Opinion
February 10, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Smith, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is well settled that a motion to vacate the dismissal of an action pursuant to CPLR 3404 and to restore the matter to the calendar is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, e.g., Ceravolo v. Sunnyside Mkt., 168 A.D.2d 409; O'Boye v Consolidated Edison, 168 A.D.2d 219; Curtin v. Grand Union Co., 124 A.D.2d 918; Merrill v. Robinson, 99 A.D.2d 578). We discern no improvident exercise of discretion in this case; the automatic dismissal of the action was proper (see, CPLR 3404), and the plaintiff's counsel failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and a lack of prejudice to the defendants (see, e.g., Moye v. City of New York, 168 A.D.2d 342; Rosser v Scacalossi, 140 A.D.2d 318; Resto v. Kohen, 124 A.D.2d 722).
Additionally, the record before us fails to support the claim of the plaintiff's counsel that he moved to restore the case to the calendar approximately eight months after it was marked off. However, assuming arguendo that the motion actually was submitted to the court for determination, the unexplained and unreasonable failure of the plaintiff's counsel to follow up on the application or to take any other action until some 18 months had passed, when combined with the other delays in the case, warranted the denial of the instant motion to restore. Sullivan, J.P., Balletta, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.