Summary
In Matter of Anonymous v C.P. (81 Misc.3d 355, 364 [Sup Ct, Warren County]), the court noted that CPLR article 63-A "does not condition the issuance of [a temporary extreme risk protection order or a final extreme risk protection order] upon a finding that a respondent suffers from a mental illness," and it is "clear that the legislature meant to borrow only the definitions of 'likelihood to result in serious harm' into the [extreme risk protection order] statutes and not incorporate the remaining text of Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39(a) therein."
Summary of this case from R.M. v. C.M.Opinion
No. 2023-23289 Index No. 2022-70852
09-18-2023
Anonymous, Petitioner, v. C.P., a Minor Whose Name is Known to the Court, Respondent, For an Extreme Risk Protection Order.
Girvin & Ferlazzo, P.C., Albany (Patrick J. Fitzgerald and Daniel S. L. Rubin of counsel), for petitioner. Martin J. McGuinness, Esq. PLLC, Saratoga Springs (Martin J. McGuinness of counsel), for respondent.
Girvin & Ferlazzo, P.C., Albany (Patrick J. Fitzgerald and Daniel S. L. Rubin of counsel), for petitioner.
Martin J. McGuinness, Esq. PLLC, Saratoga Springs (Martin J. McGuinness of counsel), for respondent.
Respondent provided the Attorney General's Office with the notice required by CPLR 1012 (b) (1). By letter dated March 13, 2023, the Attorney General's Office declined to intervene as of right as provided therein but requested that they be provided with any decision on the motion (see Executive Law § 71). This request is granted.
Martin D. Auffredou, J.
Motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that CPLR article 63-A is void as unconstitutionally vague, as applied and on its face, and violates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applicable to this State via the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, § 1.
Petitioner, a school district, brought the instant petition seeking an extreme risk protection order (ERPO) prohibiting respondent from purchasing or possessing a firearm, rifle or shotgun (hereinafter, collectively, guns) pursuant to CPLR article 63-A. The petition alleges that respondent, a student within the district who was 15 years old when the petition was brought, made threats to kill a teacher and attacked a fellow student. More particularly, it is alleged that, in response to the teacher's urging respondent to return to class, which involved the teacher placing his hand on respondent's shoulder, respondent said, "I'll f***ing kill you. Touch me again. I'll f***ing kill you. Touch me again and I will f*** you up. Touch me again and see what happens. I'll put you down bro. F*** off." This resulted in respondent's suspension from school for five days. It is reported that, during this suspension, respondent struck his mother. It is further alleged that, approximately a week after respondent's return to school, he approached another student in the cafeteria and threatened to "punch him out." Petitioner's staff intervened and escorted respondent out of the cafeteria and to an office, during which time respondent continued to threaten the student. In the office, respondent met with petitioner's school resource officer (SRO). That meeting concluded when respondent allegedly calmly stood up and walked out, went directly to the gymnasium where an assembly was taking place, went up the bleachers to where the student whom he had been threatening was seated, and struck him repeatedly about the head and upper body. The SRO is alleged to have been knocked backward down the bleachers while trying to intervene, sustaining injuries.
The court granted anonymity to petitioner as requested in the petition.
Petitioner thereafter brought the instant proceeding seeking an extreme risk protection order (ERPO), and a temporary extreme risk protection (TERPO) order during the pendency of the proceeding (see CPLR 6341, 6342, 6343). The court granted the TERPO, the effect of which was to preclude respondent from possessing or acquiring guns during its pendency (see CPLR 6340 [1], 6342 [4][d] [i]). The TERPO did not include any provision for the search of respondent's residence, vehicle or person for guns. The TERPO was successively extended, on consent, initially to allow the engagement of assigned counsel for respondent and thereafter to permit him to make the instant motion. Respondent turned 16 years old during the pendency of the TERPO, which remains in effect. Respondent's residence-which he shares with is 24-year-old brother, who is a veteran of the armed forces and respondent's immediate caregiver-was never searched and no guns were voluntarily surrendered to law enforcement upon their request for same pursuant to CPLR 6342 (8). Respondent and the brother both aver that neither of them owns any guns, though the brother is trained to use them and states that he "would like to have one in the future."
It appears from the information in the petition that respondent's mother does not reside with him and his brother but is, rather, reportedly homeless and currently located in the State of Vermont.
Respondent now moves to dismiss the petition on the aforesaid grounds. Specifically, he argues that the decisional standard set forth in the ERPO statutory scheme failed to provide him with fair and accurate notice of its ambit and provides no clear standard for its application; that these infirmities would prevent its constitutional application in all cases; and that the regulation of gun possession that it presents is inconsistent with our "Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation" (New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, __US __, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 2126 [2022]). He asserts these claims on behalf of himself and also claims third-party standing to raise them on behalf of his brother. Petitioner counters the motion in each of these respects, including challenging respondent's standing to present his constitutional claims on his own behalf.
Upon a review of the affirmation of Martin J. McGuinness, Esq., dated February 28, 2023, with exhibits, which include an affidavit of respondent's brother; respondent's memorandum of law, dated February 28, 2023; the affirmation of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Esq., dated April 14, 2023, with exhibits; petitioner's memorandum of law, dated April 14, 2023; and respondent's reply memorandum of law, dated April 28, 2023; oral argument on the motion having been held on June 1, 2023; and the court having duly deliberated upon all the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows.
To protect the identity of the minor respondent, the brother's name is also not disclosed herein.
The court first concludes that respondent has standing to challenge the application of CPLR art 63-A to him and assert that it is facially invalid. To establish standing, a petitioner must show "'(1) an 'injury in fact,' (2) a sufficient 'causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,' and (3) a 'likel[ihood]' that the injury 'will be redressed by a favorable decision'" (Susan B. Anthony List v Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-158 [2014], quoting Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 [1992] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Petitioner has carried this burden by demonstrating that his right to possess a gun has been abridged by the issuance of the TERPO pursuant to the challenged statutory scheme, and it is clear that this deprivation would be redressed by a judicial declaration that that scheme was unconstitutionally applied to him, which would carry with it the dismissal of the petition and the TERPO that was founded upon it.
While respondent does not possess the full panoply of gun rights that an adult would have, he nonetheless retains meaningful substantive rights in this regard (see Penal Law §§ 265.05, 265.20 [3], 400.00 [1] [a]). It was argued herein that respondent, who was 15 years old when the motion was made and opposed, had so limited a right to possess a gun at his age that no deprivation could be countenanced (see ECL 11-0701 [1]; 11-0929 [1], [2]). This argument is now moot due to the passage of time, during which respondent turned 16 years old. In any event, insofar as respondent did have such a right, albeit more limited that his current right (absent the TERPO), the unconstitutional deprivation of that substantive right would have conferred standing upon him for the reasons stated herein, even had he not reached age 16 during the pendency of this motion.
Petitioner argues that respondent fails to show an injury-in-fact because he has no present intention to exercise his right to possess a gun. The court rejects this position. The deprivation of respondent's substantive right to possess a gun constitutes a concrete injury notwithstanding that he has no immediate intention of obtaining one (see Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158-159; Fishman v Daines, 247 F.Supp. 238, 246 [ED NY 2017]). Absent the TERPO, respondent would have the present right to take up certain types of guns for whatever lawful purpose he may conceive. Upon the TERPO's issuance, he no longer had this option. This is an actual, concrete injury; not one that can be fairly considered "'conjectural or hypothetical'" (Baur v Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 [2d Cir 2003], quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Further, this deprivation would continue upon the issuance of an ERPO, should one issue after a hearing, and respondent has a right to contest the statute that presents the vehicle for that continued deprivation (see Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158-159). He should not be required to seek to obtain a gun in violation of the TERPO or ERPO and suffer the consequences of that violation as a prerequisite to challenging the deprivation of his rights that the TERPO already presents and the ERPO would present (see id. at 158).
Respondent has also demonstrated his standing by showing that he faces the imminent threat of the search of his home pursuant to an ERPO. While the court does agree that the issuance of the TERPO does not present this deprivation in this case, no search having been authorized therein or conducted pursuant thereto, the threat of such search being authorized in and conducted pursuant to an ERPO remains and is "sufficiently imminent" to constitute a cognizable injury for standing purposes (id. at 158-159). The argument that the possibility of a search is too remote because the court may not order one misses the mark. There remains a "'substantial risk' that the harm will occur" (id. at 158, quoting Clapper v Amnesty Intl USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n 5 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; accord Monsanto Co v Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153 [2010]; see Clapper, 568 U.S. at 404).
Unlike the situation addressed in Clapper where the injury was found to be too speculative to support respondent's standing because respondent presented only a "speculative chain of possibilities" that might lead to injury, which depended on future determinations or acts that might be taken by third-party actors-petitioner has brought respondent before this court and actively sought the application of a statutory scheme to him that he claims is unconstitutional, the direct results of which could include a search order. To hold that respondent has no standing in such situation would be akin to holding that the ERPO statute is constitutional because the court might not issue one after a hearing, or that a challenged penal statute is constitutional simply because one accused of violating it might be acquitted at trial.
The court's holding in this regard is guided by well-established precedent in criminal law. It is axiomatic that respondent would have standing to challenge the propriety of a search of his home, or the constitutionality of a law that authorizes it, after the search was conducted, either by seeking suppression of seized evidence in a criminal action or by bringing a collateral action to vindicate an unconstitutional infringement of his rights (see O'Connor v Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 [1987]; Galgano v County of Putnam, U.S. Dist Ct, S.D. NY, 16-CV-3572, Karas, J., 2020; see e.g. 42 USC § 1983). In that context, however, such adjudications must, in almost all cases, occur after the fact of the deprivation of the right because search warrants are generally issued ex parte, and warrantless searches occur amidst ongoing police investigations without any judicial involvement in advance of the search at all. Here, the propriety of a search order and the constitutionality of the ERPO statute that authorizes it are susceptible of adjudication in advance of the infringement, and there is no reason why respondent, being subject to this imminent threat, should be made to wait in silence to see whether petitioner seeks a search order at a hearing or the court orders one after it (see Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158). Indeed, to adopt petitioner's argument would be to hold that respondent's standing to challenge whether a search order should issue in an ERPO arises only when the court issues such an order after a hearing, at which point his opportunity to raise his constitutional claims against it will have come and gone.
The brother would also be entitled to standing under this rationale regarding the threat of a search order in an ERPO, if he were seeking it on his own behalf. But to say that a person would have standing to raise a claim in his or her own right is not to say that another person could do it on his or her behalf. Rather, procedural avenues exist for the brother to take up this claim in his own right, if he were of a mind to. Faced with a sufficiently imminent substantial risk that his privacy rights would be infringed upon by a search order in an ERPO, the brother is free to intervene in this proceeding and assert his rights, or to commence a collateral action to declare the ERPO statutory scheme unconstitutional (see CPLR 1012 [a] [2], 3001; United States v Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 [1960]). There is, thus, no ground for departure from the general rule that a party "'has standing only to assert claims on behalf of himself or herself... [and]... does not, as a general rule, have standing to assert claims on behalf of another,'" and the court concludes that respondent does not have standing to raise the claims presented on his brother's behalf (Matter of People v Christensen, 77 A.D.3d 174, 185 [2d Dept 2010], quoting Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 A.D.3d 176, 182 [2d Dept 2006]; see Raines, 362 U.S. at 23).
The court is not convinced by respondent's arguments that the TERPO impacts, or an ERPO that might issue would impact, the brother's right to possess guns in the absence of any seizure and where the brother affirms that he has no guns to seize (see Penal Law § 265.45 [1] [ii]). Put simply, nothing in the TERPO against respondent or an ERPO that might issue against him would legally prevent the brother from lawfully obtaining and keeping a gun, except in the case where surrender or seizure of such gun arose from the issuance of the TERPO or ERPO. A search, on the other hand, is a concrete harm in the form of a government intrusion into one's home, regardless of whether there is anything to find within it. And, if the brother did possess guns in the home to be seized under an ERPO, standing to challenge whether an ERPO should issue would be conferred on him in his own capacity. (Petitioner's claim that an ERPO would not result in the seizure of a nonrespondent's guns is also untenable, insofar as the statutory scheme specifically contemplates such seizure [ see CPLR 6342 (8), 6343 (3) (d), (5) (b); 6344 (1), (2)].)
Turning to respondent's vagueness challenges, "[i]t is axiomatic that a proscriptive law must provide people with reasonable notice of the conduct it prohibits" (People v Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d 412, 418 [2003]). "An enactment of our Legislature is presumed to be valid and the heavy burden of demonstrating that a statute is unconstitutional rests with the one seeking to invalidate the statute" (People v Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 382 [1988]). A court addressing a claim that a proscriptive statute is void for vagueness must determine "whether the statute in question is sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute" and "whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for [application]" (People v Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d at 420 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). Since petitioner here challenges the constitutionality of the ERPO statutory scheme both as applied to him and as facially invalid, the court must first consider whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct at issue in the proceeding (see id. at 422). "If it is not and the statute provides [respondent] with adequate notice and [petitioner] with clear criteria, that is the end of the matter" (id.). Otherwise, the court must proceed to consider whether the infirmity that affects the statute's application to respondent renders it "impermissibly vague in all of its applications" by reference to the considerations of fair notice and clear standards for its application (id. at 421; see id. at 420).
Accordingly, the first question posed herein is whether the ERPO statutory scheme is sufficiently definite to have provided respondent with clear notice that his conduct would fall within the ambit thereof. The court begins with a recitation of the relevant statutory provisions. A respondent may be subjected to an ERPO when there is clear and convincing evidence, or a TERPO when there is probable cause to believe, that "respondent is likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to himself, herself or others, as defined in" Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) or (2) (CPLR 6342 [1], 6343 [2]). Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a), in turn, provides that
"'[l]ikelihood to result in serious harm'... shall mean:
"1. substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or
"2. a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm."
When determining "whether grounds for a" TERPO or ERPO exist, a court must consider a nonexhaustive list of statutory factors-or red flags-that is set forth in CPLR 6342 (2) and incorporated into CPLR 6343 (see CPLR 6343 [2]; Matter of Mallery v D.P., 78 Misc.3d 250, 252-253 [Sup Ct, Schoharie County 2022]). Such red flags
"includ[e], but [are] not limited to, the following acts of the respondent:
"(a) a threat or act of violence or use of physical force directed toward self, the petitioner, or another person;
"(b) a violation or alleged violation of an order of protection;
"(c) any pending charge or conviction for an offense involving the use of a weapon;
"(d) the reckless use, display or brandishing of a firearm, rifle or shotgun;
"(e) any history of a violation of an extreme risk protection order;
"(f) evidence of recent or ongoing abuse of controlled substances or alcohol; or
"(g) evidence of recent acquisition of a firearm, rifle, shotgun or other deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or any ammunition therefor" (CPLR 6342 [2]; see CPLR 6343 [2]).
Initially, to the extent that respondent argues that CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are impermissibly vague or otherwise unconstitutional because, by incorporating Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2), they require a court to assess whether a person has a mental illness without the requirement of a physician's determination or other expert proof upon which to base such a finding, the court is not convinced and respectfully declines to follow the holding of its sister tribunal in R.M. v C.M. (79 Misc.3d 250 [Sup Ct, Orange County 2023]). The legislature's use of the phrase "as defined in" and its specific references to subparagraphs (1) and (2) of Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a)-which are the only provisions in Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) in which any term or phrase is defined-is sufficiently clear to allow this court to conclude that the ERPO statutory scheme does not condition the issuance of a TERPO or ERPO upon a finding that a respondent suffers from a mental illness (see also Matter of Hines v Doe, 2023 NY Slip Op 23059, *3-5, 3 n 5 [Sup Ct, Albany County, March 1, 2023, Marcelle, J.]). In other words, it is sufficiently clear that the legislature meant to borrow only the definitions of "likelihood to result in serious harm" into the ERPO statutes and not incorporate the remaining text of Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) therein.
"'Mental illness' means an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation" (Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03 [20]).
This, however, is where the statutes' clarity ends. An evaluation of the language employed in CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2)-in particular, but not limited to, the statutes' attempt to define the phrase "likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to himself, herself or others" by reference to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2)-is incohesive to the point that its "vagueness [so] permeates [it that] 'no standard of conduct is specified at all'" (Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d at 421, quoting Coates v City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 [1971]). The court therefore finds that respondent could not have had adequate notice of the statutes' reach; concomitantly, petitioner had, and this court has, no clear standard for the application of the statute; and this infirmity penetrates to the core of CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2), rendering them invalid in every application. In conducting this analysis and reaching these conclusions, the court is mindful of its obligation to avoid unconstitutional constructions of the statutes if at all possible, and of the countervailing consideration that it is not within a court's power to assume the legislature's prerogative and rewrite a statute to correct a defect therein (see People v Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129, 153-154 [2007]; LaValle v Hayden, 98 N.Y.2d 155, 161 [2002]). The court also remains cognizant of the precepts of statutory construction that compel it to read the challenged provisions in such a way as to avoid rendering its text as superfluous, meaningless or absurd (see Matter of Rizzo v DiNapoli, 39 N.Y.3d 991, 1001-1002 [2022]; Matter of Anonymous v Molik, 23 N.Y.3d 30, 37 [2018]).
To begin, the court is not convinced that "conduct that would result in serious harm to himself, herself or others" is a phrase sufficiently definite enough to provide clear and fair notice of the conduct that it covers or provide a clear standard for the application of CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2). Assessing a person's likelihood to engage in such conduct is, in turn, also problematic. It appears that the legislature shares this view, insofar as they saw it necessary to clarify the meaning of this standard, or some part of it, by importing Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) into the statutory text. This, however, only compounds the problem because, at bottom, CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) and Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) discuss two entirely different things. CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are concerned with the likelihood that conduct will occur, whereas Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) are concerned with the likelihood that serious harm will occur, so the latter does not and cannot logically inform the question of the likelihood that a respondent would engage in whatever conduct the ERPO scheme purports to proscribe.
To the extent that "likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to himself, herself or others" might be said to be sufficiently clear and definite standing alone, the attempt to particularize its meaning by resort to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2)-a qualifier that this court is powerless to ignore or write out of the statutes-muddies the phrase's meaning beyond salvation, for the reasons that follow (see Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d at 153-154).
Further compounding this vagueness is the provision that the conduct with which CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are concerned "would result in serious harm." This phrase signals a relative certainty that serious harm will result from the conduct, if the conduct were to occur (see Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, will [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/will] [last accessed Sept. 15, 2023]). Thus, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2)'s guidance regarding the likelihood that serious harm will occur has no logical application to the CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) standards, which present the "result [of] serious harm" as a certain consequence of the proscribed conduct.
Nor can Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) be logically read to define the conduct that CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are meant to address. As noted, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) do not define conduct. Rather, the conduct that they reference-"threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself" under subparagraph (1) and "homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm" under subparagraph (2)-is that by which the "substantial risk of physical harm" with which the definitions are concerned is manifested. Thus, the plain terms of Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) do not admit of a reading of CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) to the effect that "respondent is likely to engage in threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm, that would result in serious harm to himself, herself or others." Even if this standard could be considered other than nonsensical (and the court concludes the contrary), it would remain untenable because Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) simply do not provide for this. This finding is buttressed by the nature of the red flag factors, which the legislature binds the courts to consider, but the lion's share of which do not reflect, or necessarily reflect, homicidal or suicidal behavior at all.
Finally, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2), by their plain terms, do not define what "serious harm" is. All those provisions have to offer is that it is physical harm. Again, the references therein to suicidal and homicidal behavior do not refer to the sort of physical harm with which the provisions are concerned, but to the manifestation of a "substantial risk" that physical harm will result. It cannot be that all "physical harm" must be considered "serious harm," or that mere physical harm somehow becomes serious when there is a "substantial risk" of it, and we are left with no guidance as to what physical harm is to be considered serious.
So, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2) do not logically define any component of the phrase into which it was imported-not the conduct with which CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are concerned; not the likelihood that that conduct, whatever it is, will occur; not the likelihood that serious harm would result from a respondent engaging in that conduct; and not the meaning of the term "serious harm." The result is that these phrases, each vague unto themselves, receive no clarity from the legislature's reference to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) and (2), leaving the people of our state with a statutory morass that is largely devoid of meaning, and which could not have provided fair notice of its contours to respondent.
Put another way, since the ambit of CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) cannot be meaningfully discerned, it cannot be said that respondent's conduct plainly falls within it (see People v Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 308 [1987]). It does not suffice to say, as petitioner did in so many words at oral argument, that everyone knows what a red flag law is supposed to do or that one might reasonably believe that anyone would think that respondent's conduct would be covered by it, when, as here, we are faced with a statute so flawed in its draftsmanship that its language effectively proscribes nothing with any clarity (see Coates, 402 U.S. at 614; Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d at 421).
Such proposition is one about which reasonable minds could disagree (see Matter of Nigro v V.E., Sup Ct, Fulton County, May 18, 2023, Auffredou, J., index No. 2023-10524).
The court is mindful of the similarities between its analysis and that employed by Chief Judge Judith Kaye in her concurrence in Stuart, which, while an eminently more nuanced and compelling rationale than the somewhat more obtuse standard sanctioned by the Stuart majority, is not the controlling law in New York State. This court's rationale is, however, distinct from Chief Judge Kaye's in that it has first determined respondent's as-applied challenge, as required by Stuart; finding in the first instance that neither respondent, petitioner, nor this court may meaningfully glean notice of the decisional standard or the bounds of its application before proceeding to find that CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) would suffer this infirmity in all cases. The court nonetheless urges the high courts of our state to revisit the rule perpetuated in Stuart and reconsider the rule advanced by Chief Judge Kaye.
Having held that CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are unconstitutionally vague, it is unnecessary, and would be inappropriate, for the court to reach respondent's claim that CPLR article 63-A violates the U.S. Constitution, 2d Amendment (see Spector Motor Serv, Inc. v McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 [1944]). Arguments not specifically addressed have been examined and determined to be without merit or academic of light of the holdings herein. Based upon the foregoing it is hereby
Respondent has mounted challenges to these specific provisions, leaving much of the remainder of the article unchallenged, but baldly alleges that these provisions cannot be severed from the remainder of CPLR art 63-A. Notwithstanding that the efficacy of many of the procedures and remedies within CPLR article 63-A will be lost or diminished by striking the ERPO scheme's core provisions, the court sees no reason why the entire article must fall due to the infirmities that infect only some of its provisions, and respondent provides none.
ORDERED that respondent's motion is granted to the extent noted herein; and it is further
ORDERED that CPLR 6342 (1) and 6343 (2) are declared to be unconstitutionally vague and, as such, void and unenforceable; and it is further
ORDERED that the currently effective TERPO, issued herein on July 10, 2023, is vacated; and it is further
ORDERED that the petition is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that good cause exists to seal the record of this proceeding pursuant to Uniform Rules for the Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 216.1 (a), on the court's own initiative, to avoid the potential stigmatization of the minor respondent and in keeping with the principles underlying CPL 160.50; such interests having been found to outweigh the public interest in accessing the record.
The within constitutes the decision and order of this court.