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refusing to consider documents submitted as part of an addendum when documents were not in the district court record
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A21-1445
06-13-2022
NY PROPERTIES, LLC, Respondent, v. Kent W. SCHUETTE, Appellant.
Kristi D. Stanislawski, Christophe L. Morschen, Jovanovich, Dege & Athmann, PA, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent) Rebecca Hare, Elizabeth F. Sauer, Central Minnesota Legal Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Kristi D. Stanislawski, Christophe L. Morschen, Jovanovich, Dege & Athmann, PA, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Rebecca Hare, Elizabeth F. Sauer, Central Minnesota Legal Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
SLIETER, Judge
Tenant appeals the district court's judgment of recovery in favor of landlord, arguing that the district court erred because tenant disputed the allegations in landlord's complaint and the district court issued factual findings and legal conclusions without conducting a trial. Because the district court made factual findings and legal conclusions without first receiving evidence, and because a tenant is entitled to a trial when material facts are in dispute in eviction actions filed pursuant to Minnesota Statutes chapter 504B, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellant-tenant Kent W. Schuette began leasing an apartment from respondent-landlord NY Properties LLC in March 2020. In September 2021, NY Properties filed an eviction complaint, alleging that Schuette failed to pay his $325 monthly rent from February 2021 through September 2021, and that he failed to vacate the property after written notice was given. NY Properties also alleged that Schuette violated the lease by having "numerous contacts with law enforcement" and "causing significant damage to the interior and exterior of the unit." Attached to the complaint were several "Computer Assisted Dispatch" reports purportedly involving Schuette and law enforcement and pictures of the allegedly damaged and messy premises.
The initial, and only, hearing was held remotely with Schuette appearing pro se and a representative for NY Properties appearing with counsel. During a six-minute hearing, no exhibits were offered or received, no sworn testimony was received, no motions were made, and the parties did not stipulate to any facts.
See 301 Clifton Place L.L.C. v. 301 Clifton Place Condo. Ass'n , 783 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App. 2010) (holding that LLCs must be represented by counsel in pleadings and practice in Minnesota courts); Hinckley Square Assocs. v. Cervene , 871 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn. App. 2015) (holding that, as an exception, "landlords may appear through lay agents in the specialized housing courts of Hennepin and Ramsey Counties").
At the start of the hearing, the district court noted that the "eviction action alleges unpaid rent as well as damage that was done to the property here along with police calls;" the court then asked Schuette whether he "disagree[d] with that[.]" Schuette responded: "Yeah, some of it." Schuette asserted that NY Properties had "asked" him "to call the police officers," and acknowledged that a picture appeared to show "one broken window." NY Properties’ counsel asserted that Schuette is "at least $2,600 in arrears," and it sought eviction based on "the numerous police reports," and "significant damage done to this property."
After receiving these statements, the district court said, "Well, it looks to me after reviewing everything carefully that there is a basis here for the eviction so I am going to go ahead and grant it with immediate restitution of the premises. I will issue an order to that effect." In its order following the hearing, the district court checked the box noting that Schuette "denied the allegations in the Eviction Action complaint," and it granted NY Properties the eviction judgment. Schuette appeals.
The district court granted Schuette's request for a stay pending appeal, conditioned on Schuette posting a $4,000 bond. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.371, subd. 3 (2020) (stating a tenant "must give a bond" if the tenant remains in possession of the property pending appeal). By motion filed in this court, Schuette challenged the appeal bond, and this court denied relief in a special-term order. On April 27, 2022, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of this court's denial of relief from the appeal bond. The supreme court stayed the writ of recovery pending its resolution of the appeal-bond question.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by granting an eviction judgment without conducting a trial when material facts were disputed?
ANALYSIS
On review of a district court order in an eviction action, we defer to the district court's findings of fact, and those findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Smallwood , 379 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. App. 1985) (discussing the standard of review in an unlawful-detainer action), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."). "In applying the clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. [Appellate courts] will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, [they] are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." In re Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted). It is axiomatic that, in applying the clear-error standard, we review evidence as it appears in the record. As for mixed questions of fact and law, we correct erroneous applications of law but defer to the district court's ultimate conclusions, which we review for abuse of discretion. Porch v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. App. 2002).
Eviction is defined as "a summary court proceeding to remove a tenant or occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property by the process of law set out in this chapter." Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2020). Eviction actions are also limited in scope. "Generally the only issue for trial is whether the facts alleged in the complaint are true." Mac-Du Props. v. LaBresh , 392 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Minn. App. 1986) (citations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1986). If a court or jury finds that the allegations are true, then the plaintiff is entitled to "a writ of recovery of premises and [an] order to vacate." Minn. Stat. § 504B.345, subd. 1(a) (2020) ; see Eagan E. Ltd. P'ship v. Powers Investigations, Inc. , 554 N.W.2d 621, 622 (Minn. App. 1996) (holding that in an unlawful detainer action, the limited scope of the proceeding pertains to "issues determinative of the present right to possession"); see also Amresco Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange , 631 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Minn. App. 2001) (discussing that "the scope of the proceedings originated with the limited jurisdiction of municipal courts that once heard unlawful detainer proceedings but were not empowered to determine issues related to title" and that "a counterclaim involving title should have been heard in an eviction proceeding to avoid the problems that later arose in a separate title action"); see also SVAP III Riverdale Commons LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms, LLC , 967 N.W.2d 81, 86-87 (Minn. App. 2021) (holding that some potential defenses in an eviction action cannot be raised).
Apart from an eviction action's limited scope, it is "the same as in other civil actions," except as otherwise provided in sections 504B.281 through 504B.371. Minn. Stat. § 504B.335(c) (2020). And similar to other civil actions, eviction actions are decided by trial. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.335(a) (2020) (providing that "the defendant may answer the complaint, and the court shall hear and decide the action, unless it grants a continuance of the trial " (emphasis added)); Minn. Stat. § 504B.331(e) (2020) ("If the defendant or the defendant's attorney does not appear in court on the date of the appearance, the trial shall proceed." (emphasis added)). Additionally, "[e]ither party may demand a trial by jury." Minn. Stat. § 504B.335(b) (2020) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 504B.355 (2020) (discussing the jury verdict form). The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure also require that "[i]n actions for the recovery ... of specific real or personal property, the issues of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered." Minn. R. Civ. P. 38.01. Thus, in an eviction action, either party may request a court or jury trial.
As for the characteristics of a trial in an eviction action, the plaintiff-landlord must plead and prove facts showing the defendant-tenant is in unlawful possession of the property. Minn. Stat. § 504B.321 (2020) ; see also Mac-Du , 392 N.W.2d at 317. At trial, the rules of evidence and civil procedure apply, and witness testimony must generally be taken. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.01 ("In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court."). If a district court considers exhibits when making its decision, those exhibits generally require foundation pursuant to the rules of evidence and civil procedure. See, e.g. , Minn. R. Evid. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court."); Minn. R. Evid. 901(a) ("The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."); Minn. R. Evid. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by the Legislature.").
The record demonstrates that, despite Schuette's denial of the claims and without conducting a trial, the district court found that NY Properties had proved the allegations in the complaint. The district court found that "by a preponderance of the evidence," Schuette "failed and refuses to pay rent," he "failed to vacate said property" after proper notice, and he "broke[ ] the terms of the rental agreement." Because no exhibits were offered or received, no sworn testimony was obtained, no motions were made, and the parties did not stipulate to any facts, "we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed" and these findings are clearly erroneous. Kenney , 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting the eviction judgment. Porch , 642 N.W.2d at 477.
During oral argument, and despite a contrary claim in its brief, NY Properties conceded that the district court's eviction judgment was not based upon summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, we do not address that argument.
NY Properties argues that the district court properly granted an eviction judgment based upon the documents attached to the complaint and documents NY Properties purportedly filed with the district court before the eviction hearing. These documents, which are included in the addendum to NY Properties’ brief, are an alleged rental agreement, a notice of eviction action, notices of lease termination, a "verbal" lease agreement, and a spreadsheet. We reject this argument.
First, as noted, the record shows that no documents were offered or received into evidence during the hearing. Second, because these documents do not appear in the district court's trial record, we do not consider them. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 ("The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases."). Finally, NY Properties argues that, even if the district court erred, the error was harmless. On this record, it is plain that the district court's error, namely, granting an eviction judgment without conducting a trial on disputed facts, was not harmless. This error "affect[ed] the substantial rights" of Schuette, and refusal to hold a trial would be "inconsistent with substantial justice." Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 ; Cloverdale Foods of Minn., Inc. v. Pioneer Snacks , 580 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Minn. App. 1998) ("An evidentiary error is prejudicial if the error might reasonably have changed the result of the trial."); see Kirsebom v. Connelly , 486 N.W.2d 172, 176 (Minn. App. 1992) (granting new trial because district court's "failure to include the statute in the instructions and the lack of evidence to sustain the verdict were contrary to substantial justice and merit a new trial on the issue of liability").
NY Properties argues that we may consider these documents because they are "supplemental documentary evidence of a conclusive and uncontroverted nature" and cites Mattfeld v. Nester , 226 Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1948). Because Schuette contested the eviction, none of these documents are "conclusive and uncontroverted." See generally Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Loc. No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud , 750 N.W.2d 307, 317-18 (Minn. App. 2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part , 765 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. 2009) (declining to consider certified payroll records).
A party has a right to a trial when there are genuine issues of material facts. Cf. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc. , 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406, 413 (1971) ("No constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial exists where there is no issue of fact."); Rheinberger v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul , 276 Minn. 194, 150 N.W.2d 37, 42 (1967) (holding that when there are no issues of fact, the district court need not submit a case to a jury trial).
DECISION
The district court clearly erred by ordering an eviction judgment without conducting a trial because material facts were plainly in dispute. By doing so, the district court failed to apply the relevant eviction action statutes, the rules of civil procedure, and the rules of evidence. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion. Porch , 642 N.W.2d at 477. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for trial.