Opinion
No. CV02-0175465S
November 26, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff brought an action against both the owner and the operator of a motor vehicle for injuries she suffered in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the defendant operator. The defendants move to strike counts three and four of the complaint and their corresponding prayers for relief as to the defendant owner on the ground that the allegations contained therein are legally insufficient and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The third count alleges common-law recklessness against both defendants. The fourth count alleges statutory recklessness pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295 against both defendants.
The defendants contend that an owner of a vehicle may not be held vicariously liable for punitive damages in an action arising from a nonowner's reckless operation of a vehicle.
Discussion
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
The plaintiff alleges in the third count that the motor vehicle collision was caused by the reckless, willful and/or wanton misconduct of the defendant operator in driving through a stop sign without stopping and at a high rate of speed. The allegations in the fourth count are virtually the same except that the plaintiff adds a paragraph alleging that the defendant operator's reckless disregard for the safety of others violated § 14-295 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
The defendants argue that neither § 52-182 of the Connecticut General Statutes nor the common law imposes punitive damages on the owner of an automobile for the reckless conduct of the operator. The plaintiff counters that the defendants' motion is improper because it attempts to have the counts and corresponding prayers for relief stricken against one party only. The plaintiff argues that if any part of the count states a legally sufficient cause of action, the count is not subject to a motion to strike. The plaintiff cites the split of authority in the superior court regarding the issue of imposing punitive damages on the nonoperator owner and argues that the "more persuasive" authority is that which agrees with the plaintiff's point of view. The defendants argue that an owner cannot be held liable for double and treble damages for an operator's reckless conduct pursuant to either the family car doctrine or § 52-183 and § 14-295 of the General Statutes. With respect to the third count, the defendants state that of the superior courts which have addressed the issue of vicarious liability pursuant to § 52-182, all have held that an owner cannot be liable for double and treble damages for the operator's reckless conduct. With respect to the fourth count, the defendants acknowledge a split of authority and urge the court to adopt what the defendants consider the better-reasoned decisions, i.e. those that do not allow the departure from the common-law rule that punitive damages may not be imposed on an owner of a vehicle for a nonowner operator's reckless behavior.
The plaintiff's claim that the motion to strike is procedurally improper is without merit. The plaintiff is correct in her contention that "[I]f part of a count is viable, it is not subject to a motion to strike." Farago v. Pfizer, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of New London at New London, Docket No. 524911 (May 18, 1993, Teller, J.); "[I]f a motion to strike attacks an entire count, but any part of the plaintiff's claims therein are legally sufficient, the motion will fail." Durkin v. First Healthcare Corp., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 88 0350622, 2 Conn. L. Rptr. 743 (October 18, 1990, Freed, J.). However, the plaintiff is incorrect in her assertion that the cases she cites support her claim that the court cannot strike an entire count against a particular defendant. In fact, those superior court decisions which have held that an owner cannot be held liable for the recklessness of the operator have done so while striking a count against the owner but not the operator. Moreover, it defies credulity to say that if the allegations in a count are legally sufficient as to one defendant but not to the other, the count may not be stricken against the other.
In the third count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant owner is liable under the family car doctrine. Superior courts which have decided this issue have concluded that neither § 52-182 of the General Statutes nor common law impose punitive damages on the owner for the reckless conduct of the operator. See Hamilton v. Zarelli, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 145033, (October 27, 1995, D'Andrea, J.); Gelormino v. Soucy, Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, Docket No. 106827 (January 18, 1995, West, J., 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 341); Krisak v. Pendagast, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 263835 (June 21, 1993, Lager, J., 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 286); Sperger v. Roseman, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 437853 (December 5, 1990, Aronson, J., 3 Conn. L. Rptr. 3); Gomez v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 327864, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 102 (June 19, 1996, Ballen, J.). As the court stated in Lyte v. Kane, No. CV98063138 (Aug. 25, 1998, Flynn, J., 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 136), "There is a statutory presumption under § 52-182 that the automobile being operated by a family member was being operated as a family car within the scope of general authority from an owner . . . the effect of the family car doctrine is to provide an exception to the general principle that one who permits another to drive his automobile does not become liable for the driver's negligence unless he is pursuing an agency or an employment for the owner . . . [T]his statutory presumption and its effect applies only to awards of compensatory damages, not the multiple statutory punitive damages authorized by § 14-295 of the Statutes . . . At common law no punitive or exemplary damages were accessible against owners for acts of their agents if the owner's liability was purely vicarious . . . Civil or penal statutes passed in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed . . . in determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common-law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of the statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly within its scope . . . The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that statutes must be construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature . . . Section 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant. There is no need for further construction. Punitive damages are therefore inappropriate given the language of the law which authorizes them. The purpose of statutory punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct . . . Imposing them in this case could not serve to deter the [owner] from conduct in the manner of `operation' of the motor vehicle by [the driver] which, albeit wrongful, [owner] did not cause or have reason to know about or expect."
Because the language of § 52-183 contains the word "reckless," there has been a greater division in the decisions of the superior court with respect to extending liability for punitive damages to a nonoperating owner. Several courts have held that, when read together with § 14-295, § 52-183 "facially applies to any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle . . . The legislative reference to damages for recklessness in § 52-183 can reasonably be read as encompassing double or treble damages imposed under § 14-295." Trottier v. Eastside Garage, Inc., et al., Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain, No. CV010508472S (June 7, 2002, Berger, J.), citing Santill v. Arredono, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. 442323, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.). See also Graydus v. El-Achkar, Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville No. CV 02-0080322, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 642 (May 20, 2003, Scholl, J.). Other superior courts have disallowed the imposition of punitive damages pursuant to § 14-295 and § 52-183 because they "do not contain language explicitly allowing for an expansion of the common-law restraint on the imposition of multiple damages upon defendant owners whose liability is vicarious." Hamilton v. Zarrelli, et al., Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, No. CV95-0145033 (October 27, 1995, D'Andrea, J.).
Because the appellate courts had not ruled on the issue, the superior courts were attempting to determine legislative intent where the statutory language was ambiguous. Now, however, the Legislature has repealed § 52-182, § 52-183, and § 14-295. Section 2 of P.A. No. 03-250 provides as follows:
Section 14-295 of the General Statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2003, and applicable to causes of action accruing on or said after said date):
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or triple damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or lease to motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.
It appears that the Legislature has clarified its original intent by the addition of the last sentence. For this reason, the court finds that neither General Statute § 52-182 nor § 52-183 permits imposing liability for double or treble damages on the non-operator owner of a motor vehicle.
The defendants' motion to strike counts three and four of the complaint as to Defendant Qadar is granted.
GALLAGHER, JUDGE.