Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-CV-00520
10-10-2023
FRANK J. CAPOZZI, Petitioner, v. WARDEN R. THOMPSON, Respondent.
RAMBO, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Frank J. Capozzi (“Capozzi”), who was formerly a federal inmate housed at the Federal Correctional Complex, Allenwood (“FCC Allenwood”), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on March 24, 2023. (Doc. 1). In his petition, Capozzi challenges a disciplinary hearing decision, leading to a delay in his release from custody. (Doc. 1, at 6-8). However, it appears that Capozzi is no longer in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), having been released from BOP custody on May 8, 2023. See BOP Inmate Locator, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Aug. 9, 2023). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the petition be DISMISSED as MOOT. (Doc. 1).
I. Background and Procedural History
On March 24, 2023, Capozzi filed the instant petition pursuant to § 2241 alleging dur process violations in relation to a disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 1, at 6-8). Specifically, Capozzi appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the adequacy of the procedures and the imposition of sanctions related to a disciplinary hearing decision against him. (Doc. 1, at 6-8). As relief, Capozzi seeks an order directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to vacate the incident report, to restore his sanctions, and to recalculate his credits under the First Step Act. (Doc. 1, at 8).
On May 2, 2023, Capozzi submitted a change of address, which indicated that he had been released from custody. (Doc. 6). The BOP Inmate Locator confirms that Capozzi was in fact released from BOP custody on May 8, 2023. See BOP Inmate Locator, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Aug. 9, 2023).
Respondent Warden R. Thompson filed his response to the petition on June 27, 2023, requesting that the petition be dismissed as moot because there is no further relief available to Capozzi. (Doc. 8, at 1-2). Capozzi filed a traverse on August 7, 2023. (Doc. 12). The petition for writ of habeas corpus has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. (Doc. 1; Doc. 8; Doc. 12).
II. Discussion
For federal prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers habeas jurisdiction over an inmate's challenge to the execution - as opposed to the validity - of his sentence. Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533,535 (3d Cir. 2012). Two types of claims may ordinarily be litigated in a § 2241 proceeding. First, a prisoner may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects the duration of his custody. For example, a prisoner can challenge the BOP's computation of his federal sentence, see, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990), or the constitutionality of a BOP disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good conduct sentencing credits, Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Secondly, a prisoner can challenge BOP conduct that “conflict[s] with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536.
Before addressing the merits of Capozzi's petition, however, the Court must first consider whether Capozzi's claims are moot because he has been released from custody. “Under Article III of the Constitution, a federal court may adjudicate ‘only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.'” Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). In order to meet this standard, and “[t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). “The case or controversy requirement continues through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and requires that parties have a personal stake in the outcome.” Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (citing Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Accordingly, “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
The mootness doctrine recognizes a fundamental truth in litigation: “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 698-99. In the context of habeas corpus petitions, mootness questions often turn on straightforward factual issues. Thus:
[A] petition for habeas corpus relief generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631, 102 S.Ct. 1322, 71 L.Ed.2d 508(1982). This general principle derives from the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution, which “subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . . the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp.,
494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.at 477 (citations omitted).
DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 441-42 (3d Cir. 2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (requiring that prisoner be “in custody” to file a writ of habeas corpus).
In the context of a habeas challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings, “a petition for habeas corpus relief generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition.” Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982). In Burkey v. Marberry, for example, the Third Circuit “affirmed the district court's determination that a § 2241 petition challenging a prison disciplinary hearing was moot after the petitioner was released from BOP custody onto supervised release.” Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148. The Court reasoned that, because petitioner's sentence had expired, there was no “continuing injury” to avoid mootness after his release from BOP custody. Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148. Relying on this principle, “[c]ourts have typically dismissed habeas petitions as moot where it is shown that the prisoner-petitioner has been released from the sentence which he is challenging, reasoning that when that sentence has been fully discharged a habeas petition attacking the sentence is no longer subject to redress in the courts.” Ghertler v. Ebbert, No. 1:11-CV-526, 2011 WL 2006367, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2011) (collecting cases).
Here, because Capozzi has been released from BOP custody, his habeas corpus claims are now moot. See e.g., Buczek v. Werlinger, 513 Fed.Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2013) (dismissing a § 2241 petition as moot when petitioner had been released from custody); Scott v. FCI Schuylkill, 298 Fed.Appx. 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Williams v. Sherman, 214 Fed.Appx. 264, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Watson v. Lane, No. 3:18-CV-0676, 2019 WL 5265278 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2019) (same); Counterman v. Sage, No. 1:22-CV-592, 2022 WL 17685113, at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-0592, 2022 WL 17670419 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2022) (same).
In his traverse, Capozzi argues that the petition is not moot because the preliminary hearing violated his due process and equal protection rights, the right to appeal, and the Fifth Amendment liberty clause. (Doc. 12, at 1-2). With respect to Capozzi's alleged collateral consequences, the Court notes that it could have ordered the reinstatement of his good conduct time before his release from custody, but this does not establish that he is currently suffering collateral consequences as a result of the disciplinary sanctions. See Scholl v. Thompson, No. 1:21-CV-1774, 2022 WL 525847, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2022). As the Third Circuit explained in Scott v. Holt, petitioners who have served their complete terms of imprisonment
cannot show some concrete and continuing injury from the loss of good time credits. Good time credits do not function as a commutation of a sentence. Rather, “the only function of good time credits is to determine when, in the absence of parole, the prisoner is to be conditionally released on supervision. Once an offender is conditionally released from imprisonment, the good time earned during that period is of no further effect.”
297 Fed.Appx. 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal alteration omitted) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 2.35(b)).The undersigned acknowledges that Scott is a nonprecedential opinion, but the undersigned agrees with its persuasive ratio decidendi and adopts it for purposes of the instant matter. See Scholl, 2022 WL 525847, at *2. The undersigned find that Capozzi has not established collateral consequences arising from the loss of good conduct time.
Finally, Capozzi appears to argue that rather than dismissing the petition as moot, the Court should simply construe the petition as a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. 12). This argument is without merit. Although federal courts may construe habeas corpus petitions as civil rights complaints when the substance of the filing indicates that the petitioner is seeking civil rights relief rather than habeas corpus relief, see, e.g., Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998), the substance of Capozzi's petition does not indicate that such a construction is appropriate. Capozzi's petition seeks only to have his good conduct time restored; it does not seek any relief that would properly be sought through a civil rights complaint, such as damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief. (Doc. 1). The first time Capozzi asserts a request for an award of punitive damages is in his traverse. (Doc. 12). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court decline to construe the petition as a civil rights complaint. However, it is recommended that the dismissal of the petition be without prejudice to Capozzi's right to file a civil rights complaint in a separate action.
III. Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that Capozzi's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 be DISMSISSED as MooT, without prejudice. (Doc. 1).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated October 10, 2023.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.