Opinion
A-13539 0284
09-07-2022
Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Dillingham, Christina L. Reigh, Judge. Trial Court No. 3DI-18-00356 CR.
Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Following a jury trial, Zackariah Christian Huffman was convicted of first-degree burglary, two counts of third-degree assault, and resisting arrest. The charges arose after Huffman and three others attacked Katherine Active in her home. The group was searching for a man, J.E., whom they believed had sexually assaulted Huffman's sister-in-law. When Active denied that J.E. was in her house, the group tried to force their way inside, and Huffman assaulted Active with an ax that he wielded in front of her son, Edward.
AS 11.46.300, AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) & (a)(5), and AS 11.56.700(a)(1), respectively.
On appeal, Huffman first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for third-degree fear assault (against Edward) and resisting arrest. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences arising from that evidence, in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. We then ask whether a reasonable juror could find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012).
Id.
With respect to his conviction for third-degree fear assault, Huffman argues that the evidence was insufficient because the alleged victim, Active's son Edward, was not in fear of imminent serious physical injury. Rather, according to Huffman, Edward was only in fear of some future, hypothetical injury.
See AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) ("A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if that person . . . recklessly . . . places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.").
Under Alaska law, "a person is 'placed in fear' of imminent injury if the person reasonably perceives or understands a threat of imminent injury." Here, Edward testified that he saw Huffman assault Active, that Huffman was armed with an ax, that he believed that Huffman was going to come in the house, and that he grabbed a shovel to use in self-defense. Interpreted in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, this evidence was sufficient to establish that Edward reasonably perceived a threat of imminent serious physical injury.
Hughes v. State, 56 P.3d 1088, 1090 (Alaska App. 2002).
With respect to his conviction for resisting arrest, Huffman argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he used "force" to resist arrest. We disagree. Interpreted in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the testimony of the arresting officers established that when one officer attempted to handcuff Huffman, who was seated in the back of the patrol car, Huffman "pull[ed] [his] arm forcefully" away and tried to escape from the officer's grip. The officer testified that he had to fight with Huffman for about a minute and a half in order to put him in handcuffs, and that he only succeeded because a second officer was pushing against Huffman to keep him in the car. This evidence was sufficient to establish that Huffman used force to resist arrest.
See AS 11.56.700(a)(1) ("A person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest if, knowing that a peace officer is making an arrest, with the intent of preventing the officer from making the arrest, the person resists personal arrest or interferes with the arrest of another by . . . force."); AS 11.81.900(b)(28) (defining "force" as "any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or the threat of imminent bodily impact, restraint, or confinement"); see also Eide v. State, 168 P.3d 499, 503 (Alaska App. 2007) (Mannheimer, J., concurring) (noting that the legislative commentary to Alaska's resisting arrest statute suggests that "[m]ere non-submission to an arrest does not reach the level of resisting or interfering with [an] arrest" (alterations in Eide) (quoting Commentary to Alaska's Revised Criminal Code, 1978 Senate Journal Supp. No. 47 (June 12), at 85)).
Finally, Huffman argues that there was a fatal variance between the State's theory of burglary before the grand jury and the State's theory of burglary at trial. According to Huffman, the State's theory at the grand jury was that Huffman entered the home with the intent to assault J.E., but the State's theory at trial was that Huffman entered the home with the intent to assault Katherine Active after Active denied that J.E. was inside the house.
Huffman is incorrect. Although the prosecutor acknowledged at trial that J.E. was not, in fact, inside the house, and that Huffman assaulted Active, not J.E., the State's theory, at both grand jury and trial, was that Huffman believed that J.E. was inside the house, and that he entered the house with the intent of assaulting J.E. As the prosecutor explained to the jury during closing arguments, "[T]he charge is that [Huffman] unlawfully entered Katherine Active's home with intent to commit a particular crime. And that crime was to assault someone named [J.E.]." There was no variance between the State's theory at grand jury and the State's theory at trial. The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.