Opinion
9:22-CV-1259 (TJM/ML)
10-17-2023
WILFREDO ALFARO ACOSTA, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
WILFREDO ALFARO ACOSTA Plaintiff, Pro Se Devens Federal Medical Center Inmate Mail/Parcels. CARLA B. FREEDMAN KAREN LESPERANCE, ESQ. N.D.N.Y. United States Attorney Assistant United States Attorney Counsel for Defendant.
WILFREDO ALFARO ACOSTA Plaintiff, Pro Se Devens Federal Medical Center Inmate Mail/Parcels.
CARLA B. FREEDMAN KAREN LESPERANCE, ESQ. N.D.N.Y. United States Attorney Assistant United States Attorney Counsel for Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge.
Currently before the Court, in this Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) action filed by Wilfredo Alfaro Acosta (“Plaintiff”) against the United States of America (“Defendant”), is Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). (Dkt. No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Defendant's motion be granted.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action by the filing of a Complaint, accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.)
On December 20, 2022, Senior United States District Judge Thomas J. McAvoy issued a Decision and Order that granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and ordered that Plaintiff's FTCA negligence claim against Defendant survived the Court's sua sponte review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, and required a response. (Dkt. No. 7.) Judge McAvoy's Decision and Order thoroughly outlined the allegations and claim set forth in the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 7 at 4-5.)
B. Parties' Briefing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
1. Defendant's Memorandum of Law
Generally, in support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act (“IACA”) is the exclusive remedy for federal inmates who suffer work-related injuries. (Dkt. No. 13, Attach. 1 at 5-6.) Defendant argues that when an inmate's injury is covered under IACA, the inmate is precluded from seeking compensation under the FTCA, and thus, the district court lacks jurisdiction over any action against Defendant seeking compensation for Plaintiff's work-related injury under the FTCA. (Id.)
2. Plaintiff's Opposition
Generally, in opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff argues that he sought redress via the IACA but that “[n]othing came of” his IACA claim. (Dkt. No. 17.) Plaintiff argues that the IACA is an unavailable remedy, equivalent to no remedy at all, and thus, the Court has jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to the FTCA. (Dkt. No. 17.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Wagner v. Hyra, 518 F.Supp.3d 613, 622 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (Hurd, J.) (quoting Forjone v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 414 F.Supp.3d 292, 298 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (Hurd, J.)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Forjone, 414 F.Supp.3d at 298 (cleaned up).
“The Second Circuit has drawn a distinction between two types of Rule 12(b)(1) motions: (i) facial motions and (ii) fact-based motions.” Nicholas v. Trump, 433 F.Supp.3d 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction may be either facial or factbased.”). “A facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion is one based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it.” Nicholas, 433 F.Supp.3d at 586 (cleaned up). “A plaintiff opposing such a motion bears no evidentiary burden.” Id. “Instead, to resolve a facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a district court must determine whether the complaint and its exhibits allege facts that establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. “And to make that determination, a court must accept the complaint's allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.
“Alternatively, a defendant is permitted to make a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion, proffering evidence beyond the complaint and its exhibits.” Nicholas, 433 F.Supp.3d at 586 (quoting Carter, 822 F.3d at 57). “In opposition to such a motion, a plaintiff must come forward with evidence of their own to controvert that presented by the defendant, or may instead rely on the allegations in their pleading if the evidence proffered by the defendant is immaterial because it does not contradict plausible allegations that are themselves sufficient to show standing.” Id. (cleaned up). “If a defendant supports his fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion with material and controverted extrinsic evidence, a district court will need to make findings of fact in aid of its decision as to the subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
After carefully considering the matter, I recommend that Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted for the reasons set forth in its memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 13, Attach. 1.) The following is intended to supplement, not supplant, those reasons.
The IACA provides “compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined.” 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4). The IACA is the exclusive remedy for federal inmates who suffer work-related injuries. Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 301.319 (citing U.S. v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966)) (“Inmates who are subject to the provisions of these Inmate Accident Compensation regulations are barred from recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act.”). In Demko, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the theory that a prisoner covered by the IACA may also bring suit under the FTCA, reasoning that “there is no indication of any congressional purpose to make the compensation statute in 18 U.S.C. § 4126 non-exclusive.” 385 U.S. at 152. In addition to the workplace injury itself, courts in the Second Circuit have found that the IACA serves as the exclusive remedy when an inmate's “work-related injury is further aggravated by negligence or medical malpractice on the part of prison medical personnel.” Giraldo v. United States, 14-CV-5568, 2015 WL 4078751, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (quoting Barrett v. Goldstein, 07-CV-2483, 2009 WL 1873647, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009)).
Plaintiff's claim falls squarely within the scope of the IACA. When Plaintiff allegedly fell, he was engaged in a work activity in connection with the food service operation at Federal Correctional Institution Raybrook. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 7.) “Because [this is] admittedly [a] work-related injur[y], and because the IACA provides the exclusive remedy for [this] claim[], including any aggravation of th[is] injur[y] resulting from medical malpractice by prison officials, [Plaintiff] is barred from recovery under the FTCA.” Treasure v. United States, 17-CV-0971, 2019 WL 1243877, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's FTCA negligence claim be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED in its entirety, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 13) be GRANTED ; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Report-Recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).