Opinion
1266 EDA 2021 J-S24026-22
09-12-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ROBERT K. DAVIS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 27, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0300791-2001
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
LAZARUS, J.
Robert K. Davis appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After our review, we affirm.
Following a nonjury trial on July 25, 2001, the Honorable William J. Mazzola convicted Davis of aggravated assault, attempted murder, carrying firearms without a license and in public, possession of an instrument of crime, terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 121/2 to 25 years' incarceration. Davis filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied. After several procedural hurdles, Davis' direct appellate rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Davis, 898 A.2d 1126 (Pa. Super. 2006) (Table). Davis filed a pro se petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied. Commonwealth v. Davis, 903 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2006) (Table).
Thereafter, Davis filed pro se PCRA petitions on August 24, 2006, May 18, 2007, and August 9, 2007. Davis appealed from the order denying his August 9, 2007 petition as untimely. This Court found the PCRA court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely, vacated the order, and remanded for appointment of counsel and an amended PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Davis, 2474 EDA 2007 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 18, 2008) (unpublished memorandum).
On remand, the court appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Davis filed a response, and the court dismissed the matter on May 18, 2010.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
Subsequently, Davis filed several pro se pleadings, including a request for reinstatement of appellate rights. The PCRA court denied this request on August 3, 2010. Davis appealed, and this Court denied relief. Commonwealth v. Davis, 2306 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 24, 2011) (unpublished memorandum decision).
Davis filed additional PCRA petitions on March 20, 2015, and May 8, 2015. Both petitions were denied, and this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 2050 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed July 15, 2016) (unpublished memorandum decision). On August 23, 2016, Davis filed another pro se PCRA petition, which the PCRA court denied on April 12, 2017. Davis did not appeal that order.
On April 5, 2019, Davis filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, as well as an amended petition on September 27, 2019. On April 1, 2021, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Davis filed several pro se responses to the court's Rule 907 notice-on April 7, 2021, one on April 13, 2021, two on April 19, 2021, and one on April 22, 2021. On May 27, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Davis' petition.
Davis filed this timely appeal, and he raises the following issue for our review, verbatim:
Whether [Davis] is herein entitled to a remand for an immediate evidentiary hearing due to numerous erroneous trial court statutory incongruities to dismiss [his] original and amended PCRA petition (9/27/2019), seeking grant of leave to claim new evidence exception to timeliness requirement to the Act, was a[] result caused by interference by government officials to (estoppel) any collateral attack of the convictions, by presentation, in violation of the Constitution or laws of the Commonwealth, or the Constitution or laws of the United States, asserting mandatory statutory language of after discovered facts exception to the Act by (corollary) Commonwealth Exhibit (Laudare); (ad hoc)[?]
Appellant's Brief, at 4.
We begin by noting our standard and scope of review:
This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record and we do not disturb a PCRA court's ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Similarly, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Finally, we may affirm a PCRA court's decision on any grounds if the record supports it.Commonwealth v. Dozier, 208 A.3d 1101, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2019).
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final, except as otherwise provided by statute. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(1). "A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.'' Id. at § 9545(b)(3).
As noted above, Davis was sentenced on October 9, 2001. In September of 2004, his direct appeal rights were reinstated, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on March 22, 2006. On July 20, 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Davis, 903 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2006) (Table). Davis did not seek review with the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, his sentence became final ninety days later, on October 18, 2006. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) ("[A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States ... or at the expiration of time for seeking the review."); U.S.Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (petition for a writ of certiorari timely when filed within 90 days after entry of judgment).
Davis' present petition, filed over eleven years late, is untimely. However, an untimely PCRA petition may be considered timely if a petitioner alleges and proves one or more of the following: (1) governmental interference with the presentation of his claims; (2) discovery of previously unknown facts, upon which the claim is predicated, which could not have been discovered with due diligence; or (3) an after-recognized constitutional right given retroactive application. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Any petition invoking one of the exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. See id. at § 9545(b)(2). The PCRA's timeliness requirements "are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature," and such requirements may not be disregarded in order to reach the merits of the claims raised. Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000). Further, it is petitioner's burden to allege and prove that one of these exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).
Davis has failed to meet his burden of alleging and proving a timeliness exception. Neither his petition nor his brief discusses the statutory exceptions. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2013) ("Our review of [Appellant]'s brief reveals that he has not properly asserted an exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirements."). As the PCRA court notes, in his petition, Davis discusses ineffectiveness of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, but neglects to plead or prove a timeliness exception. Davis has "wholly failed to articulate the specifics of his claim and failed to allege the existence of any facts or evidence to establish one of the timeliness exceptions." PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/22, at 3-4. Although in his brief on appeal Davis refers to two of the exceptions in his statement of the issue, he fails to make any coherent argument. See Appellant's Brief, at 7-9. As this Court and the PCRA court have previously observed, Davis' filings have become increasingly incomprehensible.
Davis has failed to invoke any exception to the PCRA's time requirement, and, therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition. We discern no error of law. Dozier, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court's order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.