Opinion
A23-0740
01-17-2024
Campbell Property Management, Respondent, v. Valerie Steiner, Appellant.
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CV-23-2609
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Keala C. Ede, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In March 2022, appellant Valerie Steiner entered a six-month lease agreement with Campbell Property Management (Campbell) for an apartment. The initial lease term expired in October 2022, and the lease continued month-to-month. Under the lease terms, either party could terminate the month-to-month tenancy by providing a 30-day written notice.
2. During her rental period, Steiner continuously emailed Campbell staff with complaints about other tenants, staff, and issues with her apartment. In one such email, Steiner stated that someone tried to vandalize her boat because she found mayonnaise packets nearby. Steiner accused Campbell staff of knowing who was responsible for the mayonnaise packets and stated that the behavior needed to stop immediately. In another email, Steiner noted that she did not have hot water in her apartment and, rather than fix the problem, Campbell staff were gossiping about her. Steiner also accused a staff member of committing fraud on her checking account. And she threatened legal action if the issues were not resolved.
3. On February 22, 2023, Campbell formally notified Steiner that it was terminating her lease, effective March 31, 2023, based on the 30-day written notice provision for termination of the month-to-month tenancy. On April 3, 2023, Campbell filed an eviction action, seeking to evict Steiner because she remained in possession of the apartment.
4. In May 2023, following a court trial, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment. The district court found as follows. Steiner and Campbell entered into a written lease agreement with an initial term ending in October 2022. After the initial lease term, the lease continued month-to-month. On February 22, 2023, Campbell delivered a notice to quit to Steiner. Throughout the lease, Steiner's emails were "generally critical of how the apartments were managed" and Steiner accused the staff of slander and of gossiping about her to the other tenants. Noting that Steiner "raised a defense of retaliation, based on a Petition for Emergency Relief[,]" but she did not file that petition "prior to service of the notice to quit," the court ruled that "the statutory defense and presumptions [were] not available to [Steiner]." The district court determined that Steiner did not prove the common-law defense of retaliation because she "failed to show that the complaints stated in her emails were related to a breach of lease or law by" Campbell. Instead, the court determined that Steiner's daily email complaints demonstrated "an inability to get along with staff and with others." Thus, the district court determined that "the notice to quit was the result of a breakdown in the relationship between the staff at the rental unit and [Steiner], as evidenced by the emails and communications, which [the Campbell Property Manager] described as accusatory and harassing." The court ordered the entry of judgment for Campbell. This appeal follows.
5. As an initial matter, we note that Steiner has separately appealed the district court's denial of her petition for emergency relief about the hot water supply for the same property and lease at issue here. The brief Steiner filed in this appeal is identical to the brief that she filed in her separate appeal, and it more closely relates to the issues germane to that case. That said, Steiner appears to argue in this appeal that the district court erred in determining that she did not prove a valid retaliation defense.
6. Eviction is "a summary court proceeding to remove a tenant or occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property by the process of law set out in this chapter." N.Y. Props., LLC v. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2020)). If a court finds that the allegations stated in a complaint are true, "then the plaintiff is entitled to a writ of recovery of premises and an order to vacate." Id. (quotation omitted). Under certain circumstances, a residential tenant may defeat an eviction action by establishing that the eviction was in retaliation for a complaint. See Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398, 409 (Minn. 2019). Minnesota law provides for three retaliation defenses. Two of these defenses can be found in Minnesota Statutes section 504B.441 (2022) and Minnesota Statutes section 504B.285, subdivision 2 (2022). The third defense is a common-law defense that the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted. See Cent. Hous. Assocs., 929 N.W.2d at 409 (holding that "tenants have a common-law defense to landlord evictions in retaliation for tenant complaints about material violations by the landlord of state or local law, residential covenants, or the lease" and that "[t]he tenant has the burden to assert the defense and to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence").
7. We review a district court's factual findings for clear error. See Schuett Inv. Co. v. Anderson, 386 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn.App. 1986) (citation omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is a "'clear demonstration that it is without substantial evidentiary support or that it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.'" Id. (quoting Ortendahl v. Bergmann, 343 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn.App. 1984)). We review questions of law de novo. See In re Distrib. of Attorney's Fees between Stowman Law Firm, P.A. &Lori Peterson Law Firm, 855 N.W.2d 760, 761 (Minn.App. 2014), aff'd, 870 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 2015). "When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, we correct erroneous applications of law, but accord the district court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and review such conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard." Porch v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn.App. 2002) (quotation and citations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 2002). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on the record." In re Otto Bremer Trust, 984 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Minn.App. 2023) (quotation omitted).
8. The district court found that Steiner and Campbell entered into a written lease agreement with an initial term ending in October 2022; that the lease continued month-to- month after the initial term ended; and that Campbell delivered to Steiner a notice to quit on February 22, 2023. The district court also found that Steiner's emails were "generally critical of how the apartments were managed" and that Steiner accused the staff of slander and of gossiping about her to the other tenants. These factual findings are well-supported by the record, including the written lease agreement, the testimony at trial, and the emails submitted into evidence. We discern no clear error in the district court's factual findings.
9. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statutory retaliation defenses were unavailable to Steiner. To prevail under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.441, a defendant must show that the eviction was intended as a penalty for the defendant's complaint of a violation. The Minnesota Supreme Court has concluded that section 504B.441 "prohibits retaliation for a residential tenant's complaint of a violation to a government entity, such as a housing inspector, or commencement of a formal legal proceeding." Cent. Hous. Assocs., 929 N.W.2d at 408. A defendant does not have a defense of retaliation under section 504B.441 if the defendant makes a report to a government entity (or petitions for emergency relief) after they have been served with an eviction notice. See id. Campbell provided Steiner with a lease termination notice on February 22, 2023. Steiner brought her petition for emergency relief on March 3, 2023. Although Steiner complained to the property manager several times about the hot water before she filed her petition, section 504B.441 does not provide a defense "based on an expression of dissatisfaction to the landlord." Id. For that reason, Steiner's email complaints are not "complaint[s] of a violation" under section 504B.441. Although Steiner's petition for emergency relief is a complaint of a violation under section 504B.441, Campbell's notice to terminate the lease could not have been in retaliation for Steiner's petition because Campbell delivered the notice to terminate before Steiner filed her petition. See id. Steiner's statutory retaliation defense under section 504B.441 is therefore unavailing.
10. To prevail under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.285, subdivision 2, a defendant must show that the landlord intended the termination "as a penalty for the defendant's good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease" or the laws of Minnesota. Steiner's attempt to assert a statutory defense pursuant to section 504B.285, subdivision 2, fails because she only sought to enforce her rights after Campbell gave her notice to quit. As a result, Campbell could not have intended the notice to quit as a penalty. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statutory retaliation defenses were unavailable to Steiner.
11. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Steiner did not prove the common-law defense of retaliation. To prevail under the common-law defense, a residential tenant must prove that a landlord brought a breach-of-lease eviction action based on the tenant's good-faith complaint to the landlord of a material violation of local or state law, residential covenants, or the lease. See Cent. Hous. Assocs., 929 N.W.2d at 409. Rather than retaliation for Steiner's complaints about material violations by Campbell of local or state law, residential covenants, or the lease, the district court determined that "the notice to quit was the result of a breakdown in the relationship between the staff at the rental unit and [Steiner], as evidenced by the emails and communications, which [the Campbell Property Manager] described as accusatory and harassing." Given the substantial evidentiary support for that finding and because Campbell had a right to terminate the month-to-month tenancy by providing a 30-day written notice, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Steiner failed to carry her burden to prove the common-law defense of retaliation.
12. In sum, the district court did not clearly err in its findings of fact, nor did it abuse its discretion by concluding that Steiner had no valid statutory or common-law retaliation defenses to eviction.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.