unconstitutional process to enacted it. McIntyre filed a PCRA petition raising unrelated claims of error, which was denied on the merits. He appealed to this Court, where he asserted for the first time that his conviction and sentence could not stand on an unconstitutional statute. We affirmed the denial of PCRA relief, finding the novel issue waived pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302 because McIntyre failed to present the claim to the PCRA court.
Interpreting McIntyre's claim as falling under the classification of an illegal sentence, our Supreme Court reversed our determination, found the statute void ab initio, and granted relief. Critically, in deeming the issue non- waivable, the McIntyre Court reasoned, "there was no validly-enacted criminal statute on which the Commonwealth could base Appellant's conviction." McIntyre, supra at 619. Phrased differently, the Supreme Court concluded that the "illegality" arose from the trial court proceeding on an inherently defective statute.
Just as our High Court determined that the trial court in McIntyre lacked authority to impose a sentence, the juvenile court lacked the statutory authority to accept J.C.'s admission to committing corruption of minors because it was legally impossible for a juvenile to commit that offense. Thus, in the same manner that the Supreme Court deemed McIntyre's conviction and sentence void ab initio in correcting the predicate error despite waiver under Rule 903, I believe that the juvenile court's acceptance of J.C.'s admission to corruption of minors was inherently defective and facially invalid insofar as the offense cannot be committed by a minor. Thus, we may address the juvenile court's error sua sponte and grant relief. See e.g., McIntyre, supra at 616 (issue concerns legality "given that a trial court is not empowered . . . to sentence an individual for a non-existent criminal offense.")
Accordingly, while I disagree with the portion of the majority's rationale that sounds in subject matter jurisdiction, for the reasons explained above, I concur with the decision to address the trial court error sua sponte, vacate the dispositional order, and reverse the adjudication of delinquency.
this juvenile[, J.C.,] and another juvenile[, A.A.,] were on a bus and there was sexual contact, which the victim[, A.A.,] indicated [] was unwanted." N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 7/7/21, at 28 (emphasis added). We note that the juvenile was never initially alleged to have been delinquent of COM, but, rather, was alleged to have been delinquent of the above-enumerated offenses. See supra at 2. However, the Commonwealth later stated on the record that it was not moving on those initial offenses, but was amending the delinquency petition to include COM. See N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 7/7/21, at 30-31.