Opinion
No. HDSP-133755
March 22, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent. The relevant procedural history is as follows. The Notice to Quit Possession was served on June 27, 2005. The complaint was filed on July 21, 2005. The parties entered into a written stipulated agreement on August 29, 2005, wherein the Defendant, hereinafter ("Tenant"), agreed to make certain payments through May 31, 2006. There were no other express conditions of the agreement. The court entered judgment in accordance with the stipulated agreement. On December 29, 2005, the Plaintiff, hereinafter ("Landlord"), filed an Affidavit of Noncompliance. The Landlord requested an immediate execution based on the Tenant allowing the premises to be used for the sale of drugs in violation of Gen. Statutes Sec. 47a-11(g) and the lease. The Tenant filed an Objection to Execution on December 30, 2005, which was supplemented on January 19, 2006. The matter was heard on January 31, 2006.
The Landlord requests an immediate execution on the grounds that the Tenant violated General Statutes Sec. 47a-11(g) and his lease by allowing the premises to be used for the sale of drugs. The Landlord is unable to pursue an immediate execution based on violation of the lease because the lease no longer applies to a tenant at sufferance, as the service of the notice to quit is the unequivocal act that voids and rescinds the lease and its terms. Bushnell Plaza Development Corp. v. Fazzano, 38 Conn.Sup. 683, 686 (1983). In addition, the stipulated agreement does not include any condition regarding compliance with the lease and its terms.
The Tenant argues that the Landlord's request for an immediate execution, based on an alleged statutory violation that is not an express condition of the stipulated judgment which resolved this matter, has no basis in either the applicable common law, statutes or Practice Book provisions, but also it is bad public policy. He contends that the stipulated agreement spelled out the only rights and obligations of the parties. Accordingly, any subsequent alleged violation of Title 47a, not covered by the terms and conditions of the agreement, does not provide the grounds for an immediate execution.
The issue in this case is whether a tenant at sufferance must comply with General Statutes Sec. 47a-11, even though the stipulated agreement does not include an express condition to that effect. If the Tenant is requited to comply with the statutory tenant responsibilities, the court must consider the proper procedure to address an alleged violation of the statute.
Both sides agree that the Tenant is currently a tenant at sufferance. "A tenancy at sufferance arises when a person who came into possession of land rightfully continues in possession wrongfully after his right thereto has terminated." (Citation omitted). Rivera v. Santiago, 4 Conn.App. 608, 609-10 (1985). "The issuance by a landlord of a notice to quit is an unequivocal act terminating the lease agreement with the tenant. Termination of the lease does not terminate the tenancy since, upon service of a notice to quit, a tenancy at sufferance is created." (Citation omitted). Id., 610. See also O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 215 Conn. 367, 372 (1990). In this case, the Tenant became a tenant at sufferance on June 27, 2005, when he was served with the notice to quit.
In Rivera, the Appellate Court concluded that certain provisions of the Landlord Tenant Act apply to a tenant at sufferance. See also Housing Authority v. HIRD, 13 Conn.App. 150 (1988). The Court held that "[t]he statutory obligations of the landlord and tenant continue even when there is no longer a rental agreement between them. After a notice to quit has been served, for example, a tenant at sufferance no longer has a duty to pay rent. He still, however, is obliged to pay a fair rental value in the form of use and occupancy for the dwelling unit. A landlord also is required to fulfill his statutory obligations, even after a notice to quit has been served on the tenant and a summary process case is begun. Ciavaglia v. Bolles, 38 Conn.Sup. 603, 605-06, 457 A.2d 669 (1982). In that case, funds paid into court during the pendency of a summary process action for use and occupancy were properly partially distributed to hold over tenants in order to reimburse them for sums spent in discharge of obligations imposed on the landlord by virtue of General Statutes 47a-7 (Landlord's responsibilities). Although General Statutes 47a-14h (Payment of rent into court) and 47a-7 use the terms "tenant" and "landlord," there is no provision which requires that the relationship between the parties be based solely on a rental contract. The wording of the statutes militates against such a narrow construction. A statute is to be construed so that all its parts have meaning . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Rivera v. Santiago, supra, 4 Conn.App. 610-11. See also Housing Authority v. HIRD, 13 Conn.App. 150 (1988). Clearly, General Statutes Sec. 47a-3c requires that "[i]n the absence of agreement, the tenant [at sufferance] shall pay the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit." "The statute codifies the tenant's obligation, implied at common law, to pay a fair rental value in the absence of an agreement." Bushnell Plaza Development Corp. v. Fazzano, supra, 38 Conn.Sup. 686.
The Supreme Court held in O'Brien Properties, Inc., that other provisions of the Landlord Tenant Act apply to a tenant at sufferance. In that case, the defendants argued "that a tenant at sufferance is included within 47a-1(l)'s definition of "tenant" by virtue of the language: "or as is otherwise defined by law." (Emphasis added.) O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, supra, 215 Conn. 372. The Supreme Court agreed and held that General Statutes Sec. 47a-23c applies to a tenancy at sufferance. Id. The Court reasoned that "[w]e note that no word in a statute should be treated as superfluous or insignificant; and that we strive to attach independent meaning to every phrase contained in a legislative enactment. Thus given that 47a-1(l) expressly states that a person with a rental agreement is a "tenant," if we are to give any independent meaning to the language "or, as otherwise defined law," (emphasis added) we must conclude that certain persons classified as tenants by law who do not have rental agreements are also "tenants" under the statute. Our conclusion that a tenant at sufferance is a "tenant" for the purposes of 47a-23c(a)(1) finds support in the fact that 47a-23c is a remedial statute intended to benefit elderly, blind and physically disabled tenants. Since remedial statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit; and given the fact that the legislature did not expressly exclude tenants at sufferance, we conclude that 47a-23c should be liberally construed to protect all elderly, blind and physically disabled tenants, including tenants at sufferance. Moreover, if we were to hold that tenants at sufferance were not "tenants" under 47a-23c(a)(1), we would, in effect, be emasculating the protection afforded by the statute to the elderly, the blind and the physically handicapped . . . In sum, we hold that a tenant at sufferance is a "tenant" for the purposes of 47a-23c(a)(1)." (Citations omitted.) O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, supra, 215 Conn. 372-74.
The Tenant cites two Superior Court decisions in support of his Objection. Housing Authority of the City of Norwalk v. Deborah Ross, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Norwalk, Docket No. SPNO 9206-A2880 (Melville, J., July 19, 1993); Housing Auth. of Hartford v. Ebony Cobbs et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HDSP-124093 (dos Santos, J., August 6, 2004). "Trial court cases do not establish binding precedent. J.M. Lynne Co. v. Geraghty, 204 Conn. 361, 369, 528 A.2d 786 (1987)." McDonald v. Rowe, 43 Conn.App. 39, 43 (1996). This court is not sufficiently persuaded by the reasoning in these decisions given the holdings in O'Brien Properties, Inc. and Rivera. "See Tanis v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 134702 (September 24, 1996, Maloney, J.) ( 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 607) (noting that superior court decisions are not binding upon each other); Farnsworth v. North Branford Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 377477 (February 26, 1996, Booth, J.) (noting that, while due deference is owed by one superior court judge to the decision of another, the decision is not stare decisis binding upon the court)." Field v. PZ Board, The City, Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 970060710 (Sylvester, J., September 30, 1998) ( 1998 Ct.Sup 11011).
An issue of statutory construction arises as to whether the language of General Statutes Sec 47a-11 applies to the facts of this case. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply (emphasis added) . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . ." (Emphasis added.) (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 277 Conn. 398, 405 (2006).
In accordance with § 1-2z, the analysis begins with the text of General Statutes § 47a-11, which provides in relevant part:
Tenant's responsibilities. A tenant shall: . . . (g) conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises or constitute a nuisance, as defined in section 47a-32, or a serious nuisance, as defined in section 47a-15;.
"Under § 1-2z, we are precluded from considering extratextual evidence of the meaning of a statute only when the meaning of the text of that statute is plain and unambiguous, that is, the meaning that is so strongly indicated or suggested by the [statutory] language as applied to the facts of the case . . . that, when the language is read as so applied, it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely meaning. (Emphasis added.)" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., supra, 277 Conn. 407-08.
"Statutes should be read so as to harmonize with each other, and not to conflict with each other . . . We must presume that the legislature intended the two statutes to be read together and to be construed, wherever possible, to avoid conflict between them." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Furhman v. Dept. of Transportation, 33 Conn.App. 775, 778 (1994).
A tenant at sufferance is included within General Statutes Sec. 47a-1(l)'s definition of "tenant" by virtue of the language: "or as is otherwise defined by law." (Emphasis added.)" O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, supra, 215 Conn. 372. General Statutes Sec. 47a-11 is entitled "Tenant's responsibilities," not "Tenant at will's responsibilities." See Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 608 (1950) ("a tenant at will . . . exists only when the occupation of the property is with the landowner's consent."); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Van Sickle, 52 Conn.App. 37, 45 (1999) ("The lease is neither voided nor rescinded until the landlord performs this act and, upon service of a notice to quit possession, a tenancy at will is converted to a tenancy at sufferance."). Sec. 47a-11 does not expressly exclude a tenant at sufferance. The statutory language of 47a-11, "[a] tenant shall . . .," is plain and unambiguous, and applies to a tenant at sufferance as well as a tenant at will.
For the above-stated reasons, this court holds that a tenant at sufferance is a "tenant" for purposes of General Statutes Sec. 47a-11. The statutory obligation of a tenant to comply with his or her responsibilities continues even when there is no longer an agreement. A tenant at sufferance must comply with the statutory tenant responsibilities, even though a stipulated agreement is not conditioned upon compliance with the statute.
This court must next consider the proper procedure to address a violation of Sec. 47a-11 by a tenant at sufferance.
Practice Book Sec. 17-53 provides that: "Whenever a summary process execution is requested because of a violation of a term in a judgment by stipulation or a judgment with a stay of execution beyond the statutory stay, a hearing shall be required. If the violation consists of nonpayment of a sum certain, an affidavit with service certified in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17 shall be accepted in lieu of a hearing unless an objection to the execution is filed by the defendant prior to the issuance of the execution. The execution shall issue on the third business day after the filing of the affidavit." Accordingly, when a defendant fails to make a payment required by the stipulation or by the court, a plaintiff may file an affidavit of noncompliance. No hearing is required unless the defendant files an objection before the execution issues. When the plaintiff fails to comply with a condition of a stipulated agreement or other court order, a defendant may file an affidavit and a hearing will be scheduled.
"In examining the interplay between statutes and Practice Book rules the Supreme Court has resorted to traditional rules of statutory consideration. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Conn. 312, 320 (1984). The goal is to read the legislative scheme as a whole in order to give effect to and harmonize all of the parts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilkinson v. Wiegand, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA 920517285 (June 17, 1997, Shortall, J.) ( 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 457). The practice book rules are to be liberally interpreted. "The design of these rules being to facilitate business and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice." Practice Book Sec. 1-8. "Where a statute and a practice book rule are in conflict on a matter of substance, the provisions of the statute must prevail." Embalmer's Supply Co. v. Giannitti, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 0183763 (Tobin, J., September 7, 2004) ( 2004 Ct.Sup. 13315).
In deciding the proper procedure to address this matter, the court must consider the interplay between Practice Book Sec. 17-53 and General Statutes Secs. 47a-11 and 47a-1. As previously stated, the language of Sec. 47a-11 applies to a tenant at sufferance. General Statutes Sec. 47a-1(a) defines an "action" under the Landlord Tenant Act as follows: "[a]ction includes . . . any other proceeding in which rights are determined, including an action for possession." By filing an affidavit of noncompliance pursuant to Practice Book Sec. 17-53, the Landlord is requesting a determination of rights as to whether an execution should issue. Under the circumstances, this matter is an "action" under the Landlord Tenant Act that requires the court to hold a hearing "in which rights [to possession] are determined." See Sec. 47a-1(a). When an execution is requested because of a violation of an express term in a judgment or a statutory obligation of a tenant, Practice Rook Sec. 17-53 provides the tenant with the necessary procedural and substantive due process protections.
If Practice Book Sec. 17-53 does not apply, the Landlord would probably have no other remedy because the prior pending action doctrine likely precludes an aggrieved landlord from filing a new summary process action alleging breach of lease, nuisance or serious nuisance.
Under the prior pending action doctrine "[t]he pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the same parties brought to obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good cause for abatement. It is so, because there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the second, and, therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 247 Conn. 196 (1998). "It has long been the rule that when two separate lawsuits are virtually alike the second action is amenable to dismissal by the court. The prior pending action doctrine has evolved as a rule of justice and equity; and retains its vitality in this state, in which joinder of claims and of remedies is permissive rather than mandatory . . . This is a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction. The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . We must examine the pleadings to ascertain whether the actions are virtually alike. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Halpern v. Board of Education, 196 Conn. 647, 652-53 (1985). "The prior pending action doctrine applies equally to claims and counterclaims. The rule states that when two separate lawsuits are virtually alike the second action is amenable to dismissal by the court. The rule does not apply, however, when the two actions are for different purposes or ends or involve different issues; or where there is not a strict identity of the parties. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conti v. Murphy, 23 Conn.App. 174, 178-79 (1990).
If the Landlord filed a summary process action, for example, based on serious nuisance, the parties would be identical, the issues would be the same, and the remedy sought (the issuance of an execution) would not be different. Under these circumstances, a motion to dismiss based on the prior pending action doctrine would have a high likelihood of success.
Based on the above-mentioned reasons, the court orders that a hearing be scheduled to determine whether the Tenant has violated General Statutes Sec. 47a-11, and whether an immediate execution should issue.