Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-mc-00070-KLM
01-08-2020
IN RE MICHAEL OBERE EBIALA
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Michael Obere Ebiala's ("Ebiala") Motion to Correct Year of Birth on Certificate of Naturalization [#1] (the "Motion"). Mr. Ebiala is a naturalized United States citizen who is originally from Nigeria. Proceeding pro se, he is seeking to amend his birth year on his Certificate of Naturalization from 1954 to 1950 and has provided some evidence in support in connection with his Motion [#1] opening the case.
"[#1]" is an example of the convention the Court uses to identify the docket number assigned to a specific paper by the Court's case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). This convention is used throughout this Order.
Here, the Court addresses three preliminary issues: (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Ebiala's request; (2) whether Mr. Ebiala is required to serve a respondent/defendant before the Court may take action on his request; and (3) whether this case was properly filed as a "miscellaneous" action rather than as a "civil action."
I. Factual Background
Mr. Ebiala was born in Nigeria, a country which did not have a birth registry at the time when he was born. See Aff. of Ebiala [#1-1] at 2. Mr. Ebiala was naturalized as a United States citizen on July 15, 1988. See Certificate of Naturalization [#1-2]. He believed for his entire life that his birth year was 1954, but through discussion with his younger brother in May of 2019, he realized that his belief might have been incorrect. Id. at 2. After additional research, Mr. Ebiala now believes that his birth year was 1950, and he has provided the evidence he has gathered to that effect. See [#1-1, #1-3, #1-4, #1-5, #1-6].
Mr. Ebiala first made the request to amend his Certificate of Naturalization with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), which responded by letter directing him to file a motion to amend his Certificate of Naturalization with the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Despite Mr. Ebiala's Florida residency, amendment of naturalization certificates issued by the federal courts based on naturalization petitions filed prior to October 1, 1991 (i.e., before the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1990), must be made by the issuing court. See Certificate of Naturalization [#1-2] (dated July 15, 1988); 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b); see [#1-7]. In this case, the District of Colorado was the issuing court.
The letter to Mr. Ebiala first quotes § 340(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (1986), which provides:
Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of any naturalization court, by or in which a person has been naturalized, to correct, reopen, alter, or vacate its judgment or decree naturalizing such person, during the term of such court or within the time prescribed by the rules of procedure or statutes governing the jurisdiction of the court to take such action.8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986); see [#1-7] at 2. The letter then quotes 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b):
Court-issued certificates. If the certificate was originally issued by a clerk of court under a prior statute . . . , USCIS will authorize the issuing court to make the necessary correction and to place a dated endorsement of the court on the reverse of the certificate explaining the correction. The
authorization will be filed with the naturalization record of the court, the corrected certificate will be returned to the naturalized person, and the duplicate will be endorsed to show the date and nature of the correction and endorsement made, and then returned to USCIS. No fee will be charged the naturalized person for the correction.8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) (2011). The letter then directed Mr. Ebiala to "file a motion with [the United States District Court for the District of Colorado] and then if the judge deems it proper, they may issue an order making this change." Id. Mr. Ebiala followed these instructions by filing the Motion [#1] in this District.
As the Court discusses further below, the letter omitted via ellipsis a phrase in the statute which provides ". . . and USCIS finds that a correction is justified and can be made without mutilating the certificate . . . ." See [#1-7] at 2.
II. Legal Authority
"For most of the Country's history, the authority to naturalize aliens belonged to the state and federal courts." Manoukian v. Sec. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, No. 6:13-cv-1422-Orl-31TBS, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2013) (citing Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 516-17 (1910)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1988) (stating that the federal courts had "[e]xclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States"). Under the process in effect when Mr. Ebiala was naturalized, "an immigrant who wished to become a United States citizen had to file a petition in federal district court or a state court of general jurisdiction." Manoukian, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2. "If the court decided to grant the petition, the petitioner would appear before an open session of the court and take the oath of renunciation and allegiance." Id. "The court would then find that the petitioner resided within its territorial jurisdiction and met the requirements to be naturalized, and order that the petitioner be admitted as a citizen." Id. Thus, "naturalization orders . . . were unquestionably court orders." Id. (citing Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (a naturalization petition is a "case" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution)). "Following the proceeding, the clerk of the court would issue the newly-admitted citizen a certificate of naturalization." Manoukian, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2; 8 U.S.C. § 1449 (1988) (stating that a newly-admitted citizen "[was] entitled upon such admission to receive from the clerk of such court a certificate of naturalization").
The naturalization process changed with the Immigration Act of 1990. As part of that Act, Congress transferred "[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States" from the judicial branch to the executive branch, effective for all petitions filed on or after October 1, 1991. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a). As a result, "the federal courts effectively lost jurisdiction over naturalization proceedings." Teng v. USCIS, 820 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2016).
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
The Court first addresses whether it may exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Ebiala's request to amend his Certificate of Naturalization. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Federal courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party, and thus a court may sua sponte raise the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction at any stage in the litigation." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006)). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does not appear to have addressed the jurisdictional issue presented here in the precise circumstances underlying this case.
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986)
In 1988, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) was redesignated as § 1451(i) pursuant to Pub. L. 100-525, §9(dd)(2), (3). No substantive change was made to this subsection. Thus, unless otherwise noted, the Court's citations to § 1451(j) (1986) and § 1451(i) (1988) refer to the same substantive statutory subsection. The Court generally refers to § 1451(j) as the designation of the subsection in effect at the time when Mr. Ebiala's Certificate of Naturalization was issued.
Prior to amendment via enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, which went into effect on October 1, 1991, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1988) provided:
Power of court to correct, reopen, alter, modify or vacate judgment or decree: Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of any naturalization court, by or in which a person has been naturalized, to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate its judgment or decree naturalizing such person, during the term of such court or within the time prescribed by the rules of procedure or statutes governing the jurisdiction of the court to take such action.Thus, prior to amendment of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i), "district courts had jurisdiction to naturalize citizens and also had statutory authority to amend naturalization orders." Matter of Shrewsbury, 77 F.3d 490, 1996 WL 64988, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matter of Shrewsbury held that this authority under the former statute continued after the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1990: "Because the order naturalizing [a] petitioner was a court order, the [district] court had jurisdiction under the prior statute to amend it." Id. A number of other courts to consider the issue have also determined that the courts retain authority under former 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) to amend a naturalization certificate that was issued by court order. See, e.g., Ampadu v. USCIS, 944 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653-56 (C.D. Ill. 2013); Kennedy v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 871 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Chehrazi, No. C 12-80110 WHA, 2012 WL 3026537, at *23 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012); Kouanchao v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 358 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843 (D. Minn. 2005).
At least one judge in the District of Colorado has held similarly. In Boiko v. Holder, No. 12-cv-02541-JLK, 2013 WL 709047, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2013), the Court held that "[t]he Immigration Act of 1990 transferred the power to naturalize from the judiciary to the executive branch, but nowhere in this shift did the Immigration Act eradicate a court's essential authority to deal with orders it issued under the prior scheme." Therefore, the Court held that "we have jurisdiction to amend naturalization certificates that this court issued before October 1991 . . . ." Boiko, 2013 WL 709047, at *1; see also McKenzie v. USCIS, 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he predicate for [federal courts'] authority to correct or modify naturalization documents was eliminated by the removal of jurisdiction to enter naturalization judgments (except, of course, for those persons who had filed for naturalization before October 1, 1991)."). Accordingly, the Court determines at this early, preliminary stage of the case that it has jurisdiction to amend a certificate of naturalization that was issued by court order pursuant to former statute 8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986).
The Court further stated in a footnote:
Even were the statute not manifestly clear in granting this Court's jurisdiction, I would endeavor to find a reasonable legal interpretation making it so. As Judge Learned Hand wrote almost a century ago, "No one wants gratuitously to impose upon naturalization proceedings that technical spirit which easily follows a literal application of so detailed a statute, and which results in vexatious disappointment, and in needless irritation, to a defenseless class of persons necessarily left to the guidance of officials, except in so far as the courts may mitigate the rigors of their interpretation." In re Denny, 240 F. 845, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).Boiko, 2013 WL 709047, at *1 n.2.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is the procedural vehicle through which the Court exercises its jurisdiction under former statute 8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986). See, e.g., Magnuson v. Baker, 911 F.2d 330, 335 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990) ("8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) grants courts the inherent authority to set aside judgments for any reason cognizable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60."); Yeshiwas v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. C 12-1719 PJH, 2013 WL 5289061 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013) (discussing why Rule 60(b) applies); Boiko, 2013 WL 709047, at *2 (noting that relief may be effected through Rule 60(b)); Collins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 2013 WL 764752, *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (citing Magnuson to hold that former 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) granted the court the inherent authority to set aside judgments under Rule 60); McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dist. Dir., No. CIV-11-1106-M, 2012 WL 5954193, *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 28, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss petition to amend date of birth on agency-issued certificate of naturalization, but noting that a court would have jurisdiction to amend a pre-1990 naturalization order pursuant to Rule 60). However, at this early stage of the case, the Court need not yet engage in an extended discussion of the application of Rule 60(b).
2. 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b)
The Court must briefly address one additional issue here, the repeal of 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) and its effect on jurisdiction, because some courts have relied on 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) for authority to amend naturalization certificates issued prior to the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1990. 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) addressed judicial modifications to petitions for naturalization. See McKenzie, 761 F.3d at 1153 (noting that minor changes to the regulation were "probably just a nomenclature correction"). The most recent version of the regulation "provid[ing] that the Immigration and Naturalization Service would receive notice of judicial proceedings to revise naturalization papers" stated:
Whenever an application is made to the court to amend a petition for naturalization after final action thereon has been taken by the court, a copy of the application shall be served upon the district director having administrative jurisdiction over the territory in which the court is located, in the manner and within the time provided by the rules of court in which application is made. No objection shall be made to the amendment of a petition for naturalization after the petitioner for naturalization has been admitted to citizenship if the motion or application is to correct a clerical error arising from oversight or omission. A representative of the Service may appear at the hearing upon such application and be heard in favor of or in opposition thereto. When the court orders the petition amended, the clerk of court shall transmit a copy of the order to the district director for inclusion in the Service file.Id. at 1152-53 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) (1990)). This regulation, however, was repealed effective November 28, 2011, see McKenzie, 761 F.3d at 1153, and courts have continued to hold that, while this regulation provided a starting point for the proper procedure for court-issued naturalization certificates to be amended, the actual power to amend under former statute 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) was not affected by its repeal. See, e.g., Yu-Ling Teng v. Dist. Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 820 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that 8 C.F.R. § 334.16 does "not create subject matter jurisdiction" and "cannot override [a] statute's clear designation of exclusive jurisdiction"); Manoukian, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2 (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 334.16 merely "recognized courts' continuing jurisdiction over naturalization orders they issued under the prior statute" and that the basis for jurisdiction remained former statute 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (emphasis added)). Thus, the repeal of 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) has no effect on the Court's jurisdiction here.
B. Necessary Parties
Having preliminarily found that jurisdiction to determine whether amendment of Mr. Ebiala's Certificate of Naturalization issued by the Court in 1988 is appropriate, the Court next addresses whether Mr. Ebiala is required to serve a defendant/respondent in this case before the Court can rule on his request to amend his Certificate of Naturalization.
The Court begins by noting that the USCIS letter to Mr. Ebiala appears to contain a glaring inconsistency. It references 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) as legal authority for the USCIS' direction that Mr. Ebiala should file a motion with the Court and that a judge would then make a determination about amending the Certificate of Naturalization on the basis of that motion. See [#1-7] at 2. To reiterate, the full text of 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) (2011) is as follows:
Court-issued certificates. If the certificate was originally issued by a clerk of
court under a prior statute and USCIS finds that a correction is justified and can be made without mutilating the certificate, USCIS will authorize the issuing court to make the necessary correction and to place a dated endorsement of the court on the reverse of the certificate explaining the correction. The authorization will be filed with the naturalization record of the court, the corrected certificate will be returned to the naturalized person, and the duplicate will be endorsed to show the date and nature of the correction and endorsement made, and then returned to USCIS. No fee will be charged the naturalized person for the correction.(emphasis added). As noted previously, the letter omitted the phrase italicized above. See [#1-7] at 2.
The direction given to Mr. Ebiala by the USCIS appears to be at odds with the language of the regulation. The phrase omitted by the USCIS in its letter to Mr. Ebiala (". . . and USCIS finds that a correction is justified and can be made without mutilating the certificate . . . .") on its face appears to leave the decision whether to amend a certificate of naturalization with the USCIS and, if it finds that the correction is justified, to require that the Court simply correct the certificate as an administerial function. In other words, despite the letter's instruction to Mr. Ebiala that a judge must determine whether the request is proper, the regulation partially cited by the USCIS, when read in full, appears to give the USCIS the authority to make the decision, not the courts, even though the Court would need to "rubber-stamp" the decision and actually make the change to Mr. Ebiala's Certificate of Naturalization. Nothing in the letter says anything about the USCIS finding the correction to be justified or not justified, contrary to the express language of the regulation.
The Court has found scant authority actually applying and granting relief under 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b). However, a non-precedential decision issued by the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") of the USCIS is instructive. See H-K-E, 2016 WL 6137947 (U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept. 30, 2016) (Appeal of Tex. Serv. Ctr. Decision Application: Form N-565, Application for Replacement Naturalization/Citizenship Document). There, the applicant sought a replacement of his certificate of naturalization to reflect his correct former country of nationality. H-K-E, 2016 WL 6137947, at *1. The question, as stated in the decision, was "whether the Applicant's Certificate of Naturalization contains incorrect information regarding the Applicant's country of former nationality which resulted from clerical error, or whether the country of former nationality conforms to the facts on the naturalization application." Id. at *3. The decision ultimately found that "the Applicant's nationality on the Certificate of Naturalization was the result of a clerical error, and consequently, that a correction is permitted under the regulations." Id. Importantly here, the decision stated that the applicant's certificate of naturalization was issued in 1985 by the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Id. The AAO therefore found that 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) regarding court-issued certificates was applicable. Id. at *4. In other words, the AAO found that the correction was justified, and that the federal court could therefore be authorized to make the correction. Thus, to the extent that 8 C.F.R. § 338.5 applies here, it appears that the agency must first make the determination whether the correction is justified before the Court can take action.
The Court notes that Form N-565 is the same form submitted by Mr. Ebiala to the USCIS. See [#1-7] at 1.
However, the Court notes that it is highly questionable whether 8 C.F.R. § 338.5 applies at all to the circumstances of this case. This regulation permits amendment of naturalization certificates only for clerical errors. See, e.g., Hussain v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085 (D. Minn. 2008) ("8 C.F.R. § 338.5 . . . essentially gives USCIS authority only to correct clerical errors."); 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(a) (2011) (permitting amendment where the certificate "does not conform to the facts shown on the application for naturalization, or a clerical error was made in preparing the certificate"). The plain language of the regulation does not appear to permit amendment of certificates simply because a petitioner alleges after naturalization that he learned that he provided an incorrect birth date on the naturalization application, as is the situation here. 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(e) (1995) ("The correction will not be deemed to be justified where the naturalized person later alleges that the name or date of birth which the applicant stated to be his or her correct name or date of birth at the time of naturalization was not in fact his or her name or date of birth at the time of the naturalization."). Thus, because Mr. Ebiala is not asserting a clerical error, there appears to be no basis for the application of 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) to the facts of this case, despite the USCIS's instructions to Mr. Ebiala. Further, as noted above, even if 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) does apply here, the USCIS would need to first make a determination about whether the correction is justified.
The Court notes that it is not making a final determination regarding the applicability of 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) but merely engages in this discussion as part of its determination as to whether the USCIS or other entity should be brought into this action.
Regardless of whether 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) is applicable, there is one thing that all of the cases cited by the Court in this Order have in common: each case has been asserted against the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in some form. See, e.g., Mahamud v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 16-cv-2609 (JRT/HB), 2017 WL 2684224, at *1 (D. Minn. May 9, 2017) (bringing suit against "Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship & Immigration Services, Nebraska Service Center of USCIS/DHS, Jefferson B. Sessions III, James McCament, and Mark Hazuda"); Manoukian, 2013 WL 8635081, at *1 (bringing suit against "Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Field Office Director U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, District Director U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services and U.S. Attorney General"); Yeshiwas, 2013 WL 5289061, at *1 (bringing suit against "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services"); Ampadu, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (bringing suit against "United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, District Director"); Boiko, 2013 WL 709047, at *1 (bringing suit against "Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Janet Napolitano, Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Andrew Lambrecht, Acting Field Office Director for United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Robert Mather, District Director for the Denver USCIS District, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services"); McKenzie, 2012 WL 5954193, at *1 (bringing suit against "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, District Director"). This is true despite the fact that 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) was repealed effective November 28, 2011, prior to the filing of all of the above lawsuits. See 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) (stating in relevant part: "Whenever an application is made to the court to amend a petition for naturalization after final action thereon has been taken by the court, a copy of the application shall be served upon the district director having administrative jurisdiction over the territory in which the court is located, in the manner and within the time provided by the rules of court in which application is made. . . . A representative of the Service may appear at the hearing upon such application and be heard in favor of or in opposition thereto.").
Although there may well be exceptions, the Court is unaware of any case in which the USCIS has been uninvolved, either as a defendant, a respondent, or an interested party, including those cases in which a United States District Court issued the certificate of naturalization based on petitions filed prior to October 1, 1991. Thus, despite the instruction to Mr. Ebiala by the USCIS in its letter to him, the Court finds that the appropriate respondent must be formally notified of this lawsuit and given the opportunity to respond to Mr. Ebiala's request.
C. Form of the Action
This discussion regarding appropriate parties also raises the question of whether this case was properly filed as a "miscellaneous" case ("-mc-") rather than as a "civil" case ("-cv-"). The USCIS letter directed Mr. Ebiala to "file a motion with [the United States District Court for the District of Colorado] and then if the judge deems it proper, they may issue an order making this change." See [#1-7] at 2. Mr. Ebiala correctly followed these instructions by filing the Motion [#1] in this District, and, given the nature of his filing, his case was therefore accordingly opened as an "-mc-" case, i.e., a miscellaneous case. However, every case of this nature which the Court has discovered so far has been deemed a civil case with a complaint and the USCIS (or some related entity/individual) has been named as the defendant. This includes the most recent case of this nature the Court has found in the District of Colorado, which was filed in 2013 and proceeded as a civil action rather than as a miscellaneous action. See Boiko, 2013 WL 709047.
In the District of Colorado, "[m]iscellaneous numbers are assigned to a variety of matters filed with the court which are not properly considered civil or criminal cases." U.S. D.C. for the D. Colo, Office of the Clerk of Court, Operations Procedures Guide, re: Assignment & Case Mgmt. of Misc. Cases (Mar. 5, 2018) at 1. "In general, miscellaneous actions are used for administrative matters that require resolution through the judicial system," and "a miscellaneous number is assigned to ancillary and supplementary proceedings not defined as civil actions." Id. "The clerk's office should not assign a civil case number to a proceeding that is not contested before a judge . . . ." Id. Importantly, as applicable here, "[i]f a miscellaneous case (mc) becomes a contested matter or requires an Article III Judge to hold a hearing," the Clerk of Court should "assign the miscellaneous case a civil case number and transfer it to the civil docket from the miscellaneous docket." Id. at 2. In other words, a case filed as "miscellaneous" may be transformed into a "civil" case by the Clerk of Court. No additional filing fee is required to make this change. Id.
The Court finds no fault with Mr. Ebiala for following USCIS's instructions for the filing of this case. At this stage, it is unclear whether Mr. Ebiala's request is contested (and therefore appropriately classified as a civil matter), and this will not be known until after the appropriate respondent is served and enters an appearance in this case. If the appropriate respondent contests Mr. Ebiala's request, the Court may, at that time, transfer this case from the miscellaneous docket to the civil docket.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, no later than February 10, 2020, Mr. Ebiala shall file an Amended Motion naming an appropriate respondent and shall serve the proper respondent with a copy of the Amended Motion (including attachments) and a copy of this Order. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) ("Serving the United States and Its Agencies, Corporations, Officers, or Employees").
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than February 17, 2020, Mr. Ebiala shall file proof of service with the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than March 2, 2020, the respondent shall enter an appearance in this matter, if it so chooses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all future pleadings filed in this matter shall include the names of Mr. Ebiala and the proper respondent in a traditional caption format.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk's Office shall mail a copy of this Order to: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, P.O. Box 82521, Lincoln, NE 68501-2521, as a courtesy.
Mr. Ebiala is strongly encouraged to contact the Federal Pro Se Clinic here in the District of Colorado at 303-380-8786 to make an appointment to speak with a lawyer about any questions he may have regarding service (or about any other questions he may have in his case). Mr. Ebiala will not be charged any fee for the lawyer's time and assistance. If Mr. Ebiala needs more time to serve the appropriate respondent, he shall file a written motion no later than February 7, 2020, requesting additional time and stating the reason for the request.
Dated: January 8, 2020
BY THE COURT:
/s/
Kristen L. Mix
United States Magistrate Judge