Opinion
CIVIL 1:22-CV-592
11-14-2022
JAMES COUNTERMAN, Petitioner v. WARDEN SAGE, Respondent
Rambo, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
James Counterman, who was formerly a federal inmate housed at FPC-Schuylkill, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on April 22, 2022. (Doc. 1). In this petition, Counterman argued that his earned time credits had been miscalculated, leading to a delay in his release from custody. (Id.) However, it appears that Counterman is no longer in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, having been released from BOP custody on October 5, 2022. (Doc. 18).
On these facts, the Respondent has filed a Suggestion of Mootness, indicating that Counterman' claims regarding his conditions of confinement are now moot since he is no longer in BOP custody. (Doc. 18). We directed Counterman to respond to this suggestion of mootness, (Doc. 19), but our order directing Counterman's response was returned as refused. (Doc. 20).
Given the uncontested fact that Counterman is no longer in federal custody, upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this petition be dismissed as moot.
II. Discussion
As we have explained, Counterman's petition alleges that his earned time credits had been miscalculated. (Doc. 1). However, it is undisputed that Counterman has since been released from BOP custody, having been released on October 5, 2022.
It is a basic principle of constitutional law that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or controversy. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009). In order to meet this standard, and “[t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings....The parties must continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 47778). Accordingly, “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
On this score, the mootness doctrine recognizes a fundamental truth in litigation: “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 698-99. In the context of habeas corpus petitions, mootness questions often turn on straightforward factual issues. Thus:
[A] petition for habeas corpus relief generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631, 102 S.Ct. 1322, 71 L.Ed.2d 508(1982). This general principle derives from the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution, which “subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate ... the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 477 (citations omitted).DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 441-442 (3d Cir. 2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (requiring that a prisoner be “in custody” to file for a writ of habeas corpus). Here, because Counterman has been released from BOP custody, his habeas corpus claims are now moot. See e.g., Buczek v. Werlinger, 513 Fed.Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2013) (dismissing a § 2241 petition as moot when petitioner had been released from custody); Scott v. FCI Schuylkill, 298 Fed.Appx. 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Williams v. Sherman, 214 Fed.Appx. 264, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Watson v. Lane, 2019 WL 5265278 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2019) (same). Accordingly, this petition should be dismissed as moot.
III. Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the Court dismiss this petition for a writ of habeas corpus as moot. (Doc. 1).
Petitioner is placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.