Opinion
WR-95,430-01 WR-95,430-02
02-21-2024
EX PARTE JACKIE LEE BROOKS, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NOS. 1122516 & 1122517 IN THE 8TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HOPKINS COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM
Applicant filed these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded them to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. Applicant pled guilty to two drug offenses. The sentences imposed have discharged, but Applicant says the convictions were used against him in a federal prosecution.
Applicant alleges that his guilty pleas were involuntary because he believed the offenses were being reduced to misdemeanors. There is no response from either attorney who represented Applicant. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel-Mr. Heath Hyde and Mr. Eugene Stump-to respond to Applicant's claims. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant's pleas were involuntary. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted in 2012 of two state jail felonies: (1) possession of less than one gram of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and (2) attempted possession of between five and fifty pounds of marijuana. Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 481.115(b) (establishing possession of less than one gram of a penalty group one substance as a state jail felony), 481.121(b)(4) (establishing possession of between five and fifty pounds of marijuana as a third-degree felony). He pled guilty to both offenses pursuant to a plea bargain and was sentenced to two days' confinement. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.44(a) (permitting courts to punish state jail felonies as Class A misdemeanors in the interests of justice).
See also Tex. Penal Code § 15.01(d) ("An offense under this section is one category lower than the offense attempted[.]"); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.108 ("Title 4, Penal Code[, which includes Section 15.01], applies to an offense under this chapter.").
In December of 2023, Applicant filed applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In both of his applications, he alleges that his pleas of guilty were involuntary because he believed, allegedly because his plea counsel and the presiding judge told him so, that both of his offenses had been reduced to misdemeanors. In his accompanying memorandum of law, Applicant claims that he is suffering collateral consequences insofar as these felony convictions have been used to enhance his sentence in an unrelated federal prosecution.
Today, the Court remands these applications to the convicting court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a convicting court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, 663 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Yeary, J., concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in cases like these. Applicant pled guilty in 2012, but he did not file these writ applications until eleven years later. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the convicting court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the convicting court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the convicting court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.