Opinion
No. 19 WAP 2021
11-23-2022
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Demetrius Carlos COLEMAN, Appellant
Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia. Norma Chase, Esq., for Appellant. Michael Wayne Streily, Esq., Allegheny County District Attorney's Office, Daniel Albert Vernacchio, Esq., for Appellee.
Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.
Norma Chase, Esq., for Appellant.
Michael Wayne Streily, Esq., Allegheny County District Attorney's Office, Daniel Albert Vernacchio, Esq., for Appellee.
BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
JUSTICE BROBSON
OPINION
In this discretionary matter, Demetrius Carlos Coleman (Appellant) appeals from an order of the Superior Court, which vacated Appellant's judgment of sentence and remanded the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (sentencing court) for resentencing. The Superior Court concluded that the sentencing court erred in failing to sentence Appellant pursuant to the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(a), requiring that any person convicted of third-degree murder "in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder ... be sentenced to life imprisonment." We must decide whether the Superior Court was correct in concluding that the mandatory sentencing enhancement applies to a defendant such as Appellant, who killed three people simultaneously and was thereafter convicted of three counts of third-degree murder. Upon careful review, we conclude that the sentencing enhancement does apply in such a scenario. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In the afternoon of November 24, 2016, East McKeesport Police Officer Scott Lowden (Officer Lowden) was on patrol when he observed the driver of a white Hyundai make an illegal left turn. Officer Lowden followed the Hyundai as it proceeded into a gas station and stopped at a gas pump. Officer Lowden exited his patrol vehicle and approached the Hyundai, where he found Appellant in the driver's seat and Asia Camp (Camp), the owner of the vehicle, in the passenger seat. Officer Lowden explained to Appellant that Appellant had made an illegal left turn and asked Appellant to provide his driver's license, insurance information, and vehicle registration. Appellant advised Officer Lowden that he could not produce his driver's license because it was suspended. Camp was also unable to produce a driver's license.
Officer Lowden returned to his patrol vehicle, where he confirmed that Appellant's driver's license was suspended and learned that Appellant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Officer Lowden then called the North Versailles Police Department for backup. When two North Versailles police cars arrived, Appellant fled in the vehicle, driving over the curb and sidewalk. A high-speed chase ensued, with Appellant heading toward an intersection at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour. Appellant weaved in and out of traffic without slowing or stopping, travelled in the opposite lane of traffic at times, and sped past a stopped police vehicle. Appellant eventually crashed the Hyundai into two vehicles at the intersection. One of the vehicles was a Ford Fusion sedan containing David Bianco (Bianco), Kaylie Meininger (Meininger), and their two-year-old daughter (Child). The force of the impact knocked the Ford Fusion into the air, causing it to collide with a utility pole and almost immediately thereafter explode into flames, killing all three occupants of the Ford Fusion instantly.
Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) charged Appellant with, inter alia , three counts of third-degree murder. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with these offenses in the same Criminal Information, with Counts 1, 2, and 3 relating to the deaths of Bianco, Meininger, and Child, respectively. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, following which the jury convicted Appellant of all three murder offenses and several others. The Commonwealth then filed a notice of intent to proceed under Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code. The Commonwealth specifically took the position that the mandatory sentencing enhancement applied to Appellant for the murders of Meininger and Child at Counts 2 and 3 of the Criminal Information because, at the time of his sentencing on those counts, he would have a prior conviction for murder at Count 1 of the Criminal Information relating to Bianco. Appellant opposed the application of Section 9715 at sentencing. The sentencing court ultimately sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 70 to 140 years of incarceration. Pertinently, the sentencing court declined to apply the sentencing enhancement and instead imposed consecutive terms of 20 to 40 years of incarceration for each of Appellant's third-degree murder convictions.
Both parties appealed to the Superior Court. Relevant here, the Commonwealth claimed that the sentencing court erred and imposed an illegal sentence by refusing to apply the sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the sentencing court opined that Section 9715(a) was a recidivist sentencing statute and that Appellant was not a recidivist because, while Appellant had been convicted of three counts of criminal homicide, he had never "previously" committed criminal homicide. (Sentencing Ct. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Op., 6/19/2020, at 26-27, 29.) The sentencing court added that it was "illogical" and "ludicrous" to apply the sentencing enhancement to Appellant under the circumstances, that the purpose of Section 9715 was "not served by engaging in grammatical chicanery," and that "the fair and proper interpretation [of Section 9715 ] was that it was not applicable to [Appellant's] case." (Id. at 27, 29-30.)
Notably, the sentencing court rendered its decision in the face of Superior Court precedent that applied the sentencing enhancement under arguably similar circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Morris , 958 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc), appeal denied , 605 Pa. 711, 991 A.2d 311 (2010) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson , 106 A.3d 742 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied , 635 Pa. 743, 134 A.3d 56 (2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 106, 196 L.Ed.2d 87 (2016). In Morris , the defendant was charged with four counts of murder following the suspicious sudden deaths of his four children—a five-month-old daughter and an 18-month-old daughter in June of 1995, a 27-day-old son in October of 2002, and an infant son in September of 2003. Morris , 958 A.2d at 572-75. A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of third-degree murder in connection with the death of his 27-day-old son in October of 2002 and the death of his infant son in September of 2003, but it acquitted the defendant of the remaining charges. Id. at 575. The lower court sentenced the defendant to 20 to 40 years of incarceration for the third-degree murder conviction relative to the death of his 27-day-old son in October of 2002. Id. The lower court then applied the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code and sentenced the defendant to a mandatory life sentence for the third-degree murder conviction relative to the death of his infant son in September of 2003. Id.
Following the lower court's denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the lower court "misconstrued and imposed an illegal sentence under [ Section 9715 ] when it sentenced him to a mandatory term of life in prison" for the murder of his infant son in September of 2003. Id. at 575, 577. Upon review, the Superior Court affirmed, concluding that, "based upon the clear language of [S]ection 9715, ... the [lower] court did not commit legal error in using [the defendant's] first conviction for [the] murder [of his 27-day-old son in October of 2002] to enhance the sentence for [the defendant's] conviction for [the] murder [of his infant son in September of 2003], even though the two murders were tried and sentenced together" under one multiple-count criminal complaint. Id. at 580. In so doing, the Superior Court reasoned that "[S]ection 9715 is explicitly and unambiguously written" and "the plain language [thereof] specifies that the timing of the primary conviction is not relevant as long as the defendant had been convicted of the initial murder ... at the time of sentencing on the second murder." Id. at 579. The Superior Court further reasoned:
[S]ection 9715 only requires the [lower] court to determine, at the time of sentencing, whether the defendant previously has been convicted of murder ... at any time, and whether this initial conviction may be used to enhance the sentence on the second conviction. The legislature did not include a requirement in [S]ection 9715 that the previous conviction must antedate the commission of the second offense for which a defendant is being sentenced or that the crimes must have been tried and sentenced separately. We note that if the legislature intended such a result, it would have inserted such language in the statute.
Id. at 580 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
Based upon its reasoning in Morris , the Superior Court expressly overruled its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Smith , 710 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeals denied , 558 Pa. 608, 736 A.2d 603 (1999), 737 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1999). In Smith , the defendant was selling marijuana on a street corner, when he became involved in a dispute with seven individuals, pulled a .380 caliber revolver, and fired five of the revolver's seven rounds, thereby injuring one of the individuals and killing two of the other individuals. Smith , 710 A.2d at 1181. In connection therewith, a jury convicted the defendant of, inter alia , two counts of third-degree murder, and the lower court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years of incarceration. Id. at 1180. The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the lower court erred by failing to apply the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code. Id. at 1181. The Superior Court, however, found no error in the lower court's refusal to apply the sentencing enhancement under these circumstances and affirmed the lower court's order. Id. In so doing, the Superior Court explained:
[The d]efendant was found guilty at the same time and by the same jury of two counts of third[-]degree murder arising out of the same incident. We believe it strains the plain meaning of the statute to interpret "previously convicted" to encompass this situation. We note that when the legislature intended such a result, it said so in plain language, as in the death penalty statute. See 42 Pa.[ ]C.S.[ ] § 9711(d)(10), (11), (12) ("[T]he defendant has been convicted of another [offense] committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.")[.]
Id. (some alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).
In Thompson , the defendant fled the scene of an attempted traffic stop in a vehicle at a very high rate of speed, failed to stop the vehicle at a red light, and struck with his vehicle two young boys who had been crossing the street in a crosswalk, thereby killing both. Thompson , 106 A.3d at 748. In connection therewith, a jury convicted the defendant of, inter alia , two counts of third-degree murder. Id. Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to proceed under Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code. Id. At the time of sentencing, the lower court sentenced the defendant to 20 to 40 years of incarceration for the first count of third-degree murder and a mandatory term of life imprisonment for the second count of third-degree murder. Id. at 749. Following the lower court's denial of his post-sentence motion, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that his mandatory life sentence under Section 9715 was illegal and, therefore, should have been vacated. Id. at 749, 759. Applying Morris , the Superior Court affirmed, concluding that the lower court did not commit an error of law by sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment for his second count of third-degree murder. Id. at 762. In reaching this conclusion, the Superior Court explained:
[T]he [lower] court ... sentenced [the defendant] to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for his second conviction of third-degree murder. At the time of ... sentencing, [the defendant] had been convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. The [lower] court imposed a sentence of 20 [to] 40 years’ incarceration on [the defendant's] first third-degree murder conviction. The [lower] court then sentenced [the defendant] to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for his second conviction of third-degree murder. As Section 9715 provides that the sentence of life imprisonment "shall be" imposed for a second third-degree murder conviction, the [lower] court is divested of any discretion in fashioning [the defendant's] sentence.
Id. at 761 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
Turning back to the matter sub judice , a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, in a nonprecedential memorandum opinion, agreed with the Commonwealth that the sentencing court erred in failing to apply the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code to Appellant. Commonwealth v. Coleman , 2021 WL 467585 (Pa. Super., Nos. 938, 972 WDA 2019, filed Feb. 9, 2021), slip op. at 17. In its brief analysis, the Superior Court concluded that Morris was dispositive of the instant matter and that Appellant's third-degree murder conviction at Count 1 of the Criminal Information constituted a prior conviction for purposes of applying Section 9715(a) when sentencing him for his convictions of third-degree murder at Counts 2 and 3 of the Criminal Information. The Superior Court, thus, vacated Appellant's judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing in accordance with Section 9715.
Judge Strassburger wrote a concurring memorandum, wherein he joined the majority and agreed that Morris controlled the applicability of Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code to the matter but expressed his belief that Morris was wrongly decided. Commonwealth v. Coleman , 2021 WL 467585 (Pa. Super., Nos. 938, 972 WDA 2019, filed Feb. 9, 2021), concurring slip op. at 1-2 (Strassburger, J., concurring).
II. ISSUE
We granted discretionary review to resolve the following issue, as stated by Appellant: "Should the mandatory sentencing provision of 42 Pa.[ ]C.S. §[ ]9715(a) apply to a case where the offenses and the deaths were simultaneous?" Commonwealth v. Coleman , ––– Pa. ––––, 260 A.3d 923 (2021) (per curiam). This issue presents a question of law, as it requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Labor & Indus. , 640 Pa. 219, 162 A.3d 384, 389 (2017). Accordingly, "our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review plenary." Id.
III. DISCUSSION
As in all matters of statutory interpretation, the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501 - 1991, guides our analysis. The Statutory Construction Act provides that the object of all statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, the best expression of the General Assembly's intent "is found in the statute's plain language." Commonwealth v. Howard , ––– Pa. ––––, 257 A.3d 1217, 1222 (2021). "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). Moreover, "we should not insert words into [a statute] that are plainly not there." Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada Nurses, Inc.) , 616 Pa. 592, 52 A.3d 241, 245 (2012). Only in instances of ambiguous statutory language "may courts consider statutory factors to discern legislative intent." Howard , 257 A.3d at 1222. Additionally, "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage," though "technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in [the Statutory Construction Act] shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a). "We also presume that ‘the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable,’ and that ‘the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.’ " Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd. , 655 Pa. 137, 217 A.3d 238, 245 (2019) (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1) - (2) ). Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code, entitled life imprisonment for homicide, more fully provides, in part:
(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.--Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses committed with firearms), 9713 (relating to sentences for offenses committed on public transportation) or 9714 (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses), any person convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be sentenced to life imprisonment , notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
(b) Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The sentencing court, prior to imposing sentence on an offender under subsection (a), shall have a complete record of the previous convictions of the offender, copies of which shall be furnished to the offender. If the offender or the attorney for the Commonwealth contests the accuracy of the record, the court shall schedule a hearing and direct the offender and the attorney for the Commonwealth to submit evidence regarding the previous convictions of the offender. The court shall then determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, the previous convictions of the offender and, if this section is applicable, shall impose sentence in accordance with this section. Should a previous conviction be vacated and an acquittal or final discharge entered subsequent to imposition of sentence under this section, the offender shall have the right to petition the sentencing court for reconsideration of sentence if this section would not have been applicable except for the conviction which was vacated.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code should not be construed to apply to a case such as this one, where a single course of conduct caused multiple, instantaneous, simultaneous deaths and the convictions at issue were "at most" minutes apart. (Appellant's Brief at 21.) As for the language used in Section 9715(a), and specifically the phrase "has previously been convicted," Appellant argues that the term " ‘previous[,’] in its everyday use, implies an event other than that under consideration." (Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).) Appellant also argues that Section 9715(b) ’s language relating to proof at sentencing and providing that "[t]he sentencing court ... shall have a complete record of the previous convictions of the offender, copies of which shall be furnished to the offender" refutes the Commonwealth's interpretation of the statute. Appellant adds that the Commonwealth's interpretation "would condone a gross disparity: treating a single criminal episode as if it were repeat criminal episodes, based on happenstance." (Id. at 25.) In further support of his interpretation, Appellant relies upon the rule of lenity and notes that the General Assembly is presumed not to have intended an absurd result or to have intended to violate the constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and unequal treatment under the law. Appellant recognizes that not all enhanced sentencing statutes applicable to second and subsequent offenses are "construed as applying only to recidivists." (Id. at 21.) Nonetheless, Appellant argues that he is neither a recidivist nor a repeater (i.e. , an individual who has committed the same crimes separated by time but not by a period of rehabilitation) and submits that "[i]n no case decided by [this] Court has a statute enhancing punishment been applied to simultaneous offenses." (Id. at 21-22, 24-25.) Appellant contends that the sentencing court properly construed Section 9715(a) and recognized that " Smith is the more rational interpretation of the statute" under the facts of the instant matter. (Id. at 21.) Indeed, according to Appellant, "the Superior Court got it right in Smith and got it wrong in Morris and Thompson ." (Id. )
The Defender Association of Philadelphia (Association) filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Appellant, agreeing with Appellant that Morris was incorrectly decided and that Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code is inapplicable herein. The Association first argues that, based upon Section 9715 ’s text, a defendant must have previously been convicted of murder at the point in time that he is convicted of the third-degree murder subject to the Section 9715 enhancement—not at the point in time that the defendant is sentenced for the latter offense—and that circumstance did not happen here because Appellant's convictions were rendered at the same trial (i.e. , according to the Association, simultaneously). Second, the Association contends that the "recidivist philosophy" should apply here to require that the previous murder conviction exist at the time of commission of the third-degree murder offense subject to the Section 9715 enhancement. Third, the Association argues that Section 9715, as a penal statute, must be strictly construed in favor of Appellant. Finally, the Association argues that, even if Morris was correctly decided and Appellant's conduct is encompassed "within the literal terms of Section 9715, the absolute simultaneity and indivisibility of [A]ppellant's criminal act resulting in the three third-degree murder convictions renders application of Section 9715 unreasonable and no longer in effectuation of legislative intent. In such circumstances, Section 9715 ... should not be applied." (Association's Brief at 22.)
The Commonwealth counters that Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code applies in cases involving simultaneous deaths and offenses resulting from a single criminal act. Turning to principles of statutory construction and Section 9715(a) ’s use of the phrase "previously been convicted at any time," the Commonwealth argues that "previously been convicted" is a phrase consisting of ordinary words and "clearly refers to convictions antecedent to some point in time." (Commonwealth's Brief at 6.) As for the phrase "at any time," the Commonwealth argues that the phrase should be interpreted literally, meaning that "there is no previous conviction too remote, nor too recent , to be exempt from the rule." (Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).) The Commonwealth further submits that, pursuant to Section 9715(b), sentencing is the operative "look-back point." (Id. at 7.) Thus, according to the Commonwealth, the statute requires the sentencing court to look at the record at sentencing and, if there are multiple convictions for third-degree murder, sentence a defendant to life imprisonment for all but the first of such convictions. The Commonwealth submits that the statutory text expressly allows for situations like the one present here when read as a whole and that "[a]ny other approach disregards the express text of the statute." (Id. at 9.) The Commonwealth adds that we should reject Appellant's and the Association's position insofar as they seek to insert language into Section 9715(a) that is not otherwise there or ignore language that is contained in Section 9715(b).
The Commonwealth further argues that Section 9715 is not a recidivist sentencing statute, as "[o]ur General Assembly knows how to write a recidivist statute if it wants to." (Id. at 10.) The Commonwealth adds that Section 9715 is silent as to acts; rather the section focuses on the existence of multiple convictions—not multiple acts—making no distinction between convictions stemming from simultaneous murders committed in a single act and convictions for previous unrelated acts. The Commonwealth claims that this interpretation comports with Morris ’s interpretation of Section 9715 and submits that the Superior Court decided Morris and Thompson correctly. The Commonwealth contends that, while Appellant laments the application of Section 9715 to him under the circumstances as disparate and absurd, "[t]he fact that there were three victims in the Ford[ ] instead of only one[ ] entitles [A]ppellant to no leniency," as "the defendant in a criminal case takes his victims as he finds them." (Id. at 17.) As a final point, the Commonwealth argues that the statute is not ambiguous, and, thus, the rule of lenity does not apply.
Upon review, we hold that Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code applies under the circumstances presented. Section 9715(a) plainly provides that any person convicted of third-degree murder in this Commonwealth "who has previously been convicted at any time of murder" must receive an enhanced sentence. The statute does not define any of the terms in this operative phrase. Giving the most pertinent terms their plain and ordinary meaning, the term "previously" is defined as "beforehand, hitherto, antecedently," and the term "previous" is defined as "going or existing before in time." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1798 (3d ed. 1993). The word "convicted" or "convict" means "to find or declare guilty of an offense or crime by the verdict or decision of a court or other authority." Id. at 499; see also Black's Law Dictionary 421-22 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "convict" as "[t]o prove or officially announce (a criminal defendant) to be guilty of a crime after proceedings in a law court; specif., to find (a person) guilty of a criminal offense upon a criminal trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere (no contest)"). In view of these definitions, the first portion of the key phrase in Section 9715(a) (i.e. , "who has previously been convicted") dictates that the sentencing enhancement applies to any person convicted of third-degree murder who has been found or proven guilty of murder before in time. Focusing only on this first portion of the phrase set forth above, the phrase does not address whether the previous conviction must be one rendered in a separate case or whether it may also be applied in cases such as this. Any doubt arising as to the application of Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code, however, is removed upon continued reading of the statute: any person convicted of third-degree murder who has previously been convicted of murder "at any time" is to receive an enhanced sentence. Indeed, through use of the terms "at any time," the General Assembly made clear that there is no limitation relative to a person's previous conviction that would preclude application of the sentencing enhancement insofar as it concerns Section 9715(a). Thus, pursuant to Section 9715(a), so long as a person convicted of third-degree murder has previously been convicted of murder at any point in time, the sentencing enhancement applies to that person.
It is well settled that "[o]ne way to ascertain the plain meaning and ordinary usage of terms is by reference to a dictionary definition." In re Beyer , 631 Pa. 612, 115 A.3d 835, 839 (2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Hart , 611 Pa. 531, 28 A.3d 898, 909 (2011) (explaining that "common and approved usage [of term undefined by legislature] may be ascertained by examining its dictionary definition")).
In her concurring opinion, Justice Donohue observes that the term "conviction" has been the subject of competing definitions harkening back to the Civil War era. See Donohue, J., Concurring Opinion at 614-15. We acknowledge the concurrence's point that the courts have, at various times, utilized differing definitions of the term when the term has been undefined by statute. These cases, however, appear to demonstrate that both definitions—i.e. , "found guilty" and "found guilty and sentenced"—have been used with such frequency that they call into question whether a "technical" definition of "conviction" clearly remains, particularly given the passage of time. Nevertheless, Justice Donohue's concurring opinion demonstrates that, regardless of whether the analysis focuses on historical understandings of the term or modern dictionary definitions of the term, "conviction" for purposes of Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code simply means "finding of guilt," without any additional requirement that a judgment of sentence has been imposed upon the defendant relative to that finding.
The dissent finds redundancy and ambiguity in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code based upon the provision's use of the phrase "previously ... at any time." In so doing, the dissent opines that this language serves as the basis for three different options as to the statute's applicability. (See Wecht, J., Dissenting Opinion at 621-23 (reasoning that, through use of phrases "previously" and "at any time," General Assembly could have also intended to require previous conviction to arise in "entirely separate case" or to preclude claim of prior conviction being "too remote").) Consistent with our analysis above, we do not agree that the words "previously" and "at any time"—terms that the dissent acknowledges are "not at all challenging" to understand, (id. at 617-18)—are redundant or ambiguous as used together in Section 9715(a). Rather, those terms are crucial to ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, and they clearly identify the person to which the sentencing enhancement applies. As explained above, the term "previously" indicates that a person convicted of third-degree murder must already have a conviction for murder, and the phrase "at any time" makes clear that there is no limitation placed upon that previous conviction otherwise in Section 9715(a). Stated another way, under Section 9715(a), the sentencing enhancement applies to any person convicted of third-degree murder who has ever before been convicted of murder. This language encompasses all of the scenarios envisioned by the dissent, which unnecessarily complicates the analysis by creating ambiguity in the statute where none exists.
In light of the clear and unambiguous language employed in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code, Appellant's arguments fail. While Appellant argues that Section 9715 should not apply where a single course of conduct caused multiple instantaneous, simultaneous deaths, we emphasize that the General Assembly spoke only in terms of convictions and, more specifically, whether the defendant "convicted" of third-degree murder "has previously been convicted at any time of murder." Appellant's attempts to shift the focus of the analysis to his particular conduct or circumstances are not supported by the text of Section 9715. Indeed, Section 9714 of the Sentencing Code (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses)—the sentencing enhancement provision that immediately precedes Section 9715—supports our analysis. Specifically, Section 9714(a)(1) provides:
Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the current offense the person had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon a second conviction for a crime of violence, the court shall give the person oral and written notice of the penalties under this section for a third conviction for a crime of violence. Failure to provide such notice
shall not render the offender ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).
42 Pa. C.S. § 9714(a)(1) (emphasis added). Whereas application of the sentencing enhancement in Section 9714 turns on whether a person has previously been convicted "at the time of the commission of the current offense," application of the sentencing enhancement in Section 9715 turns on whether a person has previously been convicted "at any time." In addition to this significant difference in language employed by the General Assembly, Section 9715 provides that the sentencing enhancement applies "notwithstanding any other ... statute to the contrary," including "the provisions of [S]ection ... 9714." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a). This difference in statutory text combined with Section 9715(a) ’s directive that Section 9715 applies notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, again evidences a clear and deliberate choice on the part of the General Assembly—i.e. , to prescribe a specific enhancement of life imprisonment to "any person convicted of murder of the third degree ... who has previously been convicted at any time of murder" or other qualifying offense.
Additionally, we rejected a similar argument to Appellant's in Commonwealth v. Vasquez , 562 Pa. 120, 753 A.2d 807 (2000). In that case, "Eddie Vasquez (Vasquez) was arrested and charged with delivering cocaine to an undercover officer on a number of occasions." Id. at 808. A single criminal information was filed against him, and he pleaded guilty at a single guilty plea hearing to two counts of delivering cocaine "related to separate drug transactions." Id. On the second drug trafficking count, the trial court sentenced Vasquez to three to six years of imprisonment pursuant to Section 7508(a)(3)(i) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(i) (providing that "if at the time of sentencing the defendant has been convicted of another drug trafficking offense," defendant shall be sentenced to mandatory minimum term of "three years in prison and [a] $10,000 [fine] or such larger amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and the proceeds from the illegal activity"). In this Court, Vasquez argued Section 7508 should not have been applied to him. In particular, he "seem[ed] vaguely to imply that [his] two drug offenses [we]re part of a single criminal episode and thus [could not] be considered separate convictions for purposes of the enhancement statute." Id. at 809. This Court rejected Vasquez's argument, reasoning:
This Court subsequently held Section 7508 of the Crimes Code was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). See Commonweatlh v. DiMatteo , 644 Pa. 463, 177 A.3d 182, 191 (2018).
His drug transactions were distinct in time, occurring ten days apart and requiring separate planning and execution. There is no evidence in the record before us that the transactions were contingent upon each other. They should not be treated as a single criminal act simply because the transactions involved sales to the same undercover officer. Thus, the facts properly support the conclusion that we are confronted with two convictions for two separate crimes, although contained within one indictment and one arrest. Moreover, even if we were to conclude that these transactions could be construed as a single criminal episode, the statute at issue specifically focuses on a defendant's prior "convictions" at the time of sentencing, and makes no distinction between convictions that arise from a multiple count complaint, or a separate complaint. We are bound by the unambiguous language of the statute and cannot
read language into it that simply does not appear. 1 Pa.[ ]C.S.[ ] § 1921(b). The wording of the statute is unambiguous, and clearly requires that as long as at the time of sentencing, a defendant "has been convicted" of another qualifying "offense," the defendant shall receive the enhanced sentence.
Id. (first emphasis added).
Similar to Section 7508(a)(3)(i) of the Crimes Code, Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code plainly focuses upon whether a person convicted of third-degree murder "has previously been convicted at any time of murder." Further, turning to Section 9715(b) of the Sentencing Code, that provision is also plain in providing that, again like Section 7508(a)(3)(i) of the Crimes Code, the applicability of Section 9715—i.e. , the mandatory sentencing enhancement of life imprisonment—"shall be determined at sentencing." Thus, as we recognized in Vasquez , we again observe that, when a mandatory sentencing statute is unambiguously predicated on a prior conviction at sentencing, it is legally irrelevant whether this previous conviction arose from the same or different criminal conduct.
Proceeding to the additional language in Section 9715(b) of the Sentencing Code relating to the record of a defendant's previous conviction(s) and Appellant's reliance thereon to argue that the statute precludes application of the sentencing enhancement to the scenario presented in this case, we note the following. Section 9715(b) ’s proof provisions merely require a complete record of an individual's previous convictions, including but not limited to those outside of the particular case at hand. In referencing an individual's "previous convictions," Section 9715(b) is consistent with Section 9715(a) and similarly unambiguous in referring to previous findings of guilt. See Deal v. United States , 508 U.S. 129, 130-32, 133 n.1, 137, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (holding that term "conviction" as used in federal enhanced sentencing statute unambiguously meant "finding of guilt" and that district court did not err in enhancing defendant's sentence on second through sixth convictions rendered in single proceeding, as those five convictions were "second or subsequent conviction[s]" to defendant's first conviction rendered in same proceeding). In instances such as this one, the sentencing court clearly has the complete record of the relevant convictions, or findings of guilt, as those convictions have occurred in the very case before the sentencing court. Put simply, Section 9715(b) establishes the process through which a sentencing court assesses whether the sentence enhancement is applicable and allows a convicted individual to challenge the accuracy of the record of conviction(s) relied upon for imposition of the enhancement. While the provisions pertaining to challenges to the accuracy of the record are unlikely to be utilized where the convictions all stem from the same proceeding, this circumstance does not render our above reasoning infirm. This is because the language in Section 9715(b) accounts for a broad range of circumstances, including those involving individuals whose qualifying convictions were not rendered in the same proceeding. Those requirements do not, as Appellant argues, demonstrate that the sentencing enhancement is inapplicable to individuals such as Appellant, whose offenses occurred simultaneously.
Moreover, the proof requirements in Section 9715(b) of the Sentencing Code do not inject ambiguity into the statute, as the dissent opines. The dissent suggests that there cannot be a "complete record" of a person's "previous convictions" pursuant to Section 9715(b) when the previous conviction is one among a set upon which the sentencing court is imposing a consolidated judgment of sentence. The dissent posits that the statute requires the record to include a judgment of sentence at the least, if not also every document generated in the case such that the record is akin to that provided for appellate review. Section 9715(b), however, plainly dictates that the sentencing court must have a "complete record of the previous convictions " of the offender. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(b) (emphasis added). Again, consistent with Section 9715(a) ’s reference to a person who has "previously been convicted," Section 9715(b) ’s requirement that a court have a "complete record" of a person's "previous convictions" is similarly plain in referring to a finding of guilt. Not only are findings of guilt on several counts "[u]nlike a judgment on several counts, [in that] findings of guilt on several counts are necessarily arrived at successively in time," Deal , 508 U.S. at 133 n.1, 113 S.Ct. 1993, but also, such findings would clearly be contained in the record before the sentencing court.
The dissent's analysis of Section 9715(b) of the Sentencing Code is yet another effort to manufacture ambiguity in Section 9715, which the dissent ultimately resolves in a manner that contravenes the statute's plain and unambiguous language. Indeed, insofar as the dissent posits that Section 9715(b) requires the imposition of a judgment of sentence in order for there to be a "complete record" of a person's "previous convictions," such interpretation would render the word "convicted" as used in Section 9715(a) and other uses of the term "conviction" in Section 9715(b) nonsensical or would require those terms to mean something different. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(a) (providing that "any person convicted of murder of the third degree ... who has previously been convicted at any time of murder ... shall be sentenced to life imprisonment" (emphasis added)); 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(b) ("Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction , but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing " (emphasis added)). Thus, the dissent's interpretation would yield an absurd result. As such, we do not interpret Section 9715(b) ’s reference to a "complete record" of a person's "previous convictions" as an ambiguity evidencing the General Assembly's intent to limit instances in which the sentencing enhancement is to apply, particularly given that such a limit is not supported by the plain language of Section 9715(a). Instead, we read both Section 9715(a) and (b) to evidence a clear intent on behalf of the General Assembly to enhance the sentence of any person found guilty of third-degree murder who has previously been found guilty of murder, with that determination to be made at sentencing and proof of the previous finding of guilt to be required at that time. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(a) -(b).
Insofar as the dissent criticizes our interpretation of the phrase "complete record of the previous convictions" as unprecedented, it appears this Court has indeed never been called upon to interpret the meaning of this precise phrase as used in Section 9715(b) or any other statutory provision. This Court has, however, explained that "[t]he existence of a prior conviction is a simple historical fact which may be ascertained through official documents." Commonwealth v. Allen , 508 Pa. 114, 494 A.2d 1067, 1071 (1985). Our interpretation herein takes into consideration the specific context in which the phrase and the language surrounding the phrase.
Additionally, insofar as Appellant or the Association requests that we interpret the statutory language in Appellant's favor pursuant to the rule of lenity or the "recidivist philosophy," we decline to do so. "[U]nder the rule of lenity, penal statutes are to be strictly construed, with ambiguities resolved in favor of the accused." Commonwealth v. Lynn , 631 Pa. 541, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (2015). "The need for strict construction ... does not require that the words of a penal statute be given their narrowest meaning or that legislative intent be disregarded." Commonwealth v. Brown , 603 Pa. 31, 981 A.2d 893, 898 (2009). Similarly, consideration of "the ‘recidivist philosophy’ ... is a valid tool in interpreting ambiguous statutory language." Commonwealth v. Williams , 539 Pa. 249, 652 A.2d 283, 284-85 (1994). Nonetheless, "[i]f the legislature enacts a statute which clearly expresses a different application, the ‘recidivist philosophy’ possesses no authority which would override clearly contrary statutory language." Id. at 285 (rejecting challenge to Section 7508(a)(3)(i) of Crimes Code premised upon "recidivist philosophy" and noting that General Assembly is "free to reject or replace" philosophy through enactment of legislation "clearly express[ing] a different application"); see also Commonwealth v. Jarowecki , 604 Pa. 242, 985 A.2d 955, 961-62 (2009) (" ‘[T]he recidivist philosophy, while a valid policy, is not the only valid sentencing policy, nor is it a constitutional principle or mandate,’ and the legislature is free to enact a statute ‘which clearly expresses a different application.’ " (quoting Commonwealth v. Shiffler , 583 Pa. 478, 879 A.2d 185, 196 (2005) )). Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code is unambiguous and, therefore, leaves no room for application of the rule of lenity and the "recidivist philosophy" to the benefit of Appellant.
The "recidivist philosophy" represents the view that the "point of sentence enhancement is to punish more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity despite the theoretically beneficial effects of penal discipline." Commonwealth v. Williams , 539 Pa. 249, 652 A.2d 283, 284 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dickerson , 533 Pa. 294, 621 A.2d 990, 992 (1993) ).
Moreover, as explained in Williams , sentencing serves many purposes, including "protection of society, general deterrence (example to others), individual deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution (punishment, vengeance, desserts)." Williams , 652 A.2d at 285 n.1. Given the many purposes for sentencing, we also disagree with Appellant that application of the sentencing enhancement to him is unreasonable or absurd. Notwithstanding any perceived disparity in the application of the sentencing enhancement to Appellant under the circumstances presented, Appellant stands convicted of three counts of third-degree murder for his killing of Bianco, Meininger, and Child. It is within the General Assembly's prerogative to determine which goals to prioritize in enacting statutes to enhance the sentence of particular individuals, such as those with multiple murder convictions. See, e.g. , id. (explaining that "[t]he legislature is perfectly free to enact a sentencing scheme which rejects the ‘recidivist philosophy’ and focuses on other goals of the penal system"). Had the General Assembly intended to enact Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code in accordance with the recidivist philosophy, it could have used different language to effectuate that intent.
Insofar as Appellant supports his position by arguing that the General Assembly is presumed not to have intended to violate the constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and unequal treatment under the law, Appellant has failed to put forth a developed argument that the sentencing enhancement's applicability to the factual circumstances herein constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or an equal protection violation. As such, we decline to address any such claim and reject Appellant's argument in this regard.
In sum, reading Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code as a whole as we must, we conclude that the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth therein plainly applies to a person convicted of third-degree murder who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or other qualifying offense, as determined by the sentencing court at sentencing on the third-degree murder conviction. This plain and unambiguous language encompasses instances in which a person engages in a single criminal act resulting in multiple simultaneous deaths, so long as the express terms of Section 9715 are met. Here, while Appellant murdered three people simultaneously during his high-speed chase with police, Appellant was convicted of three counts of third-degree murder in seriatim fashion, a point Appellant does not dispute. As such, the Superior Court did not err in holding that the sentencing enhancement applied to Appellant for his third-degree murder convictions at Counts 2 and 3 of the Criminal Information, as Appellant was "a person convicted of third-degree murder who has previously been convicted at any time of murder" as determined at the time of sentencing on those convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
To be clear, we disagree with the Association's position, as it specifically relates to interpretation of Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code, that Appellant's convictions were simultaneous because they were rendered at the same trial. The Association itself acknowledges that the word "convicted" in Section 9715 refers to a finding of guilt. (See Association's Brief at 15.) As noted, "findings of guilt on several counts are necessarily arrived at successively in time." Deal , 508 U.S. at 133 n.1, 113 S.Ct. 1993. Section 9715 provides no indication that convictions rendered in a single trial cannot be considered previous to each other. If the General Assembly wishes to change how the sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715 is to be applied, its recourse is to amend the statute. See United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2324 n.1, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) (recognizing that, decades after Deal , Congress amended federal enhanced sentencing statute at issue such that enhancement became applicable "after a prior conviction ... has become final" (quoting First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5221 )).
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion.
The Late Chief Justice Baer did not participate in the decision of this matter.
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE
I concur in the result reached by the Majority, and I agree with its conclusion that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715 is unambiguous. Further, I agree with the Majority's construction of the terms "previously" and "at any time," as they are used in the phrase "previously been convicted at any time" in Subsection (a). I write separately, however, as I would conclude that Section 9715 is unambiguous on different grounds than the Majority. To my reading, Section 9715 ’s lack of ambiguity can be resolved through the meaning of the word "convicted" as it is used in that section. In reviewing the plain language of Section 9715 and this Court's own case law, the word "convicted" and "convictions," as they are used in Section 9715, connote a finding of guilt and not a judgment of sentence.
The Majority relies upon the following dictionary definition of "convicted" in its construction of Section 9715 : "to find or declare guilty of an offense or crime by the verdict or decision of a court or other authority." Majority Op. at 608 (quoting WEBSTER ’ S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1798 (3d ed. 1993)). The Majority's analysis on this point ignores the historical tension between the competing definitions that this Court has applied to the terms "convicted" and "convictions," a tension that has been highlighted by the Majority and the Dissent in their respective interpretations of the phrase "complete record of the previous convictions." Majority Op. at 610-12; Dissenting Op. at 620-23 (Wecht, J., dissenting). I do not believe that we should rely on the dictionary definition of "convicted" when this Court's own case law resolves the tension in favor of finding the statute unambiguous.
Over the years, this Court has attributed to the word "convicted" and its various permutations (e.g., "conviction") a "popular" as well as a "technical" meaning. The "popular" meaning of "convicted" refers to a guilty verdict. See Wilmoth v. Hensel , 151 Pa. 200, 25 A. 86, 91 (1892) ; York Cnty. v. Dalhousen , 45 Pa. 372, 374 (1863) ; See also Commonwealth v. Thompson , 106 A.3d 742, 766-68 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Bowes, J., concurring) (discussing the distinction and development of the "popular" and "technical" definitions of the term "convicted"). In other instances, this Court has applied a "technical" meaning to "convicted," which has been understood as a judgment or sentence upon the finding of guilt. See Commonwealth ex rel. McClenachan v. Reading , 336 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 776, 777-78 (1939) ; Shields v. Westmoreland Cnty. , 253 Pa. 271, 98 A. 572, 573 (1916). In the past, this Court acknowledged that the "technical" meaning should be applied except where the statutory language demonstrates a contrary intent. Commonwealth v. Minnich , 250 Pa. 363, 95 A. 565, 567 (1915) ; Reading , 6 A.2d at 778. Section 9715 is one such instance in which the plain language clearly indicates that we cannot apply the "technical" meaning to "convicted," and thus we are left to apply its "popular" meaning. This is not a novel concept and is in line with our principles of statutory construction. This Court arrived at a similar conclusion in Commonwealth v. Beasley , 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (1984), when addressing the meaning of "conviction" in the context of an aggravating circumstance in a death penalty case.
In Beasley , the defendant murdered Keith Singleton and fled from the scene, avoiding apprehension for a time. Id. at 461. A few months later, he committed another murder of a police officer and was caught shortly thereafter. Id. While in custody for the police shooting, it was determined that Beasley had committed the murder of Singleton and was charged accordingly. Id. For the murder of the police officer, Beasley was brought to trial and convicted. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Beasley , 504 Pa. 485, 475 A.2d 730 (1984) ). After being convicted for the police killing but prior to receiving a judgment of sentence in that case, Beasley was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Singleton. Id. at 464. In determining this sentence, the jury considered the proven aggravating circumstances, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711, including Beasley's "significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person." Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9) ). Beasley argued that consideration of his conviction for the police killing was improper because "a verdict of guilt may not be considered a prior ‘conviction,’ constituting an aggravating circumstance ... until a judgment of sentence has been entered." Id. This Court disagreed.
The Beasley Court noted that in Commonwealth v. Travaglia , 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), we held that "a judgment of sentence need not already have been entered following a finding of guilt in order for the finding to be considered as a conviction constituting the aggravating circumstance in [ 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 ](d)(10)," thereby ascertaining that the General Assembly had applied the "popular" meaning to "conviction" as it was used in Section 9711(d)(10). Beasley , 479 A.2d at 464 . The Beasley Court saw no reason to accord two inconsistent meanings to the word "conviction" in "consecutively enumerated provisions" and ultimately applied the "popular" meaning to "conviction," i.e., "found guilty" rather than "found guilty and sentenced." Id.
A similar rationale can be applied to the language of Section 9715 in the instant matter. Subsection (a) applies to "any person convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter," and its application is unquestionably to be determined at sentencing, pursuant to Subsection (b). 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a) - (b) (emphasis added). It would be completely illogical to apply the "technical" meaning to "convicted" as it is used in Section 9715. Under the "technical" sense, a person could never be considered "convicted" prior to sentencing because the "technical" definition requires the imposition of a sentence. Applying the "technical" definition would yield an impossible result in Subsection (a), and we must presume that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Accordingly, the "popular" meaning is the only interpretation that offers a workable and consistent definition of "convicted" as it used in Section 9715, at least with respect to Subsection (a).
There exists the presumption that the legislature is aware of our prior decisional law when crafting statutory language, and thus I would presume that the General Assembly was aware of the historical treatment and distinction between the "popular" and "technical" meaning of the word "convicted" when it drafted Section 9715. See, e.g. , City of Phila. v. Clement & Muller, Inc. , 552 Pa. 317, 715 A.2d 397, 399 (1998) ("The legislature is presumed to be aware of the construction placed upon statutes by the courts[.]").
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(d).
The Dissent suggests that this Court should apply the "technical" definition in Subsection (b), as is apparent from its contention that a "complete record of the previous convictions" must "[a]t the very minimum ... contain a final judgment of sentence[.]" Dissenting Op. at 620-21 (Wecht, J., dissenting). Although the Dissent is focused on the standalone meaning of "complete record," it is impossible to ascertain this meaning without acknowledging what it is a complete record of—convictions . Subsection (a) is undoubtedly relying on the "popular" definition of "convicted." Thus, the Dissent's proposed meaning of "conviction" in Subsection (b) would require that we read "convicted" under its "popular" meaning in Subsection (a), and its "technical" meaning in Subsection (b). This inconsistent reading of "convicted" in the same statute cannot be what the General Assembly intended. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Lindsay , 646 Pa. 381, 185 A.3d 307, 313 (2018) ("[S]tatutory interpretative principles also require that where the meaning of a word or phrase is clear when used in one section of a statute, it will be construed to have the same meaning in another section of the same statute."). These two consecutive provisions must take on the same meaning of "convicted," which is " ‘found guilty’ rather than ‘found guilty and sentenced.’ " Beasley , 479 A.2d at 464.
While I recognize that Subsection (a) uses the word "convicted" and Subsection (b) uses the word "convictions," to read those two words differently and prescribe inconsistent meanings would only serve to create an unnecessary ambiguity.
Id . § 9715(a) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, "convicted" as it is used throughout Section 9715 is employing its "popular" definition. With this meaning in mind, the phrase a "complete record of the previous convictions," as it is used in Subsection (b), suggests that a record of the previous finding of guilt was intended for compliance with Section 9715. Construing the plain meaning of "convicted" as such resolves any remaining question in favor of finding Section 9715 unambiguous.
For the above reasons, I concur in the Majority's result, but I would conclude that Section 9715 is unambiguous on different grounds.
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT
On November 24, 2016, Demetrius Coleman led police on a high-speed chase along Route 30 in Allegheny County. The chase ended in tragedy when Coleman—who was travelling at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, weaving in and out of lanes, and driving against traffic in the opposite lane of travel—collided with another vehicle. The collision caused that other vehicle, which contained three people, including a two-year-old girl, to go airborne and crash into a utility pole. All three occupants of the vehicle died instantly and simultaneously.
Coleman was charged, and later convicted, of three counts of third-degree murder. Typically, a conviction for third-degree murder carries a maximum sentence of forty years.1 However, upon notice from the Commonwealth, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715 requires a trial court to sentence a person convicted of third-degree murder to a life sentence if that person "has previously been convicted at any time of murder .... "2
The question in this case is whether this anti-recidivist provision applies in a case where: (1) three murders occur simultaneously; and (2) the defendant was tried for all three murders in a single trial, and (3) convicted of all three in the same jury verdict; and (4) sentenced for all three in a single proceeding, resulting (5) in one judgment of sentence. The Majority finds no ambiguity in the phrase "previously been convicted at any time," and determines that the mandatory sentencing provision applies in these circumstances. This conclusion is plainly incorrect. It also leads to an interpretation that stands in stark opposition to the General Assembly's intent and writes two critical provisions out of the statute. Because we are precluded from interpreting statutes in this way, I respectfully dissent.
When interpreting a statutory provision, this Court is bound to the guidelines and objectives of the Statutory Construction Act. Under the Act, the overarching goal of statutory interpretation is "to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." To this end, the Act mandates that "[e]very statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions," and that "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage."
See The Statutory Construction Act of 1972, codified at 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501 1991 (the "Act").
Id . § 1921(a).
Id.
Id. § 1903(a).
The first step required in any exercise in statutory interpretation is a consideration of whether the contested statutory term is ambiguous. This is because "[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity," the plain language controls, even if that language appears to be inconsistent with the General Assembly's intent. "[T]he letter of [the statutory language] is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." If the term bears no ambiguity, the words of the provision control, and our analysis ends. When the term is ambiguous, an interpreting court must consult the other canons of interpretation set forth in the Act.
Id.
A "statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text." Stated differently, when a statute can be read "in two different ways and the statutory language is reasonably capable of either construction, the language is ambiguous." Here, the Majority finds the phrase "previously been convicted at any time to be clear and unambiguous," i.e. , susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. This conclusion is perplexing in view of the embedded redundancy within the statutory phrase. This redundancy gives rise, at a minimum, to substantial and reasonable dispute as to the meaning of this phrase.
A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police , 636 Pa. 403, 143 A.3d 896, 905-06 (2016).
Commonwealth v. Giulian , 636 Pa. 207, 141 A.3d 1262, 1268 (2016).
See Maj. Op. at 609.
It is not at all challenging to ascertain the common meaning or understanding of the two terms at the heart of the instant dispute. The first is the term "previously," which indisputably refers to events that occurred at some earlier point in time. When a person says to another that "I have previously seen a medical specialist," no one reasonably can dispute that the person's visit to the specialist happened at some point prior to the conversation. The phrase "at any time," taken in isolation, similarly presents little definitional complexity. Taking the General Assembly at its words, "at any time" literally means at any point in time, including any that comes before, after, or simultaneous to, the reference point.
The Majority bypasses the patent redundancy that results when the two terms—"previously" and "at any time"—are used in the same phrase. Because "at any time" means "any point in time," the phrase necessarily includes those things that have already occurred. In other words, "at any time" includes all those things that have happened "previously." That means that, if the Majority's interpretation is the only reasonable one, the term "previously" is not only redundant; it also can be written out of the statute without any consequence to the Majority's understanding of the term. However, we are required under the Act to construe each statute in a manner that "give[s] effect to all its provisions." We are not permitted to rewrite statutes, nor to interpret them in a way that eliminates one of the General Assembly's chosen terms, as the Majority does here.
The Majority concludes that "previously" and "at any time" can operate in the same statute without redundancy by ignoring the fact that the former term is entirely subsumed by the latter. The Majority correctly defines "previously" to refer to those events that have happened "before in time." Then, the Majority ventures that the term "at any time" serves only to resolve any lingering doubts as to whether a simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, conviction also triggers the mandatory life sentence. When ascertaining whether a statute is ambiguous, we are required to give each contested term its plain meaning. Although the Majority does so with regard to "previously," it loses its way when interpreting "at any time." The term means literally what it says: at any time. That temporal period unquestionably must include those events that occurred "previously." There is no reason to believe that the General Assembly intended "at any time" to modify "previously," or to divest that word of its plain meaning. If the General Assembly wanted to make that contradiction or "clarification," it would have said so clearly. All we are required—and all we are able—to do now is assign terms their plain meaning. Despite the Majority's misguided insistence, "at any time" does not mean "in case the sentencing court is confused, ‘previously’ also refers to murders tried in the same case for which the defendant is being sentenced." Rather, it means literally what it says—at any time—a time frame that, without question, swallows up the term "previous." The redundancy is patent.
Maj. Op. at 608.
It is easy to see this redundancy. Indeed, it is unavoidable. Consider how the statute would change if the term "previously" is removed. It does not change at all. Every preceding murder that would be considered to have been committed "previously" would have to be considered by the sentencing court because that murder was committed "at any time." By refusing to recognize the redundancy, and, hence, the ambiguity, the Majority renders the term "previously" nothing more that surplusage.
In another attempt to justify its misinterpretation, the Majority leans upon this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Vasquez , a decision wholly distinguishable and inapplicable here. In that case, the mandatory sentencing statute was triggered "if at the time of sentencing the defendant has been convicted of another drug trafficking offense." The statute at issue in Vasquez did not contain the terms "previously" or "at any time." Because our interpretive task here requires us to consider only the plain meaning of the terms used in the statute being challenged, and because the terms here do not appear in the statute challenged in Vasquez , that precedent has no application whatsoever in this case. We interpreted entirely different statutory terms. The apples to oranges comparison is entirely inapt in a plain language analysis. There is another compelling reason to reject the Majority's conclusion that no ambiguity exists within the terms of this statute: its interpretation conflicts directly with subsection (b) of § 9715. It is axiomatic that a statute cannot be deemed to be unambiguous when it prevents the execution of another aspect of the same law. It is well-established that ambiguity can arise when considering the contested language within the context of the overall statutory scheme. As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, "oftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. So when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." The Majority acknowledges this fundamental principle, but does not apply it. Sections of the same statute must be considered "together and in conjunction with each other," and construed "with reference to the entire statute." We "are not permitted to ignore the language of a statute, nor may we deem any language to be superfluous." Here, that means that we cannot ignore subsection (b).
562 Pa. 120, 753 A.2d 807 (2000).
18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(i) (held unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. DiMatteo , 644 Pa. 463, 177 A.3d 182, 191 (2018) ).
Furthermore, as the Majority recounts, the drug transactions in Vasquez occurred "ten days apart," "requir[ed] separate planning and execution," and "were [not] contingent upon each other." Vasquez , 753 A.2d at 809. Vasquez is neither factually nor legally comparable. The Majority highlights dicta in that case, in which this Court stated that "even if we were to conclude that these transactions could be construed as a single criminal episode," the mandatory sentencing provision "specifically focuses on a defendant's prior ‘convictions’ at the time of sentencing, and makes no distinction between convictions that arise from a multiple count complaint, or a separate complaint." Id. Even if this dicta were binding, it still would have no resonance here because it was premised entirely upon statutory language that bears little, if any, similarity to the terms being challenged in this appeal. While both statutes use the term "conviction" in some form, that is the only similarity, and the arguments in this case center upon "previously" and "at any time." Simply put, Vasquez has no binding effect in this case, nor does it carry any persuasive weight.
King v. Burwell , 576 U.S. 473, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) ((internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Yates v. United States , 574 U.S. 528, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1081-82, 191 L.Ed.2d 64, (2015) (" ‘[T]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’ Ordinarily, a word's usage accords with its dictionary definition. In law as in life, however, the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things." (internal citations omitted); Giulian , 141 A.3d at 1267-68.
Maj. Op. at 612-13 (noting that we must read "Section 9715 as a whole").
Hous. Auth. of County of Chester v. Pa. State Civil Serv. Comm'n , 556 Pa. 621, 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).
Commonwealth v. McCoy , 599 Pa. 599, 962 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2009) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) ).
In that subsection, the General Assembly outlined precisely what must occur before a trial court is bound to apply the mandatory life sentence. In no uncertain terms, the General Assembly stated that "prior to imposing sentence on an offender under subsection (a)," the court "shall have a complete record of the previous convictions of the offender." The Majority finds that Coleman had "previously" been convicted, even though this predicate murder occurred at the same time and was tried in the same proceeding as the murder for which the Commonwealth sought the life sentence. Yet, at the same time, the Majority finds inapplicable a provision that requires the court to have a complete record of the "previous convictions." If, as the Majority deems it to be, Coleman's conviction in this case counts as "previous" for subsection (a), then it must also be "previous" for subsection (b). It cannot be any other way.
Needless to say, the Majority is forced to take this inconsistent approach because, otherwise, its preferred interpretation quickly collapses upon itself. Disregarding subsection (b) creates a logical and practical impossibility. A court cannot have a "complete record" of the "previous conviction" if that record is still being created. At the very minimum, a "complete record" would contain a final judgment of sentence. Here, however, Coleman was issued one consolidated judgment of sentence, and that order was being generated as sentencing progressed. The record was not, and could not have been, a "complete record" of the conviction for purposes of subsection (b).
There also is no support for the Majority's claim that subsection (b)’s "complete record" requirement "includ[es] but [is] not limited to those outside of the particular case at hand." The Majority construes "complete record" to include those records being created in the very case for which the defendant is currently being sentenced. Ignoring for the moment the fact that the statute contains no such "including but not limited to" language, the premise fails because it is based upon a misinterpretation of the term "complete record." The Majority seems to think that "complete" somehow refers to information that has yet to enter the case record. The Majority offers no support for this interpretation. This is unsurprising as it clearly belies the common understanding of the term. No common understanding of the term "complete record," in either the legal community or in everyday parlance, would include a record that currently is in the process of being generated. At the very minimum, a "complete record" in a criminal case would include a judgment of sentence. Notably, here, the judgment of sentence is a single document listing all of the individual sentences on each count—a record created necessarily after the trial court imposed sentence in open court. At the time that the trial court would have had to impose a life sentence, as the Majority now requires, there was not even a formal judgment of sentence issued for the predicate third-degree murder. This incomplete, in-progress creation of the record magically suffices for the Majority as a "complete record."
Maj. Op. at 610-11.
The Majority contends that the necessary inclusion of "judgment of sentence" within "complete record" is somehow an "effort to manufacture ambiguity," and one that leads to an "absurd result" at that. Id. at 612 n.8. Putting aside for the moment the absurdity of interpreting a foreperson's in-court announcement of a verdict as a "complete record" (an interpretation wholly foreign to criminal practice in Pennsylvania and in any other American jurisdiction as far as I can tell), the Majority does not explain what is "absurd" about the long-settled understanding of a complete record as requiring, oddly enough, a complete record (including, inter alia , a judgment of sentence). The Majority simply references the statute's use of the word "conviction," which begs the question and gives us no cause to ignore the word "complete" in the term "complete record." Had the General Assembly simply intended that we have some indication that a person was found guilty of the murder in question, at some (or at any) point in time, the General Assembly could have written that. Instead, the legislators chose to require the production of a "complete record," which always has entailed more than a recitation of a guilty verdict, notwithstanding the Majority's contrary imagination. It is hardly surprising that the Majority offers not a single case in which this (or any other court) deemed "complete record" to mean anything less than what it says. Nowhere in our jurisprudence do we find support for the—yes, absurd—interpretive feint by which "complete" is magically transformed into "incomplete." But there is always a first step on the road to confusion, and the Majority has now taken us there.
Seemingly recognizing that the ordinary understanding of the term "complete record" does not comport with its conclusion, and ignoring our obligation to assign terms their ordinary meaning, the Majority instead chooses to give the term an entirely new and more convenient meaning. For the first time ever, the term "complete record" now is said to require only a "finding of guilt." To my knowledge, and according to my research, never before in Pennsylvania has the record in a case referred only to the jury's determination of guilt. When an appellate court requires transmission of a record to its prothonotary for purposes of deciding an appeal, no appellant would submit a verdict form and believe his or her task complete. Similarly, when a lawyer seeks to inspect a record of a defendant's past criminal history, the Clerk of Courts does not provide that lawyer with a single sheet of paper or a verdict slip. A record is a full documentary accounting of a case, comprised of every document generated, every motion filed, every transcript produced, etc. Never before, and I venture to guess likely never again, will a "complete record" of a case be understood by this Court to comprise only a "finding of guilt." That is, never before until today. It is hardly compelling to claim that this is the "plain" meaning of the term when it never has been understood in this way before, by anyone.
Id. at 612-13.
In an effort to support its novel claim that "complete record" means nothing more than a "finding of guilt," the Majority cites Commonwealth v. Allen , 508 Pa. 114, 494 A.2d 1067, 1071 (1985), for the proposition that "the existence of a prior conviction is a simple historical fact which may be ascertained through official documents." But subsection 9715(b) does not require mere proof of "the existence" of a prior conviction. That subsection, which applies any time the Commonwealth seeks the imposition of a mandatory life sentence under its terms, requires the production of a "complete record." It cannot reasonably be maintained that the demonstration necessary to prove the mere "existence" of a prior conviction and that necessary to account for the "complete record" pertaining to that conviction are the same thing. If anything about this statute is plain, it is the term "complete record." It hardly seems disputable that it can mean anything other than the entirety of the record.
The Concurrence also would construe the term "complete record" as requiring proof of nothing more than some form of proof of a "previous finding of guilt." Conc. Op. at 616-17. On the way to this conclusion, the Concurrence focuses upon the use of the word "convicted," and then opines that the term has a "popular" meaning and a "technical" meaning. Apparently believing that the General Assembly knew about, and understood, this dichotomy, the Concurrence ventures that the General Assembly must have intended to use the "popular" understanding of the term in subsection (a), and, thus, must have intended the same meaning in subsection (b). The Concurrence concludes on this basis that a "complete record" is nothing more than proof of a "finding of guilt," which does not include a judgment of sentence. Like the Majority, the Concurrence offers no instance in which a "complete record" has ever been interpreted in this way. This is unsurprising, because no such interpretation exists (prior to today).
The Concurrence cites Commonwealth v. Beasley , 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Travaglia , 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), both of which held that a judgment of sentence is not required for proof of a "conviction" for purposes of establishing an aggravating circumstance in a death penalty case. Neither case has any bearing here, because the aggravating circumstance statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d), at issue in those appeals does not require the prosecutor to provide the court with a "complete record." The statute and the two cases relied upon by the Concurrence involve different statutory language and different legislative intent. They shed no light on what the statute at issue in this case means.
But let us suspend disbelief, and assume for argument's sake that the General Assembly somehow contemplated the two proffered meanings of "convicted." This still would not tell us that the common meaning of the term "complete record" can be ignored. If the General Assembly intended that the prosecutor provide the sentencing court with only some proof of a "previous finding of guilt," it could have said so. It didn't. Instead, the General Assembly required that the prosecutor present a "complete record." Like any term, this one must be afforded its common understanding and meaning. Neither the Majority nor the Concurrence attempts to demonstrate that "complete record," even if the term refers only to a conviction, commonly is understood to mean just any proof, of whatever form, that the person had been found guilty at some point in time.
Further proof that the term "complete record" does not mean what the Majority and Concurrence want it to mean is the conspicuous absence of any examples of what proof of "a previous finding of guilt" looks like. Neither the Majority nor the Concurrence illuminates for sentencing courts what must be included in order to comprise a "complete record of a previous finding of guilt." Does this mean the verdict slip? A page from a transcript? A certified copy of the conviction generated by the Clerk of Courts? All of these? The reason for the dearth of explanation or example is obvious. No one knows what this new creature looks like. And that is because this new interpretation of the term is not the common understanding of the term and could not have been what the General Assembly intended. Never in our history has the term "complete record" meant only one page or item from a record. We should not pave this strange new path here.
Every time that the enhancement is pursued, the General Assembly requires, at sentencing, the court to review "a complete record of the previous convictions." That did not occur here, because it could not occur here. By holding steadfast to its conclusion that no ambiguity exists in this statute, the Majority effectively writes subsection (b) right out of the statute, despite its own recognition that we are required to interpret a statute by considering all of its provisions and how those provisions work together to complete a workable statutory scheme. Subsection (b) is an important, and mandatory, aspect of that scheme. Giving that section its due, it is clear that the Majority's interpretation cannot stand as the only reasonable one.
By giving full effect to the term "previously," the statute also can be interpreted to require proof of a conviction from an entirely separate case, one involving different facts, a different trial, and a different judgment of sentence. There is also a third option. In its amicus brief, the Defender Association of Philadelphia argues that "at any time" refers not to when the prior conviction occurred in relation to the conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced, but instead refers to the remoteness (or lack thereof) of the previous conviction. In other words, "at any time" was meant by the General Assembly to preclude any claim that the prior conviction was too remote in time to be counted as the predicate murder for purposes of § 9715(a), such that a conviction from forty years ago counts for purposes of the statute in the same way that a conviction from two years ago does. This, too, is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
See Amicus Brief for Defenders Association at 11-12.
In my view, the Majority's cursory analysis of the key statutory language does not suffice to tease out the ambiguity inherent in the phrase at issue. Because there are multiple, reasonable interpretations that can result from the common understandings of these terms, the term is ambiguous.
Where statutory or regulatory language is ambiguous, this Court may resolve the ambiguity by considering, inter alia , the following: the occasion and necessity for the statute or regulation; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the former law, if any, including other statutes or regulations upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Freedom Med. Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 635 Pa. 86, 131 A.3d 977, 984 (2016) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) ).
As such, our interpretive goal shifts from implementation of plain language to discernment of legislative intent.
It is clear that the General Assembly aimed § 9715 at recidivist offenders. Were the objective anything other than punishing a person who has been convicted of murder after already having been given a second chance at freedom following an earlier murder conviction, undoubtedly the General Assembly would have said so. "As a matter of statutory interpretation, although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a statute says[;][o]ne must also listen attentively to what it does not say." Had the General Assembly intended the trial court to merely count convictions, regardless of when they occurred, the General Assembly could have omitted the word "previously." Or, the General Assembly could have said: "Any person with two or more convictions of third-degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment." But that is not what the General Assembly said. The General Assembly used the word "previously," which we cannot just ignore or fold into another statutory provision. The use of that term strongly supports both the obvious legislative intent of punishing recidivist offenders and an interpretation requiring some separation between the predicate murder and the one for which the defendant is being punished. It is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that the General Assembly made the effort to include temporal terms in the statute if all that it really meant to accomplish was to have the court scour the defendant's record for the existence of one other conviction anywhere in the person's history, including one rendered contemporaneously or mere seconds earlier.
See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Gonzales , 415 Pa.Super. 564, 609 A.2d 1368, 1372 (1992) (referring to § 9715(a) as a "recidivist sentencing provision").
Kmonk–Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 962 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
The Majority's interpretation conflicts directly with the anti-recidivist philosophy of this provision. Instead of punishing repeat offenders as intended, the Majority construes the statute to apply to those third-degree murderers whose convictions occur all at once, and who have never had the opportunity to demonstrate that they will not reoffend. In Commonwealth v. Dickerson , we spoke to the dangers of misinterpreting anti-recidivist statutes in this way:
It was not intended that the heavier penalty prescribed for the commission of a second offense should descend upon anyone, except the incorrigible one, who after being reproved, ‘still hardeneth his neck.’ If the heavier penalty prescribed for the second violation ... is visited upon the one who has not had the benefit of the reproof of a first conviction, then the purpose of the statute is lost."
533 Pa. 294, 621 A.2d 990, 992 (1993) (citations omitted).
We emphasized that the "point of sentence enhancement is to punish more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity despite the theoretically beneficial effects of penal discipline." The Majority's interpretation allows courts to engage in nothing more than a counting exercise, tallying up the total number of convictions, but paying no mind whatsoever to the anti-recidivist intent of the statute.
Id.
The only interpretation that is consistent with that philosophy—and with the rule of lenity, which requires ambiguous penal statutes to be construed in favor of the accused, —requires that the predicate murder conviction be separate and apart from the conviction upon which the defendant is being sentenced. That means that the two (or more) convictions must arise from a separate legal case that preceded the current one. No other interpretation comports with the provisions of the Act.
Because the Majority finds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.