Summary
holding that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in making the attorney's fees awards because the plaintiff received ample liquid funds as a result of the trial court's judgment, and the trial court's determination that not awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff would undermine its other awards was unreasonable"
Summary of this case from Merk-Gould v. GouldOpinion
SC 19361
09-20-2016
Marjorie Hornung v. Robert Hornung
Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Wesley W. Horton, and, on the brief, Richard L. Albrecht and Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellant-appellee (defendant). Campbell D. Barrett, with whom, on the brief, were Jon T. Kukucka, Brandon B. Fontaine, Wayne Effron and Johanna S. Katz, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).
Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Wesley W. Horton, and, on the brief, Richard L. Albrecht and Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).
Campbell D. Barrett, with whom, on the brief, were Jon T. Kukucka, Brandon B. Fontaine, Wayne Effron and Johanna S. Katz, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.
ROBINSON, J. The defendant, Robert Hornung, appeals from the judgment of the trial court setting forth financial orders incident to the dissolution of his marriage to the plaintiff, Marjorie Hornung. In those orders, the trial court directed the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, inter alia, lump sum alimony in the amount of $7.5 million and attorney's fees in the amount of $140,000. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court: (1) improperly rendered a lump sum alimony award that constitutes a property distribution in violation of the parties' prenuptial agreement (agreement); and (2) abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff in light of its other awards to her. We disagree with the defendant's claim that the lump sum alimony award is actually an improper property distribution, but agree that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51–199 (c) and Practice Book § 65–2. Although the plaintiff has also filed an appeal from the judgment of the trial court, we need not address the issues raised therein. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
The plaintiff also filed a “contingent” cross appeal; see Fortin v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co ., 139 Conn.App. 826, 832 n. 2, 59 A.3d 247, cert. granted, 308 Conn. 905, 61 A.3d 1098 (2013) (appeal withdrawn November 26, 2014); challenging the enforceability of the agreement in the event that the defendant prevails in challenging the lump sum alimony award or in the event the case is remanded for a new hearing on all financial matters. She contends, however, that a new hearing on all financial matters is not required if we reverse the trial court's judgment only with respect to the attorney's fees award. See Montoya v. Montoya , 280 Conn. 605, 617, 909 A.2d 947 (2006) (“Every improper order ... does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court's financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders ....” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ); Maguire v. Maguire , 222 Conn. 32, 47, 608 A.2d 79 (1992) (reversing trial court's judgment with respect to attorney's fees award only and not ordering new hearing on all financial matters). Because we uphold the validity of the lump sum alimony award and do not order a new hearing on all financial matters based on our reversal of the attorney's fees award, we need not address the plaintiff's “contingent” cross appeal.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Greenwich in 1997 and have four minor children. The defendant earns $970,000 per year from employment and investments, and received $37 million from the sale of a software program in 2000. The plaintiff, a full-time homemaker and the primary caretaker of the children, presently earns no income. She suffers from a thyroid condition and is borderline diabetic.
Shortly before their marriage, the parties entered into the agreement. The agreement provided for sole ownership of separate property acquired before the marriage, which would not be subject to equitable distribution in the event of dissolution. Marital assets were to be divided in accordance with a formula based upon the length of the marriage and the number of children. The agreement stated that the issues of alimony and child support would be addressed by the courts.
The agreement provides: “It is the intention of the parties that the disposition of property in this [a]greement be deemed a disposition of property which would fully satisfy any claims which each party may have against each other under the laws of any jurisdiction including their rights to equitable distribution and that the parties hereby specifically waive any equitable distribution.”
In 2008, the parties entered into a modification of the agreement. The modification clarified that the marital home remained the defendant's separate property and that, in the event of divorce, the defendant would pay the plaintiff an additional $3.5 million, representing her interest in the home. All other provisions of the original agreement remained intact.
In 2011, the plaintiff brought the present action seeking a legal separation, and later amended her complaint to seek a dissolution of the marriage. After trial, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay, inter alia, $40,000 per month in periodic unallocated alimony and child support, and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony. With respect to the lump sum alimony award, the court noted that “under all the circumstances [the] award ... is appropriate to provide for continuing support of the [plaintiff]” in light of the following: “[the plaintiff's] health issues; her lack of recent employment; her primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire assets in the future.” In making the award, the court stated that it considered the factors in the alimony statute, General Statutes § 46b–82, as well as “other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In discussing alimony generally, the court noted that “both parties ... made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including the real estate.” The court also ordered the defendant to contribute $100,000 toward the plaintiff's attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–62, reasoning that “to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the primary care of four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her portion of the financial award ... would undermine the purposes of [the] same” and that “it would be fair and equitable for the [defendant] to pay [those fees].” The defendant then filed this appeal. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
The trial court's other orders included a $2,082,000 payment to the plaintiff, which represented the outstanding balance owed to her under the agreement, and the defendant's contribution to the children's extracurricular fees, medical and dental expenses, and college education. The defendant does not challenge these orders in this appeal.
In response to the plaintiff's challenge to the enforceability of the agreement, the trial court held that the agreement was valid and enforceable. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
General Statutes § 46b–82 (a) provides in relevant part: “In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent's securing employment.”
General Statutes § 46b–62 (a) provides in relevant part: “In any proceeding seeking relief under the provisions of this chapter ... the court may order either spouse ... to pay the reasonable attorney's fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b–82....”
We note that, although § 46b–62 has been amended since the events underlying the present appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2014, No. 14-3, § 5; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
The plaintiff subsequently moved for an award of appellate attorney's fees. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to contribute an additional $40,000 toward the plaintiff's appellate attorney's fees. The court stated that the plaintiff needed “reasonable access to the court system [to] defend an appeal that [the defendant] made” and that she “does not have ample liquid assets” or “resources that are readily available” to pay the fees because several of the trial court's orders were stayed pending the defendant's appeal. Thereafter, the defendant filed an amended appeal challenging the trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the lump sum alimony award constitutes a functional property distribution in violation of the agreement; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees. We address each claim in turn.
I
The defendant first claims that the lump sum alimony award is actually a property distribution in violation of the agreement because: (1) in making the award, the trial court considered two factors—the plaintiff's opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate—that appear in the property distribution statute, General Statutes § 46b–81, but not the alimony statute, § 46b–82 ; and (2) the lump sum award is more than necessary for the plaintiff's continued support, thus indicating that it is functionally a property distribution. In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony, rather than a disguised property distribution, because: (1) the trial court unambiguously characterized the lump sum award as alimony, and retained discretion to consider equitable factors beyond § 46b–82, including those listed in § 46b–81, in making the award; and (2) the award was appropriate in light of the standard of living of the marriage, the substantial assets awarded to the defendant under the agreement, and the equitable factors considered by the trial court. We agree with the plaintiff.
General Statutes § 46b–81 (c) provides: “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”
We note that the defendant does not argue that the size of the lump sum alimony award itself constitutes an abuse of discretion; only that the excessiveness of the award makes it a property distribution. All of the defendant's statements with respect to the amount of the award are connected to his argument that the amount of the award indicates that it is a property distribution. He argues that “[b]ecause the lump sum [award] far exceeds what the record shows is necessary for the plaintiff's support ... the lump sum ‘alimony’ award is, in fact, a property [distribution] ....” Specifically, the defendant contends that, because “the total amount of support far exceeds the plaintiff's claimed expenses ... the only reasonable view of the lump sum award is that it is functionally a property [distribution].” Put a different way, the defendant asserts that, because the lump sum alimony award is “far more than the record shows is necessary for the plaintiff's support,” the “only reasonable conclusion is that the trial court ordered a property distribution ....”
Because we are not asked to determine whether the lump sum award, properly characterized as alimony, is so excessive that it constitutes an abuse of discretion standing alone, we make no judgment to that effect. As such, all references in this opinion to the claimed excess in the amount of the award are for the sole purpose of determining whether the amount of the award renders it a property distribution, and not whether the award itself constitutes an abuse of discretion. Although we rely on cases in which the alimony award, itself, constituted an abuse of discretion for guidance, we limit our analysis to the question presented by the defendant.
The question of whether the trial court properly applied the law when fashioning the lump sum alimony award is a question of law subject to plenary review. See Crews v. Crews , 295 Conn. 153, 162, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010). Although financial orders in family matters are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion; Ross v. Ross , 172 Conn. 269, 275, 374 A.2d 185 (1977) ; this court applies a less deferential standard “when the decision of the trial court is based not on an exercise of discretion but on a purported principle of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin , 280 Conn. 632, 641, 910 A.2d 963 (2006). “Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling ... may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law.” Borkowski v. Borkowski , 228 Conn. 729, 740, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).
We conclude that the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony, and not a property distribution in violation of the agreement, for two reasons: (1) the trial court unambiguously characterized the lump sum award as alimony and, as such, its incidental consideration of two factors in § 46b–81, the property distribution statute, does not demonstrate that the award is a functional property distribution; and (2) the fact that the combined alimony and child support awards apparently exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses does not demonstrate that the award is actually a property distribution, in light of the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable and statutory factors considered by the trial court. See footnote 10 of this opinion. We discuss each rationale in turn.
The defendant also argues that the lump sum alimony award has features of a property distribution because it is nonmodifiable, nontaxable, nondeductible, and survives the death of either party or the remarriage of the plaintiff. It is well settled, however, that alimony awards may—in lump sum form—be nonmodifiable, nontaxable, nondeductible, and survive the death or remarriage of the parties. See, e.g., Tremaine v. Tremaine , 235 Conn. 45, 59, 663 A.2d 387 (1995) (“lump sum alimony is generally neither taxable to the payee nor deductible by the payor”); Scoville v. Scoville , 179 Conn. 277, 279–80, 426 A.2d 271 (1979) (“Lump sum alimony, unlike periodic alimony ... cannot be modified even should there be a substantial change in circumstances. ... This is true even if the lump sum alimony is ... payable in installments.” [Citations omitted.] ); Pulvermacher v. Pulvermacher , 166 Conn. 380, 385, 349 A.2d 836 (1974) (“[l]ump sum alimony, even where divided into [installments], is payable in full regardless of future events such as the death of the husband or the remarriage of the wife”); cf. Parisi v. Parisi , 315 Conn. 370, 384, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (traditional alimony “typically” taxable and deductible); Lynch v. Lynch , 153 Conn.App. 208, 224, 100 A.3d 968 (2014) (periodic alimony “accrue[s]” at later date), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 923, 108 A.3d 1124 (2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 68, 193 L.Ed.2d 66 (2015). Thus, those features of the award do not necessarily render it a property distribution.
A
First, the trial court consistently described the lump sum award as alimony in its decision, articulation, and comments. From the beginning of its decision, the trial court distinguished between the property distribution allowed under the prenuptial agreement and its broad authority to award alimony. Thereafter, the trial court explained that, “under all the circumstances,” the purpose of the lump sum award was to provide “continuing support” to the plaintiff—the quintessential purpose of alimony. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Noyes – Dombrowski , 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005). The purpose of a property distribution, by contrast, is “to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 133, 869 A.2d 164 ; see also Blake v. Blake , 211 Conn. 485, 497, 560 A.2d 396 (1989) ( “[t]he difference between an assignment of a specific portion of an estate and alimony is in their purposes” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The trial court made no reference or allusion to this equitable purpose in making the lump sum alimony award, and instead divided the property in accordance with the agreement. The trial court also specifically cited § 46b–82, the alimony statute, and two judicial opinions in which lump sum alimony was properly awarded when making the lump sum alimony award. See Maguire v. Maguire , 222 Conn. 32, 47, 608 A.2d 79 (1992) (“[a]ny ambiguity as to the criteria upon which the court relied for alimony was put to rest [when] the trial court indicated that it had relied upon the criteria in § 46b–82 for its award of alimony”).
The trial court stated: “[T]he parties had agreed that in the event of divorce, the [defendant] would pay the [plaintiff] pursuant to the original prenuptial agreement, in accordance with a formula ... the agreement does not prohibit the award of alimony ....”
The trial court cited Dombrowski v. Noyes – Dombrowski , supra, 273 Conn. at 137–38, 869 A.2d 164, in which the trial court properly treated a spouse's lottery payments as alimony, rather than as a property distribution, and Pacchiana v. McAree , 94 Conn.App. 61, 68–71, 891 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 922, 901 A.2d 1221 (2006), in which the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony.
In light of this language, the trial court's mere mention of two factors in the property distribution statute, namely, the plaintiff's opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate, did not render the lump sum award an improper property distribution. See id. at 46–47, 608 A.2d 79 (trial court did not improperly predicate alimony award on “impermissible statutory criterion [by] ... refer[ring] to § 46b–81 ” in decision); Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 495–99, 560 A.2d 396 (trial court's characterization of lump sum payment as alimony in oral decision did not render it alimony, as opposed to property distribution, when court otherwise consistently characterized award as property distribution). In awarding lump sum alimony, the trial court pointed to several considerations, including “the [plaintiff's] health issues; her lack of recent employment; her primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire assets in the future .” (Emphasis added.) The court also noted that throughout the marriage, “both parties ... made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including the real estate.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court listed § 46b–81 as one of the statutes it considered in fashioning its orders, but apparently only in reference to the enforceability of the agreement. The court noted that it was “mandated to take into consideration a dozen specific factors as set forth in ... § 46b–81 ” when contemplating the enforceability of the agreement. Thus, the trial court's citation to § 46b–81 in another part of its decision does not indicate that it considered § 46b–81 in awarding lump sum alimony.
We have repeatedly acknowledged that the statutory factors for awarding alimony and distributing property are “virtually identical.” Sunbury v. Sunbury , 210 Conn. 170, 173–74, 553 A.2d 612 (1989) ; see also Greco v. Greco , 275 Conn. 348, 360, 880 A.2d 872 (2005) (“essentially identical”); Dombrowski v. Noyes – Dombrowski , supra, 273 Conn. at 137, 869 A.2d 164 (“ ‘almost identical’ ”). We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for considering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are “essentially equitable in ... nature”; Robinson v. Robinson , 187 Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234 (1982) ; and the resulting financial orders are “entirely interwoven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco , supra, at 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake , 207 Conn. 217, 232, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (“[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b–81or alimony under § 46b–82 , a trial court must weigh ... the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income ” [emphasis added] ); Koizim v. Koizim , 181 Conn. 492, 493, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980) (alimony award not abuse of discretion in part because of wife's “very significant” contributions, “both financial and otherwise,” to marriage; “even if we ... look solely at the other statutory criteria, especially ... the contributions that each spouse made to the marriage ... the court's [alimony] orders are neither mind boggling, outrageously excessive nor unreasonable” [emphasis added] ); Weinstein v. Weinstein , 18 Conn.App. 622, 634, 638, 561 A.2d 443 (1989) (after “properly assessing the parties' relative earning capacities, asset holdings, and ability to acquire assets , in accordance with ... § 46b–82,” trial court did not abuse discretion in not awarding alimony to wife because of her “capacity to acquire assets in the future” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted] ). In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court's analysis. See Borkowski v. Borkowski , supra, 228 Conn. at 743–44, 638 A.2d 1060 (courts may consider “any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute” when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Demartino v. Demartino , 79 Conn.App. 488, 500, 830 A.2d 394 (2003) (“[b]ecause § 46b–82 does not contain an exhaustive list of factors, the court properly may consider other equitable factors when determining an alimony award” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); accord Smith v. Smith , 249 Conn. 265, 283–84, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999) (court could equitably consider husband's travel expenses in seeing children as factor when awarding alimony even though factor is “listed explicitly” in child support regulations).
Both §§ 46b–81 (c) and 46b–82 (a) list the following factors to be considered when distributing property or awarding alimony: the length of the marriage; the cause of the breakdown of the marriage; and the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, and needs of each of the parties. Three additional factors appear exclusively in § 46b–81 (c) : “the opportunity of each [party] for future acquisition of capital assets and income”; “the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates”; and the “liabilities ... of each of the parties ....” Section 46b–82 (a) lists two additional, but different, factors: “the award, if any ... [made] pursuant to section 46b–81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent's securing employment.”
A spouse's ability to acquire future assets also appears related to the concept of the spouse's “station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, [and] employability ....” General Statutes § 46b–82 (a). Moreover, a spouse's contribution to the marital estate may be implicit in the court's consideration of the parties' “estate ....” General Statutes § 46b–82 (a) ; see Smith v. Smith , 249 Conn. 265, 284, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999) (noting that husband's travel expenses in seeing children “falls squarely within the general criterion of the ‘needs of each of the parties' ” under § 46b-82 ). The fact that § 46b–82 (a) mandates consideration of any property awards made pursuant to § 46b–81 when awarding alimony further supports the interrelatedness of the statutes.
The defendant argues that the agreement restricted the trial court's discretion to consider the equitable factors that appear in the property distribution statute. The agreement's language pertaining to alimony, however, does not restrict the trial court's discretion in any way: “The parties agree that a court of competent jurisdiction shall address the issues of alimony and/or child support ... in the event [of] ... divorce ....” See also Brody v. Brody , 136 Conn.App. 773, 791, 51 A.3d 1121 (2012) (trial court had “broad discretion” to award alimony because prenuptial agreement “by its clear terms, [was] concerned with equitable distributions of property ... not alimony awards”), rev'd in part on other grounds, 315 Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015). Moreover, it would be imprudent to require the trial court to consider a different set of factors when awarding alimony in a case in which the parties waived equitable distribution in a prenuptial agreement than under other circumstances.
See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–5c (b) (3) (A) (listing “significant visitation expenses” as factor in awarding child support).
Although the defendant points to the fact that the trial court considered two factors that appear in the property distribution statute but not the alimony statute, he does not mention that the trial court also considered one factor that appears in the alimony statute, but not the property distribution statute. In awarding lump sum alimony, the trial court emphasized the plaintiff's “primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis ....” The alimony statute lists as a factor, “the desirability and feasibility of [the] parent's securing employment” in the case of parents to whom the custody of minor children is awarded. General Statutes § 46b–82 (a). The property distribution statute contains no such factor. See General Statutes § 46b–81 (c).
The fact that this court has not prohibited the trial court from considering the needs of the parties' children when dividing marital property further undermines the defendant's argument. See, e.g., Blake v. Blake , supra, 207 Conn. at 232, 541 A.2d 1201 (“[w]hich spouse has primary physical custody of minor children is also a consideration in determining the division of marital assets ” [emphasis added] ); see also Robinson v. Robinson , supra, 187 Conn. at 72, 444 A.2d 234 (court may consider equitable factors not listed in § 46b–81 when distributing property).
The trial court's articulation also supports the characterization of the award as alimony and not a property distribution. The plaintiff sought an articulation as to whether the trial court “considered, applied, or intended to apply” a factor in § 46b–81 when it awarded lump sum alimony. The trial court responded: “In making an equitable division of marital property or an award of alimony, whether periodic or lump sum, the court must, as it did, consider the statutory criteria set forth in ... §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82respectively .” (Emphasis altered.) The word “respectively” indicates the court's understanding that each statute applies to each type of financial order. This language therefore confirms the trial court's application of § 46b–82, not § 46b–81, when awarding lump sum alimony. The trial court also acknowledged its equitable power to consider “any appropriate additional factors, statutory or otherwise” in its articulation, noting that those powers gave “the court the authority to consider all the circumstances that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The trial court further differentiated between the lump sum alimony award and its property distribution orders at a hearing on the plaintiff's motion to terminate an appellate stay on several of its orders. The court stated, “I crafted this order ... [a]nd I specifically separated what I consider property settlement from ... lump sum alimony .” (Emphasis added.) The court explained that it awarded both periodic and lump sum alimony in consideration of how the defendant's income “comes in” and “flow[s]” from his various income streams. The court noted that “there's a method to the ... madness in terms of how the decree is crafted.” Thus, the court evidently did not intend to effectuate a functional property distribution by awarding lump sum alimony, but intended to account for the fact that the defendant received some components of his income only a few times per year.
B
Second, we disagree with the defendant's contention that, because the combined alimony and child support payments exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses, the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution, in light of the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable factors considered by the trial court. See footnote 10 of this opinion. The plaintiff attested to having $65,444 per month in expenses at the time of trial. The $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments would not cover this amount. The lump sum alimony payments, however, when combined with these payments, equate to $102,500 per month in total alimony and child support. Although this figure exceeds the plaintiff's claimed expenses, we cannot conclude that this fact alone means that the lump sum award constitutes a functional property distribution. See Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 493–94, 435 A.2d 1030 (upholding total alimony award of $9000 per month, when wife claimed approximately $7083 per month in expenses and marital expenses were $7500 per month).
Justice Zarella argues in his dissent that, when a prenuptial agreement distributes all of the property in a dissolution action, an alimony award functions as a property distribution that violates that agreement when it: (1) exceeds the recipient spouse's expenses, plus, if appropriate, a reasonable amount based on the trial court's resolution of the equitable factors; and (2) exceeds the payor spouse's income, thus apparently requiring the spouse to dip into his or her assets. Even if we agree with this formulation of a functional property distribution, we disagree that it applies to this case for two reasons.
First, the defendant does not claim that he must invade his assets to make the alimony and child support payments and, accordingly, he does not argue that his need to do so indicates that the lump sum award is a functional property distribution. He simply argues that, because the alimony and child support awards apparently exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses, the award is actually a property distribution. As acknowledged by Justice Zarella, “this fact alone does not make the lump sum alimony award a functional property distribution.” We respectfully disagree, however, with Justice Zarella's subsequent assertion and consideration of the defendant's purported need to dip into his assets—the second factor in his two part test—in concluding that the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution. The defendant did not raise or brief this claim and, as such, the plaintiff did not have an opportunity to address whether the defendant had to invade his assets to pay the awards or the effect that it would have on this court's determination of whether the lump sum award is a functional property distribution.
We respectfully disagree with Justice Zarella's contention that the defendant's argument that he must invade his assets is “necessarily subsumed” within his claim that the award is a functional property distribution. The defendant's argument may reasonably be understood as being that, because the award exceeds the plaintiff's claimed expenses, the award is actually a property distribution, regardless of how he pays the award—out of his income or assets. Cf. Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction , 319 Conn. 623, 635 n. 7, 126 A.3d 558 (2015) (respondent's “argument” that “there was a strategic reason not to call an expert” was “subsumed” within its “claim” that “habeas court incorrectly determined that ... petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present expert testimony”). Moreover, even if the parties discussed this issue at oral argument, it is well settled that a claim cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument. State v. Lenarz , 301 Conn. 417, 483 n. 22, 22 A.3d 536 (2011). We find Justice Zarella's distinction between claims and arguments unpersuasive in this context, considering the plaintiff's inability to brief and fully respond to the invasion of assets issue. See Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, at 635, 126 A.3d 558 (petitioner could not claim to have been “ambushed” by respondent's argument that there was strategic reason not to call expert, in support of claim that habeas court improperly determined that petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not calling expert). We therefore address the issue as squarely presented by the defendant. See also footnote 10 of this opinion.
Second, even if the defendant had briefed this claim, we cannot presume that he must invade his assets to pay the alimony and child support awards based upon this record. The posture of this case presents us with a significant anomaly. Although the trial court made findings as to the defendant's income at the time of trial, our review of the record indicates that the court did not make any determination as to whether its finding of the defendant's income was also a finding of his earning capacity . See General Statutes § 46b–82 (a) (in awarding alimony trial court “shall consider the ... earning capacity ... of each of the parties”); Auerbach v. Auerbach , 113 Conn.App. at 318, 334–35, 966 A.2d 292 (court may base financial awards on earning capacity rather than actual earned income), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 902, 971 A.2d 40 (2009). Without establishing this factual predicate, we cannot agree with Justice Zarella's conclusion that the defendant would have to dip into assets that were the subject of the prenuptial agreement, because we cannot presume that the defendant would need to invade those assets to satisfy the awards. See In re Jason R. , 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012) (“[w]e read an ambiguous trial court record so as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment”). For illustrative purposes, we note that the defendant earned significantly more income—enough to pay the alimony and child support awards without utilizing any assets—in several years leading up to the dissolution of the marriage. For example, in 2006, he earned $1,687,677 in yearly income, which equates to $140,639 per month—more than enough to pay the alimony and child support awards and maintain a considerably high standard of living. The following year, he earned $1,253,766 in yearly income, which equates to $104,480 per month, which is still enough to cover the alimony and child support payments. To the extent that the defendant's earning capacity is, in Justice Zarella's words, “theoretical,” it is only so because the trial court did not make such a finding. In the absence of such a finding, we read the record to support, rather than undermine, the trial court's judgment. DeNunzio v. DeNunzio , 320 Conn. 178, 197, 128 A.3d 901 (2016). Thus, even if we agreed with Justice Zarella's formulation of a functional property distribution, these unusual facts prevent us from agreeing with his application of the formulation to this unique case.
Although Justice Zarella states that the trial court was “entitled to rely on the truth and accuracy of [the parties'] affidavits,” he calculates the plaintiff's expenses to be $45,000 per month. Using this figure, in conjunction with the defendant's expenses and the plaintiff's pendente lite alimony and child support award, he concludes that the parties need “approximately $45,000 per month” to maintain the marital standard of living. As Justice Zarella acknowledges, however, “[t]he trial court made no finding regarding the marital standard of living or the monthly marital expenses.”
First, it is not clear from the record to what extent the trial court considered the plaintiff's expenses, as stated in her financial affidavit, to represent the standard of living of the marriage. See, e.g., Mavilla v. Mavilla , Docket No. 2011–095, 2011 WL 4975100, *5 (Vt. August 31, 2011) (wife's financial affidavit showed that her “standard of living was far below that established during the marriage and that which husband currently enjoyed”); see also Stamper v. Stamper , Docket No. A10–109, 2010 WL 3119503, *4 (Minn.App. August 10, 2010) (wife's claimed expenses “reflect[ed] a significantly reduced standard of living compared to the standard enjoyed during the marriage”); cf. Thomas v. Thomas , Docket No. A13–0905, 2014 WL 802035, *3 (Minn.App. March 3, 2014) (wife's claimed expenses “accurately reflect[ed] the parties' standard of living during the marriage”). Although the primary purpose of alimony is to provide for continuing support of a disadvantaged spouse, the spouse is entitled to maintain the standard of living of the marriage after the dissolution, as closely as possible. See, e.g., Brody v. Brody , 315 Conn. 300, 313, 105 A.3d 887 (2015) (“[t]he generally accepted purpose of ... alimony is to enable a spouse who is disadvantaged through divorce to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with the standard of living during marriage” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). When the disadvantaged spouse's efforts “increased the other's earning capacity at the expense of [his or] her own,” he or she is entitled to “sufficient alimony to ensure the continued enjoyment of [that] standard of living ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dan v. Dan , 315 Conn. 1, 11, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). Moreover, the parties' children are entitled to continue “the lifestyle to which [they were] accustomed and the standard of living [they] enjoyed before the divorce ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo , 296 Conn. 80, 108, 995 A.2d 1 (2010).
The parties did not move for an articulation as to whether the trial court considered the plaintiff's financial affidavit to accurately portray the standard of living of the marriage. Cf. Matza v. Matza , 226 Conn. 166, 185, 627 A.2d 414 (1993) (trial court explicitly stated that “parties did not during their marriage years enjoy a high standard of living as claimed by the [wife]”).
The parties apparently maintained a high standard of living during the marriage. The defendant valued the marital home at $6.75 million and the parties' vacation home at $1.2 million. Although the defendant's income fluctuated during the marriage, he earned more than $1 million per year in several years of the marriage. The trial court acknowledged that his employment has “proven to be very lucrative.” In 2006, for example, he earned $1,687,677, which equates to approximately $140,640 per month. The following year, he earned $1,253,766, or approximately $104,480 per month. He also received an additional $37 million from the sale of a software program three years into the marriage. At the time of trial, the defendant's bank account contained $84,238. Because the plaintiff's efforts as a homemaker and the primary caretaker of the children increased the defendant's earning capacity at the expense of her own, she is entitled to maintain this standard of living after the divorce, to the extent possible. See, e.g., Dan v. Dan , supra, 315 Conn. at 11, 105 A.3d 118 ; Brody v. Brody , 136 Conn.App. 773, 790, 51 A.3d 1121 (2012) (“the parties had enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during their marriage ... for the benefit of the [wife] and the parties' children, any award of alimony should reflect this quality of life”), rev'd in part on other grounds, 315 Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015).
The plaintiff, however, estimated the fair market value of the marital home to be $10 million.
The record reflects that the defendant earned $1,249,989 in 2004, $902,025 in 2005, $1,687,677 in 2006, $1,253,766 in 2007, and $575,262 in 2008.
In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider the factors in § 46b–82 when awarding alimony. See Golden v. Mandel , 110 Conn.App. 376, 385, 955 A.2d 115 (2008) (“[t]he standard of living ... was only one factor that the court considered in making its financial award”). Such factors include: “the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... [and] the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties ....” General Statutes § 46b–82 (a). The trial court must also consider any property distributions made pursuant to § 46b–81 and, “in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent's securing employment.” General Statutes § 46b–82 (a). Accordingly, the plaintiff's expenses do not represent the only factor that the trial court must consider when awarding alimony. On the contrary, § 46b–82 lists thirteen other factors that the court must consider when awarding alimony, in addition to the “needs” of the recipient spouse. The court must not only examine the spouse's financial situation at the time of trial, but look ahead to his or her ability to generate income in the future. See General Statutes § 46b–82 (instructing court to consider spouse's “age, health, station, occupation ... earning capacity, vocational skills, education, [and] employability”). Several of the factors relate in no way to the spouse's expenses, such as the length of the marriage and the cause of the breakdown of the marriage. The trial court must also look to the payor spouse's financial situation, in addition to that of the recipient spouse. Specifically, the trial court must consider the payor's age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, and employability. These factors have nothing to do with the recipient spouse's claimed expenses. Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court was constrained by the plaintiff's claimed expenses in awarding alimony. The trial court instead had “wide discretion” to ensure that the plaintiff and the parties' children continued to enjoy the standard of living of the marriage for years to come. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brody v. Brody , supra, 315 Conn. at 313, 51 A.3d 1121.
The trial court's resolution of these factors in the present case further militates against characterizing the lump sum alimony award as a property distribution.
We look to the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable factors in § 46b–82 to help us determine whether the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution. In concluding that these considerations support the characterization of the award as alimony and not a property distribution, we do not suggest that award is “not excessive or improper at all,” as Justice Zarella contends in his dissent. As stated previously, we make no judgment as to the excessiveness or propriety of the alimony award as alimony . See footnote 10 of this opinion. Although we utilize the same considerations, we do so in an effort to discern whether the lump sum alimony award is actually alimony or a disguised property distribution.
The parties were married for seventeen years and have four minor children. The children, now ages eleven, fourteen, fifteen, and seventeen, three of whom have learning issues, primarily reside with the plaintiff. The defendant was fifty years old at the time of trial and in “general good health.” Although he described a “painful bout of neuropathy ” at one point during the marriage, the trial court found that he “is not prevented from working full-time.” The defendant has a business degree from Syracuse University, and his primary employment is with his family's window company and its subsidiaries. At the time of trial, the defendant earned nearly $1 million per year from his employment and investments. By contrast, the plaintiff was forty-five years old at the time of trial, suffers from a thyroid condition, and is borderline diabetic. She has a college degree from Emerson College, but did not work for the “greater portion” of the parties' seventeen year marriage. When she did work, she earned approximately $30,000 per year, with a maximum of $65,000 to $70,000 per year. She earned no income at the time of trial and claimed $65,444 per month in expenses. Significantly, the trial court also found that the defendant caused the breakdown of the marriage, characterizing him as a “controlling, emotional bully” and describing his “bizarre” and “demeaning” behavior. Moreover, the agreement left the defendant with significant assets as compared to the plaintiff. See General Statutes § 46b–82 (trial court “shall consider the ... estate ... of each of the parties”); Golden v. Mandel , supra, 110 Conn.App. at 386, 955 A.2d 115 (“[i]t is well established that the parties' estate is defined as the aggregate of the property and liabilities of each ” [emphasis added] ); see also Schmidt v. Schmidt , 180 Conn. 184, 192, 429 A.2d 470 (1980) (“the ‘estate’ of the parties ... comprehends the aggregate of the property and liabilities of each”). The trial court ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff: $2,082,000, the amount owed her under the prenuptial agreement; $40,000 per month in periodic unallocated alimony and child support for fifteen years; and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in biannual installments of $375,000. The defendant, however, kept the marital home and the parties' vacation home, in addition to all of his commercial real estate, business ownerships, securities, bonds, bank accounts, and retirement accounts. He received, in total, more than $25 million in assets. By comparison, the plaintiff kept the home she purchased during this dissolution litigation, as well as her bank accounts, retirement accounts, and personal property, which totaled approximately $4.5 million. The trial court also did not specify how much of the periodic alimony and child support award should go toward the children's maintenance, as opposed to the plaintiff's support. The trial court, at least, found it appropriate to deviate from the presumptive minimum child support amount under the guidelines based on the defendant's income. Moreover, the parties' four minor children are entitled to maintain the standard of living of the marriage, to the extent possible. See Maturo v. Maturo , supra, 296 Conn. at 108, 995 A.2d 1 ; see also id., at 168–69, 995 A.2d 1 (Vertefeuille, J. , dissenting in part) (noting “new wave” of cases recognizing “the significance of the standard of living of children of affluent parents” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The $40,000 per month award, which would not cover the plaintiff's $65,444 in expenses, was also limited to fifteen years.
The plaintiff admitted to a one year long affair late in the marriage, but the trial court determined that it did not lead to the breakdown of the marriage. The trial court stated that “ample evidence exists that, while both parties have contributed to said breakdown, the [defendant] must bear the greater share.”
Specifically, the trial court stated: “As to the breakdown of the marriage, the [plaintiff] testified at length about the [defendant's] frequent use of inappropriate language and his bizarre behavior, toward her and others, that was both demeaning and ... crude. In addition, he frequently mimicked her tendency to stutter when placed in stressful situations. She admitted to a [one year] long affair late in the marriage. That relationship, now long since ended, was not the cause of the breakdown. Evidence supports a finding that the cause for the breakdown is primarily attributable to the [defendant]. It is abundantly clear that right from the beginning, with the execution of the ... agreement, that [the defendant] was not looking for a true marital partner, and has shut the [plaintiff] out both fiscally and emotionally. He is a controlling, emotional bully, who has failed to appreciate [the plaintiff's] true worth as a wife, let alone her contributions. He offers her the minimum, which he believes that he can, in order to preserve the greater bulk of his assets for himself. The [defendant], she said, engaged in frequent, long-winded arguments about his plans, and badgered her to go along with his ideas, such as the ... agreement. She told the court that she had a hard time being heard, that [the defendant] ignored her important requests, and that she did not feel that she was a real partner.”
This figure accounts for the defendant's $2,082,000 payment to the plaintiff.
This figure includes the $2,082,000 payment owed to the plaintiff under the agreement.
In light of these principles, we disagree with the defendant's contention that, because the combined alimony and child support payments exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses, the lump sum alimony award is functionally a property distribution. The agreement's waiver of equitable distribution of property does not change this result. Although the agreement limited the court's discretion to distribute property, it did not limit the trial court's discretion to award alimony in any way . The agreement simply stated that “a court of competent jurisdiction shall address the issues of alimony and/or child support ... in the event [of] ... divorce ....” Indeed, the Appellate Court recently rejected a nearly identical argument in Brody v. Brody , supra, 136 Conn.App. at 790, 51 A.3d 1121, in which the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony despite the existence of a prenuptial agreement in which the parties waived equitable distribution. The husband argued, as here, that “the [trial] court improperly used the award of alimony to effectuate an improper distribution of property in violation of the parties' prenuptial agreement.” Id., at 788, 51 A.3d 1121. The Appellate Court disagreed, noting that the trial court had “broad discretion” to award alimony because the prenuptial agreement “by its clear terms, [was] concerned with equitable distributions of property ... not alimony awards.” Id., at 791, 51 A.3d 1121. Accordingly, we conclude that the lump sum alimony award does not constitute a functional property distribution in contravention of the parties' agreement. II
We acknowledge Justice Zarella's concerns with the “practical consequences” of this opinion. To the extent that trial courts, however, may be tempted to circumvent a lopsided property distribution contained in an otherwise enforceable prenuptial agreement by awarding large amounts of alimony, “[j]udicial restraint counsels us to commend the issue to the attention of the legislature for further review ....” Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc. , 302 Conn. 464, 473 n. 6, 28 A.3d 958 (2011). The trial court in the present case properly applied the statutory factors in § 46b–82, and properly adhered to the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (act) by enforcing the agreement and distributing the parties' property in accordance with that agreement. See General Statutes § 46b–36a et seq. Specifically, with respect to the agreement, the trial court cited the act and concluded that “[u]nder all the facts and circumstances, the [agreement] was fair and equitable at that time, and therefore a valid agreement.”
We further note that when a trial court awards a spouse alimony exceeding his or her claimed expenses in the wake of a prenuptial agreement distributing all of the parties' property, the award may still be challenged as excessive alimony , rather than a functional property distribution. Today's result does not change this fact. As noted previously, the defendant did not ask us to proclaim the lump sum award as excessive even if we determine that the award is not a functional property distribution. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
We now turn to the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $100,000 of the plaintiff's trial attorney's fees and $40,000 of her appellate attorney's fees, in light of its other awards to her. Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiff received ample liquid funds from the trial court's judgment with which to pay her attorney's fees, and that the trial court's conclusion that not awarding her attorney's fees would undermine its other awards to her was unreasonable. In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding her attorney's fees, and reasonably concluded that not doing so would have undermined its other awards. Additionally, with respect to the appellate attorney's fees award, the plaintiff asserts that she did not have sufficient liquid assets to defend the appeal because several of the trial court's financial orders were stayed pending appeal. We agree with the defendant, and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees.
The defendant also claims that the agreement prohibits an award of attorney's fees. The plaintiff argues that this claim is unpreserved because the defendant did not raise this claim at trial, he raised it for the first time in his objection to the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for appellate attorney's fees. See, e.g., Practice Book § 60–5 (“[an appellate] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial”); Cunniffe v. Cunniffe , 150 Conn.App. 419, 441, 91 A.3d 497 (appellant must “bring to the attention of the court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked” [emphasis omitted] ), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 935, 102 A.3d 1112 (2014). Because we conclude that the attorney's fees award constitutes an abuse of discretion even if authorized under the agreement, we need not address the defendant's claim that the agreement bars an award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, we need not consider the plaintiff's contention that the defendant failed to preserve this claim for review. See FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council , 313 Conn. 669, 677 n. 11, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014).
Section 46b–62 (a) authorizes the trial court to award attorney's fees in a dissolution action when appropriate in light of the “respective financial abilities” of the parties and the equitable factors listed in § 46b–82. Turgeon v. Turgeon , 190 Conn. 269, 280, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983) ; see also footnotes 7 and 8 of this opinion. “[W]e [have] stated three broad principles by which these statutory criteria are to be applied. First, such awards should not be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they should be permitted to do so. Third, where, because of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid funds, an allowance of [attorney's] fees is not justified.” Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, at 280, 460 A.2d 1260. “A determination of what constitutes ample liquid funds ... requires ... an examination of the total assets of the parties at the time the award is made.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson , 191 Conn. 46, 59, 463 A.2d 578 (1983). We have recognized, however, that “[t]he availability of sufficient cash to pay one's attorney's fees is not an absolute litmus test .... [A] trial court's discretion should be guided so that its decision regarding attorney's fees does not undermine its purpose in making any other financial award.” Devino v. Devino , 190 Conn. 36, 38–39, 458 A.2d 692 (1983) ; see also, e.g., Grimm v. Grimm , 276 Conn. 377, 398, 886 A.2d 391 (2005) (not awarding $100,000 in attorney's fees to wife would have “necessarily eviscerate[d]” any benefit she would have received from $100,000 lump sum alimony award), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S.Ct. 2296, 164 L.Ed.2d 815 (2006).
“Whether to allow [attorney's] fees, and if so in what amount, calls for the exercise of judicial discretion” by the trial court. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson , supra, 191 Conn. at 58, 463 A.2d 578. “An abuse of discretion in granting [attorney's] fees will be found only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , 297 Conn. 358, 386, 999 A.2d 721 (2010).
In the present case, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $100,000 of the plaintiff's trial attorney's fees and $40,000 of her appellate attorney's fees. The trial court reasoned, with respect to the trial attorney's fees award, that “to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the primary care of four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her portion of the financial award ... would undermine the purposes of [the] same” and that “it would be fair and equitable for the [defendant] to pay [those fees].” After the defendant filed an appeal, the trial court awarded the plaintiff an additional $40,000 in appellate attorney's fees, stating that the plaintiff needed “reasonable access to the court system [to] defend an appeal that [the defendant] made.” The trial court noted that several of its financial awards to the plaintiff, including the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement, the $375,000 biannual lump sum alimony payments, and the $100,000 trial attorney's fees award, were automatically stayed pending the defendant's appeal. See Practice Book § 61–11 (a). The $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments were not stayed, however, and the plaintiff continued to receive those payments. See Practice Book § 61–11 (c) (“no automatic stay shall apply ... to orders of periodic alimony, [or child] support”). The trial court also noted that the plaintiff had only $3700 in her bank accounts at that time and, thus, she was “land rich but cash poor.” The trial court therefore concluded that the plaintiff did “not have ample liquid assets” or “resources that are readily available” to pay the fees. Four months later, the plaintiff successfully moved to terminate the stay on the $2,082,000 payment and the lump sum alimony award. Specifically, the plaintiff was scheduled to receive the $2,082,000 payment and the first $375,000 installment of the lump sum alimony award by December 19, 2014.
In connection with the plaintiff's motion for appellate attorney's fees, the trial court also addressed, for the first time, the defendant's argument that the agreement barred an award of attorney's fees. See footnote 31 of this opinion. The trial court found that the defendant had waived or was equitably estopped from asserting this claim by previously agreeing to pay some of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. See Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. , 274 Conn. 33, 60, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) ( “[e]quitable estoppel is a doctrine that operates in many contexts to bar a party from asserting a right that it otherwise would have but for its own conduct”); Lanna v. Greene , 175 Conn. 453, 458, 399 A.2d 837 (1978) (party may waive provisions in contract included solely for his or her benefit); see also Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 292 Conn. 1, 58, 970 A.2d 656 (waiver may be implied by conduct), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 991, 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009). During litigation, the parties entered into a stipulation that the trial court made an order of the court, in which the defendant agreed to pay $250,000 of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. The trial court noted in its oral decision on the plaintiff's motion for appellate attorney's fees that, even if the agreement barred an award of attorney's fees, the defendant “basically undercut the terms of the agreement” by agreeing to pay some of the plaintiff's attorney's fees pendente lite. The defendant argues that the trial court's finding that he waived or was equitably estopped from claiming that the agreement bars an award of attorney's fees was clearly erroneous, because the parties agreed in the stipulation that “[t]he [plaintiff] shall not be precluded from seeking additional [attorney's] fees, pendente lite, and the [defendant] shall not be precluded from opposing the [plaintiff's] request for additional [attorney's] fees.” See Banks Building Co., LLC v. Malanga Family Real Estate Holding, LLC , 102 Conn.App. 231, 239, 926 A.2d 1 (2007) (“waiver [is a question] of fact ... we will not disturb the trial court's [finding] unless [it is] clearly erroneous” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also Fischer v. Zollino , 303 Conn. 661, 667–68, 35 A.3d 270 (2012) (reviewing trial court's finding of equitable estoppel for clear error). Because we hold that even if the agreement authorized an award of attorney's fees, such an award constituted an abuse of discretion under the circumstances, we need not address the defendant's claim that the agreement bars an award of attorney's fees. See footnote 31 of this opinion. We therefore need not address the defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding that he had waived or was equitably estopped from asserting this claim.
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in making the attorney's fees awards because the plaintiff received ample liquid funds as a result of the trial court's judgment, and the trial court's determination that not awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff would undermine its other awards was unreasonable. See, e.g., Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 501, 435 A.2d 1030. We further disagree with the plaintiff's contention that the appellate stay on the trial court's financial orders justifies the appellate attorney's fees award because the trial court could have terminated the stay sua sponte, and because the plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to terminate the stay on several of those orders. First, the trial attorney's fees award represents a very small portion of the liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff in the trial court's judgment. Pursuant to the judgment, the plaintiff would receive: $2,082,000, the amount owed to her under the agreement, within sixty days of the judgment; $40,000 per month in periodic alimony and child support, starting twelve days from the judgment; and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in biannual installments of $375,000, starting two and one-half months from the judgment. Thus, the plaintiff would receive liquid assets totaling $2,577,000 within three months of the judgment. The trial attorney's fees award represents only 4 percent of this amount. We have previously held attorney's fees awards amounting to a low portion of the payee's liquid assets to constitute an abuse of discretion, since the payee could easily have paid the fees out of those assets, despite the existence of equitable factors supporting the award. See, e.g., Maguire v. Maguire , supra, 222 Conn. at 34–35, 44, 608 A.2d 79 ($50,000 attorney's fees award, which amounted to 10 percent of wife's $500,000 in liquid assets, was abuse of discretion, even though parties were married for forty years and had children, husband caused breakdown of marriage, and wife had limited earning capacity); Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 488–89, 560 A.2d 396 (concluding that wife could not “reasonably” claim that failure to award $14,948 in attorney's fees and expenses, which amounted to 2 percent of wife's $630,000 in liquid assets, “would undermine or skew the substantial financial awards granted to her” and noting that awarding attorney's fees would be “gilding the lily” where husband had $5,503,000 in total assets and wife had $1,535,000 in total assets); see also Blake v. Blake , supra, 207 Conn. at 218–19, 541 A.2d 1201 (parties were married for twelve years and had three children). By contrast, this court and our Appellate Court have deemed attorney's fees awards that represent a more substantial part of the payee's liquid assets proper, because not doing so could result in the immediate depletion of those assets, especially when equitable factors support the award. See, e.g., Unkelbach v. McNary , 244 Conn. 350, 375–77, 710 A.2d 717 (1998) (wife amassed $3250 in attorney's fees and had liquid assets of only $1686); Eslami v. Eslami , 218 Conn. 801, 818–21, 591 A.2d 411 (1991) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife total of $48,230 in attorney's fees and expert witness fees, amounting to 15 percent of wife's total assets, which were comprised of $95,000 in deposits and securities and $300,000 lump sum alimony award, less $70,650 in claimed liabilities, in case where parties were married for thirty years, husband caused breakdown of marriage, there was “great disparity” in parties' income and assets, and wife was in “poor health” and had “substantial continuing medical expenses”); Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz , 2 Conn.App. 416, 417, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984) ( $7500 attorney's fees award, which amounted to 50 percent of wife's $15,000 in liquid assets, was not abuse of discretion; parties were married for thirty years and husband caused breakdown of marriage).
The trial court's judgment, dated March 20, 2014, ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff: $40,000 per month commencing April 1, 2014; $375,000 every six months commencing June 1, 2014; and $2,082,000 within sixty days of the judgment.
The combined trial and appellate attorney's fees awards represent less than 6 percent of this amount.
We respectfully disagree with Justice Eveleigh's argument in his dissent, that Maguire is “easily distinguishable” from the present case. Justice Eveleigh argues that, contrary to Maguire , the following equitable factors justify the attorney's fees awards in the present case: the parties' seventeen year marriage; the defendant's mistreatment of the plaintiff, which caused the breakdown of the marriage; and the plaintiff's limited earning capacity. All of these factors, however, weighed heavily in Maguire —some even more so than in the present case—but this court nonetheless determined in Maguire that the attorney's fees award constituted an abuse of discretion. Maguire v. Maguire , supra, 222 Conn. at 43–45, 608 A.2d 79. In Maguire , the parties were married for forty years, rather than seventeen, and the husband mistreated the wife. Id., at 35, 608 A.2d 79 (“[the wife's] participation as the linchpin of the family, as the wife, lover, mother, homemaker ... means, and has meant, nothing to the [husband]” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also id., at 34–35, 608 A.2d 79 (“ ‘In all the years of their marriage ... the [husband] never placed any property in his wife's name .... He has provided for their children who are totally self-sufficient. He has provided for the future for his secretary and for himself, but not for his wife. He dismissed her fears and concerns for her future with the comment “the [s]tate will take care of you.’ ” ”). The wife in Maguire had a limited earning capacity, and was sixty years old, compared to the plaintiff's forty-five years. See id., at 35, 608 A.2d 79 (“[t]his woman is ... past her peak as an active real estate saleswoman, and the real estate business is in shambles” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The wife in Maguire also received more than $3 million in assets, not including her $500,000 in liquid assets, just as the plaintiff received more than $4 million in assets, not including the liquid assets she would receive from her other awards. Id., at 41 n. 8, 44, 608 A.2d 79. Despite these factors, this court concluded in Maguire that “nothing in the record” would support a finding that the attorney's fees award was necessary to avoid undermining the wife's other awards. Id., at 44–45, 608 A.2d 79.
Justice Eveleigh asserts in his dissent that Blake is distinguishable based on the trial court's attempt to punish the husband with the attorney's fees award. We disagree. In Blake , the court did not reverse the award of attorney's fees based solely on the trial court's attempt to “punish” the husband. See Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 487–89, 560 A.2d 396. Rather, the court went on to determine whether the award constituted an abuse of discretion under, inter alia, § 46b–62, Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 492, 435 A.2d 1030, and Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 190 Conn. 26, 29–30, 459 A.2d 498 (1983), none of which concern punishment of a litigant through an attorney's fees award. Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 487–89, 560 A.2d 396 ; see also id., at 489, 560 A.2d 396 (“In the light of the plaintiff's net assets of over [$1.5 million ] and her liquid assets of $630,000 , it cannot reasonably be claimed that the failure to award $14,947.63 for attorney's fees and expenses would undermine or skew the substantial financial awards granted to her in the dissolution judgment. To award counsel fees under these circumstances is gilding the lily. The court abused its discretion in making such an order.” [Emphasis added.] ). Accordingly, we disagree with Justice Eveleigh's argument that Blake is “distinguishable from the facts of the present case.”
But see Emanuelson v. Emanuelson , 26 Conn.App. 527, 533–34, 602 A.2d 609 (1992) (attorney's fees award amounting to 3 percent of wife's liquid assets not abuse of discretion in light of parties' thirty-five year marriage, fact that husband caused breakdown of marriage, and “great disparity” between parties' earning capacities).
Viewed another way, the trial attorney's fees award in the present case represents less than 2 percent of the lump sum alimony award alone, not including the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement or the $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments. Similar to the comparison with the payee's liquid assets, attorney's fees awards that represent a small portion of the payee's lump sum alimony award have been held improper, because the payee could easily pay his or her own attorney's fees out of that award, even in the wake of strong equitable factors. See, e.g., Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 270, 279–81, 460 A.2d 1260 ($10,000 in attorney's fees and $1500 in expert witness fees awards, amounting to 8 percent of $140,000 in total lump sum alimony awards to wife, was abuse of discretion, though parties were married for twenty-three years and husband received $309,000 in assets, compared to wife's $100,000; property and alimony awards to wife were “generous” and “liquid assets being made available [to her were] ample”); Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 493–501, 435 A.2d 1030 ($55,000 in attorney's fees award, amounting to 9 percent of $600,000 lump sum alimony award and 4 percent of $1,410,000 in total assets, not including periodic alimony award, was abuse of discretion where parties were married for twenty-seven years, husband earned $208,000 per year, wife earned $1000 per year, husband was unfaithful, and wife made “significant” contributions to marriage, “both financial and otherwise”). Conversely, attorney's fees awards reflecting a more significant portion of the payee's lump sum alimony award, thereby potentially undermining that award, have been held proper, especially when equitable factors support the award. See, e.g., Holley v. Holley , 194 Conn. 25, 26–27 and n. 1, 478 A.2d 1000 (1984) (attorney's fees award of $7500, amounting to 50 percent of $15,000 lump sum alimony award, not including periodic alimony and child support award, not abuse of discretion where parties were married for approximately fifteen years, had one minor child, husband earned $100,000 per year, wife earned $23,000 per year, and husband had $280,000 in separate assets); Costa v. Costa , 11 Conn.App. 74, 75–77, 526 A.2d 4 (1987) (attorney's fees award of $6000, amounting to 30 percent of $20,000 lump sum alimony award, not including periodic alimony award, not abuse of discretion where husband had $280,000 in assets, wife had $170,000 in assets, husband earned $58,400 per year, and wife “needed treatment for deep depression and had no immediate prospect of being able to work”); see also Weiman v. Weiman , 188 Conn. 232, 235–37, 449 A.2d 151 (1982) ($10,000 attorney's fees award to wife proper when trial court “could reasonably have concluded that [her] financial resources ... were necessary to meet her future needs” and alimony awarded to her “was not substantial in amount nor was it for a long period of time”).
Although this court and the Appellate Court did not actually calculate the percentage of the alimony award that the attorney's fees award represented in these cases, they did compare the size of the attorney's fees award to the alimony award. In fact, they could not avoid such comparisons in order to determine whether the spouses had “ample liquid funds” with which to pay the attorney's fees, or whether an award of attorney's fees was necessary to avoid undermining their alimony awards. Anderson v. Anderson , supra, 191 Conn. at 59, 463 A.2d 578. Calculating the percentages in these cases only helps compare them to the present case for illustrative purposes, notwithstanding Justice Eveleigh's criticism of these calculations in his dissent.
But see Devino v. Devino , supra, 190 Conn. at 38–39, 458 A.2d 692 (attorney's fees award amounting to 7 percent of lump sum alimony award was not abuse of discretion, when wife had only $2000 in assets and income of $200 per week); Pacchiana v. McAree , 94 Conn.App. 61, 71–72, 891 A.2d 86 (attorney's fees award amounting to 4 percent of lump sum alimony award not abuse of discretion due to wife's “relatively low level of earnings,” husband's “periodic receipt of substantial distributions from his investment activities,” and court's decision not to award periodic alimony to wife), cert. denied, 278 Conn. 922, 901 A.2d 1221 (2006).
In the present case, given the vast liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff, and the modest nature of the attorney's fees when compared with those assets, the equitable factors in § 46b–82, as incorporated into § 46b–62, do not justify the award. See Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 500–501, 435 A.2d 1030 (equitable factors justified lump sum and periodic alimony awards, but not attorney's fees award). As grounds for the trial attorney's fees award, the trial court cited the plaintiff's “minimal earning capacity” and responsibility for caring for the parties' four minor children. The trial court further stated that it would be “fair and equitable” for the defendant to pay the fees. The trial court cited similar concerns with regard to the appellate attorney's fees award. We have stated, however, that attorney's fees “are not to be awarded merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay” and that “[w]here, because of other orders, both parties are financially able to pay their own counsel fees they should be permitted to do so.” Koizim v. Koizim , supra, at 500–501, 435 A.2d 1030. Although these factors strongly support the validity of the lump sum alimony award, they are outweighed in the attorney's fees context by the fact that the fees represent but a small fraction of the substantial liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff. Cf.
We disagree with Justice Eveleigh's characterization in his dissent of our analysis as a “purely mathematical calculation ....” We simply use percentages to place our prior case law into perspective, in light of the massive financial awards rendered in this case. We do not contend that attorney's fees awards amounting to 4 or 6 percent of a spouse's assets constitute a per se abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Damon v. Damon , 23 Conn.App. 111, 113–14, 579 A.2d 124 (1990) ( “[a]lthough the assets awarded to the [husband] equaled more than 85 percent of the total marital assets, that is not a per se abuse of discretion”). Rather, these percentages elucidate the financial circumstances of the parties and help us determine whether the equitable factors justify the award of attorney's fees. In this vein, we do not “ignore” the equitable factors or attempt to “boil down these [equitable] considerations to a mathematical equation” as Justice Eveleigh suggests. We instead evaluate the equitable factors in the context of these percentages.
Furthermore, we see no reason why such calculations should be barred in the attorney's fees context when both this court and the Appellate Court have used similar calculations to evaluate divisions of property under § 46b–81 and alimony awards under § 46b–82, in conjunction with the equitable factors listed in those statutes, which are the same as those applicable under § 46b–62. See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco , supra, 275 Conn. at 356, 360, 880 A.2d 872 (concluding that, “[u]nder the circumstances” presented, award providing “98.5 percent of the marital estate” to wife and “less than 2 percent” to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet , 190 Conn. 657, 664, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly “considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets ” [emphasis added] ); Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 279, 460 A.2d 1260 (husband properly awarded “approximately 76 percent” of total marital assets); Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 496–97, 435 A.2d 1030 (upholding property and alimony awards when assets distributed to plaintiff represented “52 percent of the total assets as calculated by the plaintiff and 46 percent of the total assets as calculated by the defendant,” and noting that “[c]alculated another way, the value of assets” would represent “39 percent of family wealth”); Pellow v. Pellow , 113 Conn.App. 122, 129, 964 A.2d 1252 (2009) (alimony and child support awards consuming “more than 90 percent” of husband's income excessive); Valentine v. Valentine , 149 Conn.App. 799, 807, 90 A.3d 300 (2014) (alimony and child support payments that “constituted more than 80 percent” of husband's income was abuse of discretion).
Ultimately, not including these percentages in our opinion, and simply listing the panoply of financial awards in our prior cases, along with the equitable factors, would be unhelpful to the bench, bar, and members of the public who rely on our opinions for meaningful guidance.
Mistho poulos v. Misthopoulos , supra, 297 Conn. at 383–87, 999 A.2d 721 ($64,000 attorney's fees award was proper when “the overwhelming majority of the assets awarded to the [wife] were not liquid assets,” given that “[$2.6 million] of the approximately [$3.2 million] in assets awarded to the [wife] consisted of the family home in which the [wife] and the parties' three minor children resided” and “also included her interest in a trust ... certain retirement accounts, vested stock and vested stock options”).
In Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , supra, 297 Conn. at 389, 999 A.2d 721, this court made the following observation: “[T]he trial court determined that the [husband] had used the parties' marital assets to pay his attorney's fees .... By requiring the [husband] to pay an additional $50,000 of the [wife's] trial attorney's fees and a portion of her appellate attorney's fees, it is reasonable to presume that the trial court was attempting to equalize the amount of marital assets that were used to pay each of the parties' attorney's fees.”
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the $40,000 appellate attorney's fees award was, at least, proper, because the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement and the lump sum alimony payments were stayed pending the defendant's appeal. Thus, she claims that she did not have ample liquid funds with which to defend the appeal. We are unpersuaded that the stay on these orders justifies the appellate attorney's fees award. The plaintiff always had the option of seeking to terminate the stay. See Practice Book § 61–11 (c). As stated previously, the plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to terminate the stay several months after the trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees. Furthermore, the trial court had the discretion to terminate the stay sua sponte at any time. See Practice Book § 61–11 (d). Additionally, although the plaintiff's amended financial affidavit showed only $3700 in her bank accounts, she was still receiving $40,000 per month in periodic alimony and child support, and attested to having personal property worth $305,810, a home worth $2.1 million, and other assets worth $79,794. See Anderson v. Anderson , supra, 191 Conn. at 60, 463 A.2d 578 (attorney's fees award was abuse of discretion when home would be sold at later date, because sale of home would “yield liquid assets for both parties”). These factors, when considered in light of the substantial liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff, offset the significance of the temporary stay on the orders.
The plaintiff, however, claimed monthly expenses of $44,332 and liabilities of $68,142, not including the attorney's fees.
But see Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz , supra, 2 Conn.App. at 424, 479 A.2d 826 ($7500 attorney's fees award not abuse of discretion, when wife had $15,000 in liquid assets, and $2500 per month periodic alimony payments and first $23,000 installment of $116,000 lump sum alimony award were stayed pending husband's appeal).
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees under these circumstances, thus requiring reversal of the trial court's judgment with respect to those awards. Furthermore, because we conclude that the attorney's fees awards are severable from the trial court's other financial orders, it is not necessary to remand the case for reconsideration of all financial matters. See Smith v. Smith , supra, 249 Conn. at 277, 752 A.2d 1023. “This court and the Appellate Court have often described financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings as entirely interwoven and as a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other. ... Every improper order, however, does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court's financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Here, the attorney's fees awards are severable from the trial court's other financial orders and a new hearing on all financial matters is not required.
Like Justice Eveleigh, “[w]e are fully cognizant of the reluctance of appellate courts in Connecticut to disturb the discretionary findings of the trial court in dissolution cases. ... Delay and uncertainty create hardship for all concerned, more frequently for the recipient of the disputed award. ... Reluctance to reverse the trial court's exercise of discretion, however, should not mean that the door is entirely closed to successful appeals in dissolution cases. Limited appellate review in dissolution cases must not be a mere shibboleth on the basis of which the appellate court makes such review a ity. ... This practice does not establish the proposition that such an award should never be disturbed, but rather that it should be disturbed only under the clearest circumstances.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz , supra, 2 Conn.App. at 421, 479 A.2d 826. In the present case, when the attorney's fees awards represent such a miniscule amount of the spouse's liquid assets and total financial awards, the “clearest circumstances” are present. Id. We must be mindful not to “abdicat [e] ... our responsibility for appellate review” in these matters. Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 498, 435 A.2d 1030.
The judgment is reversed only with respect to the attorney's fees awards to the plaintiff, and the case is remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff's motions for trial and appellate attorney's fees; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.
ZARELLA, J., dissenting.
I fear that the majority's opinion in the present case is the beginning of a grave and perilous road for matrimonial law in Connecticut, and, therefore, I respectfully dissent. By upholding the trial court's $7.5 million lump sum alimony award, the majority eviscerates the parties' enforceable premarital agreement, defeats the purpose behind the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (act), General Statutes § 46b–36a et seq., and fails to keep pace with the development of matrimonial law in our sister states. In light of the majority's opinion, an enterprising trial court struck by sympathy for a recent divorcee who entered into a less than favorable—but not unconscionable —premarital agreement may now end-run the agreement, consciously or subconsciously, by awarding greater “alimony,” unless the agreement expressly provides for the level of alimony. Today's result defeats Connecticut's public policy of encouraging the private settlement of family matters and removes the predictability the act was intended to create. See, e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 7, 1995 Sess., p. 2492 (“[one] purpose of the [proposed] [a]ct is to provide certainty as to the enforceability of the provisions in premarital agreements”). Prospective spouses who enter into premarital agreements that settle issues of property division in the unfortunate event of a future divorce but leave for the courts the award of alimony—a seemingly prudent decision —do so at their own risk. No longer can such prospective spouses be sure that the Connecticut courts will honor their intentions as expressed in the agreement. Until the legislature addresses the majority's conclusions, attorneys are well advised to include alimony waivers or provisions setting alimony amounts and terms in premarital agreements.
The trial court in the present case determined that the parties' premarital agreement is enforceable. Because the challenge by the plaintiff, Marjorie Hornung, to the trial court's enforcement of the premarital agreement is contingent on whether the defendant, Robert Hornung, prevails on appeal; see footnote 2 of the majority opinion; I assume, for purposes of the defendant's challenge to the lump sum alimony award, that the parties' premarital agreement is enforceable.
I note that § 46b–62 has been amended since the events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2014, No. 14-3, § 5. As the majority notes, these amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. See footnote 8 of the majority opinion. Consequently, I refer to the current revision of the statute.
One would think that this court would encourage prospective spouses to leave issues of alimony open for the courts. When a couple begins their marital journey, there is no way of knowing what life has in store. The couple may live happily together until death, divorce after twenty years, or their marriage may last mere months. Serious illness may befall one spouse and fame and fortune the other. They may have no children or four children. The possibilities are endless, and the needs of the potential alimony recipient are unknowable. But, instead, the majority encourages the settlement of alimony issues before any couple weds because leaving alimony awards to the court, as the present case demonstrates, may result in a circumvention of the property division that the parties reached in their premarital agreement.
The majority concludes that “these percentages elucidate the financial circumstances of the parties and help us determine whether the equitable factors justify the award of attorney's fees. ... We instead evaluate the equitable factors in the context of these percentages.” See footnote 40 of the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with the majority that the use of percentages supports its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the attorney's fees in the present case. First, the majority's position is contrary to the statute. The statute does not require, or even suggest, that the trial court should examine what percentage of the total financial picture the attorney's fees represents. Instead, the statute clearly requires the trial court to examine whether the statutory factors support an award of attorney's fees. Second, the majority cannot point to any other case in which this court has used percentages in examining whether an attorney's fees award is appropriate. Accordingly, in light of our deferential standard of review in the present case, I cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by not employing an analysis that is not required by either statute or our prior case law.
I
LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARD
In the present case, the majority upholds the trial court's financial order awarding the plaintiff, Marjorie Hornung, lump sum alimony of $7.5 million. The defendant, Robert Hornung, claims that, in light of the periodic alimony award, the property settlement resulting from the premarital agreement, and the trial court's express reliance on statutory criteria pertaining to property division, the lump sum alimony award was an improper property distribution in contravention of the parties' premarital agreement. More specifically, the defendant claims that the parties intended that all property matters be settled by the premarital agreement. He argues that the lump sum alimony award subverted such intention because it was, either in fact or function, a disguised property distribution. To support his contention that the alimony award is a property distribution, the defendant argues, among other things, that the support award far exceeds what the plaintiff requires for her support and maintenance. I agree with the defendant that the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution. I reach this conclusion in light of the fact that the support award in the present case far exceeds the plaintiff's need for support and maintenance, and requires the defendant to invade his assets to satisfy the obligation. I additionally conclude that the lump sum alimony award undermines the premarital agreement because the agreement contemplated alimony, which is an award sufficient to allow the recipient to continue in his or her current lifestyle. In the present case, however, the trial court's alimony award exceeds an amount sufficient for such purpose and the reasonable bounds of discretion. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the entry of new financial orders.
The defendant also argues that the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution because (1) the trial court relied, in part, on the plaintiff's ability to acquire assets in the future and her contributions during the marriage to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of assets, which are both criteria set forth in the property division statute, General Statutes § 46b–81 (c), (2) the premarital agreement restricted the court's ability to consider additional equitable factors, and, thus, the plaintiff's contribution to the family assets and ability to acquire future assets were not appropriate additional factors for the court to consider under Borkowski v. Borkowski , 228 Conn. 729, 743–44, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994), (3) the court's comments that the defendant's insistence on entering into a premarital agreement contributed to the breakdown of the marriage and that the defendant offered the minimum he could to the plaintiff demonstrate that the court felt it would be equitable to provide additional funds to the plaintiff, and (4) the court's order that the lump sum alimony be nonmodifiable, survive the death of either party or remarriage of the plaintiff, and be nontaxable to the plaintiff and nondeductible to the defendant reveals its true character, namely, that it is a property award. In light of my conclusion, I need not address these additional arguments.
Additionally, the defendant claims that the trial court “expressly considered equitable factors such as the parties' children, even though the premarital agreement expressly contemplated children and provided for an increased property award in that event.” I am not sure how consideration of the parties' children demonstrates that the alimony award is a functional property distribution. Moreover, it is unclear why a court's consideration of the minor children in awarding support to a custodial parent would be improper. It is true that the formula for dividing marital property in the premarital agreement contemplated the children. That does not, however, foreclose consideration of the same factor when support determinations are made. Indeed, General Statutes § 46b–82 (a) requires that the court consider, “in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent's securing employment.” In any event, the existence of children seems like an appropriate additional factor for the court to consider in determining the type, amount, and duration of an alimony award, even when such factor is also accounted for in a premarital agreement that governs the division of property. See Borkowski v. Borkowski , supra, 228 Conn. at 743–44, 638 A.2d 1060 (when entering financial orders in dissolution action, court, “in the exercise of its inherent equitable powers ... may also consider any other factors [that] may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
The majority recognizes that “[a]s grounds for the trial attorney's fees award, the trial court cited the plaintiff's ‘minimal earning capacity’ and responsibility for caring for the parties' four minor children. The trial court further stated that it would be ‘fair and equitable’ for the defendant to pay the fees.” But, then without analyzing the trial court's reliance on these factors, the majority summarily concludes “[a]lthough these factors strongly support the validity of the lump sum alimony award, they are outweighed in the attorney's fees context by the fact that the fees represent but a small fraction of the substantial liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff.” In doing so, the majority fails to engage in any analysis necessary to support its conclusion that the trial court was unreasonable in determining that “the total of all the awards regardless of the items to which they were apportioned, was reasonable in the light of the respective financial abilities of the parties and the criteria set forth in § 46b–82.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , supra, 297 Conn. at 388, 999 A.2d 721. I respectfully disagree with the majority that the award of attorney's fees in the present case represents the “clearest circumstances” necessitating a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in making the award. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The majority asserts that “[u]ltimately, not including these percentages in our opinion, and simply listing the panoply of financial awards in our prior cases, along with the equitable factors, would be unhelpful to the bench, bar, and members of the public who rely on our opinions for meaningful guidance.” See footnote 40 of the majority opinion. I disagree. Instead, I would conclude that the analysis of the equitable factors as it relates to the award of attorney's fees in the present case is an essential component of this opinion. Particularly, in light of the majority's conclusion that it does “not contend that attorney's fees awards amounting to 4 or 6 percent of a spouse's assets constitute a per se abuse of discretion”; id; an analysis of the equitable factors in the present case is essential to understanding why the award of attorney's fees amounting to 4 or 6 percent of the spouse's assets is an abuse of discretion in the present case.
The majority analyzed the facts of the present case in light of the equitable factors of § 46b–82 in part I. In that part, the majority explained how the equitable factors supported the alimony award. Because their conclusion in part II necessitates a finding that the equitable factors do not support an award of attorney's fees, I would conclude that it is essential to provide a separate analysis of the equitable factors as they relate to the award of attorney's fees.
Because I would reverse the trial court's financial orders, insofar as the plaintiff was awarded $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, and remand the case for a new hearing regarding the financial matters, I must also address the plaintiff's contingent appeal regarding the enforceability of the premarital agreement. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. I address that issue in part II of this opinion.
But see Ramin v. Ramin , 281 Conn. 324, 353, 915 A.2d 790 (2007) (party's litigation misconduct can form part of basis of such award of attorney's fees).
An understanding of the premarital agreement is essential to the resolution of the defendant's claim. On July 14, 1997, the plaintiff and the defendant executed a premarital agreement. The agreement defines and identifies each party's separate property. It also defines marital property as “all property that is acquired by either or both parties subsequent to the marriage ....” In the event of dissolution of the marriage, the agreement provides that each party shall retain his or her separate property, the defendant will retain the marital property, except for certain personal property, and the plaintiff will receive from the defendant a property settlement payment. A formula for determining the amount of the property settlement payment is provided in the agreement. The payment amount increases with the length of the marriage and the number of children of the marriage. It was the express intention of the parties that the property distribution effectuated by the agreement fully satisfy both party's claims to property under Connecticut's equitable property distribution statute, General Statutes § 46b–81. The agreement also provides that “a court of competent jurisdiction shall address the issues of alimony and/or child support, both temporary and permanent ....” In July, 2008, the parties amended the agreement. At the time of the dissolution, the trial court found that, under the terms of the amended agreement, the plaintiff was to receive a property settlement payment of $4.75 million, $1.25 million under the terms of the original agreement and an additional $3.5 million pursuant to the July, 2008 amendment for her separate interest in the marital home.
The agreement contained additional terms that are not relevant to this appeal.
The majority reasons as follows: “Furthermore, we see no reason why such calculations should be barred in the attorney's fees context when both this court and the Appellate Court have used similar calculations to evaluate divisions of property under [General Statutes] § 46b–81 and alimony awards under § 46b–82, in conjunction with the equitable factors listed in those statutes, which are the same as those applicable under § 46b–62.” See footnote 40 of the majority opinion. The majority then cites a number of cases from this court and the Appellate Court. See id. I find those cases distinguishable.
First, in Greco v. Greco , 275 Conn. 348, 355–56, 880 A.2d 872 (2005), this court reasoned that “[w]e must, however, consider, the paramount purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding [which] is to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution. ... Under the circumstances of this case, an award of 98.5 percent of the marital estate, or $720,936.56 of the $731,870.21 estate, fails to capture this maxim.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) I would conclude that, contrary to the present case, it is appropriate to use a percentage when addressing whether a property division is an “equitable share” of the marital property. Furthermore, in Greco , this court did not end its analysis with a discussion of percentages, but fully examined the equitable factors that supported the award.
Second, in Sweet v. Sweet , 190 Conn. 657, 664, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983), the husband claimed it was improper for the trial court to award 90 percent of the family assets to the wife and this court reasoned that, even though the family home constituted 90 percent of the family assets, the statutory factors supported awarding it to the plaintiff. I would conclude that Sweet actually represents a rejection of a reliance on percentages and emphasizes the need to focus on the equitable factors.
Third, in Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 279, 460 A.2d 1260, this court did not rely on a percentage as its primary analysis of whether the property distribution was proper. Contrary to the majority's representation, this court did not conclude that an award of “approximately 76 percent” of the total marital assets was proper. Instead, this court merely stated that the property awarded to the defendant constituted 76 percent of the marital property, but this court then proceeded to engage in an analysis of all of the awards to each party to determine whether they constituted an abuse of discretion and did not rely on mere percentages.
Fourth, although this court did use percentages in discussing an alimony award in Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 496, 435 A.2d 1030, it only did so to address a dispute in the valuation of the award, not whether an alimony award was proper under § 46b–82.
Fifth, the Appellate Court also used percentages in addressing a claim that an alimony award was excessive in Pellow v. Pellow , 113 Conn.App. 122, 128–29, 964 A.2d 1252 (2009). In doing so, the Appellate Court was addressing the issue of whether the defendant was going to have the ability to pay the award, not whether the trial court properly applied the equitable factors. The defendant's ability to pay the attorney's fees in the present case is certainly not an issue, therefore, the use of percentages in Pellow , is inapplicable. Likewise, in Valentine v. Valentine , 149 Conn.App. 799, 807, 90 A.3d 300 (2014), the Appellate Court considered what percentage of the defendant's income the trial court's financial award represented and concluded that the trial court failed to consider whether the defendant would be able to comply with its financial orders. I would not dispute that, when considering whether one party is able to comply with financial orders it is appropriate to consider whether the financial order represents a large majority of his or her income. In the present case, however, the majority relies on percentages as its only analysis of whether the award of attorney's fees was unreasonable in the present case. I would conclude that the majority's use of percentages is not in compliance with our prior case law.
In addressing alimony and child support, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff periodic unallocated alimony and child support, as well as lump sum alimony. The court awarded $40,000 per month in periodic unallocated alimony and child support, which the parties do not challenge on appeal. That award is time limited, ending upon the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage, or in March, 2029, at which time the plaintiff will be sixty years old. In addition, the periodic award provides the plaintiff with an income safe harbor of $50,000. The court also awarded the plaintiff $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in twenty semiannual installments of $375,000. The lump sum award is nonmodifiable, survives the death of either party, and does not terminate upon the remarriage of the plaintiff. During the ten years that the plaintiff will receive both periodic and lump sum alimony payments, she will collect monthly support of $102,500. The lump sum alimony payments will end in 2024, at which time all four of the parties' children will be well past the age of majority. Thereafter, the plaintiff will continue to receive the monthly periodic unallocated alimony and child support until March, 2029, unless she has remarried or she or the defendant has died.
In its periodic unallocated alimony and support order, the trial court stated: “It is the ... intention of [the] court that ... the amount of alimony shall be nonmodifiable by the [defendant] where the sole basis for the modification is the annual gross earnings of the [plaintiff] of [$50,000] or less.” In essence, this order creates a safe harbor for the first $50,000 of the plaintiff's annual income. Stated differently, the plaintiff's income cannot constitute a substantial change in circumstances, necessary to modify an alimony award, until it exceeds $50,000 per year. See General Statutes § 46b–86 (a) (“any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support ... may, at any time thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party”).
In March, 2014, when the trial court issued its memorandum of decision in the present case, the parties' four children were fifteen, thirteen, twelve, and nine, respectively. Thus, by the time the defendant has paid the last installment of the lump sum alimony, the children will be approximately between twenty-five and nineteen years old.
The trial court's $7.5 million award, despite being characterized by the court as lump sum alimony, operates as a property distribution and subverts the premarital agreement. The award functions as a property distribution because it (1) exceeds the plaintiff's support and maintenance needs, and (2) requires the defendant to invade the assets he retained pursuant to the premarital agreement in order to meet the claimed alimony obligation.
The convergence of both factors makes this purported alimony award a functional property distribution. If the award was merely excessive, but did not require the defendant to invade assets to satisfy the obligation, it would not result in the transfer of property and, therefore, would not be a functional property distribution. That does not mean, however, that such an excessive award does not otherwise undermine the premarital agreement, as I subsequently explain in this opinion. Additionally, if the award required the defendant to invade assets but was not excessive, it would not be a functional property distribution because an award that does not exceed the recipient's support and maintenance needs comports with the purpose of alimony and thus functions as alimony.
I will first address the excessiveness of the alimony, beginning by setting forth the legal principles that govern this determination. Generally, trial courts enjoy broad discretion when equitably distributing property and entering alimony orders in a marital dissolution case. E.g., Greco v. Greco , 275 Conn. 348, 354, 880 A.2d 872 (2005). Such broad discretion is necessary due to the myriad circumstances surrounding marriage dissolution actions and the court's objective to place each spouse in an equitable postdissolution position. See, e.g., Kiniry v. Kiniry , 299 Conn. 308, 316, 9 A.3d 708 (2010) ; Mickey v. Mickey , 292 Conn. 597, 615, 974 A.2d 641 (2009). It has often been said that the court's equitable power is “the keystone [of] the court's ability to fashion relief” when dissolving a marriage and that, without it, and the court's broad discretion, it might be impossible to fairly resolve some dissolution disputes. Sunbury v. Sunbury , 210 Conn. 170, 174, 553 A.2d 612 (1989). Nevertheless, divorce is a creature of statute, and the court's authority to provide relief in such cases is derived therefrom. Id. ; Rubin v. Rubin , 204 Conn. 224, 229, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987). General Statutes §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82 provide the court with its primary tools for rendering an equitable dissolution of marriage. Mickey v. Mickey , supra, at 615, 974 A.2d 641.
With respect to § 46b–81, the Superior Court is empowered to “assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse.” General Statutes § 46b–81 (a). The purpose of such property distribution “is to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution.” Smith v. Smith , 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). In applying § 46b–82, the court is permitted to order either spouse or both spouses to pay alimony to the other spouse; see General Statutes § 46b–82 (a) ; see also Smith v. Smith , supra, at 280, 752 A.2d 1023 (concluding that § 46b–82 permits trial courts to order both spouses to pay alimony); and the purpose of such award is to provide for the continuing support and maintenance of the recipient spouse. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Noyes – Dombrowski , 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005). Although each of these statutory provisions serves a divergent purpose, they are nonetheless interrelated and complementary. See Mickey v. Mickey , supra, 292 Conn. at 615, 974 A.2d 641. Indeed, § 46b–82 (a) provides that alimony may be awarded “in addition to or in lieu of ” a property division, and it directs the court, in determining whether alimony should be awarded, to consider any distribution it made under § 46b–81. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the factors to be considered under each statute largely overlap. In assigning property under § 46b–81 and determining whether alimony should be awarded under § 46b–82, the court must consider, inter alia, “the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate ... and needs of each of the parties ....” General Statutes § 46b–81 (c) ; accord General Statutes § 46b–82 (a). Under the property division statute, the court must also consider each party's liabilities, contributions to the “acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates,” and future opportunities to acquire capital assets and income; General Statutes § 46b–81 (c) ; and, in rendering alimony orders, the court must consider whether the alimony recipient is the custodial parent of any minor children and the desirability and feasibility of such parent securing employment. General Statutes § 46b–82 (a).
Alimony is intended to provide for the recipient's basic needs and to maintain the lifestyle that the recipient enjoyed throughout the marriage. See, e.g., Brody v. Brody , 315 Conn. 300, 313, 105 A.3d 887 (2015) ; Dan v. Dan , 315 Conn. 1, 10–11, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). Thus, my use of the words “expenses,” “needs,” and “support” throughout the remainder of this opinion encompasses both need and maintenance, and those words are used interchangeably.
Pursuant to §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82, trial courts may balance property distributions and alimony awards to achieve a fair and equitable result in dissolving a marriage. See Sunbury v. Sunbury , supra, 210 Conn. at 174–75, 553 A.2d 612 (concluding that reversing one element of financial order and limiting remand to reconsideration of that element “would impede the trial court's ability to weigh the statutory criteria for financial orders to achieve an equitable result” because “issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven” and “rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Nevertheless, these statutes are distinct and serve separate purposes, namely, property division and spousal support. See Mickey v. Mickey , supra, 292 Conn. at 615–16, 974 A.2d 641 (“Despite their close relationship ... the purposes and operation of §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82 are distinct .... [T]he purpose of § 46b–81 is to unscramble the spouses' current property interests ... [whereas] the purpose of § 46b–82 is to recognize the obligation of support that spouses assume toward each other by virtue of the marriage.” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ). The dividing line between the two statutes becomes particularly important when the divorcing parties have entered into a premarital agreement that completely resolves the property distribution, such as in the present case.
The existence of a premarital agreement in a dissolution action implicates additional statutory provisions, namely, the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (act), General Statutes § 46b–36a et seq. The act authorizes premarital agreements and provides for the form and permissible content of such agreements. See General Statutes §§ 46b–36c and 46b–36d. It also sets forth the factors that courts are to consider in determining whether premarital agreements are enforceable. See General Statutes § 46b–36g. When divorcing spouses invoke these statutory provisions to seek enforcement of a premarital agreement in a dissolution proceeding, these provisions come into tension with §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82. In such cases, therefore, we must harmonize the dissolution court's broad discretion, conferred by §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82, with the parties' right and intention to settle the property distribution and/or alimony issues privately, as permitted by the act. Cf. Rainforest Cafe, Inc . v. Dept. of Revenue Services , 293 Conn. 363, 377–78, 977 A.2d 650 (2009) (“we must, if possible, construe two statutes in a manner that gives effect to both, eschewing an interpretation that would render either ineffective” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). At the very least, it should be obvious that premarital agreements have some impact on the operation of §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82. If they did not, premarital agreements and the act would be meaningless.
This case presents this court with its first opportunity to clarify the impact that a premarital agreement has on a trial court's discretion to structure financial orders pursuant to §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82. In the presence of a premarital agreement that distributes the parties' property but leaves open the question of alimony, the trial court's broad discretion in fashioning financial orders, by necessity, becomes limited. See, e.g., Walker v. Walker , 765 N.W.2d 747, 753–54 (S.D.2009) ; see also Hannon v. Hannon , 740 So.2d 1181, 1187 (Fla.App.1999) (“A primary purpose of [a premarital] agreement is to modify or shrink the general discretion of the dissolution ... [court] in doing equity between the parties. The agreement itself is intended to define the mutual equities, and the [dissolution court] is not free to ignore its provisions or to render them ineffective .” [Emphasis added.] ). The trial court's discretion in dissolution matters could be thought of as a sliding scale. At one end of this scale, where the court has the greatest discretion to craft financial orders, is the case in which the parties have not executed a premarital agreement. In such cases, the court may begin by unscrambling the marital assets through consideration and weighing of the factors enumerated in § 46b–81. Then, the court might turn to alimony, assessing the alimony recipient's support needs, in accordance with the factors set forth in § 46b–82. Of course, the amount and type of property awarded to the recipient spouse may impact that spouse's ability to meet all, or some, of his or her support needs and thereby affect the appropriate alimony amount. See Walker v. Walker , supra, at 751 (“[c]ourts are to consider property division and spousal support jointly because an award of more assets can eliminate or reduce the need for spousal support and vice versa” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). It is this sequence of events—the property distribution, the alimony order, and the assessment of the alimony recipient's ability to provide for his or her own needs in light of the property distribution—that I am referring to when I speak of balancing the property distribution and alimony award. The trial court is balancing the orders in the sense that the alimony recipient's needs and ability to provide for those needs may vary depending on the type and amount of property that he or she is awarded through the equitable distribution of property. See id.
Conversely, when the parties have entered into a premarital agreement that divides the separate and marital property, but does not address or prohibit alimony, the court's discretion necessarily narrows. Under such circumstances, the trial court no longer has any discretion to divide the parties' property under § 46b–81. Likewise, because the court cannot distribute the property, it no longer has the flexibility to balance the property and alimony awards, at least not in the same sense. Instead, the court is working from a fixed property settlement, one the parties have decided is acceptable, and the court's role is to determine, in light of that property distribution , whether an alimony award should be made and, if so, in what amount and under what terms. The fixed property settlement also influences the alimony obligor's ability to meet an alimony obligation and the alimony recipient's support and maintenance needs. Thus, the trial court's discretion is limited to making an award that provides for the support of the recipient spouse, and the court need only consider how the property settlement impacts that alimony recipient's ability to provide for himself or herself and the alimony obligor's ability to satisfy the alimony obligation. Stated differently, the award should reflect what the alimony recipient needs in order to maintain, to the extent practicable, the lifestyle he or she enjoyed during the marriage, in light of the property distribution reached by the parties. The award should not attempt to counterbalance the property distribution reached by the parties in the name of doing equity.
At the far end of the sliding scale, where the court's discretion is the narrowest, is the instance in which the parties have executed a premarital agreement that divides all the property, separate and marital, and sets alimony.
For example, when the parties have not executed a premarital agreement, and the trial court possesses complete discretion to equitably divide the marital estate and to award alimony, the property distribution ordered by the court has the potential of impacting each spouse's respective needs and ability to pay alimony. To illustrate, assume that a marital estate includes an asset that produces significant income. Awarding such an asset to the alimony obligor impacts his or her ability to satisfy an alimony obligation. If, instead, the asset is awarded to the alimony recipient, the asset would provide an income stream from which the recipient could provide for some, or perhaps all, of his or her support and maintenance needs, thereby impacting the necessary amount of alimony. When the parties have executed a premarital agreement, however, and have decided which spouse will receive the income producing asset, not only have they effectuated the property distribution, and consequently limited the trial court's discretion to divide the property, but they have also impacted the alimony obligor's ability to pay alimony and the alimony recipient's needs.
My view of the interrelationship between § 46b–81, § 46b–82, and a premarital agreement is supported by the legislative history of the act. See Public Acts 1995, No. 95-170 (P.A. 95–170). The purpose of the act was to “serve as a guideline and standard for planning for people who are entering into a marriage ... [and] to provide certainty as to the enforceability of the provisions in premarital agreements ....” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, p. 2492; see also 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1995 Sess., p. 3210, remarks of Representative Ellen Scalettar (“This bill establishes standards and guidelines for premarital agreements. It includes what the agreements may have in them, what they can include, and also under what conditions the agreements will be unenforceable.”). Thus, the act provides prospective spouses with the necessary tools to ensure that, in the unfortunate event of a divorce, they, themselves, may settle their financial affairs and that the trial court will honor their expectations. Such an objective is consistent with the noted public policy of this state to encourage the private resolution of family matters and to foster the “private settlement of the financial affairs of estranged marital partners ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Billington v. Billington , 220 Conn. 212, 221, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991). These purposes and policies would be undermined, however, if the trial court were allowed to order alimony that unreasonably exceeds the support needs of the alimony recipient.
With respect to the present case, for the first ten years following the divorce, the plaintiff will receive $102,500 in monthly support through periodic and lump sum alimony. Thereafter, she will continue to receive monthly periodic unallocated alimony and child support until March, 2029, unless she has remarried or she or the defendant has died. The trial court found, in relation to the alimony award, that time limited alimony was proper and that the purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony was to provide for the continued support of the plaintiff. In addition, the trial court decided that, “under all the circumstances, an award of lump sum alimony payable over time, in addition to the award of periodic alimony, [was] appropriate to provide for [the] continuing support of the [plaintiff] ... given the [plaintiff's] health issues, her lack of recent employment, her primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis, and her limited opportunity to acquire assets in the future.”
In light of the more limited discretion trial courts have to fashion alimony orders when the parties have entered into a premarital agreement, reviewing courts should carefully evaluate such awards. In this case, the record reveals that the plaintiff's monthly support need is approximately $45,000. The monthly support that the plaintiff receives pursuant to the trial court's financial orders, however, far exceeds such need. Under the current financial orders, the plaintiff will receive $102,500 in monthly support over the next ten years. That is approximately $57,500 per month, or $690,000 per year, more than she claims to need. Thus, during that ten year period, she will collect $6.9 million in alimony that is not attributable to her need for support and maintenance.
The plaintiff submitted a financial affidavit to the trial court, outlining her monthly income and expenses. In that affidavit, she claimed monthly living expenses of $65,444, and, because the trial court did not make any particular findings regarding such expenses, I will accept the plaintiff's financial affidavit as true. Nevertheless, some adjustments to the affidavit are necessary. The plaintiff included what appear to be one time expenses, such as $11,787 for furniture, home furnishings, and home improvements, as well as $3750 for a Bat Mitzvah for one of the children. The affidavit also includes $6559 in monthly expenses arising from property the parties owned in Vermont, which was awarded to the defendant pursuant to the parties' premarital agreement. Removing these items from the plaintiff's monthly expenditures results in expenses totaling $43,348. This figure is consistent with the affidavit the plaintiff submitted in a posttrial proceeding, in which she outlined monthly living expenses totaling $44,332. For ease of calculation, I rounded the plaintiff's monthly support need to $45,000.
I note that, even with these adjustments, the plaintiff's monthly expenses are likely overstated. She claims $2712 in monthly medical expenses for both her and the children, and $6846 for the children's monthly expenses, including various extracurricular activities (this figure excludes the Bat Mitzvah expense previously discussed). The defendant, however, was ordered to pay one half of the costs for the children's camps, tutors, lessons, and extracurricular activities, and to provide for the children's health and dental insurance and to pay 60 percent of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses. For a period of three years, the defendant also must pay the premiums for the plaintiff's continuing health insurance coverage, should she elect to obtain such coverage.
Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff's periodic alimony and expenses remain unchanged, it appears, at first blush, that she will have a support deficit of $5000 a month, or $60,000 a year, for the five years after the lump sum alimony installments end in light of her estimated monthly support need of $45,000 per month and the court's award of $40,000 in monthly periodic alimony and support. A closer examination of her financial affidavit, however, reveals that the $40,000 in monthly periodic alimony will be more than sufficient to cover her support needs when the lump sum alimony installments end. The plaintiff's monthly expenses include approximately $15,755 in expenses relating to the children. See footnote 15 of this opinion. As I previously noted, however, when the lump sum alimony payments end in 2024, the parties' children will have reached the age of majority. See footnote 7 of this opinion. Thus, the periodic alimony and support award of $40,000 per month, if unchanged, will provide the plaintiff with nearly $11,000 more in monthly support than she needs ($45,000 less $15,755 equals $29,245, which is approximately $11,000 less than the $40,000 monthly periodic alimony and support award).
In light of these facts, it is difficult to understand how the financial support orders in the present case comport with the limited support purpose of alimony. The plaintiff contends that the award was not excessive and results in only minimal surplus, if any. She argues that the periodic award of $40,000 per month is insufficient to provide for her expenses, let alone the expenses of the children, which the award, as unallocated alimony and child support, was intended to cover. In addition, she asserts that the shortage is even greater when the tax consequences of the alimony award are considered, and, therefore, the lump sum award was necessary to provide for the shortfall between her and her children's needs, on the one hand, and the periodic unallocated alimony and child support award, on the other. Even if one were to accept these arguments, the approximately $6.9 million in alimony that is not attributable to the plaintiff's monthly expenses, which include considerable child care costs; see footnote 15 of this opinion; will certainly provide for the children and the tax consequences of the periodic award, and still result in more than minimally excessive alimony. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the defendant is responsible for a substantial amount of the expenses related to the children. In addition to the child support award, the defendant is required to maintain health and dental insurance for the minor children, provide for 60 percent of their unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, including orthodontic, optical, pharmaceutical and psychological expenses, and pay for one half of the children's extracurricular activities. Moreover, one child has reached the age of eighteen, another child, who is currently sixteen, is quickly approaching the age of majority, and the other two children are not particularly young—fourteen and eleven, respectively. The majority acknowledges that, at the very least, the monthly alimony award of $102,500 exceeds the plaintiff's stated monthly need of $65,444 per month. Nevertheless, the majority argues that this fact alone does not transmute the lump sum alimony award into a functional property distribution. Instead of ending its inquiry there, however, the majority suggests, in light of the marital standard of living, the factors set forth in § 46b-82, the relative division of the marital estate, and the lack of a specific allocation for child support, that, perhaps, the lump sum alimony award is not excessive or improper at all. I will address each unpersuasive contention in turn.
The plaintiff also argues that the lump sum alimony award is not a functional property distribution because the trial court unequivocally referred to the award as alimony and stated that the purpose of the award was for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff. The majority makes similar arguments. The mere labeling of the award as alimony and finding that the award “is appropriate to provide for [the] continuing support of the [plaintiff]” does not necessarily mean that the award was proper and did not function as a property distribution. Instead, the alimony award must actually be consistent with its purpose—support—and when the alimony award provides approximately $6.9 million more than the plaintiff needs for support, I cannot conclude that it comports with such a purpose.
I question the extent to which the $40,000 periodic award is insufficient to provide for the plaintiff's needs because her financial affidavit includes numerous expenditures that relate to the children. The affidavit includes the following monthly expenses incurred for the children: restaurant costs ($851), medical, dental, and counseling costs ($949), clothing costs ($2851), personal care costs ($222), nanny and sitter costs ($4036), and lessons and extracurricular costs ($6846, excluding Bat Mitzvah costs). If these costs are subtracted from the plaintiff's expenses, as adjusted in this opinion (approximately $45,000), the plaintiff's monthly support need totals $29,245. Thus, the monthly unallocated alimony and child support award of $40,000 per month would completely provide for the plaintiff's needs and leave approximately $11,000 per month to defray child care costs.
In addition, the lump sum alimony award is nonmodifiable. As a result, the defendant will be unable to modify the obligation as the children attain the age of majority. Of course, he can seek an adjustment to the periodic unallocated alimony and child support award pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86.
As I previously noted in this opinion, the plaintiff's stated need—$65,444—overstates her actual monthly support need—approximately $45,000. See footnotes 12, 13 and 15 of this opinion. In addition, there is no reason to believe that the plaintiff's financial affidavit does not reflect the expense of maintaining her current lifestyle. Surely, no one could reasonably argue that the stated monthly support need, or the support need as adjusted in this opinion, merely covers the bare necessities . Moreover, it is no doubt a truism that $102,500 exceeds both $65,444 and $45,000.
The majority claims that it “make[s] no judgment as to the excessiveness or propriety of the alimony award as alimony.” (Emphasis omitted.) Footnote 25 of the majority opinion. Instead, the majority insists that its consideration of the § 46b-82 factors supports “the characterization of the [lump sum] award as alimony and not a property distribution.” Id. In my view, this reasoning is circular. If the majority, after considering the § 46b-82 factors, concludes that the lump sum award can fairly be characterized as alimony, then it must conclude that the award is a proper amount, not an excessive amount, for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff; after all, that is the character of alimony. Thus, at least in my view, the majority's conclusion that the lump sum award is characteristically alimony necessarily is a conclusion that the award is not excessive.
I agree that divorcing spouses are entitled, to the extent practicable, to maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage and that alimony may be awarded for such purpose. See, e.g., Brody v. Brody , 315 Conn. 300, 313, 105 A.3d 887 (2015) (“[t]he generally accepted purpose of ... alimony is to enable a spouse who is disadvantaged through divorce to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with the standard of living during marriage” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Dan v. Dan , 315 Conn. 1, 11, 105 A.3d 118 (2014) (“[o]ne reason for the abandoned spouse's entitlement to sufficient alimony to ensure the continued enjoyment of the standard of living that he or she enjoyed during the marriage is that the spouse's efforts increased the other's earning capacity at the expense of [his or] her own” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). I further agree that the parties in the present case enjoyed a high standard of living. I cannot agree, however, that the alimony award is necessary for the plaintiff to maintain such a standard.
We have defined the statutory factor of “station” in §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 to mean standard of living. See, e.g., Blake v. Blake , 207 Conn. 217, 232, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (“The most pertinent definition of ‘station’ ... is ‘social standing.’ A person's social standing is strongly correlated to his standard of living ....”).
The trial court made no finding regarding the marital standard of living or the monthly marital expenses. Nevertheless, pursuant to Practice Book § 25-30 (a), both the plaintiff and the defendant submitted financial affidavits to the trial court, which cataloged their current incomes, expenses, assets, and liabilities around the time of the dissolution. Our cases have made clear that courts are entitled to rely on the truth and accuracy of such affidavits. See, e.g., Billington v. Billington , supra, 220 Conn. at 219, 595 A.2d 1377. If the trial court is entitled to rely on such affidavits, I see no reason why this court cannot also rely on such affidavits, particularly when the trial court has not discredited such affidavits and appears to have relied on them itself. The plaintiff's affidavit reveals monthly expenses of approximately $45,000, and a cursory review of her affidavit leaves the reviewer with but one reasonable conclusion, namely, that $45,000 per month is the cost of maintaining her current lifestyle, not, as the majority seems to suggest, merely the cost of her basic living expenses. A sampling of the plaintiff's monthly expenses is illustrative: more than $2000 for clothing, approximately $1300 for “personal care,” including costs for hairdressing, manicures, pedicures, massages, and fitness classes, and more than $3800 for entertainment, travel, and vacations. The defendant's affidavit discloses monthly expenses of $97,645. Contained in that amount is a monthly expense for alimony and child support in the amount of $46,000. When the alimony and support expense is subtracted, the defendant is left with $51,645 in his own living expenses. Given the similarity in the monthly expenses disclosed by the plaintiff and the defendant, it appears from the record that, in order to sustain their current lifestyle, the parties each need between $45,000 and $52,000 per month. Such a conclusion is further supported by the parties' stipulation for unallocated alimony and child support, pendente lite , of $46,000 per month. Of course, the trial court made no finding in this regard, and it is not the province of this court to do so. I highlight these facts simply to make the following point: no trial court could reasonably conclude that an alimony award of $102,500 per month, an amount that is nearly 230 percent of the plaintiff's monthly expenses, is proper based on the facts of the present case. Moreover, the record reveals no evidence that would support a finding that the plaintiff's monthly expenses—and, therefore, the cost of maintaining her current lifestyle—are anywhere near $102,500.
Next, the majority notes, and correctly so, that the marital standard of living, or station, and expenses, or needs, of the parties are but two of the statutory factors that the trial court is to consider when entering alimony orders. Consideration of all the factors, the majority states, “militates against characterizing the lump sum alimony award as a property distribution.” Text accompanying footnote 25 of the majority opinion. I presume this means that the majority has concluded, in light of the statutory factors set forth in § 46b-82, that the alimony award is not excessive or improper. See footnote 18 of this opinion. I disagree.
First, the majority mistakenly assumes that the § 46b-82 factors go exclusively to the alimony award amount, and, therefore, because that statute includes factors in addition to “station” and “needs,” an alimony award may properly exceed the recipient's support and maintenance needs. Section 46b-82 does direct the trial court to consider factors other than station and need, such as “the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health ... occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, [and] estate ... of each of the parties ....” General Statutes § 46b-82 (a). These factors are not only relevant for determining the amount of an alimony award, but they must also be considered “[i]n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration ... of the award ....” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-82. To be sure, not all factors go to the cost of maintaining the recipient's lifestyle. Nonetheless, they do relate to the recipient's support and maintenance needs. More specifically, the factors help the trial court determine, in light of the recipient's assets and income, the amount and duration of alimony necessary for the recipient to maintain the lifestyle that he or she enjoyed at the time of dissolution. For example, the court is to consider the age, health, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, and employability of the parties. These factors, as they relate to the recipient spouse, inform the court of the recipient's current income or potential future income and, therefore, his or her ability or inability, as the case may be, to provide for his or her own support needs, at least in part. For example, if the recipient did not work for the greater portion of the marriage, like the plaintiff in the present case, such recipient's age, health, vocational skills, education, and employability may lead the trial court to conclude that he or she, despite having been unemployed during the marriage, can, in time, find employment, potentially reducing the amount, or shortening the duration, of the alimony needed. Second, and relatedly, it is an axiom of matrimonial law that the purpose of alimony is to provide the recipient with support and maintenance. See, e.g., Dan v. Dan , supra, 315 Conn. at 10, 105 A.3d 118 (“[h]istorically, alimony was based [on] the continuing duty of a divorced husband to support an abandoned wife and should be sufficient to provide her with the kind of living [that] she might have enjoyed but for the breach of the marriage contract by the [husband]” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Simms v. Simms , 283 Conn. 494, 503, 927 A.2d 894 (2007) (“[t]he traditional purpose of alimony is to meet one's continuing duty to support” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Gay v. Gay , 266 Conn. 641, 647, 835 A.2d 1 (2003) (“[t]he purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony is to provide continuing support” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Thus, the § 46b-82 factors are intended to help the trial court determine, first, whether alimony is necessary for the recipient's support and maintenance, and, second, if alimony is necessary, the amount and duration necessary to provide for the recipient's support and maintenance. The factors do not, however, transform alimony into something it is not. Stated differently, the factors are not to be utilized to justify an award that exceeds the purpose of alimony, namely, support and maintenance.
A trial court must also consider an alimony obligor's ability to pay alimony and still provide for himself or herself. See Greco v. Greco , supra, 275 Conn. at 361–62, 880 A.2d 872 (“[i]t is hornbook law that what a spouse can afford to pay for support and alimony is a material consideration in the court's determination as to what is a proper order” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). In this regard, § 46b-82 (a) directs the court to consider “the age, health ... occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability ... and needs” of the obligor spouse.
The alimony award is also justified, the majority suggests, due to the disparity in the premarital agreement's distribution of the marital assets. The majority emphasizes that the defendant received more than $25 million in assets as a result of the divorce, compared to the approximately $4.5 to $5 million in assets that the plaintiff received. To support its suggestion that the alimony award is proper in light of the premarital agreement's comparative property distribution, the majority cites § 46b-82, particularly, the factor directing the trial court to consider the estate of each party. Section 46b-82 provides no support for this approach. Indeed, the court must consider the estate of both spouses. Consideration of the estate of the alimony obligor is necessary to determine his or her ability to pay alimony, and, likewise, consideration of the estate of the alimony recipient is necessary to determine his or her need for alimony. Considering the estates of the parties in a relative fashion, as the majority does in the present case, however, is an entirely different application of that factor. The majority's suggestion that a large lump sum alimony award, one not necessary to provide for the recipient's support and maintenance, might be justified due to the comparative share of the assets received by each spouse in accordance with a premarital agreement is entirely antithetical to the concept of such agreements. In fact, approving a $7.5 million lump sum alimony award because the parties' premarital agreement awarded the obligor $25 million in assets and the recipient between $4.5 and $5 million in assets is simply an attempt by the court to rewrite the parties' agreement. Our case law makes clear that the courts are not to second-guess the wisdom or question the fairness of premarital agreements that are entered into voluntarily. Cf. Crews v. Crews , 295 Conn. 153, 167, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010) (“whether the trial court or this court thinks the [premarital] agreement was a good bargain for the plaintiff does not enter into the analysis of [its enforceability]”). In a final attempt to justify the lump sum alimony award in the present case, the majority claims that the trial court did not specify how much of the unallocated alimony and child support award was intended for the children's support, rather than the plaintiff's. Although the trial court did not expressly state what the child support award amount was, we are not without guidance. Using the trial court's findings in the present case and the Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (guidelines) in effect at the time of the dissolution, we can, at the very least, determine the baseline for child support. To assist courts in calculating equitable and consistent child support orders, the guidelines contain a schedule of basic child support obligations based on the number of children and the parents' combined net weekly income. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b (f). In the present case, the parties have four minor children and a combined net weekly income of $12,097. For families with four minor children, however, the schedule only provides basic child support obligations for families with a combined net weekly income ranging between $370 and $4000. See id. “When the parents' combined net weekly income exceeds [$4000], child support awards shall be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the current support prescribed at the [$4000] net weekly income level shall be the minimum presumptive amount.” Id., § 46b–215a–2b (a) (2). In accordance with the guidelines, therefore, the presumptive minimum child support obligation in the present case is $765 per week. In Maturo v. Maturo , 296 Conn. 80, 995 A.2d 1 (2010), this court explained that, when a trial court is making a case specific child support determination for a family with a combined net weekly income that exceeds the upper range of the schedule, it must still follow the principle on which the guidelines are based, namely, “that the child support obligation as a percentage of the combined net weekly income should decline as the income level rises.” Id., at 95, 995 A.2d 1. Thus, the rule to be gleaned from Maturo is that the minimum child support order in high income cases should presumptively be no less than “the current support prescribed at the [$4000] net weekly income level”; Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–2b (a) (2) ; for a family with the same number of minor children, and the presumptive maximum order should “not exceed the [maximum] percent [set forth in the schedule] when the combined net weekly income of the family exceeds $4000 ....” Dowling v. Szymczak , 309 Conn. 390, 401, 72 A.3d 1 (2013). With these principles in mind, I conclude that the presumptive appropriate range for the child support order in the present case is between $765 and $2314 per week—19.13 percent of the combined net weekly income. See id. (child support obligation for high income family should not exceed percent of combined net weekly income used for family with same number of minor children at highest combined net weekly income set forth in schedule); Maturo v. Maturo , supra, at 96, 995 A.2d 1 (presumptively, support order for family with combined net weekly income in excess of income range covered by schedule should not exceed same percentage of income provided for family with same number of children and highest combined net weekly income provided by schedule); see also Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–2b (f) (setting child support obligation percentage for four minor children and combined net weekly income of $4000 at 19.13 percent). Thus, the presumptive maximum monthly child support, about $10,000, accounts for only a small amount of the excessive alimony. Even if it is assumed that the trial court found it necessary to deviate upward, there is no evidence in the record that would support the magnitude of the excessiveness of the award in the present case. Moreover, and as I explained in response to the plaintiff's argument on this point, the plaintiff's financial affidavit contains significant costs related to child care. Thus, simply stacking the presumptive child support amount on top of the expenses that the plaintiff listed in her financial affidavit would likely result in the double counting of some costs. Furthermore, the defendant is obligated to pay, in addition to the alimony and child support award, a substantial portion of the child care expenses, including health and dental insurance, 60 percent of unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, and one half of the expenses from the children's extracurricular activities.
The plaintiff received a $4.75 million property settlement payment pursuant to the premarital agreement, as well as other personal property, such as home furnishings, an automobile or automobiles, personal savings, checking and money market accounts.
Section 46b–215a–2b of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies was in effect in 2014, when the parties' marriage was dissolved. It was repealed July 1, 2015.
In the present case, the trial court found that the presumptive minimum child support obligation is $795. This finding conflicts with the amount prescribed in the schedule for a family with four minor children and a combined net weekly income of $4000. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–2b (f) (setting presumptive minimum weekly child support obligation at $765 for combined net weekly income of $4000). I assume the discrepancy is a clerical error.
Because the monthly alimony obligation of $102,500 unreasonably exceeds the plaintiff's monthly support need of $45,000, and despite the arguments advanced by the plaintiff and the majority, I conclude that the lump sum alimony award, in conjunction with the periodic alimony award, is excessive. I concede, however, that this fact alone does not make the lump sum alimony award a functional property distribution. Indeed, for the alimony award to function as a property distribution, it must result in the transfer to the plaintiff of property that the defendant was awarded pursuant to the premarital agreement. The lump sum alimony award in the present case results in such a transfer.
The majority claims that it is improper to consider the defendant's need to invade his assets to meet the alimony obligation because (1) the defendant did not make this argument, and (2) the trial court made no finding regarding the defendant's earning capacity. See footnote 20 of the majority opinion. Both claims are unwarranted.
First, the defendant in the present case claims that the trial court's lump sum alimony award is an improper functional property distribution. In order to be a property distribution, the award must distribute some of the defendant's property to the plaintiff; therefore, necessarily subsumed in the defendant's claim is the argument that he will need to invade assets to satisfy the alimony award. Moreover, at oral argument in the present case, counsel for both the plaintiff and the defendant discussed the defendant's need to utilize assets to meet the alimony obligation and the impact, if any, that fact should have on this court's resolution of this case.
Even if I agreed that the defendant has not argued that he will need to invade his assets to satisfy the alimony obligation—which I do not—that would not prevent this court from considering such an argument in the present case. Indeed, this court generally will not consider claims that the parties have not raised; see, e.g., State v. Connor , 321 Conn. 350, 362, 138 A.3d 265 (2016) (“appellate courts generally do not consider issues that were not raised by the parties”); and this opinion is consistent with that principle. I have not addressed any claim that was not raised by the defendant. Instead, I have merely decided the specific claim asserted by the defendant, namely, that the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution, albeit, on the basis of a slightly different argument or theory than the defendant presented. See, e.g., State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410, 467 n. 5, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (Zarella, J. , concurring in the judgment) (noting that majority declined to adopt any of defendant's three alternatives for prescreening eyewitness identification testimony, opting instead to craft rule of its own creation); Waterbury v. Washington , 260 Conn. 506, 549, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002) (agreeing with plaintiff's claim but for reasons different from those that plaintiff advanced). It is not improper for me to consider the defendant's need to invade assets because “it is an argument , not a claim .” (Emphasis in original.) Michael T . v. Commissioner of Correction , 319 Conn. 623, 635 n. 7, 126 A.3d 558 (2015) ; see id. (this court may “review legal arguments that differ from those raised before the trial court if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim raised at trial” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The majority's contrary assertion must be based on a misunderstanding of the argument-claim distinction. “Generally speaking, an argument is a point or line of reasoning made in support of a particular claim.” State v. Fernando A ., 294 Conn. 1, 116 n. 32, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (Palmer, J. , dissenting in part). Arguments and claims are not subject to the same rules. See id. (“[o]nly claims are subject to our rules of preservation, not arguments”). Moreover, the defendant's claim raises an issue of first impression. Accordingly, it would be unfair and inequitable for this court to decline to address the claim fully simply because the defendant did not accurately foresee the exact argument on which the court would rest its decision. Cf. Rowe v. Superior Court , 289 Conn. 649, 661 n. 6, 960 A.2d 256 (2008) (preservation rules are applied less stringently to arguments of first impression), overruled in part on other grounds by Hardy v. Superior Court , 305 Conn. 824, 48 A.3d 50 (2012). Insofar as the majority is concerned that it would be unfair or prejudicial to the plaintiff to decide the claim that the defendant raises, which is based, in part, on the argument that the defendant will need to invade his assets to satisfy the obligation, the proper remedy would be to order supplemental briefing, not to avoid fully addressing the defendant's claim. In fact, this court often orders supplemental briefing when it identifies an argument that may impact the resolution of a claim raised by the parties. See, e.g., State v. Wright , 320 Conn. 781, 786–87, 135 A.3d 1 (2016) (defendant argued that trial court improperly excluded certain evidence under rape shield statute, and we ordered supplemental briefing regarding meaning of “material,” as used in statute).
Second, the majority's assertion that “we cannot presume that [the defendant] must invade his assets to pay the alimony and child support awards based [on] this record ... [because] the [trial] court did not make any determination as to whether its finding of the defendant's income was also a finding of his earning capacity ” is inconsistent with our case law. (Emphasis in original.) Footnote 20 of the majority opinion. “It is well established that the trial court may under appropriate circumstances in a marital dissolution proceeding base financial awards ... on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on actual earned income.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer , 309 Conn. 105, 113–14, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). We have recently decided, however, “that, when a trial court has based a financial award pursuant to § 46b–82 or [General Statutes] § 46b–86 on a party's earning capacity, the court must determine the specific dollar amount of the party's earning capacity.” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 117, 70 A.3d 13 ; see also id. (“the failure to specify the dollar amount of the earning capacity leaves the relevant party in doubt as to what is expected from him or her, and makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, both for a reviewing court to determine the reasonableness of the financial award and for the trial court in a subsequent proceeding on a motion for modification to determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances”). In light of this requirement, and because, as the majority acknowledges, the trial court made no finding regarding the defendant's earning capacity, the financial orders in the present case must be based on the defendant's actual income. Thus, the reality of the present case is that the trial court ordered an alimony award that exceeds the defendant's income, thereby requiring the defendant to invade his assets to satisfy the alimony and support obligation. The majority's theoretical argument that perhaps the defendant has a greater earning capacity and, therefore, could increase his income and avoid the need to utilize assets to meet the alimony obligation is misplaced. The trial court did not base its orders on such reasoning, and the orders should not be upheld on the basis of such reasoning. That the trial court did not impute income to the defendant evinces that the court concluded that the defendant is reasonably meeting his earning potential and should not be obligated to do better. The fact that, theoretically, the defendant may be able to generate a greater income does not mean that he should have to.
A recent decision of the Appellate Court is instructive. In Dumbauld v. Dumbauld , 163 Conn.App. 517, 523, 136 A.3d 669 (2016), the Appellate Court considered a pendente lite alimony award that exceeded the obligor's income and, as a result, had to be paid out of the obligor's assets. Acknowledging that alimony in excess of the obligor's income had been upheld in the past, the Appellate Court nevertheless concluded that the award was an improper property distribution. Id., at 531, 136 A.3d 669. It reasoned that the cases permitting alimony in excess of net income were distinguishable on two grounds. See id., at 527, 136 A.3d 669. First, in many cases, the court had found the obligor's evidence regarding his or her income to be untrustworthy and made specific findings as to either imputed income or earning capacity. Id. Second, those courts allowing alimony to be based on an ability to pay, rather than on imputed income, earning capacity, or actual income, had the authority, pursuant to § 46b–81, to divide property. Id., at 529, 136 A.3d 669. The statute permitting pendente lite alimony, the court reasoned, did not authorize the court to transfer property between spouses. Id., at 530, 136 A.3d 669. Thus, the Appellate Court concluded that the pendente lite alimony award was improper because it exceeded the income of the obligor, the trial court made no finding regarding imputed income, and the trial court was without authority to distribute property between the spouses. See id., at 531, 136 A.3d 669. Similarly, in the present case, the alimony obligation exceeds the defendant's income, and the trial court has made no finding regarding imputed income or earning capacity. Moreover, the trial court had no authority to transfer property between the spouses because the spouses had executed a premarital agreement. Of course, a trial court may, when necessary for support and maintenance of the alimony recipient, require the obligor to pay alimony out of assets. Simms v. Simms , supra, 283 Conn. at 505, 927 A.2d 894. As I discussed in this opinion, however, this is not such a case.
The defendant has a monthly income of approximately $80,833. The alimony obligation, however, is $102,500 per month. Thus, the defendant's monthly income is insufficient to satisfy the monthly alimony obligation, and, therefore, the defendant will necessarily need to invade his assets—assets that he was awarded under the premarital agreement—to cover the balance of the obligation, nearly $22,000 per month. Of course, the need to invade assets, in and of itself, does not make the lump sum alimony award a functional property distribution. See Simms v. Simms , supra, 283 Conn. at 505, 927 A.2d 894 (trial court is not without authority to order alimony simply because such order would require obligor to invade his or her assets); see also Brody v. Brody , 136 Conn.App. 773, 790, 51 A.3d 1121 (2012) ( “The defendant may elect to pay the [lump sum alimony] award out of his separate assets, but how he chooses to satisfy his obligation under the court's order is his decision. The court did not order him to pay the award out of his separate assets. That he plans to do so does not invalidate an otherwise valid award of alimony.”), rev'd in part on other grounds, 315 Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015). When an alimony award is necessary to provide for the support and maintenance of the recipient, the fact that the obligor needs to invade his or her assets to satisfy the obligation does not change the award's function, which is to provide support and maintenance. On the other hand, when an alimony award is excessive and requires the obligor to invade his or her assets to satisfy the obligation to pay the award, the function of the award changes. In this circumstance, the obligor is forced to transfer assets to the recipient, assets that the obligor was awarded in the dissolution proceeding and that are unnecessary for the support and maintenance of the recipient.
In the present case, the alimony order results in the plaintiff receiving at least $6.9 million in excess of her support and maintenance needs. Thus, the award goes beyond the purpose of alimony. Moreover, the award is nearly 127 percent of the defendant's monthly income, and, therefore, he will need to invade his assets to satisfy the court order. Thus, under the trial court's current financial support orders, the defendant must transfer to the plaintiff assets that he was awarded under the premarital agreement, assets that are unnecessary for the plaintiff's support and maintenance. The only logical conclusion is that the trial court has effectuated, whether intentional or not, a transfer of the defendant's assets to the plaintiff, contrary to the intention of the parties as represented in their premarital agreement. I thus conclude that the lump sum alimony award in the present case is a functional property distribution. The analysis employed in this case is consistent with the development of matrimonial law in other jurisdictions. Courts in Florida and South Dakota agree that premarital agreements limit the discretion of dissolution courts. See Hannon v. Hannon , supra, 740 So.2d at 1187 (“A primary purpose of [a premarital] agreement is to modify or shrink the general discretion of the dissolution ... [court] in doing equity between the parties. The agreement itself is intended to define the mutual equities, and the [dissolution court] is not free to ignore its provisions or to render them ineffective. ... Dissolution ... courts should attempt to give effect to [premarital] agreements that are ... properly made and fully enforceable.”); Walker v. Walker , supra, 765 N.W.2d at 754 (same). In Hannon , the husband, George Hannon, Sr., and the wife, Lorain A. Hannon, entered into a premarital agreement, pursuant to which each waived any interest in the separate property of the other, including any rights they might have as a surviving spouse. Hannon v. Hannon , supra, at 1182–83,. The agreement also provided that the husband promised “to support [the wife] during their marriage in a manner [that] is consistent with the standard of living of [the husband] from time to time during their marriage,” but it did not address alimony. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 1183. The parties divorced, and the husband challenged the trial court's lump sum alimony award of $92,736. Id. He argued that the award was, in effect, a property distribution because his separate property was the only source from which he could pay the lump sum alimony award. See id. The Florida District Court of Appeal overturned the lump sum alimony award. See id., at 1188. The court recognized that the wife could receive lump sum alimony despite having waived any rights in the husband's separate property. See id. Nevertheless, the court stated that “the [premarital] agreement cannot be treated as though it has no limiting effect on the power of the trial [court] to award lump sum alimony. Any such award must be carefully restricted in its amount so that it does not appear to contradict the terms of the [premarital agreement].” Id. The court concluded that the agreement demonstrated the parties' intent to waive any interest in the property of the other, both during their lifetimes and after death, and the husband's intent to support the wife during his lifetime only. Thus, the court further concluded that the lump sum alimony award was improper in light of the agreement because it was based on the wife's, rather than the husband's, life expectancy. Id.
The plaintiff and the majority assert that the trial court called the award alimony and stated it was for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff. Thus, they say, it cannot be a functional property distribution. I say, “[s]uppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird has no label that says ‘duck.’ But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to the pond and you notice he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not.” R. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (1982) p. 102. Of course, in this case, the alimony award has a label. That fact, however, cannot be dispositive. See footnote 14 of this opinion. The label does not change the award's function. Cf. State v. Gooch , 186 Conn. 17, 18, 438 A.2d 867 (1982) (“[p]utting a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional claim will no more change its essential character than calling a bull a cow will change its gender”). Indeed, the lump sum “alimony” award in the present case looks like a property distribution. It works like one, too.
The majority avoids fully addressing the defendant's claim that the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution by expressing no opinion regarding whether the alimony is excessive—although it seems to attempt to justify the size of the alimony award—and by declining to address the defendant's need to invade assets to satisfy his alimony obligation. Instead, it states: “[W]hen a trial court awards a spouse alimony exceeding his or her claimed expenses in the wake of a [premarital] agreement distributing all of the parties' property, the award may still be challenged as excessive alimony , rather than a functional property distribution. [The] result [in the present case] does not change this fact. ... [T]he defendant did not ask [the court] to proclaim the lump sum award as excessive even if [the court] determine[s] that the award is not a functional property distribution.” (Emphasis in original.) Footnote 30 of the majority opinion. This is just semantics. It seems to me that in a case in which the alimony award exceeds both the recipient's needs and the obligor's income—thereby necessitating the obligor to use assets to satisfy the alimony obligation—it should not matter whether the obligor characterizes the alimony award as excessive alimony or a functional property distribution. Under such circumstances, that is a distinction without a difference.
In Walker , the wife, Debra Sue Walker, and the husband, Edward Walker, Jr., entered into a similar agreement in that each waived any right or interest in the premarital property of the other. See Walker v. Walker , supra, 765 N.W.2d at 749. When the parties divorced, the trial court denied the husband's request for lump sum alimony because the court found that he had not established a need for the alimony or the wife's ability to pay alimony. Id., at 753. The husband appealed, claiming that the trial court failed to consider the wife's premarital assets in assessing her ability to satisfy a lump sum alimony obligation. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court characterized the husband's claim as an attempt to effectively ify the premarital agreement and concluded that, in light of such agreement, the trial court could not consider the wife's premarital assets, valued at nearly $630,000, as a source of funds for a lump sum alimony award because the husband had waived any right to such funds. See id., at 754.
Even if the lump sum alimony award in the present case was not a functional property distribution, I would still find it to be improper under the circumstances. As I already discussed, the award far exceeds the plaintiff's needs for support and maintenance. For that reason alone, I believe it undermines the premarital agreement.
When the parties agreed to allow the court to set alimony in the event of a divorce, they intended for the court to award an amount that would provide for the recipient spouse's support; after all, that is what alimony is. According to the plaintiff's own financial affidavit, that amount is approximately $45,000 per month. When the trial court entered an order requiring the defendant to pay alimony in considerable excess of the plaintiff's needs, the order provided the plaintiff with a windfall that was not contemplated by the parties' premarital agreement. In doing so, the trial court defeated that agreement. When the premarital agreement in the present case was executed, as amended, the plaintiff and the defendant intended that, if their marriage were to be dissolved, each would keep his or her own separate property, the defendant would keep the marital property and, in exchange, the plaintiff would receive a property settlement payment, which increased with the length of the marriage and the number of children, and the court would set an alimony award. Because the purpose of alimony is to provide support and maintenance, at the time of dissolution, the alimony award the parties had bargained for was approximately $45,000 per month. Of course, the award need not be that amount exactly and could be in lump sum, rather than periodic, form. The trial court, however, awarded more than twice that amount. That is not what the parties bargained for. Thus, the court's alimony award is improper and undermines the premarital agreement because it exceeds the plaintiff's support and maintenance needs beyond all reasonable bounds.
I am not suggesting that a court's alimony award must exactly equal a recipient's support and maintenance needs when there is an enforceable premarital agreement. There most certainly is a zone of reasonable alimony awards. An order that awards nearly $7 million in excess alimony, however, is surely beyond the outer bounds of reasonableness.
In light of the foregoing facts, I conclude that the lump sum alimony award in the present case is a functional property distribution because it far exceeds the plaintiff's need for support and requires the defendant to invade assets to satisfy the obligation. The lump sum alimony award is also improper because the parties' bargain allowed for the court to set alimony—an award that would provide for the support and maintenance of the recipient. The award in this case goes far beyond that purpose. Moreover, “[b]ecause the financial orders in an action for dissolution of marriage are of necessity interwoven and because the rendering of judgment in an action for the dissolution of marriage is a carefully crafted mosaic ... each element of which may be dependent on the other”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Wiegand v. Wiegand , 129 Conn.App. 526, 540, 21 A.3d 489 (2011) ; the defendant's second claim regarding attorney's fees is affected by the trial court's improper lump sum alimony award. Accordingly, I need not consider that claim. See id. Instead, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the financial orders and remand the case for a new hearing on the financial matters.
In sum, I reiterate my concern with the practical consequences that are likely to follow from the majority's opinion in the present case. In light of that opinion, trial courts can effectively undermine premarital agreements entered into by prospective spouses by making excessive alimony awards. As a result, I fear that parties will be encouraged to include in their premarital agreements provisions either establishing alimony, by amount or formula, or precluding it altogether. Although the public policy of this state generally favors the private settlement of family matters; see, e.g., Billington v. Billington , supra, 220 Conn. at 221, 595 A.2d 1377 ; and alimony is a permissible subject matter for premarital agreements; General Statutes § 46b–36d (a) (4) (parties to premarital agreement may contract with respect to “[t]he modification or elimination of spousal support”); in my view, alimony is more appropriately settled at the time of dissolution, when the obligor's ability to pay and the recipient's support needs are both known, rather than at some time before the marriage, when these relevant considerations are uncertain. II
The majority appears to “acknowledge” my concerns over the practical consequences of its opinion in the present case. Footnote 30 of the majority opinion. Nevertheless, the majority contends that, if trial courts are “tempted to circumvent a lopsided property distribution contained in an otherwise enforceable [premarital] agreement by awarding large amounts of alimony, [j]udicial restraint counsels us to commend the issue to the attention of the legislature for further review ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The majority's statement illustrates the point that its analysis misses. The legislature has already addressed this issue by enacting the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (act), General Statutes § 46b–36a et seq. That the majority believes that the legislature must do more in order to prevent trial judges from circumventing premarital agreements is akin to directing those judges to ignore the act altogether.
ENFORCEABILITY OF PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
The plaintiff filed a cross appeal challenging the enforceability of the premarital agreement. Her appeal, however, was contingent on the defendant prevailing on his claims or this court otherwise remanding the case for the entry of new financial orders. Because I would reverse the trial court's financial orders and remand the case for a new hearing on the financial matters, I reach the plaintiff's cross appeal. The plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the premarital agreement entered into by the parties in 1997, and amended in 2008, was enforceable. In essence, she argues that the agreement is unenforceable because (1) the defendant did not make a fair and reasonable disclosure of his income when the agreement was amended in 2008, (2) the defendant did not make a fair and reasonable disclosure of the value of certain software in which he had a proprietary interest when the parties married, and (3) the agreement was unconscionable when entered into in 1997, when amended in 2008, and when the defendant sought enforcement of the agreement in 2014. I agree that the defendant did not make a fair and reasonable disclosure of his income in 2008, when he and the plaintiff amended the premarital agreement, and, therefore, I need not address the plaintiff's other arguments. In light of the defendant's unfair and unreasonable disclosure of his income, I conclude that it was improper for the trial court to enforce the amended agreement.
The following facts are relevant to this claim. The plaintiff and the defendant executed a premarital agreement on July 14, 1997, approximately three weeks before they were married. As I previously noted, the agreement provided that, in the event of dissolution of the marriage, each party would retain their separate property, the defendant would retain the marital property, with the exception of certain personal property, and the plaintiff would receive a property settlement payment, which increased with the length of the marriage and the number of children. Both parties made financial disclosures in connection with the agreement, including a disclosure by the defendant of his proprietary interest in a certain software program. At that time, the defendant valued that interest at between $285,000 and $570,000. Within three years of marrying, the defendant sold the software and received approximately $37 million for his interest in it.
In July, 2008, the parties amended their premarital agreement. The amendment ratified and confirmed the terms of the original agreement. In addition, it granted the plaintiff a separate interest in the marital home and provided that, in the event of a legal separation or a divorce, the plaintiff would receive $3.5 million for such interest, along with any payment due pursuant to the formula set forth in the original agreement. The parties again made financial disclosures in connection with the amendment. Among other things, the defendant listed his taxable income for 2004, 2005, and 2006 in the amounts of $1,249,989, $902,025, and $1,687,677, respectively. He did not, however, disclose his 2007 income or his income in 2008 as of the date of the amendment, namely, July 10.
I will begin with the standard of review and governing legal principles. A trial court's determination of whether a premarital agreement is unenforceable under § 46b–36g is a mixed question of fact and law, and, therefore, this court's review of such determination is plenary. E.g., Friezo v. Friezo , 281 Conn. 166, 180, 914 A.2d 533 (2007). Thus, I must decide whether the trial court's “conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 181.. Premarital agreements entered into on or after October 1, 1995, such as the agreement in the present case, are governed by the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (act), General Statutes § 46b–36a et seq. See P.A. 95–170, §§ 10 and 11 (act applies to premarital agreements executed on or after October 1, 1995). Under the act, a premarital agreement or amendment thereto is unenforceable “if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that: (1) [s]uch party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) [t]he agreement was unconscionable when it was executed or when enforcement is sought; or (3) [b]efore execution of the agreement, such party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party; or (4) [s]uch party was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel.” General Statutes § 46b–36g (a).
The parties disagree on which standard should be applied to review the premarital agreement in the present case. The plaintiff contends that the agreement should be treated as a postnuptial agreement because it was amended during the marriage, and, therefore, the agreement should be subjected to “special scrutiny” in accordance with Bedrick v. Bedrick , 300 Conn. 691, 697, 17 A.3d 17 (2011). She contends that the same policy concerns present in Bedrick , which resulted in the adoption of heightened scrutiny for postnuptial agreements, are present in this case as well. On the other hand, the defendant claims that the amended agreement should be treated as a premarital agreement because the act expressly provides for the modification of such agreements during the marriage. See General Statutes § 46b–36f (“[a]fter marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended”). Thus, the defendant claims, the enforceability of the agreement should be governed by § 46b–36g, like all premarital agreements. Moreover, the defendant argues that the plain language of § 46b–36g (a) requires such a conclusion in that it provides that “[a] premarital agreement or amendment shall not be enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves” either that such party did not voluntarily enter into the agreement, the agreement was unconscionable, such party was not provided with a fair and reasonable disclosure regarding the property, financial obligations and income of the other party, or such party was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel. (Emphasis added.) Because I have concluded that the premarital agreement in the present case would not survive the scrutiny required by § 46b–36g, which is less exacting than the scrutiny required by Bedrick , I need not decide which standard should be applied to a premarital agreement that is amended during the marriage.
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant has waived the argument that § 46b–36g, rather than Bedrick , should govern the enforceability of the agreement. She asserts that the defendant failed to challenge the trial court's application of Bedrick , and, therefore, he cannot now challenge it on appeal. As the defendant correctly notes, however, he was not aggrieved by the trial court's enforcement of the premarital agreement and, thus, could not appeal the trial court's decision to apply the special scrutiny required for postnuptial agreements in accordance with Bedrick . See, e.g., Seymour v. Seymour , 262 Conn. 107, 110, 809 A.2d 1114 (2002) (“[o]rdinarily, a party that prevails in the trial court is not aggrieved”).
The plaintiff contends, among other things, that the defendant's financial disclosure in connection with the 2008 amendment to the premarital agreement was not fair and reasonable because he did not disclose his 2007 and 2008 income. In response, the defendant argues that he provided the plaintiff with a three year income history, including 2004, 2005, and 2006. He further contends that he generally does not know his exact annual income until he has filed his income tax returns and that, as of July, 2008, he had not filed his 2007 income tax return; therefore, he could not have disclosed his 2007 and 2008 income at the time the parties amended their premarital agreement. Under these circumstances, the defendant claims that his financial disclosure was fair and reasonable.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court found that the defendant's income disclosure was inadequate and that the defendant did not challenge that finding in his principal brief in this appeal. Thus, the plaintiff contends, the defendant has waived this claim. The defendant responds that he could not challenge such finding on appeal because, in light of the trial court's enforcement of the premarital agreement, he was not aggrieved by the finding. The plaintiff argues that, in Bauer v. Bauer , 308 Conn. 124, 60 A.3d 950 (2013), we rejected the very argument the defendant now makes, namely, that a party cannot be aggrieved by a factual finding in the event that such party agrees with the ultimate financial orders.
First, I believe that the plaintiff reads the trial court's decision to establish more than it does. The finding that the plaintiff relies on must be read in context. At trial, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's disclosure of his assets was inadequate because he had valued the assets as of December 31, 2007, rather than contemporaneously with the execution of the amendment to the premarital agreement in July, 2008. In addition, she argued that the defendant had the information necessary for such valuation. The trial court agreed that the defendant could have valued the assets as of July, 2008, but nonetheless found the disclosure of the value of the assets to be adequate. The trial court reasoned that “the evidence supports a finding that the [defendant's] earlier disclosure of [the value of his] assets [was] substantially the same as the financial picture at the time the [amendment] was executed.” (Emphasis omitted.) The court then went on to state: “The same, however, cannot be said for the [defendant's] failure to adequately disclose his income for the [eighteen months] preceding the execution of the [amendment] in [July] of 2008.” I do not read this to be a finding that the defendant's disclosure was inadequate, in the sense that it was not fair and reasonable as required by § 46b–36g (a) (3), as the plaintiff suggests. Instead, when read in conjunction with the preceding sentence, the trial court's finding was that the defendant's income disclosure was unlike his asset disclosure in that the income disclosure did not provide the plaintiff with a current value of his income, whereas the asset disclosure, despite being based on a six month old valuation, provided a value that was substantially similar to the value of the assets at the time the 2008 amendment was executed. This reading is consistent with the ultimate conclusion of the trial court, namely, that the premarital agreement was enforceable. If the trial court had in fact found that the defendant's financial disclosure was not fair and reasonable, it could not have ultimately enforced the agreement, regardless of whether the court applied the standard set forth in § 46b–36g or in Bedrick v. Bedrick , 300 Conn. 691, 17 A.3d 17 (2011).
Second, Bauer is inapposite. In that case, the factual finding at issue was that “[t]he parties agree to split equally the [husband's] ... pension and annuity 403 (b) plans ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bauer v. Bauer , supra, 308 Conn. at 126, 60 A.3d 950. The trial court's orders, however, failed to address these plans. Id., at 127, 60 A.3d 950. The trial court subsequently granted the wife's motion for clarification and clarified the ambiguity created by the absence of an order addressing the court's finding that the parties would split the value of the pension and annuity plans. See id., 127–28, 60 A.3d 950. In light of the finding that the husband was to split his pension and annuity plans with the wife, the absence of any order regarding the plans, and the ambiguity created when the two were considered together, we concluded that the husband was indeed aggrieved by the finding. Id., 135–37, 60 A.3d 950. In the present case, however, even though the finding might arguably be to the defendant's disadvantage, the trial court enforced the premarital agreement. Thus, the defendant was not aggrieved and could not have appealed the trial court's finding. See, e.g., Seymour v. Seymour , 262 Conn. 107, 110–11, 809 A.2d 1114 (2002) ; see also footnote 29 of this opinion.
Friezo is our seminal, and only, case addressing what constitutes a fair and reasonable disclosure under § 46b–36g (a) (3). In that case, we began by noting that the question was a matter of statutory interpretation, and, as such, we first looked to the plain meaning of the statutory text. Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 180, 182, 914 A.2d 533. Although “fair and reasonable” is not defined in § 46b–36g (a) (3), we concluded that it “was intended to be understood in the context of the phrase that directly follows, namely, ‘the amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party ....’ General Statutes § 46b–36g (a) (3). Accordingly, ‘fair and reasonable’ disclosure refers to the nature, extent and accuracy of the information to be disclosed ....” Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 182–83, 914 A.2d 533.
Finding no further guidance in the text of the statute, we turned to the legislative history. See id., at 183, 914 A.2d 533. The legislative history revealed that the act had been influenced by three things: this court's decision in McHugh v. McHugh , 181 Conn. 482, 436 A.2d 8 (1980), the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, and a law review article written by Professor Judith T. Younger, J. Younger, “Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements,” 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 1059 (1988). Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 183–84, 914 A.2d 533. Our review of the legislative history also uncovered that the original bill made it more difficult to challenge the enforceability of a premarital agreement on the ground that the financial disclosure was not fair and reasonable. Id., at 185, 914 A.2d 533. Under the terms of that bill, in addition to establishing that the disclosure was unfair and unreasonable, the challenging party was required to show that he or she had not waived such a disclosure and did not have, or reasonably could not have had, adequate knowledge of the other party's property, income, and financial obligations. Id. The removal of the latter two requirements, we reasoned, not only made it easier to establish that a financial disclosure was not fair and reasonable, but also demonstrated that the legislature intended the requirement to focus on the information disclosed rather than on the party to whom disclosure was made. Id.
Finally, we considered the case law of this and other jurisdictions. We began with McHugh , noting that the act was intended to clarify and not supplant it. Id., at 185–86 and n. 23, 914 A.2d 533. McHugh was the first case in our modern history to consider the enforceability of a premarital agreement. McHugh v. McHugh , supra, 181 Conn. at 485, 436 A.2d 8. In that case, we concluded that a premarital agreement is enforceable if, among other things, each party discloses to the other “the amount, character, and value of individually owned property ....” Id., at 486, 436 A.2d 8. The duty is one of disclosure and not of inquiry, we noted, for that is the only way in which a court can ensure that the parties have intelligently waived their statutory rights. See id., at 486–87, 436 A.2d 8. Moreover, because prospective spouses are in a confidential relationship, each must exercise good faith, candor, and sincerity in matters bearing on the agreement. Id., at 487, 436 A.2d 8. In Friezo , we gleaned three important points from McHugh : “First, the purpose of disclosure is to ensure that each party has sufficient knowledge of the other party's financial circumstances to understand the nature of the legal rights being waived. ... Second, financial disclosure in Connecticut must be understood as a burden to inform borne solely by the disclosing party. ... Third, full financial disclosure is required in a [premarital] agreement only if the party to whom disclosure is made does not have independent knowledge of the other party's financial circumstances.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 186–87,, 914 A.2d 533.
After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, we agreed with the position taken by a majority of other states, which was consistent with McHugh and our reading of the statute. See id., 188–91, 914 A.2d 533. “[A] fair and reasonable financial disclosure requires each contracting party to provide the other with a general approximation of [his or her] income, assets and liabilities ....” Id., at 191, 914 A.2d 533. After determining the meaning of “fair and reasonable,” we turned to the facts in Friezo . See id., at 191–93, 914 A.2d 533. In Friezo , the trial court had found that the husband's financial disclosure was not fair and reasonable because the wife was not provided sufficient time to examine the disclosure and lacked sufficient knowledge to understand the disclosure. See id., at 179, 192, 914 A.2d 533. It did not find, however, that the disclosure was inaccurate or incomplete, nor did the wife make any such allegations. See id., at 192, 914 A.2d 533. Ultimately, this court concluded that the husband's financial disclosure in Friezo was fair and reasonable because the standard is concerned with the content of the disclosure rather than the timing of the disclosure or the receiving party's capacity to understand the disclosure. See id., at 183, 191–93, 914 A.2d 533. The content of the husband's disclosure, we concluded, was adequate. See id., at 191, 914 A.2d 533. When the husband and the wife entered into the agreement in November, 1998, the husband disclosed his 1997 gross income, excluding capital gains, and he provided a list of assets and liabilities, including individual values with respect to most items. Id.
We noted that such factors may be relevant to whether a party executed the premarital agreement voluntarily or whether the agreement was substantively fair, but they do not affect the adequacy of the disclosure. Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 193, 914 A.2d 533. Thus, the timing of the disclosure or the ability of the recipient of the disclosure to understand it may serve as a basis for finding an agreement unenforceable under § 46b–36g (a) (1) (voluntariness), or § 46b–36g (a) (2) (unconscionability).
Although this court has not had the opportunity to revisit this issue since Friezo , the Appellate Court has twice addressed the question of fair and reasonable disclosure under § 46b–36g (a) (3) since this court's decision in Friezo . See Beyor v. Beyor , 158 Conn.App. 752, 762–65, 121 A.3d 734, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 933, 125 A.3d 206 (2015) ; Oldani v. Oldani , 132 Conn.App. 609, 615–24, 34 A.3d 407 (2011), overruled in part on other grounds sub silentio by Brody v. Brody , 315 Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015). The Appellate Court first applied Friezo in Oldani . In that case, the defendant, the wife, appealed from the trial court's decision enforcing the premarital agreement that she had entered into with the plaintiff, the husband. See Oldani v. Oldani , supra, at 610, 34 A.3d 407. The wife argued, among other things, that the husband did not make a fair and reasonable financial disclosure. Id., at 614, 34 A.3d 407. Both parties executed a premarital agreement in December, 2002; id., at 612, 34 A.3d 407 ; and, prior to signing the agreement, they exchanged written financial disclosures. Id., at 619, 34 A.3d 407. The husband's disclosure was dated May 1, 2002, and the trial court credited his testimony that the May, 2002 information was reliable as of December, 2002. Id., at 619 n. 7, 34 A.3d 407. The disclosure listed the husband's assets and liabilities and included certain schedules. Id.. One schedule contained information regarding the husband's interest in certain commercial and residential real estate, including, among other things, his percentage of ownership, and the annual gross rents, operating expenses, and net operating income for each property, where applicable. See id., at 619, 34 A.3d 407. The disclosure did not specifically state the husband's income. Id. Nonetheless, the trial court found that the disclosure was adequate because it provided sufficient information from which to determine the husband's income and to ensure that the wife's waiver of her statutory rights was intelligent. Id.
The Appellate Court disagreed, however, and determined that the husband's disclosure was not fair and reasonable. Id., at 616, 34 A.3d 407 ; see id., at 624, 34 A.3d 407. That court reasoned that the real estate schedule did not expressly identify the net income that the husband received or was entitled to receive, and it did not provide the wife with a formula or other information directing her on how she might determine his share of the rental income. Id., at 621, 34 A.3d 407. Moreover, the husband conceded at trial that not all the necessary information was provided to accurately calculate the income that he would receive from the rental properties. Id. For example, he testified that there is often a holdback of rental income, but the schedule did not provide any information regarding holdbacks. Id. Finally, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had incorrectly concluded that the husband's additional sources of income, such as consulting fees, distributions, and interest and dividend income, were irrelevant to the validity of his disclosure and improperly considered the wife's motive for signing the premarital agreement in assessing the fairness and reasonableness of the husband's disclosure. See id., at 622–23, 34 A.3d 407. In light of these facts, the Appellate Court concluded that, although the husband may have provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of his assets, he failed to make such a disclosure of his income. See id., at 624, 34 A.3d 407.
The Appellate Court next considered this question in Beyor v. Beyor , supra, 158 Conn.App. at 752, 121 A.3d 734. The defendant, the wife, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which enforced the premarital agreement that she entered into with the plaintiff, the husband. Id., at 754, 121 A.3d 734. The parties entered into the agreement in August, 2006, waiving any claims that they might have had in each other's property and any right to receive alimony or support in the event of a divorce. Id. On appeal, the wife argued that the premarital agreement was unenforceable because, among other things, the husband's financial disclosure was not adequate. Id., at 762, 121 A.3d 734. Specifically, she contended that his disclosure omitted his Internal Revenue Service “Schedule E income,” which was $394,048 in 2006, and that such an omission required a finding that the disclosure was not fair and reasonable under Oldani . Id. The Appellate Court disagreed. See id., at 765, 121 A.3d 734. The court distinguished Oldani by noting that, in Oldani , the husband did not list any income, the parties had a minor child, and the premarital agreement provided for some alimony. Id., at 764, 121 A.3d 734. The court noted that that was unlike the facts in Beyor because the husband in Beyor had disclosed the amount, character, and value of property, financial obligations, and income, excluding the Schedule E income, the parties had no children, and the parties waived all rights to alimony in the premarital agreement. Id. Thus, the Appellate Court reasoned that the wife knew going into the marriage that the husband had substantially more financial worth than her and that she would not be entitled to any of it if they divorced. Id., at 764–65, 121 A.3d 734. Moreover, the court noted that, although the husband did not disclose his Schedule E income, he did disclose the sources of such income, his interest in those sources, and the value of those sources. See id., at 765, 121 A.3d 734. I am convinced that Beyor was incorrectly decided, and, therefore, I will not apply its reasoning to the present case. With this background in mind, I turn to the present case. I begin by noting that what is a fair and reasonable financial disclosure under § 46b–36g (a) (3) depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is undisputed in the present case that the defendant did not disclose his 2007 and 2008 income when he and the plaintiff entered into the July, 2008 amendment to the premarital agreement. In light of this, I conclude that the defendant, like the husband in Oldani , failed to make a fair and reasonable disclosure of his income in 2008. In Oldani , the Appellate Court held that the disclosure in question was not fair and reasonable because, although the husband disclosed his interests in certain real estate and the net operating income generated by such real estate—which arguably could provide a general picture of his income—he did not expressly disclose his income, did not provide information on how to calculate his income, and did not disclose all the information necessary to accurately estimate his income. See Oldani v. Oldani , supra, 132 Conn.App. at 619–21, 34 A.3d 407. In the present case, not only did the defendant fail to disclose his 2007 and 2008 income, but he did not even provide information from which an estimate of his income for those years could be derived. The defendant might argue that an estimated income for 2007 and 2008 could be derived by averaging the historical income data. This argument is unavailing, however, given the fluctuating nature of his income, which varied by nearly 50 percent over the three years disclosed.
Schedule E income can include real estate rental income, royalties, and income from partnerships or S corporations.
The Appellate Court's reasoning in Beyor is flawed for a number of reasons. First, a premarital agreement is enforceable only when it is entered into voluntarily. See General Statutes § 46b–36g (a) (1). In McHugh , we noted that, in order for the waivers effectuated by a premarital agreement to be voluntary and knowing, the waiving party must “be aware of any right that he [or she] possesses prior to a proper waiver of it.” McHugh v. McHugh , supra, 181 Conn. at 486, 436 A.2d 8. We explained that fair and reasonable disclosure is a prerequisite to a valid agreement precisely because each party must know what is being waived. See id. Thus, with respect to Beyor , that the wife had waived any right to alimony is of no consequence to the adequacy of the husband's disclosure. Indeed, the fact that the husband did not make a fair disclosure of his income calls into question the validity of the wife's waiver. Second, in Friezo , we noted that financial disclosure in this context is a duty to inform, and, accordingly, the focus of the examination should be on the actions of the disclosing party, not on the party to whom disclosure is made. See Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 192–93, 914 A.2d 533. Because disclosure is a duty to inform, the fact that the wife in Beyor knew of the significant disparity in her wealth and the husband's wealth misses the mark. The Appellate Court's focus should have been on the husband's disclosure. Of course, if the wife had sufficient , independent knowledge of the husband's income, then the husband would not have had to make a fair and reasonable disclosure of such income. See id., at 188, 914 A.2d 533 (noting that majority of jurisdictions require disclosure “when a party's independent knowledge is insufficient”); Winchester v. McCue , 91 Conn.App. 721, 729, 882 A.2d 143 (holding that premarital agreement was enforceable despite omission of parties' income from disclosures because parties possessed independent knowledge of each other's financial situation), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 922, 888 A.2d 91 (2005). It does not appear to me, however, that the Appellate Court's decision was based on the conclusion that the wife had sufficient knowledge of the husband's income , as opposed to his wealth. Third, and finally, the 2006 Schedule E income was a significant portion of the husband's annual income. In his financial disclosure, the husband disclosed a weekly gross income of $4610. Beyor v. Beyor , Conn. Appellate Court Briefs & Appendices, March Term, 2015, Plaintiff's Appendix p. A33. That is $239,720 annually. The undisclosed Schedule E income was $394,048; Beyor v. Beyor , supra, 158 Conn.App. at 762, 121 A.3d 734 ; approximately 62 percent of the husband's $633,768 annual income in 2006. It strains credulity to suggest that the husband's financial disclosure was fair and reasonable, despite the omission of such a substantial portion of his income.
The defendant argues that he disclosed three years of historical income and that such a disclosure was sufficient to provide the plaintiff with a “general approximation” of his income. (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A disclosure of historical income information, however, does not provide a general approximation of the defendant's current income. I conclude that a fair and reasonable disclosure requires the disclosing party to divulge his or her current income. This is consistent with the purpose of the disclosure requirement. As I noted previously, the purpose of the disclosure requirement “is to ensure that each party has sufficient knowledge of the other party's financial circumstances to understand the nature of the legal rights being waived. ... In other words, a party cannot know what is being waived unless he or she is privy to all of the relevant facts, in particular, the financial status of the other party.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 186–87, 914 A.2d 533. Providing historical, rather than current, income information does not provide the party receiving such disclosure with accurate knowledge of the discloser's income at the time the agreement is being executed and, therefore, prevents the receiving party from intelligently waiving his or her statutory rights. Receiving current income information is particularly important in cases, like the present case, in which the receiving party is waiving equitable distribution of property and receiving a right to alimony. The party waiving equitable distribution in exchange for alimony undoubtedly relies on the income disclosure of the opposing party in assessing whether he or she agrees with the terms of the premarital agreement. Moreover, under the facts of the present case, the defendant's disclosure of his 2007 and 2008 income was important given the fluctuating nature of his income. See footnote 34 of this opinion. The defendant's disclosure in connection with the 2008 amendment to the premarital agreement and his testimony at trial revealed that he had variable income. His income for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 was $1,249,989, $902,025, $1,687,677, $1,253,766, and $575,266, respectively. Knowledge of such variable income would be necessary for an intelligent waiver of statutory rights, particularly when a party is to receive alimony, and, therefore, disclosure of both historical and current income is necessary for a fair and reasonable disclosure when the discloser's income fluctuates like the defendant's had in the present case.
This is not to say that, in all instances, a disclosure of historical income data would not constitute a fair and reasonable disclosure of the disclosing party's current income. For example, in Friezo , the parties executed the premarital agreement in November, 1998, but the husband disclosed his 1997 gross income. Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 177, 191, 914 A.2d 533. In that case, we did not decide whether the disclosure was fair and reasonable despite the disclosure of past, rather than current, income because the wife did not make such an argument. Nonetheless, I can imagine a set of circumstances in which such a disclosure would be fair and reasonable, such as those in which the disclosing party's income does not materially fluctuate from year to year. That is not this case, however, when one's income has varied significantly. In 2006, the defendant's income increased to nearly $1.7 million from approximately $900,000 the year before. Then, in 2007, his income decreased to approximately $1.25 million. Finally, in 2008, his income had fallen to approximately $575,000. This income range of more than $1 million in just four years is not an immaterial fluctuation.
The defendant also argues that he could not have disclosed his 2007 and 2008 income when the parties executed the 2008 amendment because he did not have the tax information for those periods at that time and, thus, was not aware of his precise income for those tax years. This argument is unavailing. First, as the defendant has acknowledged, an exact disclosure of his income is not necessary. Indeed, all that is required for a fair and reasonable financial disclosure is that the defendant provide the plaintiff with “a general approximation of [his] income, assets and liabilities ....” Friezo v. Friezo , supra, 281 Conn. at 191, 914 A.2d 533. Thus, he need not wait until his income tax returns are filed in order to make an exact disclosure. He can instead provide an accurate and reasonable estimate of his income. Moreover, there can be no doubt that, by July, 2008, he had some general idea of the income he had received in 2007 and the income he had received during the first half of 2008. Second, at trial, the plaintiff claimed that it was improper for the defendant to value the assets in his financial disclosure as of December 31, 2007, when he had available valuations for those assets that were contemporaneous with the execution of the amendment to the premarital agreement in July, 2008. Although the trial court did not find the use of the six month old valuations fatal, and I express no opinion on that issue, it did note that “the evidence supports a finding that the [defendant] actually had available virtually all [of] the asset figures on a contemporaneous basis, and , by inference , his income figures as well .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, it appears, despite the defendant's contention, that he would have been able to provide income estimates for 2007 and 2008 when the parties amended their premarital agreement.
Finally, the defendant contends that, if he had provided a “snapshot” of his 2008 income at the time the parties amended their premarital agreement, and had that snapshot turned out to be substantially higher than his actual 2008 income, the plaintiff would still be challenging the accuracy of his disclosure. Even if that were true, it does not excuse him from making such a disclosure. The defendant had a duty to disclose information that would provide the plaintiff with a general approximation of his income. If, for whatever reason, the disclosure subsequently appeared to the plaintiff to be inconsistent with the defendant's actual 2008 income, and she wanted to challenge the accuracy of such disclosure, that is her prerogative. In such a case, she would carry the burden of establishing that the disclosure was inaccurate when it was made. See General Statutes § 46b–36g (a) (allocating burden of establishing unenforceability of premarital agreement to party against whom its enforcement is sought).
In sum, the defendant did not make a fair and reasonable financial disclosure when the parties executed the 2008 amendment to their 1997 premarital agreement, and I therefore conclude, pursuant to § 46b–36g (a), that their amended premarital agreement is unenforceable. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as the trial court enforced that agreement.
Neither party has argued that the invalidation of the 2008 amendment on the basis of an inadequate financial disclosure would reinstate the original 1997 premarital agreement. Thus, despite my grave reservations regarding the unconscionability of the original premarital agreement, I express no opinion on the validity of such agreement or the possible claim that such agreement should be reinstated in light of the invalidation of the amendment to that agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
EVELEIGH, J., with whom ESPINOSA, J., joins, dissenting.
I agree with and join part I of the majority opinion, which affirms the judgment of the trial court with respect to the award of lump sum alimony to the plaintiff, Marjorie Hornung. I respectfully dissent, however, from part II of the majority opinion, which concludes “that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff.” Specifically, I would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the defendant, Robert Hornung, to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiff where it determined that “to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the primary care of four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her portion of the financial award ... would undermine the purposes of [the] same ....” Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
I agree with the facts and the procedural history set forth by the majority. Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
Contrary to the majority's representation, I can find no example of where this court has employed a purely mathematical calculation to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees. Furthermore, I would conclude that merely analyzing the percentage that the award of attorney's fees represents in the overall financial award is contrary to the mandates of General Statutes §§ 46b–621 and 46b–82, which require the trial court to examine certain equitable factors in deciding whether to make an award of attorney's fees. Those equitable factors are eviscerated when one attempts to boil down these considerations to a mathematical equation.2
Before addressing whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff in light of its other awards to her, I must address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff because the parties' prenuptial agreement (agreement) bars the award of attorney's fees. In response to this claim, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant failed to preserve this claim for review as it relates to the $100,000 trial attorney's fees because he did not assert that the agreement barred the award at trial. Furthermore, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant waived his right to claim that the agreement barred the award of attorney's fees because he entered into stipulations that explicitly allow the plaintiff to apply for attorney's fees. I agree with the plaintiff.
First, despite the fact that the issue of attorney's fees was addressed at the trial in this matter, the defendant never claimed that the agreement barred the award of attorney's fees. Specifically, the trial court heard testimony relating to counsel fees and an affidavit of fees was submitted as an exhibit. Furthermore, the defendant had already agreed to pay $250,000 of the plaintiff's attorney's fees pendente lite. The defendant never contested the court's authority to award attorney's fees at trial. To the contrary, the defendant's claim that the agreement barred the award of attorney's fees was first raised well after trial, and only in relation to the motion for appellate attorney's fees. “It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court's review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co. , 312 Conn. 714, 761, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014) ; see also Practice Book § 60–5 (“[an appellate] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial”). Accordingly, I would conclude that the defendant failed to preserve his claim that the agreement barred the award of attorney's fees as it relates to the $100,000 of trial attorney's fees.
Second, I would conclude that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel bar the defendant from claiming that the agreement bars the award of $40,000 in appellate attorney's fees. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to claim that the agreement barred the award of attorney's fees because he had entered into numerous stipulations allowing for attorney's fees. Specifically, prior to judgment, the defendant entered into a stipulation in which he agreed to pay $250,000 of the plaintiff's attorney's fees and $100,000 of her expert fees. The stipulation also permitted the plaintiff to seek additional counsel fees in the future. The defendant also entered into four separate stipulations providing for payment of the plaintiff's counsel fees in order to induce the plaintiff to sign gift tax returns and joint income tax returns. The trial court properly recognized that this conduct constitutes a waiver of any right to claim that the agreement precluded an award of attorney's fees. It is well established that “waiver and estoppel are questions of fact” and that this court “will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL – CIO , 237 Conn. 378, 388, 677 A.2d 1350 (1996). I would agree with the trial court and conclude that the defendant cannot enter into a stipulation that the plaintiff is allowed to apply for attorney's fees and then later reverse course and assert that the agreement bars the award of any attorney's fees. Although the defendant was allowed to challenge the award of attorney's fees, by entering into these stipulations, the defendant acknowledged that the trial court had authority to award the plaintiff attorney's fees in some circumstances. The defendant was aware of and understood the terms of the stipulations at the time they were presented to the court and by now asking this court to conclude that the agreement bars the award of any attorney's fees, the defendant “is taking a position clearly inconsistent with his previous position” and “would derive an unfair advantage from this change of position.” Dougan v. Dougan , 301 Conn. 361, 374–75, 21 A.3d 791 (2011). Accordingly, I would conclude that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel bar the defendant from asserting that the agreement bars the award of attorney's fees. Therefore, I next turn to whether the trial court abused its discretion by its award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff in light of its other awards to her.
Section 46b–62 (a) governs the award of attorney's fees in dissolution proceedings and provides that “the court may order either spouse ... to pay the reasonable attorney's fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b–82.” The criteria set forth in § 46b–82 (a) include: “the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81....” In awarding attorney's fees under § 46b–62, “[t]he court is not obligated to make express findings on each of these statutory criteria.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grimm v. Grimm , 276 Conn. 377, 397, 886 A.2d 391 (2005).
“Courts ordinarily award counsel fees in divorce cases so that a party ... may not be deprived of [his or] her rights because of lack of funds. ... Where, because of other orders, both parties are financially able to pay their own counsel fees they should be permitted to do so. ... Koizim v. Koizim , 181 Conn. 492, 501, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980). An exception to the rule announced in Koizim is that an award of attorney's fees is justified even where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees if the failure to make an award would undermine its prior financial orders .... Eslami v. Eslami , 218 Conn. 801, 820, 591 A.2d 411 (1991). Whether to allow counsel fees [under § 46b–62 ], and if so in what amount, calls for the exercise of judicial discretion. ... Holley v. Holley , [194 Conn. 25, 33–34, 478 A.2d 1000 (1984) ]. An abuse of discretion in granting counsel fees will be found only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded as it did. Unkelbach v. McNary , 244 Conn. 350, 374, 710 A.2d 717 (1998)....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , 297 Conn. 358, 386, 999 A.2d 721 (2010).
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court predicated its factual findings with the following statement: “The court, having heard the testimony of both parties, and having considered the evidence presented at [the] hearing, as well as, inter alia, the factors enumerated in [§ 46b–82 ] ... hereby makes the following findings ....” The trial court then proceeded to make the following factual findings in relation to its award of attorney's fees: “That the court has reviewed the affidavit of attorney's fees ... filed by the attorney for the [plaintiff] dated October 17, 2013; that the attorney's fees incurred by the [plaintiff] through October 16, 2013, in the amount of $116,103.24, are fair and reasonable under all the circumstances; that to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the primary care of four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her portion of the financial award ... would undermine the purposes of same; and that it would be fair and equitable for the [defendant] to pay same. Maguire v. Maguire , 222 Conn. 32, [44, 608 A.2d 79 (1992) ].” The trial court further awarded the plaintiff an additional $40,000 in appellate attorney's fees, determining that the plaintiff needed “reasonable access to the court system [to] defend an appeal that [the defendant had] made.”
The majority concludes that “the trial court abused its discretion in making the attorney's fees awards because the plaintiff received ample liquid funds as a result of the trial court's judgment, and the trial court's determination that not awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff would undermine its other awards was unreasonable.” I disagree.
In support of its position, the majority reasons that “the plaintiff would receive liquid assets totaling $2,577,000 within three months of the judgment. The trial attorney's fees award represents only 4 percent of this amount.” (Footnote omitted.) The majority further reasons that “[t]he combined trial and appellate attorney's fees awards represent less than 6 percent of this amount.” See footnote 34 of the majority opinion. This analysis is misplaced.
I also disagree with the majority that the appellate stay on the trial court's financial orders does not justify the appellate attorney's fees award “because the trial court could have terminated the stay sua sponte, and because the plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to terminate the stay on several of those orders.” In analyzing the defendant's claim that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was unreasonable, we must be mindful that “[a]n abuse of discretion in granting counsel fees will be found only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unkelbach v. McNary , supra, 244 Conn. at 374, 710 A.2d 717. We are not to substitute our judgment for the trial court, but only to determine if, based on the record before it, the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Furthermore, it is important to remember that in determining whether to award attorney's fees, the trial court must determine “[w]hether a spouse has ‘ample liquid funds ' with which to pay counsel fees .... This makes necessary an examination of the total assets of the parties at the time the award is made .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson , 191 Conn. 46, 59, 463 A.2d 578 (1983).
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiff had ample liquid assets to pay her attorney's fees at the time the trial court made the award. Specifically, the majority reasons that “although the plaintiff's amended financial affidavit showed only $3700 in her bank accounts, she was still receiving $40,000 per month in periodic alimony and child support, and attested to having personal property worth $305,810, a home worth $2.1 million, and other assets worth $79,794.” First, the majority relies on the plaintiff's home and furnishings as available liquid assets that she could have used to pay her attorney's fees. This position is contrary to our case law. In Anderson v. Anderson , supra, 191 Conn. at 60, 463 A.2d 578, which the majority cites favorably, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding attorney's fees because it concluded that the trial court had improperly found that the defendant had ample liquid assets with which to pay the attorney's fees. Specifically, this court concluded that “a close inspection of the property disposed of by the judgment discloses that the family home was the only real asset capable of generating the funds to respond to the award of counsel fees. It, however, was not a ‘liquid asset’ although by our disposition of this appeal, the sale of the family home hereinafter ordered will yield liquid assets for both parties. Under the circumstances, the award of counsel fees to the plaintiff constituted error.” Id. Similarly, in the present case, the marital home and the furnishings contained therein were not liquid assets available to the plaintiff to pay her own attorney's fees in the present case. Furthermore, although the plaintiff had other assets totaling $79,794, she also had liabilities of $68,142, not including the attorney's fees.
Second, the majority relies on the $2,082,000 payment due under the agreement. That payment was not available to the plaintiff because it was stayed pending the appeal. Although, as the majority states, the plaintiff could have moved to terminate the stay on that order or the trial court could have, sua sponte, terminated the stay on that order, the trial court was required to award the attorney's fees based on the total assets at the time the award was made. The possibility of terminating the stay is not a reason to consider that payment as liquid funds available to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the fact that the stay on that award was terminated after the award of attorney's fees was made is not relevant to our review of whether the trial court could have reasonably made the award of attorney's fees at that time.
At the time the trial court made the award of attorney's fees in the present case, the only liquid assets available to the plaintiff was the $40,000 in monthly alimony and child support. The majority fails to acknowledge that, after taxes, the plaintiff's net monthly alimony and child support award was $23,600. In her affidavit, the plaintiff averred that she had $44,332 in monthly expenses and approximately $219,487 in attorney's fees. Accordingly, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that requiring the plaintiff to pay the attorney's fees out of the monthly alimony and child support would have undermined that award. This court has previously concluded that a trial court's award of attorney's fees was proper where “the [wife] would have been required to [forgo] a portion of the alimony award in order to satisfy her obligations to her attorney, thereby undermining its other orders.” Holley v. Holley , supra, 194 Conn. at 34–35, 478 A.2d 1000 ; see also Bornemann v. Bornemann , 245 Conn. 508, 544–45, 752 A.2d 978 (1998) (“Of the significant assets that the [wife] received in the distribution, only the shares of stock would have been easily convertible to liquid form; the family residence and automobile were not liquid assets, the first three flights of stock options had not yet been exercised, and the fourth flight was not yet exercisable as of the date of dissolution. Further, the shares of stock owned outright that were awarded to the [wife] were not worth an amount sufficient to cover all of the fees owed. As a result, the court reasonably could have concluded that unless it awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff, its other financial orders would be undermined, or that the plaintiff lacked the liquidity necessary to enable her to pay her own fees. We conclude, therefore, that the award of attorney's fees did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion.”). In comparison, the defendant in the present case had ample liquid assets available to him at the time that the trial court made the award of attorney's fees. Specifically, the defendant had more than $14 million in securities and bonds, which could have been easily converted to liquid form. See Bornemann v. Bornemann , supra, at 544–45, 752 A.2d 978. On the basis of the foregoing, I would conclude that the trial court reasonably determined that the award of attorney's fees was necessary to avoid undermining its other awards.
As the majority recognizes, § 46b–62 (a) “authorizes the trial court to award attorney's fees in a dissolution action when appropriate in light of the ‘respective financial abilities' of the parties and the equitable factors listed in § 46b–82.” Indeed, the trial court based its finding that not awarding attorney's fees would undermine the other financial awards in this matter on those equitable factors and the respective financial abilities of the party. Despite recognizing that those are the proper considerations, the majority appears to ignore those factors and rely entirely on a mathematical calculation of what percentage of the assets awarded to the plaintiff the attorney's fees represent.3 The majority further states that “[w]e have previously held attorney's fees awards amounting to a low portion of the payee's liquid assets to constitute an abuse of discretion, since the payee could easily have paid the fees out of those assets ....” The majority cites to Maguire v. Maguire , supra, 222 Conn. at 32, 608 A.2d 79, and Blake v. Blake , 211 Conn. 485, 560 A.2d 396 (1989), in support of its position. I would conclude that Maguire and Blake are distinguishable from the present case.
In Maguire , this court did not rely on the percentage of the liquid assets that the award of attorney's fees represented, but instead concluded that “the [trial] court abused its discretion in awarding $50,000 for counsel fees to the plaintiff because ... in this case the trial court made no finding that such an award was necessary in order to avoid undermining its other financial awards. Moreover, there is nothing in the record that would support such a finding.” Maguire v. Maguire , supra, 222 Conn. at 44–45, 608 A.2d 79. In the present case, the trial court explicitly determined that failing to award the plaintiff attorney's fees would undermine the other financial awards and pointed to the evidence in the record that supported that finding—namely, the plaintiff's limited earning capacity and her role as the primary caretaker for four minor children, three of whom have learning issues. In fact, the evidence in the record supports the award of the attorney's fees on the other equitable factors, as well. First, the parties were married for seventeen years. Second, the trial court found as follows: “As to the breakdown of the marriage, the [plaintiff] testified at length about the [defendant's] frequent use of inappropriate language and his bizarre behavior, toward her and others, that was both demeaning and sophomorically ... crude. In addition, he frequently mimicked her tendency to stutter when placed in stressful situations. She admitted to a [one year long] affair late in the marriage. That relationship, now long since ended, was not the cause of the breakdown. Evidence supports a finding that the cause for the breakdown is primarily attributable to the [defendant]. It is abundantly clear that right from the beginning, with the execution of the ... agreement, that [the defendant] was not looking for a true marital partner, and has shut the [plaintiff] out both fiscally and emotionally. He is a controlling, emotional bully, who has failed to appreciate [the plaintiff's] true worth as a wife, let alone her contributions. He offers her the minimum, which he believes that he can, in order to preserve the greater bulk of his assets for himself. The [defendant], she said, engaged in frequent, long-winded arguments about his plans, and badgered her to go along with his ideas, such as the ... agreement. She told the court that she had a hard time being heard, that [the defendant] ignored her important requests, and that she did not feel that she was a real partner.” Third, the trial court further found that “[t]he [defendant] is [fifty] years old and in general good health. He described a painful bout of neuropathy at one point during the marriage, but he is not prevented from working full-time. The [defendant] has a business degree from Syracuse University. His primary employment is with a family window company and its subsidiaries, which he operates along with his father and mother. It has proven to be very lucrative. He earns nearly $650,000 per annum from employment, and an additional $320,000 from his investments. The [plaintiff] is [forty-five] years old. She told the court that she suffers from a thyroid condition that affects her metabolism ... and that she is borderline diabetic. The [plaintiff] has a degree from Emerson College. She was employed at the time of the marriage, but for the greater portion, she has been a full-time homemaker, and, at least up to the filing of the action, she has been the primary caretaker of the children. When she was employed outside of the home, principally prior to and during the early years of her marriage, her average earnings were approximately $30,000 per annum, with a maximum of between $65,000 and $70,000 per year.” These significant findings on the equitable factors in § 46b-82 in the present case support the trial court's conclusion that failure to award attorney's fees would undermine the other financial awards and make this case easily distinguishable from Maguire , particularly where the trial court in that case “made no finding that [the award of attorney's fees] was necessary in order to avoid undermining its other financial awards.” Maguire v. Maguire , supra, 222 Conn. at 44–45, 608 A.2d 79.
Furthermore, Maguire is also distinguishable from the present case because, in Maguire, the wife had more than $500,000 in liquid assets prior to any financial awards from the dissolution action. Id., at 44, 608 A.2d 79. The wife in Maguire had these funds in cash and from the estate of her deceased mother. Id., at 44 n. 3, 608 A.2d 79. Although the plaintiff in the present case will have liquid assets as a result of the financial orders related to the dissolution, there is no evidence that the plaintiff had any substantial liquid assets available to her outside the financial awards made in the dissolution action. Because the liquid assets available to the plaintiff in the present case are part of the dissolution action, those assets are part of the mosaic that the trial court was fashioning when it awarded the attorney's fees. As a result, all of the assets in the present case are part of the orders that “were made at the same time and were predicated on the assumption that the total of all the awards regardless of the items to which they were apportioned, was reasonable in the light of the respective financial abilities of the parties and the criteria set forth in § 46b–82.” Eslami v. Eslami , supra, 218 Conn. at 820, 591 A.2d 411. In Maguire , the wife had an additional $500,000 in liquid assets that were not part of the awards and were available, unencumbered, to be used for the attorney's fees. Accordingly, I would conclude that Maguire is distinguishable from the present case.
Next, the majority relies on Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 489, 560 A.2d 396, which involved a husband's claim that, in postdissolution orders, the trial court improperly awarded his wife attorney's fees of $10,000 plus expenses of $4974.63 relating to the husband's appeal. This court explained that “[a]t the hearing on attorney's fees the parties submitted current financial affidavits. The [wife's] affidavit showed a net worth of about $1,535,000. The parties stipulated that her liquid assets were approximately $630,000. The [husband's] net assets on his affidavit were $5,503,000.” Id., at 487–88, 560 A.2d 396. This court reasoned that “[i]n the light of the [wife's] net assets of [more than] $1,500,000 and her liquid assets of $630,000, it cannot reasonably be claimed that the failure to award $14,947.63 for attorney's fees and expenses would undermine or skew the substantial financial awards granted to her in the dissolution judgment. To award counsel fees under these circumstances is gilding the lily. The court abused its discretion in making such an order.” Id., at 489, 560 A.2d 396.
Although Blake appears to provide the majority with some support, it is distinguishable. In Blake , prior to making the award of appellate attorney's fees, the trial court stated “that part of the appeal was a pressure technique by [the husband], particularly and frivolous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 488, 560 A.2d 396. In finding that the trial court abused its discretion in making the award of appellate attorney's fees, this court concluded that “[w]e found nothing frivolous in the appeal to this court. Punishment of a litigant should play no role in the determination of the issue of awarding attorney's fees.” Id.4 In the present case, there is no claim that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was intended to punish the defendant. Accordingly, I would conclude that Blake is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
Furthermore, unlike the husband and wife in Blake , in the present case there is an approximate $21 million disparity in assets between the plaintiff and the defendant. Section 46b–82 (a) requires the trial court to consider the “amount and sources of income ... estate and needs of each of the parties ....” This court has repeatedly affirmed an award of attorney's fees where the evidence presented demonstrates that one party “ ‘has greater income available for support of the children than [the other]’ and ‘has greater income available to him than does [the other party] for purposes of paying counsel fees.’ ” Unkelbach v. McNary , supra, 244 Conn. at 377, 710 A.2d 717 ; id. (affirming award of attorney's fees by trial court where trial court found it “ ‘fair and appropriate’ ” to award counsel fees to wife); see also Murphy v. Murphy , 180 Conn. 376, 380, 429 A.2d 897 (1980) (§ 46b–82 directs trial court to consider respective financial abilities of parties).
The majority also similarly reasons that “the trial attorney's fees award in the present case represents less than 2 percent of the lump sum alimony award alone, not including the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement or the $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments. Similar to the comparison with the payee's liquid assets, attorney's fees awards that represent a small portion of the payee's lump sum alimony award have been held improper, because the payee could easily pay his or her own attorney's fees out of that award, even in the wake of strong equitable factors. See, e.g., Turgeon v. Turgeon , [190 Conn. 269, 270, 279–81, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983) ] ($10,000 in attorney's fees and $1500 in expert witness fees awards, amounting to 8 percent of $140,000 in total lump sum alimony awards to wife, was abuse of discretion, though parties were married for twenty-three years and husband received $309,000 in assets, compared to wife's $100,000; property and alimony awards to wife were ‘generous' and ‘liquid assets being made available [to her were] ample’); Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 493–501, 435 A.2d 1030 ($55,000 in attorney's fees award, amounting to 9 percent of $600,000 lump sum alimony award and 4 percent of $1,410,000 in total assets, not including periodic alimony award, was abuse of discretion where parties were married for twenty-seven years, husband earned $208,000 per year, wife earned $1000 per year, husband was unfaithful, and wife made ‘significant’ contributions to marriage, ‘both financial and otherwise’).” I respectfully disagree with the majority's representation regarding these cases. First, in neither of these two cases did this court look to the percentage of the alimony award that the award of attorney's fees represented.5
Second, both of these cases are distinguishable from the present case. In Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 282, 460 A.2d 1260, this court relied on the fact that “[t]he [wife] for her part, had had some business training background and has indicated a desire to engage in business activity. The trial referee found her to be resourceful, energetic and in good health and concluded that she should obtain employment for which she is fitted.” To the contrary, the trial court in the present case noted the following: “the [plaintiff's] health issues; her lack of recent employment; her primary child care responsibilities of four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire assets in the future.” Accordingly, I find the reasoning of Turgeon inapplicable to the present case.
I would also conclude that Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 500–501, 435 A.2d 1030, is inapplicable to the present case. In Koizim , this court found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees, stating that “[w]here, because of other orders, both parties are financially able to pay their own counsel fees they should be permitted to do so.” Id., at 501, 560 A.2d 396. This court did not, however, discuss the statutory factors or whether the failure to award attorney's fees would undermine the other financial awards. Indeed, subsequently, this court “[i]n Arrigoni v. Arrigoni , 184 Conn. 513, 519–20, 440 A.2d 206 (1981)... clarified Koizim by stating that we did not mean to imply that no allowance should be made if a party has sufficient cash to meet an attorney's bill .... If ... the trial court concludes, based on the total financial resources of the parties, that denying an award of counsel fees would undermine its prior financial orders, then it may award counsel fees to the requesting party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eslami v. Eslami , supra, 218 Conn. at 820, 591 A.2d 411.
Instead, I would conclude that the case law of this state supports the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award of attorney's fees in the present case, where it found that failing to make such an award would undermine the other financial awards in the case. In examining our case law regarding the award of attorney's fees, it must be remembered that this court has long recognized that “[s]ince the trial court fashioned the other financial awards, it [is] uniquely qualified to determine whether those awards would be undermined by rejecting [a party's] request for counsel fees and expenses. All the awards were made at the same time and were predicated on the assumption that the total of all the awards regardless of the items to which they were apportioned, was reasonable in the light of the respective financial abilities of the parties and the criteria set forth in § 46b–82.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , supra, 297 Conn. at 388, 999 A.2d 721, quoting Eslami v. Eslami , supra, 218 Conn. at 820, 591 A.2d 411.
For instance, in Eslami v. Eslami , supra, 218 Conn. at 820–21, 591 A.2d 411, this court affirmed the award of attorney's fees and expenses to the wife despite her having sufficient assets to pay the award, including a $300,000 lump sum alimony award. In affirming the award of attorney's fees, this court reasoned as follows: “The evidence in this case, which includes a thirty year marriage, substantial continuing medical expenses because of the wife's poor health, the clear responsibility of the husband as the cause of the marital breakdown, and the great disparity in the income and assets of the parties, provides adequate support for the court's conclusion that an appropriate allowance for counsel fees and litigation costs should be made so that the other orders would not be undermined.” Id. Similarly, in Holley v. Holley , supra, 194 Conn. at 27, 478 A.2d 1000, this court affirmed an award of attorney's fees despite other significant financial awards, including the husband's interest in the family residence, $15,000 in lump sum alimony, $10,000 to purchase an automobile, $35,000 annually in unallocated alimony and child support until the minor child reached the age of eighteen, which would then be reduced to $20,000 annually. In doing so, this court reasoned: “We agree with the defendant that the counsel fee award in this case is remedial in nature and is intended to restore her as nearly as possible to the position she was in prior to the dissolution of the marriage. Moreover, the trial court could have reasonably found that if an award of counsel fees were denied, the defendant would have been required to [forgo] a portion of the alimony award in order to satisfy her obligations to her attorney, thereby undermining its other orders.” Id., at 34–35, 608 A.2d 79.
In 2010, this court again affirmed the award of attorney's fees in Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , supra, 297 Conn. 358, 999 A.2d 721. In Misthopoulos , the husband challenged the trial court's award of attorney's fees where the wife had received substantial assets, totaling approximately $3.2 million. Id., at 361–62, 999 A.2d 721. The husband appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the award of attorney's fees was improper because the wife had sufficient liquid assets to pay the attorney's fees as a result of the other financial orders and that there was not sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that denying the wife's request for attorney's fees would undermine the other financial orders in the case. Id., at 383–84, 999 A.2d 721. This court rejected both of the husband's claims.
In Misthopoulos , this court first reasoned that $2.6 million of the $3.2 million in assets awarded to the wife consisted of the family home in which the wife and the parties' three minor children resided. Id., at 386–87, 999 A.2d 721. In addition, some of the other assets awarded to the wife were not liquid. On the basis of these awards, this court explained that “we cannot conclude that the [wife] had ample liquid funds such that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the [wife] attorney's fees.” Id. In the present case, although the plaintiff was awarded many liquid assets, a significant portion of the financial award, namely $2.1 million, is comprised of the family home in which the plaintiff and the parties' four minor children reside. Furthermore, the $40,000 per month payment that the trial court ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff includes child support for the parties' four minor children.
This court's analysis in Misthopoulos did not end there, however. This court then considered the husband's separate claim that there was not sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that denying the wife's request for attorney's fees would undermine the other financial orders in the case. In doing so, this court explained as follows: “The record demonstrates that the [husband] has a significantly higher earning capacity than the [wife], and that during the parties' eighteen year marriage, the [wife] had been a stay-at-home mother for the last ten years of the marriage. This court has previously noted that ‘[s]ince the trial court fashioned the other financial awards, it [is] uniquely qualified to determine whether those awards would be undermined by rejecting [a party's] request for counsel fees and expenses. All the awards were made at the same time and were predicated on the assumption that the total of all the awards regardless of the items to which they were apportioned, was reasonable in the light of the respective financial abilities of the parties and the criteria set forth in § 46b–82.’ ” Id., at 387–88, 999 A.2d 721.
This court further reasoned that “the financial orders of the trial court required the [wife] to pay a share of many expenses, including the medical, day care, summer camp and extracurricular activities of the children, attorney's fees for the guardian ad litem and a portion of her own attorney's fees, including for her appellate counsel. All of the other financial awards, however, clearly required the [husband] to pay a larger portion of the expenses presumably in light of his significantly higher earning capacity. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports a finding that the order requiring the [husband] to pay a portion of the [wife's] attorney's fees in this case was necessary so as not to undermine the other financial orders.” Id., at 388, 999 A.2d 721. Similarly, in the present case, the trial court's other financial orders require the plaintiff to pay one half of the cost of camp, tutors, lessons, ski lessons, Bar Mitzvahs, Bat Mitzvahs, and other extracurricular activities of the parties' children. Therefore, I would conclude that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the failure to make an award of attorney's fees would undermine the other financial orders.
In Weiman v. Weiman , 188 Conn. 232, 237, 449 A.2d 151 (1982), this court affirmed the award of attorney's fees explaining that “[i]f the court could reasonably have concluded that the [wife's] financial resources, even when supplemented by the financial orders contained in the judgment, were necessary to meet her future needs and therefore were not available to pay counsel fees, there was no abuse of discretion. Although the [wife] had liquid assets resulting from the judgment, in reviewing the overall awards, we cannot say that the trial court's order for counsel fees was unreasonable.” In the present case, although the plaintiff is receiving significant assets as a result of the dissolution of the marriage, the trial court made findings regarding the plaintiff's limited future earning capacity based on her health condition, her role as a primary caregiver to the parties' minor children, and her lack of recent work experience. On the basis of the foregoing, I cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that the resources provided by the financial orders were necessary to meet her future needs and, therefore, were not available to pay counsel fees was unreasonable. See also Grimm v. Grimm , supra, 276 Conn. at 403–404, 886 A.2d 391 (“trial court reasonably could have determined that the fee award was necessary to avoid undermining lump sum alimony order”).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from part II of the majority opinion.