Opinion
A167309
10-17-2023
JUSTICE CASTRO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALAYA LYNN PARISH, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV-268945
STEWART, P.J.
Justice Castro sued Alaya Lynn Parish for defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (IIED and NIED, respectively), and fraud. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court found in favor of Castro on her defamation and NIED claims, and it awarded her nominal damages. On the IIED and fraud causes of action, however, the court concluded Castro failed to meet her burden of proof.
Representing herself, Castro appeals the judgment. She principally contends the trial court erred in concluding she did not meet her burden of proof on the IIED and fraud claims, and that the damages award is inadequate. We affirm.
Because Parish has not filed a respondent's brief, we have decided this appeal based on the record and Castro's opening brief. (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.) We recite only those facts necessary to resolve the issues on appeal; we disregard factual references in Castro's opening brief unsupported by record citations. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520 (Tanguilig).)
BACKGROUND
In 2020, Parish was in the process of divorcing her husband; they were also embroiled in a contentious battle for custody of their four-year-old son, (child). At that time, Parish's estranged husband was dating Castro.
In August 2021, Castro filed a verified complaint against Parish alleging causes of action for defamation, IIED, NIED, and fraud, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. According to the complaint, Parish had contacted the local child welfare agency (the Agency) earlier that year and falsely accused Castro of sexually abusing the child. Parish-the complaint alleged-knew the accusation was false. As a result of the false allegations, Castro suffered humiliation, severe emotional distress and mental suffering. Additionally, her reputation in the community was damaged. Finally, the complaint alleged the Agency had concluded the allegations were unfounded.
Representing herself, Parish filed a verified answer to the complaint. Castro served Parish with discovery, including eight requests for admission asking her to admit-among other things-that she "made false and unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct" against Castro; that she told the Agency that Castro had sexually abused the child; that the Agency concluded the allegations were unfounded; and that the sexual abuse allegations "were made in bad faith and with malicious intent to harm" Castro. Parish failed to respond to the requests, and the trial court deemed them admitted.
Thereafter, the matter proceeded to a court trial, where both parties represented themselves. At the outset of trial, Castro moved "to conclusively establish admitted matters and to exclude evidence, testimony or argument contradicting [the] admitted matters." She also moved to preclude Parish from presenting evidence not disclosed during discovery. The court accepted Parish's "eight admissions as evidence." But as for Castro's request to exclude evidence not produced during discovery, the court instructed her to object to the evidence when it "comes up."
The parties provided narrative testimony. As relevant here, Castro relied on the matters deemed admitted; she also testified she suffered stress and humiliation as a result of Parish's false accusation, and that she had to work in a different city because she did not "know who" Parish had "spoken to." She also explained that she intended on raising a family, and that she might have to send her children to private school because Parish had "tarnished [her] reputation with some of the teachers around this area." Parish, by contrast, testified Castro's reputation was unaffected by the incident-she pointed out that Castro had recently graduated from vocational school, found a job and married Parish's ex-husband. On cross-examination, Parish described the circumstances leading to the child's disclosure of the alleged sexual abuse.
Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment for Castro on her claims for defamation and NIED, and it awarded her $50 in nominal damages. On her IIED and fraud causes of action, however, the court found she had failed to satisfy her burden of proof, and it entered judgment for Parish.
DISCUSSION
Castro challenges the judgment on several grounds. Before addressing her arguments, we recite the pertinent principles of appellate procedure. A trial court's order is presumed correct, and the party challenging that order has the burden to demonstrate the court committed reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) We review the result reached by the court, not its reasons, and we affirm if the judgment is "correct on any legal basis." (65283 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC v. Coastal Harvest II, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 162, 169.) We disregard arguments unsupported by citations to legal authority. (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) Finally, we note self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Ibid.)
We now turn to Castro's assertion that the trial court erred by concluding she failed to meet her burden of proof on her causes of action for IIED and fraud. Her contention is not supported by supporting authority- other than a citation to the provision of the Civil Code authorizing punitive damages-and is forfeited. (Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 285, 303, fn. 21.)
The argument also fails on the merits. Castro had the burden to prove her IIED and fraud claims by preponderance of the evidence. (Potter v. Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1000, fn. 20 [IIED]; Liodas v. Sahadi (1977) 19 Cal.3d 278, 292 [fraud].) When reviewing a trial court's "failure of proof finding, we do not employ the sufficient evidence standard of review. Rather, we review the record to determine whether the evidence presented at trial compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law." (In re D.C. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 915, 921.) To prevail on appeal, Castro must show the evidence she offered at trial compelled a finding in her favor on these claims as a matter of law-in other words, that her "evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such character and weight that there is no room for a trial court determination that it was insufficient to support a finding in [her] favor." (Ibid.)
Castro cannot satisfy this demanding standard. To be sure, the uncontradicted evidence-in the form of the admitted matters-established Parish falsely accused Castro of sexually abusing the child in "bad faith and with malicious intent to harm." But even if we assume for the sake of argument this conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it exceeded all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community (see Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1582), there was little or no evidence establishing the additional elements of an IIED claim. (See Potter v. Firestone Tire &Rubber Co., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1001 [listing elements].) None of the requests for admission concerned the alleged harm Castro suffered as a proximate result of Parish's conduct; neither Castro's trial testimony that she suffered stress and humiliation as a result of the false accusation, nor her testimony that she had to work in a different city because her reputation had been tarnished, compel a finding that she suffered severe emotional distress, particularly in light of Parish's contradictory testimony. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051 ["discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation" did not constitute "severe or extreme emotional distress"].) The same is true with respect to the fraud cause of action. At trial, Castro established Parish lied to the Agency, but she offered no evidence Parish intended to deceive her, that she justifiably relied on Parish's false representation or that she suffered resulting damages. (See West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 792 [reciting elements].) On this record, we cannot conclude Castro established her IIED and fraud claims as a matter of law. (In re D.C., supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 921.)
Relying on the trial court's comments at the outset of trial, Castro insists it concluded she met her burden of proof on all of her claims. She is mistaken. Before trial began, the court encouraged the parties to discuss settlement-it told Parish that she was "in a difficult position because with those requests for admissions, Ms. Castro has a lot of evidence already to prove some or all of her causes of action." The court did not, however, conclude Castro had proven her IIED and fraud causes of action. Nor could it, as the parties hadn't presented any evidence. In any event," 'a court's oral comments . . . may never be used to impeach the order or judgment on appeal.... This principle is essential to the effective conduct of trials-trial courts must have the freedom to comment on the law and evidence to guide the presentations of the parties without fear that those comments will limit or otherwise be used against the court or the parties in the future." (Divine Food &Catering, LLC v. Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1067.)
Next, we turn to Castro's challenge to the damages award. She contends the trial court erred by declining to award her punitive damages, and that the nominal damages award is inadequate. To the extent the court impliedly found Castro failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to punitive damages, her brief does not establish reversible error. (See Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) And her challenge to the adequacy of the damages award is not properly before us. A litigant may not raise a claim of inadequate damages on appeal unless the error was first urged in a new trial motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (5); Jamison v. Jamison (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 714, 719-720.)
Finally, we reject Castro's suggestion that the trial court's ruling on her motion to exclude evidence not disclosed during discovery "could be seen as an abuse of discretion." The court deferred ruling on the motion and instructed Castro to object to the evidence on that ground when Parish testified. By failing to do so, Castro forfeited her claim of error. (D.D. v. Pitcher (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1058.) Her assertion that the court erroneously denied her right to a jury trial fails as it is undeveloped and unsupported by citation to authority. (Conservatorship of Tedesco, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 302, fn. 20.) And we observe that although Castro requested a jury trial and filed an initial fee waiver, she did not comply with the court's April 2022 case management order requiring her to file a new jury trial fee waiver within 10 days of the date of the order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subd. (f)(5).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded because Parish did not make an appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur. RICHMAN, J., MARKMAN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Alameda Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.