Opinion
23-cv-63 (JMB/TNL)
04-24-2024
Shane Eric Hanley, Petitioner, v. Warden LeJeune Warden of FCI Sandstone, Respondent.
Shane Eric Hanley, Reg. No. 16721-040, FCI Sandstone, (pro se Petitioner); and Ana H. Voss and Kristen Elise Rau, Assistant United States Attorneys, (for Respondent).
Shane Eric Hanley, Reg. No. 16721-040, FCI Sandstone, (pro se Petitioner); and
Ana H. Voss and Kristen Elise Rau, Assistant United States Attorneys, (for Respondent).
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Tony N. Leung, United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Petitioner Shane Eric Hanley's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). See Pet., ECF No. 1. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation to the district court, the Honorable Jeffrey M. Bryan, District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D. Minn. LR 72.1.
Based upon the record, memoranda, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED AS MOOT, and this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner commenced this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See generally Pet. Prior to this action, Petitioner was found guilty of possession of images of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2256. See Ex. B to Declaration of Matthew Apple, ECF No. 13. Petitioner is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota (“FCI Sandstone”) where he is serving a 188-month term of imprisonment, followed by a 20-year term of supervision. Id.; see Pet. at 3. Petitioner was also sentenced to pay $17,769.00 in restitution. See Ex. C to Apple Decl. Petitioner's restitution payments were ordered by the sentencing court to be paid:
in minimum quarterly installments of $25.00 based on IFRP participation, or minimum monthly installments of $20.00 based on UNICOR earnings, during the period of incarceration, to commence 60 days after the date of this judgment. Any balance due upon commencement of supervision shall be paid, during the term of supervision, in minimum monthly installments of $100.00 to commence 60 days after release from imprisonment.Id. at 6. While incarcerated, Petitioner has been participating in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). See Ex. F to Apple Decl.
“The [BOP] encourages each sentenced inmate to meet his [ ] legitimate financial obligations” through the IFRP. 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. The BOP must help develop financial plans with inmates who have financial obligations. See Cervantes v. Cruz, No. 07-4738 (DWF/JJK), 2009 WL 76685, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2009) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 545.11). Financial obligations generally include fines, court costs, restitution, special assessments, child support, and outstanding judgments. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(1)-(5). The BOP uses the following calculation to develop an inmate's financial plan:
the unit team shall first subtract from the trust fund account the inmate's minimum payment schedule for UNICOR or non-UNICOR work assignments, set forth in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section. The unit team shall then exclude from its assessment $75.00 a month deposited into the inmate's trust fund account. This $75.00 is excluded to allow the inmate the opportunity to better maintain telephone communication under the Inmate Telephone System (ITS).28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b). Therefore, the BOP's policy Program Statement 5380.08 uses the following summarized calculation to determine the appropriate IFRP payment amount at each program review: “determine the total funds deposited into the inmate's trust fund account for the previous six months; subtract the IFRP payments made by the inmate during the previous six months; and subtract $450 (i.e., $75 x 6 months, ITS exclusion).” Ex. A at 7 to Apple Decl. According to Program Statement 5380.08, “[a]ny money remaining after the above computation may be considered for IFRP payments, regardless of whether the money is in the inmate's trust fund or phone credit account.” Id. An inmate's unit team “has the discretion to consider all monies above that computation to adjust the inmate's IFRP payment plan.” Id. Whereas the unit manager “is the determining authority when it comes to deciding whether an inmate's IFRP payments are commensurate with his[ ] ability to pay.” Id. The unit manager also has discretionary decision-making authority, decided on a case-by-case basis. Id.
“Participation in the IFRP is not mandatory.” Cervantes, 2009 WL 76685, at *3; see also 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). If an inmate refuses to participate in the IFRP, then that inmate will be placed in refuse status. See Ex. A at 13 to Apple Decl.; 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). Non-participation results in “not be[ing] considered for various program privileges, such as furloughs, outside work details, and community-based programs” as well as being subjected “to a lower housing status (dormitory, double bunking, etc.) and a spending limit in the commissary.” Cervantes, 2009 WL 76685, at *3; see also 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d)(1)-(11) (listing the effects of non-participation in the IFRP).
In January 2020, Petitioner agreed to participate in the IFRP by signing a IFRP contract consenting to pay $25.00 per quarter towards his restitution. See Ex. F to Apple Decl. At the start of 2022, a significant amount of media coverage of high-profile inmates revealed that some high-profile inmates with large sums of money in their trust fund accounts were paying only the minimum amounts towards their financial obligations through their IFRP contracts. See Apple Decl. ¶ 13. This media coverage triggered the BOP to conduct an audit of inmate trust fund accounts and IFRP payment amounts. Id. The North Central Regional Office notified FCI Sandstone (where Petitioner is incarcerated) of the inmates at FCI Sandstone that required a reassessment of their IFRP contracts. Id.
Per the Regional Office's direction, FCI Sandstone notified inmates through an inmate bulletin on IFRP changes that their IFRP contracts could be adjusted if their IFRP contracts were found to not be commensurate after considering all the remaining funds pursuant to the formula outlined in Program Statement 5380.08 and 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. See Ex. D to Apple Decl.; See also Pet. at 8; Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. at 8, ECF No. 2. The inmate bulletin also contains notice that if inmates refuse to agree to a new IFRP contract, the BOP will place such inmates in refusal status subject to additional consequences as outlined in Program Statement 5380.08 as well as an encumbrance to ensure funds are not depleted by an inmate in refusal status. See Exs. D-E to Apple Decl. According to Program Statement 4500.12, “[a]n encumbrance may be made for various reasons (e.g.[,] to ensure inmates do not seriously deplete their funds before release, disciplinary measures, inmate's request, claims). Encumbrances are at the Warden's discretion or the result of a disciplinary hearing sanction or notification of a pending Federal court order.” Ex. E at 14 to Apple Decl.
Petitioner's IFRP contract was flagged by the Regional Office for review by the BOP. See Apple Decl. ¶ 18. Therefore, the BOP applied the formula below per Program Statement 5380.08 and 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 to determine Petitioner's remaining funds for IFRP payments:
See Apple Decl. ¶ 19; Ex. H to Apple Decl.; see also Ex. A to Apple Decl. As a result of the $211.80 remaining funds for consideration, Petitioner agreed to pay on February 24, 2022, $36.20 per month towards his restitution instead of the $25.00 quarterly payments he had been paying under his previous IFRP contract. See Ex. G to Apple Decl. Petitioner made three monthly payments of $36.20 in March, April, and May of 2022, See Ex. H at 5-6 to Apple Decl., until he signed a new IFRP contract on May 15, 2022, agreeing to pay $25.00 per quarter towards his restitution. See Ex. I to Apple Decl. Later, in early January 2023, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See generally Pet.
Total funds deposited 8/24/2021-2/24/2022
$711.80
Less IFRP payments during previous six months
- $50.00
Less $450 for the ITS exclusion
- $450.00
Remaining funds
$211.80
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that the BOP violated his procedural and substantive due process rights as well as the Administrative Procedure Act when the BOP adjusted his IFRP payments outside of his program review period. See Pet. at 3, 7-9; Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. at 6, 8-11, 13-14. Petitioner further challenges the BOP's decision to subject inmates in refusal status to an encumbrance pursuant to the inmate bulletin on IFRP changes. See Pet. at 8, Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. at 6, 8. Petitioner requests declaratory and injunctive relief as well as recovery of the $108.60 he paid during the three months he agreed to make monthly payments in the amount $36.20 towards his restitution under the IFRP contract he signed in February 2022 because of the inmate bulletin on IFRP changes. See Pet. at 9; Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. at 5-6, 15, 19; see also Motion to Amend Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) at 1, ECF No. 23; Pet'r's Supp. Reply, ECF No. 40.
Pursuant to the Court's Order, ECF No. 24, the Court treats Petitioner's Motion to Amend Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), ECF No. 23, as his Amended Petition along with the Petition.
Respondent opposes the Petition. Respondent asks this Court to dismiss the Petition for three reasons: (1) the BOP properly exercised its authority in adjusting Petitioner's IFRP payments from $25.00 per quarter to $36.20 per month; (2) Petitioner's claim with respect to his February 24, 2022 IFRP contract is now moot; and (3) any alleged noncompliance with the BOP's Program Statement 5380.08 does not constitute a viable procedural and substantive due process violation. See Resp't's Resp. to Pet. at 7-8, ECF No. 12; see also Resp't's Supp. Resp., ECF No. 25.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal prisoner may seek relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by challenging “the execution of a sentence or the length or duration of his confinement.” Jones v. Jett, No. 10 4201 MJD/AJB, 2011 WL 5507222, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 5408009 (D. Minn. Nov. 8, 2011), aff'd, 470 Fed.Appx. 522 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2002)). “A petitioner may attack the execution of his sentence through § 2241 in the district where he is incarcerated; a challenge to the validity of the sentence itself must be brought under § 2255 in the district of the sentencing court.” Matheny, 307 F.3d at 711. The Eighth Circuit has permitted federal prisoners to challenge their own IFRP payment schedule under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district where they are incarcerated because “[t]hese claims concern the execution of sentence, and are therefore correctly framed as § 2241 claims brought in the district where the sentence is being carried out.” Id. at 711-12.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Petitioner's Challenge to His IFRP Payment Schedule
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether Petitioner exhausted his remedies with the BOP prior to bringing the Petition that is before the Court. See generally Pet. Respondent, however, did not raise any exhaustion argument. See generally Resp't's Resp. to Pet. Regardless, “[e]xhaustion of remedies as a prerequisite to filing § 2241 petitions is [a] judicially-created barrier, not jurisdictional in nature.” Berry v. Marques, No. 18-cv-934 (SRN/TNL), 2018 WL 3750543, at *2 n.3 (D. Minn. July 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3748179 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2018). Therefore, this Court considers the Petition on its merits.
Petitioner clarifies that he is not challenging the IFRP or the amount of his IFRP payments. See Pet'r's Reply at 17, ECF No. 35; Pet'r's Supp. Reply at 1-2. Petitioner concedes that the BOP “correctly calculated [his] IFRP payments according to the formula used in 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b).” Pet'r's Supp. Reply at 1. Rather, Petitioner is challenging the BOP's decision to review, pursuant to the Regional Office's direction, his IFRP payments outside his scheduled program review. Id. at 1-2. Even though Petitioner concedes that he is not challenging his IFRP payment amount, the Court will still address Petitioner's challenge to his IFRP payment schedule as Petitioner's arguments are not always articulated in a clear manner and because a federal prisoner's challenge to the IFRP's payment schedule is all that is cognizable in this habeas case. See Matheny, 307 F.3d at 711-12. Whether the BOP is properly executing the sentencing court's payment plan through the IFRP is a valid claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. Therefore, whether the BOP properly exercised its authority in adjusting Petitioner's IFRP payments from $25.00 per quarter to $36.20 per month is appropriately before this Court.
The sentencing court that convicted and sentenced Petitioner set the following payment schedule for Petitioner's court-ordered restitution of $17,769.00:
Payments to be made in minimum quarterly installments of $25.00 based on IFRP participation, or minimum monthly installments of $20.00 based on UNICOR earnings, during the period of incarceration, to commence 60 days after the date of this judgment. Any balance due upon commencement of supervision shall be paid, during the term of supervision, in minimum monthly installments of $100.00 to commence 60 days after release from imprisonment.See Ex. C at 6 to Apple Decl. The BOP's Program Statement 5380.08 provides that “[o]rdinarily, the minimum payment for non-UNICOR and UNICOR grade 5 inmates will be $25.00 per quarter. This minimum payment may exceed $25.00, taking into consideration the inmate's specific obligations, institution resources, and community resources.” Ex. A at 8 to Apple Decl.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. Program Statement 5380.08 further provides that at each program review, the BOP must “determine the total funds deposited into the inmate's trust fund account for the previous six months; subtract the IFRP payments made by the inmate during the previous six months; and subtract $450 (i.e., $75 x 6 months, ITS exclusion).” Ex. A at 7 to Apple Decl. “Any money remaining after [this] computation may be considered for IFRP payments, regardless of whether the money is in the inmate's trust fund or phone credit account.” Id. An inmate's unit team “has the discretion to consider all monies above that computation to adjust the inmate's IFRP payment plan.” Id. IFRP payment amounts, however, are “solely at the discretion of the Unit Manager and is [ ] decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
Here, Petitioner signed a IFRP contract in January 2020, agreeing to pay $25.00 per quarter towards his restitution. See Ex. F to Apple Decl. This is the minimum amount Petitioner is permitted to pay towards his restitution pursuant to his sentencing court's order. In response to negative media coverage on inmates paying the minimum amount towards their financial obligations through IFRP contracts, federal inmates financial accounts and IFRP payments were subjected to an audit. See Apple Decl. ¶ 13. This audit resulted in FCI Sandstone notifying Petitioner through an inmate bulletin on IFRP changes that his IFRP contract could be adjusted after review of his financial plan pursuant to Program Statement 5380.08. See Ex. D to Apple Decl.; See also Apple Decl. ¶ 14. Per Program Statement 5380.08, “[a]ny money remaining after the [ ] computation may be considered for IFRP payments.” See Exs. A, D to Apple Decl. Therefore, FCI Sandstone applied the IFRP formula to determine Petitioner's remaining funds:
See Apple Decl. ¶ 19; see also Ex. H to Apple Decl. The remaining funds in the amount of $211.80 led to an adjustment of Petitioner's IFRP contract. In February 2022, Petitioner agreed to an adjustment of $36.20 per month. See Ex. G to Apple Decl.
Total funds deposited 8/24/2021-2/24/2022
$711.80
Less IFRP payments during previous six months
- $50.00
Less $450 for the ITS exclusion
- $450.00
Remaining funds
$211.80
The record reflects that the BOP properly applied the proper formula to determine Petitioner's remaining funds for consideration of his IFRP payments and acted within its discretion under Program Statement 5380.08 and 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. The record also showed that Petitioner could afford to make higher payments than the minimum amount required by his sentencing court. Thus, under his new IFRP contract, Petitioner made three monthly payments in the amount of $36.20 until his payment was reduced back to the minimum amount of $25.00 per quarter. See Ex. I to Apple Decl. The Court concludes that the BOP properly applied the IFRP formula pursuant to Program Statement 5380.08 and 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 to determine Petitioner's financial plan. See Hill v. Fikes, No. 20-cv-1365 (SRN/LIB), 2021 WL 606709 at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2021) (“When [p]etitioner's institutional and community resources, including his total deposits, are considered and the proper deductions made, Petitioner's agreed-upon $50 quarterly payment is permissible pursuant to Program Statement 5380.08.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 603755 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2021); Gaines v. Castillo, No. 11-3113-CV-S-RED-H, 2011 WL 5546865, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2011) (“[B]ecause the BOP has the discretion to require petitioner to pay on an installment basis, to the extent that he can make the payments, and because the record indicates petitioner can reasonably make the $40.00 monthly payment, based on his community resources and deposits in his inmate account, petitioner's claim is without merit.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 5546546 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2011). Therefore, to the extent Petitioner is challenging the BOP's application of the IFRP formula that argument fails because the BOP properly exercised its authority to adjust Petitioner's IFRP payments. Likewise, Petitioner's request for the return of the $108.60 he paid during the three months he was under the February 2022 IFRP contract is denied.
Petitioner's request for the return of the $108.60 is a convoluted request as Petitioner himself concedes that the BOP properly applied the IFRP formula, and the sentencing court ordered Petitioner to pay a minimum of $25.00 per quarter.
To the extent that Petitioner is challenging the BOP's decision to adjust his IFRP payment plan outside of his program review that argument too fails. Petitioner argues that the BOP did not comply with Program Statement 5380.08 and that this non-compliance violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. See Pet. at 7-8; Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. at 8-9. Program Statement 5380.08 affords the BOP considerable discretion in determining Petitioner's IFRP payment plan. See generally Ex. A to Apple Decl.; see also Hill, 2021 WL 606709 at *4 (noting that the IFRP policy “expressly requires the BOP to consider the total funds deposited into [an inmate's] trust fund account when developing his IFRP financial plan”). Nevertheless, even if the BOP violated Program Statement 5380.08 by conducting a review of Petitioner's IFRP payment plan outside of Petitioner's scheduled program review such non-compliance with a prison policy does not give rise to a procedural due process violation. See Bonner v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 196 Fed.Appx. 447, 448 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[A] violation of prison regulations in itself does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) ([T]here is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state law or prison officials follow prison regulations.”).
Nor does Petitioner's challenge give rise to a substantive due process claim because any alleged non-compliance with the Program Statement 5380.08 was not “so outrageous that it shocks the conscience or otherwise offends judicial notions of fairness, or is offensive to human dignity.” Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation and quotation omitted). First, Petitioner agreed to the IFRP payment increase, which was consistent with the BOP's application of the IFRP formula pursuant to Program Statement 5380.08 and 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. See also Ex. A at 7 to Apple Decl. (outlining the BOP's “discretion to consider all monies above that computation to adjust the inmate's IFRP payment plan.”) Second, the IFRP is also a voluntary program that “serves valid penological interests and is fully consistent with the [BOP's] authorization, under the direction of the Attorney General, to provide for rehabilitation and reformation.” Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 851 (2nd Cir. 1990); see Cervantes, 2009 WL 76685, at *3 (“Participation in the IFRP is not mandatory.”). There is nothing “so outrageous” about Petitioner's voluntary participation in the IFRP and the BOP's subsequent review of his IFRP payment plan, even if the BOP's review was outside of Petitioner's program review period.
Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner is challenging the encumbrance the BOP would have subjected Petitioner to if he did not participate in the voluntary IFRP, that challenge too fails. It is important to note that Petitioner was not subject to any encumbrance because he voluntarily agreed to participate in his February 2022 IFRP contract, see generally Ex. G to Apple Decl., therefore, Petitioner was not subjected to any adverse consequence. It is also important to note that an encumbrance is at Respondent's discretion pursuant to Program Statement 4500.12. See Ex. E at 14 to Apple Decl. Nonetheless, “prison inmates have no constitutional right to receive the benefits or privileges at issue when an inmate refuses to participate in the IFRP.” Hill, 2021 WL 606709, at *4. “[A]ny adverse consequences that may occur to Petitioner as a result of his withdrawal from the IFRP program do not trigger a constitutional claim.” Cervantes, 2009 WL 76685, at *5; see also Gaines, 2011 WL 5546865, at *2 (“[B]ecause participation in the [IFRP] program is voluntary[,] to the extent that the penalties incurred for not participating do not rise to constitutional proportions, it cannot be said that [P]etitioner has stated a constitutional violation on this issue.”). Moreover, at times it appears that Petitioner is challenging the BOP encumbering the funds of inmates placed in refusal status, but all that is cognizable in this habeas case is whether the BOP is properly executing the sentencing court's payment plan for Petitioner, not other inmates generally. See Matheny, 307 F.3d at 71112. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied for all the above reasons.
B. The Mootness of Petitioner's Challenge
In addition to the above, the Petition is also moot and ultimately should be denied under the mootness doctrine. “Article III of the [United States] Constitution only allows federal courts to adjudicate actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Potter v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2003); See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The case-or- controversy requirement exists at all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Potter, 329 F.3d at 611. It is of no consequence that a claim was live at an earlier stage in the proceedings; a claim must be live when the court decides the issue. State of South Dakota v. Hazen, 914 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1990). “The ‘case or controversy' requirement is not met if ‘the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments.'” Roberts v. Norris, 415 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). “When, during the course of litigation, the issues presented in a case ‘lose their life because of the passage of time or a change in circumstances . . . and a federal court can no longer grant effective relief,' the case is considered moot.” Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Beck v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1994)). If there is no longer an active case or controversy, the action is moot and must be dismissed. Potter, 329 F.3d at 611; see Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2005) (“If an issue is moot in the Article III sense, we have no discretion and must dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.”).
Petitioner challenges the BOP's decision to adjust his IFRP payments outside his program review. Since then, however, the BOP has returned to periodic review procedures as outlined in the Program Statement 5380.08 and Petitioner's IFRP payment amount returned back to $25.00 per quarter pursuant to Petitioner's May 2022 IFRP contract. See Apple Decl. ¶ 21; Ex. I to Apple Decl. Thus, the Petition in this case is now moot as “there is no longer any live case or controversy to be resolved in the present case.” See Flynn v. Eischen, No. 22-cv-1265 (ECT/LIB), 2022 WL 18461620, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 415162 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2023). Mootness, however, requires analysis of potentially applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Sayonkon v. Beniecke, No. 12-cv-27 (MJD/JJK), 2012 WL 1621149, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 2012) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1622545 (D. Minn. May 9, 2012). The Petition should not be dismissed as moot if any of the following exceptions apply:
(1) secondary or ‘collateral' injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit.Sayonkon, 2012 WL 1621149, at *2 (quotation omitted); see also Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-2124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL 3267738, at *3 (D. Minn. July 11, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3268176 (D. Minn. July 31, 2017). None of the mootness exceptions apply in this case.
First, Petitioner has not identified any cognizable collateral consequences that resulted from the BOP adjusting his IFRP payments outside of his program review. Petitioner seeks the return of funds in the amount of $108.60 which is the total amount he paid towards his restitution during the three months he was under the February 2022 IFRP contract. See generally Motion to Amend Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); Pet'r's Supp. Reply. The Court rejects any argument that the $108.60 Petitioner paid towards his restitution constitutes a cognizable collateral consequence. The sentencing court ordered Petitioner to pay a minimum of $25.00 per quarter towards his restitution; therefore, the additional amount he agreed to pay for those three months neither violated the sentencing court's order nor did it violate 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b) and Program Statement 5380.08, which Petitioner does not dispute. Again, participation in the IFRP is voluntary and Petitioner agreed to the February 2022 IFRP contract. Even if the BOP failed to follow Program Statement 5380.08 when Petitioner agreed to the February 2022 IFRP contract, no cognizable collateral consequence resulted. See supra Section IV Part A.
Second, this case does not involve conduct that is capable of repetition yet evading review. The second “exception applies if the matter is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends or expires and there is a reasonable expectation that [Petitioner] will be subjected to the same action again.” In re Search Warrants Issued in Connection with Investigation of S. Cent. Career Ctr., W. Plains, Mo., 487 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 2007). The record in this case shows that Petitioner agreed to a new IFRP contract in May 2022 reverting his IFRP payments back to $25.00 per quarter before Petitioner brought this action. See Apple Decl. ¶ 21; Ex. I to Apple Decl. Accordingly, there is nothing further to litigate and therefore the second exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply. See Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *3 (“Because there is nothing further to litigate in Petitioner's case, [this] situation does not apply.”).
Third, there is no indication in the record before the Court that the BOP “is free to reinitiate the challenged conduct once this case is dismissed.” See Jefferson v. Jett, No. 153308 (PJS/BRT), 2016 WL 4196824, at *2 n.1 (D. Minn. July 1, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4186943 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2016). Thus, the third exception does not apply.
Finally, the Petition was brought on behalf of the individual Petitioner, not on behalf of a class of individuals; therefore, the fourth and last exception do not apply either. See Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *3 (quotation and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes the Petition is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, because the Court has resolved the Petition by relying on the record before the Court, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary in this matter. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 729-30 8th Cir. 1983) (“[D]ismissal of the habeas petition without a [evidentiary] hearing is proper where . . . the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the record.”) (citation omitted). Thus, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. 1, be DENIED AS MOOT; and
2. This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3. The Court kindly requests that the Clerk's Office mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Petitioner at the below mailing address:
Shane Eric Hanley
Reg. No. 16721-040FCI Sandstone
P.O. Box 1000
Sandstone, MN 55072
NOTICE
Filings Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge's proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).