Opinion
NBHCV186004973S
10-29-2019
Housing Authority of the City of New Britain v. Luz Perez et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Shah, Rupal, J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING AFFIDAVIT OF NONCOMPLIANCE, #109
Hon. Rupal Shah Judge.
This is a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent on a written renewable month-to-month lease for the use and occupancy of the subject premises at 19 Malikowski Circle, New Britain, Connecticut. The court heard evidence on the plaintiff’s Affidavit of Noncompliance with Stipulation on October 17, 2019. The plaintiff, Housing Authority of the City of New Britain, seeks an execution based on its affidavit of noncompliance alleging that the defendants breached the parties’ stipulated judgment. After consideration, the court denies the request for execution.
I
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Housing Authority of the City of New Britain, initiated this action by summons and complaint on November 21, 2018, and the service of a notice to quit on October 16, 2018, for nonpayment of rent. The parties had entered into a written lease. The plaintiff is a federally-subsidized public housing authority. The defendant resides in housing that is governed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Low Income Public Housing Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437a, et seq. and subject to the regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 966. The notice to quit possession that was delivered to the defendant and attached to the complaint states one reason for termination of the lease: "Non-Payment of Rent."
II
LEGAL STANDARD
The standard regarding summary process is well established in Connecticut. "Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy ... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms ... Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination ... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 733, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011).
A proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the initiation of a summary process action. Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582, 587, 33 A.3d 802 (2011). In order to be effective pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23, the notice to quit must be unequivocal regarding the landlord’s intent to terminate and the reasons for termination. Messinger v. Laudano, 4 Conn.App. 162, 163, 493 A.2d 255, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 812, 495 A.2d 279 (1985). In addition, a "Kapa" notice is required before a summary process action is commenced based on material noncompliance with General Statutes § 47a-11 which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or materially affects the physical condition of the premises or if there is material compliance with the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with General Statutes § 47a-9. General Statutes § 47a-15; Kapa v. Flores, 35 Conn.Supp. 274, 408 A.2d 22 (1979).
Finally, "[w]hen a defendant is a tenant of federally subsidized housing, federal law must be followed in addition to state law." Housing Authority v. Martin, 95 Conn.App. 802, 808, 898 A.2d 245 (2006). The termination of a federally subsidized tenancy must comply with the applicable federal regulations. See Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 132, 520 A.2d 173 (1987); but see Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips, 325 Conn. 394, 404 n.11, 158 A.3d 772 (2017).
III
DISCUSSION
On January 10, 2019, the parties entered into a written stipulated judgment in favor of the plaintiff with a non-final stay of execution through December 31, 2019 based on only a few conditions relating to payment terms and the inclusion of the defendant’s children in the action. The parties agreed, in part, that the defendant’s portion of the rent would be $667.00, or as adjusted by guidelines, due on or before the tenth day of each month beginning February 10, 2019. The defendant acknowledged arrearages in the amount of $2,792.33. The stipulation also provided: "If the defendant fails to make any agreed payment, the plaintiff may immediately file an affidavit requesting an execution without additional court hearings." The stipulation did not contain any provision regarding compliance with other lease terms during the pendency of the stipulation, as is customary in these types of stipulations.
In the affidavit of noncompliance, the plaintiff alleges the defendants violated the stipulation based on an alleged incident between the defendants and a neighbor where Daniska Perez and the neighbor were in a physical confrontation. The defendants reside in federal low-income public housing pursuant to the Low Income Public Housing Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437a, and any termination must comply with federal regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 966.4. The notice to quit possession and the complaint both indicate that the reason for termination of the lease is non-payment. No other reason is provided.
While the plaintiff relies on Housing Authority v. Russotto, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-133755 (March 23, 2006, Bentivegna, J.) (41 Conn.L.Rptr. 56) to obtain its execution, the court in that case simply held that a hearing was required to determine rights to possession in a matter where the parties had a stipulated agreement that was silent on the alleged violation. The trial court found that when an execution is requested because of a violation of an express term in a judgment or a statutory obligation of a tenant, Practice Book § 17-53 provides the tenant with the necessary procedural and substantive due process protections. Although General Statutes § 47a-11 may apply to tenants who are parties to a stipulation under a summary process matter without an express provision in the stipulated judgment, that provision does not address whether such a process would satisfy the federal requirements for Section 8 tenants.
Federal law imposes additional preconditions in order to terminate a Section 8 tenancy. The purpose of these requirements is to afford due process and avoid arbitrary or discriminatory termination. "[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process, the landlord must prove compliance with all of the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination of the lease." Housing Authority v. DeRoche, 112 Conn.App. 355, 361-62, 962 A.2d 904 (2009). "Service of a valid pretermination notice is a condition precedent to a summary process action. See id., § 247.4. In any subsequent summary process action, the landlord can rely only on grounds that were set forth in that notice, unless the landlord had no knowledge of an additional ground at the time the pretermination notice was served. See [24 C.F.R.], § 247.6(b). With respect to the statement of such grounds in the pretermination notice, the regulations mandate that the notice must, among other things, ‘state the reasons for the landlord’s action with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to prepare a defense.’ " Presidential Village, LLC v. Perkins, 332 Conn. 45, 57, 209 A.3d 616 (2019).
Connecticut courts considering the issue have decided in one of two ways. There are some courts that believe a hearing on the affidavit is sufficient and will allow execution based on a general term in the stipulation. See e.g. 461 Washington Street v. Ortiz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket Nos. HDSP-17 8598, H-1614 (March 7, 2016, Rubinow, J.) (granting execution after hearing where stipulation provided the general language "[tenant] shall comply in all respects with ... his obligations under [General Statutes § ] 47a-11"). Other courts have found that some kind of notice is required in the stipulation in order to protect a tenant’s due process rights. See East Hartford Housing Authority v. Ludwig, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-160965 (July 11, 2012, Oliver, J.) (stipulation to "obey all lease terms" not specific enough to give notice to tenant of grounds for execution); Preston Housing Authority v. Aguiar, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, geographical area number twenty-one at Norwich, Docket No. 20581 (November 14, 2013, Goodrow, J.) (stipulation to "[e]nsure [tenant’s] guests comply with applicable parking regulations" not specific enough to encompass ground for execution, violation of a separate four-hour parking rule); Barkan Management Co. v. Artis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session, Docket No. SPNH-9511 45269 (February 16, 1996, Jones, J.) (stipulation that tenants would "refrain from the use of alcohol" and "attend scheduled meetings" provided sufficient notice for tenant to defend against execution on ground of failure to comply with toxicity screening).
This court follows the reasoning of those courts and thus denies the execution sought by the plaintiff. The defendants are at least entitled to a proper notice of the basis of the eviction and cannot be removed on the basis of such an improper notice. "Such would impose no significant burden upon defendants [landlord], while the additional safeguards thus provided would reduce significantly the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Section 8 benefits." Edgecomb v. Housing Authority, 824 F.Supp. 312, 315 (1993) (finding due process requires sufficient details of the alleged cause of the termination).
IV
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s request for execution is denied. The parties are returned to their obligations under the stipulated judgment. So ordered.