Opinion
03-23-00098-CV
07-13-2023
D. V., Appellant v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. 21-1568, THE HONORABLE TANNER NEIDHARDT, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Chief Justice Byrne and Justices Triana and Theofanis.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice.
D.V. (Mother) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her four-year-old son, James. She argues in three issues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for a de novo hearing, that the judgment is not supported by the pleadings, and that insufficient evidence supports the predicate finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). We reverse and remand.
To protect the child's privacy, we refer to him by a pseudonym and his parents by their initials or as Mother and Father. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8.
BACKGROUND
On January 16, 2021, the Department of Family and Protective Services received a report that James witnessed two violent incidents involving Mother and his half-siblings. On July 1, 2021, the Department filed suit seeking temporary managing conservatorship over James and to terminate Mother's rights. The district court appointed the Department temporary managing conservator of James.
The parties tried the case before an associate judge on June 16 and August 17, 2022. The associate judge signed a proposed judgment finding that the Department had proven two predicate grounds for termination and that termination was in James's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O), (2). Mother timely filed a written request for a de novo hearing. Her request stated: "Pursuant to Texas Family Code § 201.015, Respondent [Mother] requests a hearing before the Referring Court on the following issues: A. Associate Judge's ruling to terminate Respondent [Mother's] parental rights." Following a hearing, the district court signed a judgment denying her request because she "failed to specify the issues that were presented to the referring court under Texas Family Code section 201.015(b)," and adopting the associate judge's judgment. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the question of whether the district court erred by denying her request for a de novo hearing because it is dispositive.
Legal Standards
We review the denial of a de novo hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Guerrero v. A.C.G., No. 08-22-00042-CV, 2023 WL 2589697, at *2 (Tex. App.-El Paso Mar. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.F., No. 07-17-00407-CV, 2018 WL 1278796, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Mar. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion "when it acts with disregard of guiding rules or principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner." In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). If this analysis involves the construction of a statute, that is a question of law that we review de novo. Regent Care of San Antonio, L.P. v. Detrick, 610 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. 2020). To determine the meaning of a statute, "we start with its text and the plain meaning of its words construed within the statute as a whole." Sunstate Equip. Co., LLC v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex. 2020).
The Family Code permits a judge to refer certain matters, including a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, to an associate judge for a ruling. Tex. Fam. Code § 201.005(a). Upon ruling on the matter, the associate judge must issue a proposed order or judgment containing the associate judge's findings, conclusions, or recommendations. Id. § 201.011(a). Any party may request a de novo hearing before the referring court by filing a written request within three days of receiving notice of the associate judge's order or judgment. Id. § 201.015(a). The request "must specify the issues that will be presented to the referring court." Id. § 201.015(b). The de novo hearing is mandatory if properly requested. See id. § 201.015(f) ("The referring court . . . shall hold a de novo hearing not later than the 30th day after the date on which the initial request for a de novo hearing was filed with the clerk of the referring court."); J.V. v. Texas Dep't of Fam. &Protective Servs., No. 03-16-00614-CV, 2017 WL 876028, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. Orr, 989 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to hold a hearing on proper request. See Guerrero, 2023 WL 2589697, at *3; In re T.C., No. 03-21-00624-CV, 2022 WL 91673, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 7, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re E.O., No. 01-19-00207-CV, 2019 WL 4019713, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
If an objection is filed, the reviewing court shall hear the case or preside over a jury trial on the matter. Tex. Fam. Code § 201.005(b).
Analysis
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request as insufficiently specific because she requested de novo review of the associate judge's findings of two statutory predicates and that termination was in James's best interest. The Department responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the supreme court has held that a party must specify individual issues in its request for de novo review. See In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. 2019).
We agree with Mother that the district court abused its discretion. Proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship "implicate rights of constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection." In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 2018). "Consequently, termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized ...." C.C. v. Texas Dep't of Fam. &Protective Servs., 653 S.W.3d 204, 216 (Tex. App.-Austin 2022, no pet.) (citing Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). A judgment terminating parental rights necessarily requires findings of at least one statutory predicate and that termination is in the best interest of the child. See, e.g., In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) ("Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code requires two findings to support termination of a parent's legal rights: (1) the parent's acts or omissions must satisfy an enumerated statutory ground for termination; and (2) termination must be in the child's best interest."); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2002). The associate judge expressly found that the Department had proven two predicate grounds for termination-subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O)-and that termination is in James's best interest. Under the circumstances, Mother's request for review of the associate judge's ruling terminating her parental rights necessarily challenged the sufficiency of the evidence challenging those findings.
Holding that Mother's request was sufficiently specific would not, as the Department argues, "essentially invalidate the specificity requirements of [section] 201.015(b) and A.L.M.-F." The supreme court explained in A.L.M.-F. that a de novo hearing is not a trial de novo, which is a "new and independent action in the reviewing court with 'all the attributes of an original action' as if no trial of any kind has occurred in the court below." 593 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Key W. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. 1961)). Rather, the de novo hearing process is "mandatory when invoked but expedited in time frame and limited in scope." Id. at 279. Instead of "a complete retrial on all issues," the requesting party "must specify the specific issues presented to the referring court. Issues not specified need not be reviewed." Id. at 280 (footnote omitted). The purpose of the specificity requirement is to preclude the party seeking review from raising other issues during the hearing. See Chacon v. Chacon, 222 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.) (explaining that Section 201.015(b) "is intended to limit the appealing party's ability to raise issues he has not specifically appealed in the de novo hearing"). Mother's request, which implicitly requested de novo review of the sufficiency of the findings of two statutory predicates and best interest, fulfills this purpose. See In re L.R., 324 S.W.3d 885, 890 n.5 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, orig. proceeding) (observing that reviewing court did not abuse its discretion by concluding challenge to "[e]ach and every finding entered by the Associate Judge" was broad enough to include challenge to denial of jury trial).
In this context, specifying the "ruling to terminate" Mother's parental rights as the issue to be presented to the referring court does not transform the nature of the proceeding as the Department suggests. As with any de novo hearing, the judgment of the associate judge is not vacated but remains "in full force and effect and is enforceable as an order or judgment of the referring court," Tex. Fam. Code § 201.013(a), and the referring court retains the authority to consult the record of the trial before the associate judge, id. § 201.015(c). The hearing, in other words, remains an extension of the original trial on the merits rather than a new and independent proceeding. See A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d at 280 ("In short, a de novo hearing is not an entirely new and independent action, but instead, is an extension of the original trial on the merits.").
Under the circumstances, and mindful that we must strictly scrutinize parental-termination proceedings in favor of the parent, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for a de novo hearing on the ground that it was insufficiently specific. See, e.g., In re S.S.R, No. 13-18-00576-CV, 2019 WL 1290659, at *1-2 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that request for de novo review of "all issues of fact and findings of law" related to "termination of their parent-child relationship" was sufficiently specific to entitle parents to de novo hearing on "the statutory findings under section 161.001(b)(1) and the finding that termination was in the best interest of the children"); In re A.A.T., No. 13-16-00269-CV, 2016 WL 8188946, at *2 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that parent who challenged "all findings and conclusions resulting in the termination of his parental rights" was entitled to de novo hearing on associate judge's findings of two statutory predicates and best interest).
We also conclude that the error was harmful. A trial-court error requires reversal if it "probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment" or "probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals." Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(a). The supreme court recently explained in a related context that when "the wrong decisionmaker makes factual determinations, the resulting judgment is improper." In re J.N., No. 22-0419, __S.W.3d__, 2023 WL 3910042, at *5 (Tex. June 9, 2023). For example, "when a suit involves material disputes of fact that are erroneously resolved by the court rather than a jury, the judgment is improper and reversal appropriate." Id.
The Department asserts that the error is harmless because Mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting one of the predicate findings and the bestinterest determination. Because only one statutory predicate and a best-interest finding are necessary for termination, J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312, the Department reasons this is essentially a concession that there is sufficient evidence to uphold the judgment. Although the Department is correct regarding the requisites for termination, Mother's decision not to challenge all grounds on appeal is not dispositive. The record reflects factual disputes regarding all the grounds for termination, which Mother was entitled to have resolved by the district court. We conclude that the loss of that opportunity was harmful. See J.N., 2023 WL 3910042, at *5 ("Because selecting which parent will designate M.N.'s primary residence involves factual disputes that Mother would have been entitled to have a jury resolve, Mother's loss of that opportunity was harmful."); In re R.A.O., 561 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ("A judgment rendered without granting a party the right to a de novo hearing on matters disposed of in the judgment is an improper judgment."); J.V., 2017 WL 876028, at *2 ("We presume that the failure to hold the requested hearing is harmful." (citing Orr, 989 S.W.2d at 469)).
We sustain Mother's first issue. Because this conclusion requires reversal, we need not address Mother's second and third issues. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1 ("The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.").
We need not reach Mother's third issue-where she challenges the legal sufficiency of the Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) finding-because it would not afford her greater relief. Because she did not challenge one of the predicate findings and the best interest finding, Mother is entitled to review of the Subsection (E) finding only because of the collateral consequences that attach to it. See, e.g., In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) ("[D]ue process requires that courts also review termination under Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) even after affirming termination on another ground because of the collateral effects of termination on those grounds."). Because those collateral consequences will no longer exist after our decision, we go no further.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court's judgment and remand for the district court to conduct a de novo hearing and for further proceedings.
Reversed and Remanded.