Opinion
5:22-CV-1077 (BKS/ML)
09-15-2023
JENNIFER CHAFFEE, Plaintiff, v. SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DIST; and FRANKLIN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, Defendants.
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: JENNIFER CHAFFEE Pro Se Plaintiff
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
JENNIFER CHAFFEE
Pro Se Plaintiff
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent this Pro Se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) filed by Jennifer Chaffee (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed with leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Pro Se Complaint against defendants Syracuse City School District and Franklin Elementary School (collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 9.)
Plaintiff's Complaint-which was completed on a form complaint alleging violations of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983- is a series of run-on sentences that are difficult to decipher. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint alleges that at an unspecified time, Plaintiff's phone was hacked and the hacker “threaten[ed] that they [were] rap[ing her minor child] inside of school and that they had a creative way of giving shots to [her child] age 6 in the nurse[']s office.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that she went to the school to discuss the threats and when she got home, the hackers described where she sat and what was discussed at the school meeting. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that she made an anonymous call to the school superintendent requesting that the school be spied on to ensure that her child was safe. (Id. at 3.)
The Complaint alleges that two days after Plaintiff's anonymous call to the school superintendent, a social worker and police officers were “sent” to her home where they (1) condemned her home, (2) accused her of trying to kill a social worker with a gun, and (3) placed her in CPEP against her will. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “they used [her child's] absences as an excuse” but that the child only missed school for proper purposes such as doctor's appointments, illnesses, and when Plaintiff was concerned about his safety. (Id.)
While the Complaint does not define CPEP, it is presumed that Plaintiff meant a Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her right to report a crime, right keep her child safe at home, and pursuant to the Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (“CVRA”). (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that six months after the above series of events, “a person involved with [the] group confessed” that her child was drugged and raped by multiple people and his images were put on a website. (Id. at 4.)
As relief Plaintiff requests, inter alia, reimbursement for her costs initiating this action and compensation for the shame that she and her family have endured.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
Having found that Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action in forma pauperis, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e). Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that- . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Additionally, when reviewing a complaint, a court may also look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, C.J.) (quoting Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977)).
A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Thus, a pleading that contains only allegations which “are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” is subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe her pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.
It is clear that Plaintiff's Complaint is frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). By way of example, the Complaint alleges that:
When I was refused a police report on a local level, then reason because I was hacked on phone. The hacker threaten that they was raping my son inside of school and they had a creative way of giving shots to my son age 6 in the nurses office. I pannicked my son came home with changes of clothes and had feces in his underwear time the bus took an hour to get to my house and the school is 15 minute walk from my house I trusted the school and I went there and principal was out so I ended up talking to Mrs gosh and when I told her the story and I told her they said they were raping my 6 yo son in the nurse office(Dkt. No. 1 at 2 [errors in original].)
A “[p]laintiff's beliefs-however strongly [s]he may hold them-are not facts.” Morren v. New York Univ., 20-CV-10802, 2022 WL 1666918, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2022) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 1665013 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2022). Plaintiff provides no factual basis for her assertions that she was the victim of a broad conspiracy perpetrated by the school employees, phone hackers, law enforcement, and third parties. See Lefkowitz v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 13-CV-6414, 2014 WL 2619815, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014) (complaint must set forth facts showing basis for information and belief); Johnson v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 686 F.Supp.2d 259, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (even where necessary evidence is in “exclusive control of the defendant, . . . plaintiff must still set forth the factual basis for that belief”).
Plaintiff fails to provide “any plausible support for [her] claims and [the allegations contained in the Complaint] rise to the level of irrational.” Muzumala v. Unknown Federal Agents, 22-CV-7851, 2023 WL 5530308, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2023) (citing Livingston v. Adirondack Bev. Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)). Instead, “Plaintiff's allegations amount to conclusory claims and suspicions that are not plausible and must be dismissed as frivolous.” Muzumala, 2023 WL 5530308, at *4 (citing Kraft v. City of New York, 823 Fed.Appx. 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the complaint as frivolous,” based on the plaintiff's allegations that he had “been the subject of 24-hour, multi-jurisdictional surveillance by federal ‘fusion centers' and the New York State Intelligence Center, which put a ‘digital marker' on him in order to collect his personal data and harass him.”); Khalil v. United States, 17-CV-2652, 2018 WL 443343, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018) (dismissing complaint where “[p]laintiff allege[d] a broad conspiracy involving surveillance of and interference with his life by the United States and various government actors” because his allegations were “irrational and wholly incredible”)).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in its entirety because it is frivolous. See Uzamere v. Uzamere, 22-CV-4876, 2022 WL 4451107, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022) (citing Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that even a well-pleaded complaint may be dismissed as factually frivolous “if the sufficiently well-pleaded facts are clearly baseless-that is, they are fanciful, fantastic, or delusional.”); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”)) (dismissing as frivolous the plaintiff's complaint that “contains allegations of the delusional variety.”).
In the alternative, the undersigned notes that the CVRA does not provide for a private cause of action. Willingham v. Willingham, 23-CV-0045, 2023 WL 2891236, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 11, 2023) (citing Pawelek v. Paramount Studios Corp., 571 F.Supp. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no private cause of action is inherent in federal criminal statutes defining civil rights violations); accord Bryant v. Quintero, 01-CV-2721. 2001 WL 1018717, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (there is no private cause of action under Title 18, and no amendment can cure such a deficiency)) (noting that the “[p]etitioner also asserts claims under the Crime Victim Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771” but holding that “federal criminal statutes found in Title 18 of the United States Code, do not provide a basis for a private cause of action, but, rather, must be prosecuted by the Attorney General.”); see In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1224, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (“we hold that the CVRA does not provide a private right of action authorizing crime victims to seek judicial enforcement of CVRA rights outside the confines of a preexisting proceeding.”); Bonds v. Virginia, 21-CV-0363, 2021 WL 2827301, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 7, 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6)) (“[A]lthough the CVRA provides a mechanism for a crime victim to assert his rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), it does not authorize any cause of action for damages.”).
IV. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Although I have serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can replead to assert an actionable claims against Defendants, given that this is the Court's first review of Plaintiff's pleading, out of an abundance of caution and in light of Plaintiff's status as a Pro Se litigant, I recommend that she be permitted to leave to amend.
If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, she should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) because it is frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); and it is further respectfully
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Report and Recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding Pro Se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).