Opinion
C.A. No. 00M-02-016 (Sussex County Case) and C.A. No. 00M-12-011 (Kent County Case) (Consolidated Cases).
Submitted: June 30, 2004.
August 9, 2004.
James Arthur Biggins, Delaware Correctional Center, Smyrna, DE.
Richard W. Hubbard, Esquire, Robert F. Phillips, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Mr. Biggins, Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Phillips:
Pending before the Court is a motion for reargument which petitioner James Biggins ("petitioner") has filed in the above-caption ed matter. This motion is procedu rally barred. It also is frivolous, and simultaneously with the denial of this motion, I am entering an order requiring the forfeiture of five (5) days of good time credit.
On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed, in Sussex County Superior Court, a petition which this Court could not understand and refused to allow to proceed absent amendme nt thereof. Petitioner filed an amended petition, and the Court allowed petitioner to pursue claims for denial of access to the courts and unlawful confiscation of inmate funds provided he filed a petition setting forth those claims. Biggins v. Department of Correction of the State of Delaware, Del. Super., C.A. No. 00M-02-016, Graves, J. (May 3, 2000). Petitioner sought a review of this decision from the Supreme Court by writ of mandamus, and that court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. In the Matter of the Petition of James Arthur Biggins for a Writ of Mandamus, 758 A.2d 933 (Del. 2000). Meanwhile, petitioner filed the amended petition which complied with this Court's May 3, 2000, order. The named respondent was the Department of Correction ("DOC").
DOC filed a motion to dismiss, and this Court held a hearing thereon on November 17, 2000. At that hearing, the Court obtained clarification as to petitioner's assertions: he was being denied access to the courts because restrictions imposed on his going to the law library were unreasonable and DOC improperly took money from his account to pay for copies when it was required to provide copies for free. The Court explained what discovery would be allowed to take place, instructed petitioner to file an affidavit addressing any situations where he was denied access to the law library, and set a briefing schedule on the pending issues.
On December 11, 2000, petitioner filed another petition seeking a writ of mandamus in Kent County Superior Court, wherein he asserted he was denied access to the courts because Delaware Correctional Center was refusing him appointments in the law library. The Court consolidated these two matters by order dated February 16, 2001.
Because matters outside the pleadings were submitted, the Court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56. Petitioner did not submit any facts which could have been considered under Superior Court Civil Rule 56.
The Court rendered a decision denying the petition. Biggins v. Department of Corrections of the State of Delaware, Del. Super., C.A. No. 00 M-02-016, et al., Graves, J. (September 26, 2001). Therein, it held that petitioner did not have a duty to provide copies free of charge and petitioner had failed to submit any acceptable facts establishing that a claim or case of his was dismissed or denied because he did not have copies of documents in a timely manner. This Court further held that with regard to his contention he did not have as many appointments to go to the library as he thought he should have, he had not shown that any nondiscretionary policy was violated; thus, he had not established entitlement to a mandamus. The Court ruled that, in the alternative, even if it considered his claim to be one for damages, his complaint failed. Finally, the Court took away petitioner's good time credits he earned during the period from the filing of the Kent County action until the time of the decision because petitioner asserted the same claim in the Kent County action as was under review in the Sussex County action.
Petitioner did not file a motion to reargue. He appealed the Superior Court's decisions to the Supreme Court. That court affirmed both the May 3, 2000 and September 26, 2001 Superior Court decisions. Biggins v. State, 790 A.2d 475 (Del. 2002).
On June 21, 2004, petitioner filed several documents. The pertinent one is captioned "Motion and Petition to Set Aside Judgment or Order Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rules of Procedures 60(b)(6) and Injunctive Reliefs". He also filed an affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, which is unnecessary since he previously had been granted relief to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, and a praecipe, which is not an appropriate document to file in connection with a motion.
In his motion, petitioner argues that the Court abused its discretion in concluding no genuine issues of material facts exist and in ruling petitioner had not shown a denial of access to the courts, and the Court incorrectly relied on information from DOC in rendering its decision. Petitioner labels his motion as one filed pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6). However, it is the substance of the motion, not the label, which controls. Milford School District v. Young, 445 A.2d 337 (Del. 1981).
In Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b)(6), it is provided in pertinent part as follows:
(b) Mistake; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Petitioner's arguments actually seek to reargue this Court's decision on summary judgment, and they should have been made pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). A motion to reargue affords "the trial court an opportunity to correct errors prior to an appeal." Kohler v. Hughes, Del. Super., C.A. No. 98 L-12-117, Toliver, J. (Feb. 2, 2000) at 3. The motion is procedurally barred and time-barred. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e).
In Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e), it is provided in pertinent part as follows:
(e) Rearguments. A motion for reargument shall be served and filed within 5 days after the filing of the Court's opinion or decision. The motion shall briefly and distinctly state the grounds therefor.
Alternatively, petitioner should have raised these arguments on appeal. A party cannot use Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6) to raise issues which should have been raised on appeal. Brown v. Comegys, Del. Super., C.A. No. 83C-MR-93, Taylor, J. (Feb. 28, 1989) at 4-5.
Finally, even if the Court were to consider this to be a Rule 60(b) motion, petitioner would have to show extraordinary circumstances to reopen a judgment. Subolefsky v. Palese, 820 A.2d 373 (Del. 2003); Schneider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 813 A.2d 1141 (Del. 2002). He has not even alleged extraordinary circumstances. In addition, the motion is filed within an unreasonable amount of time after the judgment became final and is time-barred. Brown v. Comegys, supra at 6.
Petitioner filed this frivolous pleading seeking to reargue this Court's previous decisions over two years after the prior decisions were final. This Court warned petitioner in its September 26, 2001, decision that subsequently filed frivolous proceedings would result in the further loss of good time credits. Biggins v. Department of Corrections of the State of Delaware, Del. Super., C.A. No. 00M-02-016, et al., Graves, J. (September 26, 2001). Since both this Court and members of the Attorney General's Office, respectively, had to spend several days reviewing and addressing petitioner's pleading, it is appropriate that petitioner be docked good time credit in an equivalent amount of days. Accordingly, I order that five (5) days of petitioner's good time credit be forfeited. I warn that the forfeiture of such a small amount of time in light of the substantial amount of good time credit petitioner has (over one thousand days) is not something petitioner should expect will occur in the future. I forewarn petitioner that if he files another frivolous proceeding, the Court will order the forfeiture of a substantial amount of his good time credit.
In conclusion, the Court dismisses the pending motion as frivolous. It also orders that five (5) days of petitioner's good time credit be forfeited.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,