Summary
finding that, in a factually similar matter, Plaintiff's motion for default judgment filed within fifteen days of an untimely response was sufficient to reject Defendant's untimely Answer
Summary of this case from Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Elena Gomez, Aca PT & Rehab, P.C.Opinion
01-03-2017
Law Office of Gregory A. Goodman, P.C., Hauppauge (Gregory A. Goodman of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Daniel J. Tucker, Brooklyn (Joshua M. Goldberg of counsel), for respondent.
Law Office of Gregory A. Goodman, P.C., Hauppauge (Gregory A. Goodman of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Daniel J. Tucker, Brooklyn (Joshua M. Goldberg of counsel), for respondent.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., SWEENY, RICHTER, MANZANET–DANIELS, KAPNICK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur F. Engoron, J.), entered July 11, 2016, which granted plaintiff's motion for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 declaring that it owes no duty to pay any pending or future no-fault claims arising out of a September 24, 2014 motor vehicle accident, and denied the cross motion of defendant Innovative Medical Heights, P.C. (Innovative Medical) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it and for attorneys' fees, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff's motion for a default judgment. The record demonstrates that plaintiff submitted proof that it served Innovative Medical with the summons and complaint, Innovative Medical does not deny that it was received, and Innovative Medical failed to set forth a reasonable excuse as to why it failed to timely answer the complaint (see CPLR 3215[a], [f] ). Innovative Medical's claim that plaintiff accepted its untimely answer by failing to reject it fails, because plaintiff moved for the default judgment within 13 days of its receipt (see e.g. Katz v. Perl, 22 A.D.3d 806, 807, 803 N.Y.S.2d 696 [2d Dept.2005] ).
Furthermore, Innovative Medical's cross motion was properly denied. Since Innovative Medical never properly filed an answer, it may not ask the court to reach the merits of the action because CPLR 3212(a) expressly provides that a motion for summary judgment may only be made after joinder of issue (see Afco Credit Corp. v. Mohr, 156 A.D.2d 287, 548 N.Y.S.2d 672 [1st Dept.1989] ).